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THE PCF AND THE QUESTION OF "INTELLECTUAL WORKERS": THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL IDEOLOGY

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Doctor of Philosophy

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OCTOBER 1986

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THESIS SUMMARY

The University of Aston in Birmingham

The PCF and the question of "intellectual workers": the crisis of social ideology.

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1986

The aim of this thesis is to examine the approach of the Parti Communiste Français (from 1956 to 1982) to the emergence of new strata of salaried "intellectual workers" (technicians, engineers, low to middle managers in industry and commerce, scientific researchers, teachers etc) paralleled by the gradual diminution of the traditional industrial working class which forms the core of the Party's support base. This examination is carried out in the context of the debate in France (initiated in the 1950s by social theorists of the Left) on the class membership and role of these strata. The reason for the emergence of such a debate is that in a society given to both a rapid evolution of its social structure and an increased polarisation between Left and Right, a precise knowledge of the objective and subjective determinations of new strata would enable parties of the Left to make proper distinctions between potential allies and adversaries. The thesis posits the view that the PCF has failed to make correct distinctions between its potential allies and adversaries and has thus pursued unsuccessful alliance strategies. The thesis contributes towards a scientifically-based understanding of one of the reasons governing the PCF's steady decline since the 1950s.

Key words: Parti Communiste Français (PCF) intellectual workers alliance strategy
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INTRODUCTION
The Parti Communiste Français (PCF) has, since the time of its birth, commanded considerable attention from political theorists and historians alike. Born of conflict and controversy at the Socialist Congress of Tours in 1920 (as the Section Française de l'Internationale Communiste - SFIC) it renounced all organic links with French socialism and from that moment became an integral part of the international communist movement, entertaining strong ties with the USSR.

This dual and conflictual heritage lends to the PCF its uniqueness amongst French political parties, making it fully deserving of the oft quoted epithet "un parti pas comme les autres". The PCF's roots in French socialism and its connections with the Communist International have always allowed it to present itself (although not without difficulty) as the continuator of the democratic French traditions of the 1789 Revolution and the Commune as well as of the revolutionary socialist traditions of Bolshevism. Moreover since 1920 the PCF has lived through and contributed, in one way or another, to all the major dramas or events of French political life and of international communism, at times gaining success from its contributions, at other times not. In this way it has been able to claim for itself a special place in French and European history.

However, turning to the PCF today, one tends to associate it with the terms "crisis", "isolation", "decline", a party stripped of its former prestige and influence. In November of 1946 the Party had earned for itself the privileged position of "premier parti de la France". By the mid-'eighties the PCF's influence
(measured primarily in terms of election results) has decreased to such a level that now it is forced to share fourth position with the Front National after the Socialists, Gaullists and the Liberal Right respectively. The erosion of the PCF's electoral support commenced during the late 'fifties but has been precipitated acutely from the mid-'seventies onwards. Also to be noted is the fact that the Party's membership figures have registered overall a sharp fall since the 'fifties and now remain stagnant despite the easing of entry restrictions in 1976. In the light of such evidence one poses the obvious question: what are the reasons governing the Party's decline?

Two common or popular lines of reasoning may be put forward in order to answer the question. Firstly, the decline of the PCF's influence may be attributed to the absence of a critical analysis on the part of the Party of all aspects of Soviet society. The absence of such an analysis, it could be said, has led the PCF to align itself, most of the time unconditionally, with the USSR while forsaking its commitment to French national politics. As a result, French voters have not voted for the PCF for they fear the intervention of Moscow in any government of the Left balanced in favour of the Communists. However such reasoning would not explain fully why the Party's political influence and popularity has followed overall, an upward trend during the first 35 years of its history when its links with the USSR (first through the Communist International and later through the Kominform) were of a more concrete nature.

The second reason for the PCF's decline, it may be argued,
has to do with the "closed" and "undemocratic" nature of its internal structure and organisation where power is concentrated at the top and decisions or initiatives are imposed upon the rest of the Party. This kind of structure and organisation may be regarded by voters as indicative of the way in which France would be run by a PCF dominated government and hence stops them from supporting the Party. But, again this argument does not present the full picture if one takes into account that the issue of the PCF's internal structure and organisation has not prevented it from making electoral advances in the past. As these first two reasons explain insufficiently the loss of the PCF's fortunes in the more recent period, one is obliged to search out another or others. I choose to advance the following as the third and major reason for the PCF's decline over the latter half of this century.

The PCF's decline may be taken as due to the lack of serious critical analyses, on its part, of the sociological transformation of French society characterised mainly by the rapid increase in the numbers of salaried "intellectual workers" (engineers, technicians, low to middle managers and supervisory workers, academics, teachers, scientific researchers) and the shrinking of traditional proletarian strata, the core of the Party's support base, over the last 40 years. In this case the absence or insufficiency of such critical analyses has prevented the PCF from formulating a sound ideological, and hence political response designed to gain support from the burgeoning non-working class strata. However, in order to present the argument as a credible alternative to the first two outlined above, that which
must be examined and which in fact constitutes the main purpose of this thesis is:-

- the approach of the PCF in its theory and practice to the emergence of intellectual workers and the way in which the Party has tried to engage them with the working class in the struggle for change - chapters VII, VIII, IX.

The problem of engaging non-working class strata in the struggle for socialism has been faced by the PCF and indeed other parties of the Left prior to the 1950's. Throughout their histories parties of the Left have encountered problems in characterising the precise nature of the social structures within which they have operated, particularly in relation to Marx's dichotomous model of class. Marx himself never set forth a total theory of class and in fact although he referred, in his theory, to two major conflicting classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, a study of his writings (covering the period 1843 to 1883) reveals that he became increasingly aware of the finer complexities of real societies and of the difficulty of drawing boundaries between "middle classes" and the bourgeoisie on one side and between "middle classes" and the proletariat on the other. He was especially conscious of the fact that as capitalism evolved the class boundaries between certain strata of the middle classes and the proletariat became blurred. Thus it was in *Capital* ( volume I) that Marx drew a strong comparison between the real life class situation of a salaried school teacher and a typical proletarian - the factory worker. Marx left the question of what the social reality of the working class
was to those who were to follow him. To this question the parties of the Left claiming to represent the working class in its struggle for change, have provided varying responses. However, the problems do not cease once this question has been answered - if anything they are enhanced as working class parties then have to ask themselves that if the working class is the only agency for change through its direct struggle against capitalism, what approach must be adopted towards those middle classes or middle class strata who do not stand in direct opposition to the working class? In other words can these other classes be engaged in the struggle against capitalism and thus in the movement for change and if so how can this be done? The PCF has, in the course of its history, reacted to this question in a number of ways at different times depending upon domestic political circumstances and, until 1956, upon the lines taken by Russian Communist leaders.

Chapter III of this thesis considers in some detail shifts in the PCF's strategy towards the middle classes through an examination of the PCF's approach to intellectuals from 1920-1956. The chapter focuses upon the Party's approach to intellectuals for two reasons. Firstly, intellectuals in particular, as part of non-working class or middle class strata had a special role to play in the struggle for socialism. Secondly, a study of the PCF's approach to intellectuals during the period 1920 to 1956 constitutes an essential historical backdrop to the comprehension of its attitudes to intellectual workers later on.

For the greater part of the 'twenties the PCF adopted an
emphatically ouvriériste ideology of which the "class against class" strategy, for example, was a practical manifestation. Following such an ideological approach the Party rejected as "objective" class enemies all those who were not of the working class. The ouvriériste ideology was also coupled with attempts to develop a proletarian culture in opposition to bourgeois culture. If cross-class links were considered, then they were sought amongst those of the middle classes, mainly intellectuals, who were prepared to renounce their class origins and put themselves at the service of the working class.

During the 'thirties and 'forties up to the period marking the beginning of the Cold War the PCF favoured the strategy of alliance which brought under the leadership of the working class all categories of French men and women who held to their hearts the interests of the French nation. This strategy of broad alliance was most clearly articulated during the Popular Front and immediate post-war periods. During this epoch the PCF also decided to abandon the development of a proletarian culture. Culture was then considered national.

However at the outbreak of the Cold War the Party retreated to ideological positions reminiscent of those taken in the 'twenties. Broad alliances were no longer advocated and an extremely sectarian vision of culture – that of socialist realism – emerged. Once again those who entered into any kind of alliance with the working class were expected to defend, unconditionally, its ideological positions. This outlook was to endure until the mid-'fifties when the necessity to take into
account certain new factors in the domestic situation in France and within the international communist movement was to oblige the Party to reconsider its approach to non-working class strata.

From 1956 onwards the PCF came to realise that the need for a coherent approach to the question of cross-class alliances was urgent. Three factors contributed to this realisation. The first was that following the guidelines of the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communists in 1956, Western European communist parties were to pursue their own "peaceful roads" to socialism. Thus electoral politics were to serve as the principal vehicle by which communist parties could accede to power. In order to build substantial electoral majorities they had to be able to win allies among non-working class strata. The second factor was the increased polarisation in French political life between forces of the Left and Right especially after the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. In the face of such polarisation the political need for cross-class alliances became obvious. Thirdly, the nature of Western capitalist society was changing with the rapid expansion of a new significant social force of workers: intellectual workers. A definition of the term "intellectual workers", background to the emergence of this group and a "portrait" of its reality in France today are offered in chapters I, II and IV respectively. Given that French political life was becoming increasingly polarised, then the political allegiance of intellectual workers could well have had a determining effect upon the future of French society. For parties of the Left whose aim was ostensibly to change capitalist society, the question of the political allegiance of intellectual
credibility to the arguments of "new class" theorists such as Mallet and Touraine, the PCF set out to formulate a serious ideological approach and political strategy to the question of intellectual workers. It also increased practical efforts to bring together manual and intellectual workers in common manifestations and activities within the areas of politics and the economy. For the major part of the 'seventies the working class-intellectual alliance, coupled with the Party's political alliance with the Socialists, became the main axis of the PCF's strategy for change towards "democracy and socialism". The relative success of the Party's approach was reflected in the increased heterogeneousness of its membership and electorate during this period.

However, in the long term it had become only too clear that in election after election the Socialists had made spectacular progress in winning the support of intellectual workers. The Socialist Party (PS) had in fact unseated the PCF from its prized position of "premier parti de la France". The PCF's response to this situation, in the run up to the 1978 legislative elections was not only to forsake its political alliance with the PS in the hope of halting the latter's success, but also to adopt extreme ouvrieriste positions, abdicating from its strategy of cross-class alliances and placing all its efforts in extending its appeal within the working class. The Party's unofficial abdication from the strategy of alliance during its 1978 electoral campaign was followed four years later by an official renunciation of this strategy. In the 'eighties, the PCF is more
than ever reaffirming the role of the working class as the only leading force in the struggle for social change. French society has changed, the PCF's ideology remains unchanged. Can the PCF's failure to find an effective political response to the sociological mutations of French society be attributed to a crisis of ideology?

The study of the PCF's approach to the question of intellectual workers, as far as its official position was concerned, was carried out without major difficulties, as a fairly vast literature has been produced by the Party in recent years which deals with the emergence and development of intellectual workers as a significant social force. Thus, the most logical method was to review systematically all PCF texts which touched either directly or indirectly upon the subject and which were readily available for use by researchers. One assumes that PCF sources in general remain underexploited as the Party produces an enormous number of documents and texts, apart from its regular publications, of which there exists no systematic index.

Firstly, it is important to study official records of PCF congresses and conferences as these present the principal elements of the Party's policies and thus reflect the "party line". However, other major regular publications provide more detailed insights into elements of theory from which policies may emerge and into the ideological positions of the Party at certain points in its history.

In this respect the following are of particular interest and importance to researchers:
- L'Humanité, the Party's daily which in the past was read by a large section of PCF members and supporters. The paper's circulation has suffered in recent years.

- France Nouvelle, whose publication stopped in 1979, was a cultural weekly which enjoyed a wide Communist readership. Its successor although not as successful is Révolution.

- Cahiers du Communisme, Economie et Politique, La Nouvelle Critique (publication ceased in 1979), La Pensée, Société Française (launched in 1981) and Cahiers d'Histoire de l'Institut Maurice Thorez are all theoretical publications aimed at Party cadres and intellectuals and, with the exception of Cahiers du Communisme, at academics and researchers outside the Party.

In general a researcher reviewing official PCF texts will gain extra insight into the PCF's approach to a question if he or she is able to "read between the lines" and this depends largely upon one's understanding of the PCF's discourse. Language as a rule is used as a conveyer of ideologies and as an instrument which indicates changes which have taken place in the material world. A study of the PCF's ideology and politics requires an awareness of the role of language as terminology is carefully selected and employed (especially in the case of congress reports). The following for example, should be taken into consideration:

- the status of the speaker or writer in the Party's hierarchy, for it indicates the importance accorded to the subject spoken or written about;
- the absence or reduction in frequency of words or slogans which may indicate that the Party has changed or is considering changing course in certain matters of ideology or policies;

- the use of euphemisms in order to sound less extreme (especially during periods of ouverture) as illustrated by the use of the terms démocratie or pluralisme to replace socialisme;

- the addition of extra words to qualify a term and thus introduce a change in policy or strategy, thus union à la base as opposed to union.

The use of such "devices" of language remain a permanent feature of the PCF's discourse.

Although one obtains, through a review of the above mentioned publications, a good picture of the PCF's overall approach to intellectual workers during the period under study, one can only gain a hint of the nature of internal debates and opinions which may have fashioned an approach or even opposed it. The principles of structure and organisation maintained by the Party prevent the publicising of internal discussions and views particularly if they are of a controversial or "dissident" nature. To gain some idea of internal debate and views, while using official texts, a researcher can make a study of discussion forums (tribunes de discussion) opened by L'Humanité and France Nouvelle prior to each Party congress and sometimes even major meetings (for example, the Conseil National of Bobigny in 1980). In studying discussion forums one must be aware that strict editorial control is exercised (especially in L'Humanité) and
that generally speaking only mildly critical views are accepted for publication. Even then these are quickly countered either through editorial comment or through the comments of other contributors. However, exceptions to this practice can occur and have sometimes occurred in the past (mainly in *France Nouvelle*).

In order to gain a more precise picture of the internal views and dissensions which may have contributed to or opposed the formulation of a particular approach or line one has to rely on "unofficial" PCF sources. Firstly, one may refer to "opposition" reviews. These are published by PCF members who wish to register their dissent. For the purpose of this thesis two such reviews were examined: *Que Faire* and *Rencontres Communistes Hebdo*. A second unofficial source which can be relied upon is constituted by the personal written testimonies or autobiographies of prominent Party members or ex-members. These can take the form of books or newspaper articles and are usually published by the "bourgeois" press and publishing houses. The sources that I have used are listed in the bibliography at the end.

In addition to the study of official or non-official Communist texts I conducted a number of interviews with prominent members and ex-members of the PCF. These interviews were helpful on two counts: they provided me with a greater understanding of the texts I had examined either by confirming my own interpretations of these texts or by providing alternatives; they conveyed to me the mood of the views and discussions taking place during the period under study, which had fashioned the PCF's
approach to intellectual workers.

Non-Communist and secondary sources were referred to, mainly to confirm my own interpretations and conclusions regarding the PCF's approach to intellectual workers, and to recognise the existence of other non-Communist viewpoints on this subject.

George Ross, in his book *Communists and Workers* makes some useful general comments on the PCF's attitude to intellectual workers and its failure to make great inroads into the vote of this section of the electorate. In a report entitled *Alliance Strategies* and The French Communist Party's Concept of "rapport de forces", Michel-André Gadbois examines the approach of the PCF to intellectual workers as well as other non-working class strata in the context of the Party's efforts to influence the rapports de forces in its favour. At a Conference on French political parties, held at Leeds University in January 1981, Jolyon Howorth presented a paper, outlining the approach of the PCF towards intellectual workers (up to 1980), with the aim of identifying problems and directions of research on this subject. Finally, in their works (discussed in chapter V), analysing the political implications of the emergence of new social strata, theorists of the Left such as Mallet, Touraine, Gorz and Poulantzas have, inevitably, all had cause to mention the PCF in relation to intellectual workers. However, no work other than this thesis devotes itself to a detailed examination of the PCF's approach to the emergence of intellectual workers, with a view to providing a scientifically-based understanding of one of the reasons governing the Party's decline since the 'fifties.
CHAPTER I

"INTELLECTUALS" AND "INTELLECTUAL WORKERS":

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND TERMINOLOGY
I. "Savants" and "intellectuals"

Although the substantive "intellectual" did not come into existence until 1898, the individual, "the man of letters" or the savant, has existed since the times of Greek and Roman antiquity. One comes across the names and works of such eminent philosophers as Plato and Aristotle and others: grammarians, historiographers and rhetors. These individuals were themselves part of an impenetrable aristocracy (Plato's "class of philosophers") whose study of the arts and sciences, removed from their ideas on political philosophy, was not geared directly to the purpose of serving and maintaining the power of social institutions: art and science were studied for their own sake. The use of savants or of the intelligentsia for the purpose of directly serving and of maintaining the power of social and political institutions became crucial with the spread of Christianity and the rise of the non-gentile state. The setting up of new universities and the demand for jurists, theologists, doctors etc., was only part of a vast edifice erected to serve Christian society. In Paris, in 1215, the Université de Paris was given official recognition; certain courses of study were approved and its members were instructed that their mission was to construct a comprehensive theory of the world whilst discarding any anti-Christian or non-Christian elements from the large amount of knowledge already gained by scholars in Europe. Universities all over Europe were to contribute to a common goal: the normalisation of Christian culture and of its organisations within the set hierarchy of medieval society. But every society
gives birth to its own non-conformists who criticise the existing social order and Christian society did not lack of such members. Major socio-cultural movements, such as the Renaissance and the Reformation, gave ample proof of their existence.

From this period onwards the numbers of the members of the learned professions increased rapidly, right through the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries. During the period of the Renaissance and of the Reformation the growth of existing and of new learned professions was greatly accelerated. For example, the invention of the printing press led to the creation of several new professions: publishing, editing, translating, librarianship and others. Unlike the learned individuals of Plato's time, the new breed of savants actually earned their living from their intellectual activity and at the same time contributed to the maintenance of the social and political order. Access to the printing press and to the printing professions, for example, became crucial to those already in power as well as to those challenging the political order and existing ideologies. This became particularly clear during the Eighteenth century when during the period 1723 and 1789, the titles of 30,000 works were printed. A large proportion of these works transmitted political ideologies of which the liberal ideology of Voltaire and the philosophes made great impact on large sections of the French population. The ideas of the philosophes relating to justice, freedom of expression, the rights of man etc., were to become slogans of the French Revolution and shape the Republican constitution upon which the political system of France would come to rest. The permeation of liberal ideologies in French society
had also led to the creation of the "salons", various "clubs" and "cafés" ("le despotisme éclairé") which began to admit persons of bourgeois origin. As a result a large number of these persons succeeded in attaining high intellectual status as doctors, lawyers, poets, painters etc.

The French Revolution of 1789, contrary to what one might have expected, brought a sudden halt, albeit a temporary one, to the flourishing intellectualism of previous decades. During, and for some time after this major social upheaval, savants were greatly mistrusted. They were often suspected of either being in sympathy with the aristocracy or of being more extreme than the revolutionaries and therefore of endangering the Republic and of leading it to the frontiers of "la barbarie". The period 1792 to 1794 saw the elimination of many savants and the dismantling of universities and académies. A member of the Convention is quoted as having said "Ce ne sont pas des savants qu'il nous faut, ce sont des hommes libres et dignes de l'être". The re-emergence of an intellectual current only took place under Napoleon and the Empire, with the establishment of a system of Éducation Nationale and the founding of institutions such as the Université Impériale in 1806 and the École Normale in 1810. However the intellectualism of this period was greatly restricted compared with that which existed prior to 1789. Members of the intelligentsia did not enjoy great autonomy and freedom of expression and creativity. They were civil servants and scientific and artistic creativity was governed by the law. For Lammenais (priest, publicist and ideologist of Christian
socialism) the French university, "fille de Buonaparte" and indeed the entire centralised system of education was no more than a "monstrueux édifice, de toutes les conceptions de Buonaparte, la plus effrayante pour l'homme qui réfléchit, la plus profondément anti-sociale". The attempts, by the makers of the first Empire, to totally integrate intellectual thought and creativity into a highly centralised and repressive state system were followed, as one might expect, by the turbulent and bloody events of that century. The rise and fall of the First and Second Empires, the restoration of the monarchy in between, all contributed to the intellectual dissensus and to the generation of the various "isms". The reaction against the repressive regimes led the way to a new romanticism, liberalism, socialism of thought which in fact carried on the tradition of the philosophes. This was to culminate, at the end of the century, in "l'Affaire Dreyfus".

During the political and economic restructuring of Nineteenth century France, new categories of savants (or of those who used their intellect to earn a living) had appeared: doctors, teachers, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers etc. Just as the Christian, aristocratic regimes of previous centuries had required an intelligentsia to create and maintain a belief, amongst the people, in the "raison d'être" of those societies, so also the new bourgeois regimes needed their scholars and learned men to justify the new liberal ideology of Republicanism, to destroy any positive images of aristocratic rule and to counteract Catholic dogma which supposed the Republic and its philosophy of positivism to be diabolical creations.
The bourgeois regime had to encourage the lay intelligentsia to take over any positions previously occupied by the Church. To maintain such a process it had to encourage education and learning. To this end, the university system founded under the First Empire was expanded. The student population had increased almost two and a half fold between 1890 (16,500 on roll) and 1910 $\frac{4}{4}$ (41,040 on roll) and the range of subjects and speciality disciplines offered at universities also increased considerably. However, the most essential feature in this vast and complex structure of learning was not which subject or speciality one studied, but that through that process of study one acquired a mode of reasoning in keeping with bourgeois philosophy. Subjects as diverse as Greek literature or mathematics had but one goal: to place within the student a certain image of Man and of morality in the social reality of bourgeois society and to inculcate a rigorous logic of thought. Thus the student of Latin, years after his or her graduation, may forget the conjugation of a verb but he or she possesses a culture which is essential to his or her success in bourgeois society and to his or her contribution in maintaining the stability of that society.

As we shall see, the appearance of new categories of savants alongside the emergence of the industrial proletariat will assume great importance in the debate, concerning the structure of present day French society, between sociologists of different persuasions.

In this brief outline of the existence of learned persons or savants throughout history, I have deliberately avoided using the
term "intellectual", as a noun, for fear of anachronising. The word "intellectual", as a substantive, in fact, only came into existence, in France, in the late Nineteenth century. Prior to this, it had existed in the French language as an adjective. (According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word, as a substantive, first made its appearance in the English language in 1652). A discussion of the use of this noun, far from being irrelevant, shows that language may act as a sensitive precision instrument; an indicator of the rapid changes that have taken place in social structure, along with the complexity of mental activity and its many diverse forms.

The noun "intellectual" first came into existence, in France, at the time of the Dreyfus Affair (but not because of it as has been noted: "le mot et la chose étaient dans l'air, en particulier dans le milieu socialiste") when a group of leading learned individuals (among them Emile Zola, Fernand Gregh, Anatole France, Gabriel Monod, Léon Blum, Marcel Proust and others) demanded an inquiry into the vagueness and anomalies surrounding the case against Dreyfus in 1894. Their demands for an enquiry were sent to L'Aurore and were published by this same newspaper on 14 January 1898 under the title, chosen by its editor, Clemenceau: "Manifeste des intellectuels." Thus the invention of the noun "intellectual" may be attributed to Clemenceau. The word used by Clemenceau, to designate the dreyfusards at once acquired an ambiguous sense. Who were the dreyfusards? They included persons of learning who for the most part were committed to social democracy and certain intellectual Socialists such as Jaurès and Blum. On the other side, against
Dreyfus were the anti-parliamentarians, anti-republicans, anti-semites, monarchists and a large number of "bourgeois" writers and journalists.

During the fierce debating provoked by the affair, Zola and the group of "intellectuals" were ridiculed and abused by the anti-dreyfusards. Of the latter Maurice Barrès and Brunetiè, demonstrated, in the most contemptuous manner, their anti-"intellectual" sentiments. Barrès's utter disdain was reflected in an article entitled "La protestation des intellectuels", which appeared in Le Journal of 1 February 1898. The "intellectuals" were referred to in the following terms:

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Although these "intellectuals" evoked intense hatred, against themselves, in the minds of different sections of the population, at the end of the day, they seemed to gain victory. When Félix Faure died in January 1899, he was replaced by Loubet. An attempted coup to overthrow Loubet led by Déroulède and other anti-republicans, had the effect of uniting all republicans, in the face of their adversaries, over most issues, including that
of the Dreyfus case. Dreyfus was pardoned by Loubet some time after the attempted coup d'état. The pardoning of Dreyfus, which in a way symbolised a victory for republicanism, went some way towards integrating the "intellectuals" into the higher echelons of bourgeois society: Zola's ashes were transferred to the Panthéon in 1908. (This was an honour reserved for those held in high esteem).

Thus in the wake of the Dreyfus affair, the word "intellectual" came to signify a person of high scholarly or scientific standing (e.g. distinguished writers, academics or artists) who presumed to represent the nation's conscience in various political matters; a person from the educated strata who had aspirations to political power either directly or indirectly by guiding the conscience and the decisions of society. At the same time, the word was often used in an ironical or disdainful sense, for the anti-"intellectual" sentiments of Barrès and other anti-dreyfusards had effectively permeated through large sections of society and would take a long time to be effaced. A. Cartault, writing for the Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine, noticed the ambivalent reactions aroused by the noun "intellectual":

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This ambivalent and even hostile attitude towards
intellectuals prevalent during and long after the Dreyfus affair was not the preserve of the Right alone. Some years later, in 1914, Edouard Berthe (a disciple of Proudhon) in his book Les méfaits des intellectuels, made the following charge: "Il n'y a pas de régimes plus corrompus que ceux où les intellectuels détiennent une place considérable." This brand of anti-intellectualism or ouvrierisme was later to be inherited by the PCF.

Since the last echoes of Barrès's violent diatribes were heard, the social situation and the role of intellectuals has evolved greatly so that it was difficult to satisfy oneself with a definition of the notion of intellectual during the late nineteenth century, today the task of doing so has become almost impossible (conceptions of the term vary not only from country to country and from person to person, but also from one period of history to another, within a country and within a particular school of thought). Perhaps one of the commonest errors lies in the fact that a great number of social theorists (Marxists and non-Marxists alike) have tried to define the concept of intellectual on a theoretical level and have then attempted to fit in their respective definitions to social reality. Consequently most definitions tend to be very narrow.

Certain theorists (Julien Benda, Paul Baran and others) have founded their definitions of the notion of "intellectual" upon the ideological orientation of such agents. These theorists have obviously placed an importance on the origin of the noun (in the Dreyfus Affair). They suppose, on the part of the intellectual, a
consciousness of his or her situation and role in society as critic and as objector against the injustices of the world. Paul Baran thus remarks:

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The idea of the intellectual as a social critic and as a person possessing a sense of "engagement" was very much accentuated during the pre-war years of the 'thirties and during the resistance period. Intellectual reviews with a radical or Left-wing orientation, such as *Esprit* (founded in 1932) and *Les Temps Modernes* (founded in 1945), contributed to the extension of this idea and encouraged the publication of "la littérature engagée". Sartre, the embodiment of the "intellectuel engagé", pushed further the idea that the intellectual and the radical were one and the same. This attitude was reinforced by Edgar Morin when he wrote: "l'écrivain qui écrit un roman est écrivain mais s'il parle de la torture en Algérie il est intellectuel."

Various right-wing opposition reviews were also launched at this time (e.g. *La Parisienne*, *Arts* etc.) and these took upon themselves the task of pushing to the fore the notion of the "intellectuel dégagé". Not only are these notions (of the intellectual as social critic and "engagé" and of the "intellectuel dégagé") extremely narrow and insufficient but they are in fact misleading and irrelevant for there exists no
intellectual (or non-intellectual) who does not entertain a certain position vis-à-vis the society of which he or she is a member; hence: "intellectuel et engagé forment un pléonasme; l'intellectuel dégagé est une illusion".

Other definitions have been arrived at from the perspective of "culture". Sociologists such as Mannheim, Geiger and S. M. Lipset have insisted on the centrality of culture in the notion of "intellectual":

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This definition which, in fact, draws upon criteria of a socio-professional nature as well as those of a cultural nature, is subject to criticism. It is important to point out that exercising an intellectual profession ought not to automatically qualify one as an intellectual for certainly there are members of the intellectual professions who might hardly ever consult intellectual journals and printed matter of that nature. Conversely there must also exist certain members of the non-intellectual professions who enjoy vast cultural knowledge but who are denied the appellation "intellectual". Where the question
of culture is concerned, one is left to determine one's own conception of a legitimate and universally acceptable culture, the practice of which would lead to the qualification of "intellectual". This seemingly impossible task obliges one to conclude that the definition of "intellectual" as outlined by Lipset and others remains superfluous to social reality and is, as such, unsatisfactory.

There is also a great temptation to define a concept or notion by its very opposite and several definitions are based on the use of the intellect as opposed to physical activity or upon the distinction between physical labour and intellectual labour. Consultation of the major dictionaries of the French language will reveal definitions founded on just such distinctions as have been mentioned above. The 1961 edition of Le Petit Larousse defines the noun intellectuel, as "personne qui s'occupe, par goût ou par profession, des choses de l'esprit", whereas the 1973 edition of Le Petit Robert defines an intellectual as a person:

"qui a un goût prononcé (ou excessif) pour les choses de l'intelligence, de l'esprit; chez qui prédomine la vie intellectuelle . . . dont la vie est consacrée aux activités intellectuelles."

Both definitions are inadequate, for who is to determine exactly what "un goût pour les choses de l'esprit" or what activités intellectuelles constitute? The term goût itself has diverse implications. Its very use in this context implies that a value judgement has been made. A person who has acquired such a goût, one may legitimately assume, is part of an elite of philosophers, of writers, of scientists etc; one may also assume that it is good taste rather than bad taste, and therefore
acceptable to most people, although that which is of good taste to one person may not be to another. According to such reasoning a person who reads *Le Monde* and listens to Chopin would be considered an intellectual whereas a person who reads a popular daily and listens to pop music would not be considered an intellectual.

Similarly, *activités intellectuelles* leaves one perplexed. *Activités intellectuelles* taken in a narrow traditional sense could include only creative writing, painting, composition and reproduction of music, appreciation of literature and poetry etc. This restricted conception of the term, again, excludes vast numbers of persons and thus implies that intellectuals (those who practise the above mentioned activities) form a small elite possessing a certain sensibility, a certain aesthetic quality and a common educational background. On the other hand, *activités intellectuelles*, in a broader sense, may be defined as professional activities which are only accessible to those possessing a university (or equivalent) degree or diploma. Teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, higher civil servants, army cadres and ecclesiasts etc. would then all merit the title of intellectual regardless of the fact that some persons within this group may not have cultivated "un goût pour les choses de l'esprit". This type of definition would obviously exclude some of the traditional intellectuals mentioned above and is therefore unsatisfactory.

Finally *activités intellectuelles*, in its most extensive sense could include all those activities where the use of the intellect, pen and paper (or their modern equivalents) play a
predominant part as opposed to the use of physical labour coupled with the use of tools. Here again the dichotomy between mental and physical labour remains a central element. Thus those agents, whose forms of work are located on the side of intellectual labour, would be considered as intellectuals. This extensive category would include all those working in accounting; banking; advertising; marketing; insurance, commercial and the service sectors (private or public) i.e. all civil servants, service workers of various types and office workers, including managers, secretaries, typists and clerical workers in general. This definition of intellectual, based on activités intellectuelles in the most extensive sense, would appear to be a convenient glory-hole for any type of "thinking person" and is in fact relied upon by many. Unfortunately it still does not resolve certain problems. In a complex industrialised society such as ours, how does one determine the frontiers between the intellectual and manual content of labour? Is a dentist an intellectual or not? Is the worker who oversees the efficient running of machinery (in an automated factory) an intellectual or not? These questions would receive varied answers depending upon the ideology of the respondent and as such remain universally unanswerable. The tenuity of the definition thus becomes evident.

II. Gramsci and "intellectuals"

Both traditional and modern Marxists have faced the dilemmas, in defining "intellectual", that have been discussed in the previous paragraphs and hence one finds that definitions of
"intellectual", within Marxist thought, fall into the following categories: that of intellectual as creator and diffuser of works and of ethical values; that of intellectual as critic of the social order; that of intellectual as part of a social category, encompassing non-manual workers.

One detects a constant hesitation on the part of Marxist thinkers as regards the choice between these definitions of "intellectual". Most often intellectuals become the focus of Marxist interest in terms of their social relations with the working class. This interest is all the more justified as, paradoxically, the history of Marxism is dominated by encounters between intellectuals of different social backgrounds and the working-class, with the former becoming eminent leaders of the latter (e.g. Marx, Engels, Lenin and others were all of intellectual, "bourgeois" background) and by the fact that, traditionally, working-class organisations have always paid great attention to the intellectual formation of their cadres and militants. The only Marxist who recognised these paradoxes, as an intellectual and as a leader of the working-class movement, and who thereby attempted to construct a notion of "intellectual" which was not based upon one single or absolute premise was Gramsci.

The narrowness of the type of definitions, previously discussed, was recognised by Gramsci who based his analyses on the historically determined division of labour and on the social role played by intellectuals in diverse social formations. One ought to take note that the content of this division cannot be
reduced to empirical criteria of the sort: "those who work with their hands" and "those who work with their brains". This division, as perceived by Gramsci, is more a function of the ideological and political relations which denote the positions occupied by these agents. Thus he wrote:

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Gramsci observed that all persons engage in and enjoy some form of intellectual activity and that therefore it was highly inappropriate to refer to non-intellectuals as these did not exist. The most important element to emerge from all of this is that, that which distinguishes an intellectual does not inhere in
that intellectual's character but in his or her function. Gramsci drew a distinction between those he called "traditional intellectuals" and those he called "organic intellectuals". This distinction may be understood as follows. Each new socio-economic structure emerges out of a previous one and newly emergent social groups find already in existence certain categories of intellectuals who mistakenly consider themselves as autonomous of social classes and who seem to represent a historical continuity despite socio-economic and political change. Such intellectuals are "traditional intellectuals" e.g. writers, artists, men of letters, philosophers, scholars, ecclesiastes etc. These are intellectuals who survive the dissolution of the mode of production out of which they were born. The example of ecclesiastes who became traditional intellectuals after having been organic intellectuals of the aristocracy, illustrates the content of the definition that Gramsci put forward. The self-conception of these intellectuals as independent of social classes (albeit historically moribund ones) is of course a delusion and involves the creation of an ideology (usually of an idealist bent) in order to conceal their real decline.

Those intellectuals who emerge with a new social class are "organic intellectuals". The extent to which an intellectual is organic, may be measured by the closeness of the links between the organisation he or she is part of, to the class represented by that organisation. Consequently, an industrial social scientist who devises methods to increase the productivity of
workers, through their subordination, may be considered an organic elaboration of the capitalist mode of production. The main function of the organic intellectual is to be an "expert in legitimation," that is to say, to render homogenous different isolated social groups and to articulate the collective consciousness of his or her class in the social, economic and political domains.

In Gramsci's definition of "intellectual", the most essential element, the intellectual function, is not purely and simply assimilable to any one profession or another. Instead it is performed within the vast complex of social relations and does not contain an intrinsic quality which then determines the existence of an intellectual group organically linked to a social stratum. In other words, this intellectual function can exist despite the fact that there may be no specialised agents to exercise it. Thus intellectuals cannot exist, sociologically, in their own right, but only as groups, through their attachment to social classes whose ambitions and struggles they, in turn, express. Gramsci also distinguished between groups of organic intellectuals. He suggested that there existed a hierarchy of organic intellectuals, but in fact, only distinguished two main levels (along Hegelian lines): that of civil society and that of the state. This distinction clearly separated those organic intellectuals who are directly linked to production, or who form part of the liberal professions, from those intellectuals who are directly linked to the dominant class; for example high civil servants, state officials and members of the ruling body of the country. The latter group of dominant intellectuals, or the
"intellectuels d'intellectuels", expresses the power of the dominant class and assures the welding of disparate social groups and relativises other intellectual groups and ideologies to form one national entity whose interests and ideology may be safeguarded on a universal level. Gramsci based this argument on the study of the medieval church which represented the archetype of an intellectual stratum or group, directly linked to a dominant class: in this instance the land-owning aristocracy. At the heart of the feudal system, the medieval church monopolised the intellectual function in its entirety. Not only did it prove to be an effective arbitrator of political power in a society often threatened by social and political upheaval, but it conserved, added to and censured all learning and knowledge from its most basic forms (the copying of manuscripts) to its most elevated forms (the control of all cultural and artistic life, the elaboration and practice of science and medicine, the organisation of the calendar, the safeguard of civil registers etc.).

Furthermore the church owned a vast amount of land and disposed of privileges in the same manner as the nobility. Its political power was represented in the Estates, as an order, which was distinct from, but not inferior to, that of the nobles. Gramsci's example of the medieval church, as the stratum of dominant organic intellectuals, demonstrates the extent of the closeness, or even fusion, that may exist between dominant organic intellectuals and the dominant class of which they were born. His analyses, therefore, not only allow an extension in the
concept of "intellectual" to agents whose social role, in the workings of class ideologies, had hitherto not been recognised (e.g. engineers and technicians whose case has been cited above), but also to political agents and ideological functionaries of the state. This extension of the concept was justified in his writings:

"This way of posing the problem has as a result a considerable extension of the concept of intellectual, but it is the only way which enables one to reach a concrete approximation of reality."16

However, it is clear that although the concept has been greatly extended, it does not and indeed cannot include every grouping of agents, which in contemporary society is located on the side of mental labour, for example, those who do not carry out the intellectual function, and for this reason some criticism has to be made. Gramsci does not provide us with any criteria whereby one may judge if a certain profession or agent merits the title "intellectual", but merely designates certain groups as fullfillers of the intellectual function in certain historical contexts and to this extent his reasoning remains abstract. The problem here is knowing how to determine whether certain groupings fulfil the intellectual function. All cases are not as clear cut as that of the engineer or of the technician. For example, do typists fulfil an intellectual function? If they do not, then they do not merit the title "intellectual" and yet they are regarded by some as part of the vast army of workers, the content of whose labour falls predominantly on the mental side of the division of labour.
However the Gramscian notion of "intellectual" does allow one to put aside quarrels of definition and to turn away from the "impasse" of both non-Marxist and traditional Marxist thinking, (Kautsky for example) based upon the nature of work and ideology and thus it provides a method which can be used to apprehend certain distinctive traits of groupings in their historical development.

One way in which the problem of defining the concept "intellectual" has been avoided is through the introduction of that of "intellectual worker" ("travailleurs intellectuels").

III. "Intellectual workers"

The term "intellectual worker" first came into current usage this century although it is difficult to determine the exact date of its appearance. One could say that, in France, it was probably first put into use with the formation of the Confédération des Travailleurs Intellectuels - CTI (itself a member of the Confédération Internationale des Travailleurs Intellectuels - CITT) in 1920, which grew out of the need of certain intellectuals to organise themselves during the economically unstable years following the First World War. The need to organise themselves was felt as a result of the negative effects of the war upon the lives of intellectuals who earned their living through selling the products of their labour. In the preceding pages I discussed the difficulties encountered in attempting to define "intellectual" and although one has yet to define the term in a way that is largely acceptable, such problems have not been manifest, to the same extent, where the
term *travailleur intellectuel* or intellectual worker is concerned. The reason for this stems from the fact that it has not been the subject of as close a definitional scrutiny as the term "intellectual" but also because the CITI was formed by certain categories of intellectual workers and as such presumed to represent these categories; the need to clearly define its members was thus immediately recognised. Therefore, whether rightly or wrongly, its definition of "intellectual worker" was firmly based upon the division of labour, reduced to the empirical criteria of "those who work with their brains" as opposed to "those who work with their hands". This is not to say that the CITI did not acknowledge the dilemma in making too simplistic a dichotomy between intellectual and manual labour.

Among those concerned, Justin Godart noted:

"La catégorie de travailleurs intellectuels est innombrable . . . Et il faut prendre garde, pour appeler une solution, d'envisager l'ampleur du problème. Entre le terrassier et l'écrivain, entre celui qui dépense sa force musculaire et celui qui dépense principalement sa force cérébrale, il y a une série de cas-limites." 17

In order to overcome the problem of defining wholly intellectual and wholly manual labour it was suggested that the distinction between the two ought to be made by determining whether physical or mental effort was the predominant factor:

"La distinction du travail en intellectuel et musculaire doit être entendue simplement en ceci que, parmi les divers genres de travaux, les uns font surtout appel à la force physique de l'homme, les autres à son effort intellectuel." 18

The above definition was based upon three main criteria: that of gain or income from the exercise of intellectual labour (the
intellectual worker could be salaried or self-employed); that of originality of labour ("initiative", "personnalité"); that of the habitual nature of labour. However, much controversy and criticism surrounded the adoption of such a definition and Louis Gallié, the General Secretary of the CITI, was charged with the task of defending this definition of "travailleurs intellectuels" before the Commission Internationale de Coopération Intellectuelle. One of the criticisms levelled at the CITI, by the latter, concerned the criterion of gain or income: the idea that only those who earned their livelihood from their mental labour should merit the title "travailleurs intellectuels" or intellectual worker was not acceptable. However it was pointed out that within the framework of economics and professional organisation, work was performed in order to satisfy the immediate necessities of life and therefore the intellectual worker needed protection as did any other manual worker. The amateur, on the other hand, chose freely to perform a certain activity without the constraining framework of economics and of professional organisation. Similarly students could not be considered as intellectual workers as they did not receive an income from their work. The CITI and the CTI considered these as "travailleurs intellectuels en formation" or as "pré-professionnels". The CITI was also criticised for having included certain groups of workers in the category of "intellectual workers" by force of custom rather than by rational observation of the nature of work, (e.g. the inclusion of typists in this category was one such contentious point) and for not making clear the divisions or links between the liberal professions, civil servants and employees (employés). Thus Albert
Thomas, in a report at the twelfth session of the Conférence du Travail, which took place in May 1929, remarked:

"... des définitions a priori du travailleur intellectuel, de l'employé et du fonctionnaire risquent fort de faire double emploi puisque les mêmes individus peuvent se trouver dans des catégories différentes suivant le pays."

This criticism is well-founded, especially where employés are concerned, for in a country such as Germany, the notion rests upon the (intellectual) nature of the work performed, whereas in France or in Britain, the term employé or employee generally refers to agents who are salaried. In the face of these criticisms and contradictions, the CITI acknowledged that intellectual workers, by no means, constituted a permanently set category. The organisation was thus content to let the matter rest on the following observation:

"pour le moment, le plus sûr critérium serait d'énumérer certaines professions qui peuvent être généralement considérées comme intellectuelles et de laisser à leurs membres eux-mêmes ou à ceux d'autres professions le soin de dire s'ils désirent être considérés comme des travailleurs intellectuels ou s'ils préfèrent adhérer à une autre catégorie qu'il faudrait encore définir."

Since the late 'twenties and early 'thirties during which time the CITI has faced various criticisms of the definition of "intellectual worker", it has made an important modification. It has, in fact, removed one of the main criteria of that definition, which had, at that time, caused a great deal of debate at the Commission Internationale de la Coopération Intellectuelle: i.e. the criterion of gain or income from the exercise of intellectual or mental labour. In 1952, the definition adopted by the congress of the CITI and which has,
since then, remained unchanged was as follows:

"Un travailleur intellectuel est celui dont l'activité exige un effort de l'esprit, avec ce qu'il comporte d'initiative et de personnalité prédominant habituellement sur l'effort physique." 23

This modification is very significant in that it removes the concept of travail and therefore of travailleur from the domain of purely economic and professional activity to a more general framework where travail may represent professional activity, whether mental or physical, carried out as a means of of earning a living, or it may represent a subsidiary or amateur activity, performed as a means of attaining self-fulfilment or satisfaction. Consequently the categories of travailleur intellectuel are greatly extended. This modification was presumably made, by the CITI in order to free itself of the responsibility of drawing boundaries between groups of workers. This is reflected by the varied membership of the CTI, which ranges from national trade and professional organisations such as main trade-union sections (including those of the CGC, CGT, CFDT, FO) to smaller regional amateur bodies (e.g. the Association des scientifiques, artistiques et collectionneurs amateurs d'Epinay).

However the removal of the criterion of gain or income from the exercise of intellectual labour, means that the CITI's concept of "intellectual worker" has in fact become more fluid and therefore subject to many of the difficulties encountered in defining the term "intellectual". One may, therefore, argue that the introduction of the notion "intellectual worker" has not really enabled one to avoid the definitional problems encountered in the first place vis-à-vis the notion "intellectual".
Any organisation which has, amongst its members, those whose work is of an intellectual nature encounters problems in defining these agents. The PCF has, since its formation, counted such agents amongst its members and supporters. The following section deals with the PCF's conception and use of the terms "intellectual" and "intellectual worker".

IV. The PCF, "intellectuals" and "intellectual workers"

The PCF has never clearly stated a definition of the term "intellectual": partly because it is problematic, as has already been discussed, to attempt to define a constantly evolving reality, and partly because orthodox Marxist-Leninist literature has devoted little space to the discussion of intellectuals and their role in society. Neither Marx nor Engels nor, later on, Lenin, contributed in any substantial way to the elaboration of a socialist thinking on intellectuals. One only comes across comments on the latter, in their works, in the context of the relevance of these agents to concrete historical situations. However it is interesting to note that the PCF has failed to make use of the only Marxist critique of intellectuals: that developed by Gramsci. The reason for this has to be traced back to the period of the Comintern and the Bolshevisation of the European communist parties. Gramsci's non-conformist position in the Comintern led him to be regarded, by the more "Stalinist" cadres of the Comintern (with members of the French Party featuring strongly amongst these), as a "deviationist". Although the PCF was later (principally during its Euro-Communist phase) to give
recognition to that part of Gramsci's thought which related to the fusion of workers and intellectuals into a type of collective organic intellectual, as represented by the worker's party, it remains generally critical of Gramsci and particularly of the theory of intellectuals. Thus Gramsci's theory of intellectuals has, in the past, been attributed by the PCF to the fact that there already existed, in Italy, a frame-work of a theory of elites based upon empirical sociology (e.g. that of Mosca and Pareto). Gramsci is accused of merely having set out to oppose the existing sociologically based theory by counterposing a politically based one, and of reacting to the strongly ouvriériste current, in the Italian Communist Party, by following an "intellectualist" line. In addition to this accusation, Gramsci's distinction between "organic" and "traditional" intellectuals is dismissed as outdated.

One could say that the PCF's conception of "intellectual" has operated on two planes: that of cultural and ideological production and that of social production, and, that the former features more predominantly in the Party's thought during the first thirty to forty years of its existence while the latter begins to intervene from the mid-'fifties onwards. During the early years, when the Party spoke of "intellectuals", like many others, it referred primarily to the producers and diffusers of ideas who also possessed some kind of political consciousness:

"De Droite ou de Gauche, le fait demeure, néanmoins que la conception de l'intellectuel légitimant son engagement politique par son savoir, a établi durablement son image et longtemps fonctionné . . . comme forme d'identification pour l'ensemble des intellectuels."28
Not only did these intellectuals (writers, philosophers, academics in diverse fields of study, artists, scientists etc.), referred to by the PCF, fall into the traditional intellectual professional categories but they were invariably persons whose intellectual contributions were well recognised in society:

"... on avait été longuement accoutumé, nous et d'autres je crois, à considérer, par exemple, dans les années vingt, que les intellectuels étaient essentiellement des créateurs, de grands chercheurs ou grands universitaires qui pourraient, certains d'entre eux, se rallier aux combats de la classe ouvrière."29

Thus the Party's interest in these agents stemmed from its vision of them as possible ralliés of the working-class, and indeed certain intellectuals had displayed their wish to act in such a capacity (e.g. Paul Langevin, Anatole France and others). Apart from the "star" intellectuals the PCF's notion of "intellectual" also included both salaried and self-employed professionals such as teachers, doctors, lawyers, magistrates, engineers, architects, journalists etc.

It was after the Second World War and especially in the 'fifties that the intervention of the second plane, within the Party's concept of "intellectual", began to take place. It began to move away from the idea of the traditional and "star" intellectuals for several reasons. Firstly, in practical terms, it was becoming more and more difficult to refer to the great intellectuals simply because fewer and fewer of these were willing to lend their support to the PCF. Secondly, and more importantly, the Party was forced to recognise the increasing numbers of intellectuals who were entering the sphere of social production as salaried workers, as a result of the scientific and
technological revolution within industry. The direct result of the sphere of production lending itself more to intellectual activity was that parallels could now be drawn between the deteriorating socio-economic conditions of both intellectuals' and workers' lives. The PCF, therefore, found itself no longer confronted just by well-known individuals or small groups of intellectuals, who may or may not rally to the working-class, but by masses of intellectuals with a changed role and status in society. It was compelled to rethink the notion of "intellectual" in sociological terms rather than purely in terms of individuals with particular ideological functions. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact period of the transition between one notion ("intellectual") and the other ("intellectual worker").

It was a gradual transition, the beginning of which seems to have been recognised officially for the first time, by the Party at the Fifteenth Congress of 1959. This is indicated by the fact that a section of the report of the activities of the Central Committee (delivered by Maurice Thorez), was devoted to the emergence of les nouvelles couches moyennes ("new middle strata") including new categories of intellectual workers. Hence, one comes across mention of ingénieurs, cadres et techniciens (henceforth referred to as ITC) who form the main core of the group of intellectual workers directly involved in the production process.

From this date onwards the PCF's recognition of the notion "intellectual worker" increases during the 'sixties and especially after the Central Committee meeting at Argenteuil in
1966 and the events of May in 1968, during which time intellectual workers and students (apprentice intellectual workers) led protests against the government, in questioning the organisation of production. This view is shared by many of the persons I interviewed and is taken further by some in the suggestion that this transition, from one notion to the other, came to a close with the notion of "travailleur intellectuel" being firmly established after the Twenty-Third Congress, at the Conseil National de Bobigny in February 1980:

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The PCF's terminology, in the designation of the categories of intellectuals, and more recently of intellectual workers, has remained constant: the term "intellectuel" has been employed generally since the early years. The reason as to why the Party has continued to use the term "intellectual" is that, in France, it is more commonly referred to than that of "intellectual worker". It is thus convenient, for the Party, to employ this term in its discourse. This is explained as follows:

"... la notion d'homme de "savoir"..."
However, while the term "intellectual" continues to be used generally in the PCF's political language, references to "intellectual workers" have increased during the 'seventies and 'eighties, in Party texts, specifically in relation to discussions on ITC and other salaried intellectual categories such as teachers, academics, industrial scientists, researchers.

The purpose of the examination of the uses of the notions and terms "intellectual", and "intellectual worker" by the PCF and others was three-fold. Firstly, it was carried out in order to recognise the diversity of definitions in existence and of the contradictions which are present therein. The fact that so many definitions do exist only demonstrates the difficulty in rendering an indisputable character to a constantly changing reality. Secondly, both terms and notions will be encountered as key elements in the chapters which follow and it is therefore important for the reader to gain a prior comprehension of their evolution and uses. Thirdly, this examination was undertaken in order to arrive at a "working definition" of the terms...
"intellectual" and "intellectual worker" which in turn determines the use of terminology for the purpose of this thesis.

The first point which has to be made is that my conception of the terms "intellectual" and "intellectual worker" is based firmly within a socio-economic framework whereby these terms are applicable only to those agents who perform work of a predominantly intellectual nature in order to earn a living. They, therefore, do not apply to those who perform intellectual work for reasons other than that of earning a living (for example as a leisure time activity). Nor do the terms imply a certain political commitment (engagement politique) on the part of those to whom they apply. Secondly, both terms apply to categories of persons who have obtained some form of higher education and whose work demands a certain amount of skill and initiative. Hence socio-economic categories covered by the terms "intellectual" and "intellectual worker" do not include routine white-collar work (for example, clerical staff) who nevertheless perform work of a predominantly intellectual type. These are referred to, in the context of French society, as employés.

The term "intellectual" is used in a general sense in the pages that follow. It lays greater accent on the "traditional" intellectual professions and includes the following: creators of works of art and literature (painters, writers, musicians etc), the scientific professions (biologists, chemists, physicists, etc.), the liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, etc.) and the teaching professions. The term covers people who may be self-employed or salaried.
The term "intellectual worker" is used in a more specific sense. It applies to agents whose professions have evolved qualitatively in line with the new industrial technologies of the post-war period or to agents whose professions are in rapid quantitative expansion. Also, it refers only to those who are part of the salariat. Thus the following are considered as intellectual workers: engineers, technicians, junior and middle managerial and supervisory staff (Ingénieurs, techniciens, cadres) in industry and commerce, researchers in the sciences and social sciences, teachers and academics. The final point to be made, regarding terminology, is that I have avoided using the term "intellectual" in parts of the thesis which relate to the post-'fifties context. An exception is made when referring to the PCF's own intellectuals.
CHAPTER II

THE EMERGENCE OF INTELLECTUALS AS A SIGNIFICANT FORCE OF WORKERS

IN TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALISM
As has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, the "intellectual" has existed since the times of Greek and Roman antiquity. However the composition, the size, the status and the influence of this group have been constantly evolving throughout history as has the basic organisation of society. In order to understand the emergence of one group or class and the decline of another in society, one has to look to the evolution of the organisation of production in that society. Thus one may explain the rise of merchants and urban wage earners and the corresponding decline of the nobility and of serfdom in Europe by relating these changes to the transformation of European society from one organised along feudal lines (characterised by artisanal and agricultural units and hand tools) to one organised along capitalist lines (characterised by industrial units and machine tools) for, at any period of time, the form of society is conditioned primarily by the technical level of production. The continuing and inevitable evolution of industrial production has, in its turn, led to changes within the social structure and social relations of capitalist society. The evolution of capitalist society is characterised by the constant renewal of fixed capital and by the reorganisation of production and labour (this, in search of higher profits). The following observation made by Marx is, in this respect, instructive:

"The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society."2

The emergence of new types of intellectuals or intellectual workers as a clearly defined group of workers and the decline of
"traditional" intellectuals in the Twentieth century industrial setting, is therefore inextricably linked to the changes in the organisation of production brought about by advances in science and technology.

It would be true to say that intellectuals in France had, up to the Nineteenth century, operated very much as individuals within their own spheres of influence, without seeking moral or practical support from their counterparts on a formal or organisational level. It was only in the Nineteenth century, with a steady growth in their numbers and the appearance of rapidly expanding numbers in some professions (jurists, teachers, notaries, pharmacists, engineers etc.) that a movement towards associations of intellectuals began to take place in France, along the lines of craft guilds of previous decades. These associations were set up as a result of the realisation, on the part of certain groups of intellectuals, of the financial benefits of such arrangements. Associations were only interested in gaining, for their members, advantages such as authors' rights to royalties or in setting up retirement pensions and did not progress beyond the corporation image. This, however, started to change as the Nineteenth century drew to a close and the deteriorating state of the French economy and at times political events such as the Dreyfus Affair led, on the one hand, to the appearance of new types of intellectuals, and on the other hand provoked existing intellectuals towards militancy and group action as their status in society became increasingly fragile.

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The end of the Nineteenth century and the beginning of the Twentieth heralded what is now recognised as a turning point in capitalist industrial production. This new era of industrial production was marked by the tendency towards the increased, direct application of science and technology to the sphere of production. Furthermore this tendency could only flourish within a frame-work of the concentration of capitalist production into larger and larger units. The effect of this tendency (it is the inevitable consequence of the need for capital to search out more profits in order to reproduce itself and survive) has been far-reaching upon the deployment of labour in industry and particularly upon the growth of intellectual strata and their massive entry into industry as salaried workers.

I. The application of science and technology to industry and the concentration of capitalist production.

The application of science to the industrial process goes back prior to the Industrial Revolution when, for example, it was applied to manufacturing as a means of solving unforeseen difficulties of production. However, by the end of the Nineteenth century, scientific techniques were developed as the basis for the formation of new industries, Science became a major agent for rendering possible technical developments. Its full integration into the production process of the capitalist economy did not take place until the Twentieth century with the appearance of the "applied sciences" whereby it began to fulfil clear utilitarian functions. At the same time research for research's sake became less and less viable.
The fact that scientific progress (since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution) has matched the development of the productive forces, is not accidental. One major point of correlation can be posited in the notion that the basic historical tendency of capital is to transform general labour (including scientific labour) into a more specific form of labour that is subjected to the requirements of capital. This notion is put forward by Marx as follows:

"In machinery, the appropriation of living labour by capital achieves a direct reality in this respect as well. It is, firstly, the analysis and application of mechanical and chemical laws, arising directly out of science, which enables the machine to perform the same labour as that previously performed by the worker. However, the development of machinery along this path occurs only when large industry has already reached a higher stage, and all sciences have been pressed into the service of capital: and when, secondly, the available machinery itself already provides great capabilities. Invention then becomes business, and the application of science to direct production becomes a prospect which determines and solicits it."6

This tendency of capital to control scientific labour is, as mentioned above, directly related to the need to extract maximum profits in the face of capitalist competition and resistance from workers in industry. Therefore radical cost-cutting techniques are developed during a period of depression to be generalised and applied widely as soon as possible (for example, conveyor belt technology was first introduced during the period 1910-1914 but was only generalised after 1918). Alternatively these techniques may originate during a period of expansion and are only applied generally during a subsequent period of depression (for example during the years 1945-68 only a few industries were introduced
to semi-automated or automated techniques while the
generalisation of these techniques started to take place in the
'seventies and 'eighties with the emergence of the
microprocessor). Here one can establish another point of
correlation between the development of the productive forces and
scientific progress. That is that each period of radical new
technology, in capitalism, has been symbolised by a specific type
of machine system which in turn has led to the formation of a
specific type of worker. Thus the period of capitalism symbolised
by the steam engine led to the formation of the skilled craft-
worker, whereas that period symbolised by the electric motor,
leading to mechanisation, saw the formation of the semi-skilled
or unskilled machine operator; and finally, that period
symbolised by automatic or semi-automatic machines has led to the
emergence of a highly skilled worker who is able to develop, use
and diffuse theoretical research for practical applications. This
new worker, typified by the qualified technician for example, may
be termed "intellectual worker".

Having indicated certain correlations between the
development of the productive forces and scientific progress, one
should not underestimate the speed factor of such developments
this century: the latter accounts for the unprecedented rapidity
in the expansion of the number of intellectual workers, and the
parallel decline or stagnation in numbers of semi and unskilled
workers in industrial production. The Twentieth century, more
than any other era of history, has experienced one of the most
dynamic movements in terms of scientific progress and has seen
the fullest integration yet of science into the sphere of

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production and economy. The rate of growth of scientific understanding has been perceived in the following terms:

"La connaissance scientifique double tous les dix ans... En quinze ans l'ensemble des résumés d'articles consacrées à la chimie a quadruplé; et les changements sont plus rapides encore en biologie. A l'heure actuelle, si vous parlez des savants, et entendez par là des personnes qui consacrent leur vie à l'obtention et à l'application des connaissances nouvelles, vous devez conclure que quatre-vingt-treize pourcent d'entre eux sont en vie."

The invasion by science of every sphere of life (economic, political and socio-cultural) has led to the knowledge of thousands of intellectual workers being integrated into enormous material resources of the production process and extensive information services.

The advances in technology which contributed to the diminution in numbers of semi and unskilled workers of the Twentieth century were no less responsible for the decline of the "independent" intellectual professions (artists, actors, writers, musicians, journalists etc.) in the cultural and the commercial sphere. In general, the growth of technology, in the Twentieth century, has meant that wherever the traditional "independent" intellectual can be replaced by the new type of intellectual, who is better trained to master new techniques, he or she is certainly forced to abandon his or her traditional role in order to learn new techniques and thus become part of the vast army of salaried workers. For example, new technology leading to the mass production of leisure goods (the boom in sound and vision systems) which were and still are becoming more accessible to the average person also contributed to the move away from the
traditional forms of (literary, theatrical and musical etc.)
entertainment. Many intellectuals found it increasingly
difficult to practise their professions independently due to the
decline of literary readership, theatre and concert-going
audiences. Meanwhile the numbers of salaried technicians,
engineers, cadres, writers, researchers, journalists, commercial
artists and musicians, dealing with the highly "technologicalised"
reproduction of audio-visual material and information for large
broadcasting companies and other commercial enterprises,
increased.

The advances in technology which have led to the emergence
of new strata of intellectual workers in industry and commerce
and which continue to demand further the skills of these workers
also means that a parallel and spectacular rise has taken place
in the numbers of the teaching professions. Teaching, which has
always been less individual in France than in many other European
countries has in the Twentieth century become a mass industry.
Consequently, teachers and academics form a sizeable section of
new strata of intellectual workers. The emergence and growth of
diverse strata of intellectual workers may be linked either
directly or indirectly to the changes which have occurred in the
capitalist production process through the application of new
technologies.

It has already been mentioned that technological advance in
modern capitalist industry flourishes only within the frame-work
of a concentrated production process in which two or more
enterprises merge to eventually form monopolies. The development
of monopolies or cartels began at the end of the Nineteenth
century, following the short economic boom of 1889 to 1890, and
continued with greater rapidity after the crises, in European
mining and iron industries, of 1900 to 1903 when the
competition for markets, between individual enterprises, proved
to be financially disastrous for the latter. Thus, large
enterprises saw greater advantage in merging rather than in the
engagement of "free" competition.

Concentration of production took place in different forms:
enterprises producing identical products merged in order to cut
out competition; companies merged to group different branches of
industry in a single enterprise, thus representing the
consecutive stages in the processing of raw materials (this was
particularly true in the case of the French steel industry where
the smelting of iron ore into pig iron and the conversion of pig
iron into steel and then the manufacture of steel goods were
carried out under one group of companies); companies merged if
they produced goods which were auxiliary to each other, (for
example the utilisation of scrap or of by-products). These
combined enterprises could then agree upon prices and quantities
of goods produced, sections of the market that each would be
entitled to and profit sharing, thus shielding themselves from
bitter and damaging competitive struggles in periods of
depression and assuring themselves of a stable if not higher rate
of profit. Profits ensured in this manner could then be used to
harness new technologies which would further cut the costs of
production (mainly with the substitution of human labour by
machines) and lead to the securing of "super profits". For
example, the capital outlay required for the use of mass production technology industry could only be afforded by monopolies or combined enterprises which, while altogether representing only a small proportion of the total number of enterprises in existence, make up the major part of total investments in new technologies.

The tendency towards the concentration of production, which initially had the effect of devalourising the labour of the craft worker and of bringing together and organising manual labour, began to reach the domain of intellectual production after the First World War. The necessity, after the war, to reorganise production in order to conquer new markets and gain maximum profits meant that the value of intellectual labour as that of manual workers was depreciating. The market value of intellectual labour, like that of any commercial object, was subjected to the play of market forces. After 1918, intellectuals were particularly hard hit as the result of the concentration of capital in the sphere of cultural (including scientific) production.

Many intellectuals within the domain of culture, unable to earn a living independently, joined the ranks of the salaried workers employed by large, combined enterprises. Similarly, many small, independent science and research laboratories, which during the war had been closed down or had been turned over to war uses, never reopened but were taken over either by government agencies for the purposes of large scale military research or by the research departments of monopoly firms for the purposes of industrial research.
The process of concentration within research and scientific production and its organisation along industrial lines meant that research, which had in the first place appeared as a by-product of teaching, was beginning to dominate the latter and teaching itself became limited as an introduction to research. In addition to this, the control of the research, carried out by students within universities, lay outside of these institutions, in the hands of industry or of government. Consequently, many doctors, scientists, inventors and "technologists" alike ceased to be professionals in the old sense, exercising their skills for fees; instead they became salaried workers or executives in the service of big companies or government departments. This process of concentration has persisted throughout the course of this century and has continued to transform, with even greater speed after the Second World War, the status of the intellectual from that of an independent producer of artistic culture and scientific knowledge to that of a salaried worker.

The concentration of capital and the application of scientific techniques to the industrial sphere went some way to contribute towards the growing awareness amongst intellectuals of their own existence as a group. Traditional, independent intellectual professions realised the need to organise themselves in defence of their withering privileges and consequently the old forms of associations, mentioned previously, were abandoned in favour of organisations based on trade-unions (especially since the right to unionise had been granted to the liberal professions in 1920), following the example of manual workers. However,
although these intellectuals were beginning to view themselves more in terms of a group of organised working people, they nevertheless operated very much within the sphere of their respective professions, so that mutual solidarity, common between groups of manual workers, was lacking. This was due to the fact that whereas manual workers generally accomplished a given work task together, within a production unit, the work of intellectuals was, in comparison, marked by a certain amount of individuality. In this sense the spirit of competition often prevailed over that of solidarity.

New intellectual workers, whose labour was and still is increasingly absorbed into the system of production, have, from the beginning, experienced an awareness of their group status and have therefore been unionised at a rapid rate. It is important to note that the new intellectuals or intellectual workers have been more dynamic in the movement towards the establishment of group specificity than the traditional intellectuals.

The question of unionisation among intellectuals and intellectual workers has been mentioned at this juncture, merely to demonstrate the fact that these social groups were, for the first time, attempting to project themselves as a definite (although not homogeneous) group of working people with a specificity of their own in society.

II. The evolution of modern industrial production

The previous paragraphs provide a general background to the emergence of new intellectual strata in French society and to the parallel decline of traditional intellectual strata.
following section is devoted to a narrower examination of the
development of intellectuals as workers and of the inevitable
reduction in numbers of unskilled manual workers. These two
movements, opposed to one another and which ought not to be
isolated from each other, are outlined within the specific
framework of the evolution of industrial production.

Modern industrial production began in Western Europe during
the Eighteenth Century. The principal features separating this
type of production from all previous forms were: the use of
machines; the multiplicity and combination of mechanical
operations (which could not be executed by a single person)
required in the creation of one product. In other words, simple
labour which was produced by an individual with the use of a hand
tool, was replaced by more complex forms of labour accomplished
with the use of machines.

Western industrial sociology generally accepts the division
of the period of modern industrial production into three main
stages: that of the manufactory or of the skilled craft worker;
that of the mechanical factory or of the semi-skilled worker;
that of automation or of the highly skilled technician or
intellectual worker.

The first stage of industrial production was characterised
by small family or group enterprise, geographically constrained
by the proximity of raw material sources or markets and which
incorporated an entire production process although production was
diversified among various workshops within the enterprise.

During this stage, economic conditions were such that it was
difficult to predict market demand for products. Skilled workers
were, therefore, not constrained by market forces; that is to say, they were not compelled to maintain a certain level of productivity which would require a strict supervision of work tasks and a rigorous adherence to a certain division of labour. Consequently skilled workers, although no longer owners of their means of production retained a degree of autonomy on the level of work origin and decision-making and thus, like the artisans of old, guarded their occupational skill or métier which they could transport with them wherever work could be obtained. This stage of industrial production only persisted as long as such economic conditions allowed. Its predominance came to an end when the effect of market forces on production became marked. Thus the onset of the second stage, that of the mechanised factory, was linked with the capacity to foresee and to organise work as a result of being able to predict the demand for a certain product, as a result of the enlargement of the market and the accelerated development of capitalist concentration.

The stage of mechanisation and of mass production eventually brought with it the elimination of the skilled worker of the manufactory and a rapid increase in numbers of semi-skilled workers who were subjected to a highly centralised system of scientific management where decisions regarding the production process were concentrated in the hands of a central authority. Workers no longer represented potential professionals able to carry out various tasks but persons assigned to particular work posts, isolated from each other but integrated into a whole system of stages through which a product must pass in the process
of its creation. Each worker was, therefore, identified not by an occupational skill (métier) but by an aptitude to adapt to conditions of mechanised production. Training on the job therefore replaced traditional training and indeed was concerned with obtaining from workers a conditioning of psychological reflexes whereby all form of thought, initiative and knowledge was driven out. Thus the reduction of professional activity into "bits and pieces", the subjugation of the worker to the origin of work rather than to the machine and to methods more than to techniques of production, point towards the conception of the semi-skilled worker as a mere element within the production process.

Although the semi-skilled worker represents the majority of the workforce in the development of mechanised mass production, there still exist a number of occupational skills which are kept alive in tool-making and maintenance workshops, either as a result of the technical unfeasibility of integrating certain work tasks into a chain of production or as a result of the economic unviability of fully mechanising others. This in itself has led to transformations in the nature of skilled work in the mechanised setting. Unlike the skilled workers of the previous stage, the skilled workers of the mechanised stage of production have a higher level of knowledge of technical processes of production and their professional language is more akin to that of the technicians of stage three than to that of the unskilled workers of the mechanical stage. However, these skilled workers are not a homogenous category and in fact one finds that this category represents certain characteristics of the first stage,
certain particularities of the second stage and often some indicators of the stage of automation.

Apart from the semi-skilled workers and skilled workers, a third category of workers also exists: that of unskilled labourers. This category, charged with the marginal tasks of loading, unloading and transporting materials, is itself dwindling as such tasks become mechanised, so that the only tasks left to these labourers are those tedious (unmechanised) tasks of elementary maintenance work and cleaning. Pierre Naville has described this hierarchical breakdown of the workforce in the following terms:

...
automation, began to make its appearance after the Second World War, during a period of economic expansion when governments in the West were obliged to organise and regulate economic activity, in order to ensure the development of production and thus meet the needs of such an expansion. Automation, which helped to meet the needs of expansion in certain sectors more efficiently than mechanisation was first introduced in the 'fifties. It was received initially in the sector of energy production where steam power had long ceased to be the driving force of automatic operations and where electricity, gas and oil were being gradually replaced by electronic and nuclear energy to produce uninterrupted operations in the most complex and heaviest of mechanical systems. Automation was also harnessed in sectors where synthetic chemistry and petrochemicals were being developed (where the properties of certain new materials required precise control, for example in conditions where a certain temperature, pressure, volume of density had to be precisely applied). Oil refineries and potassium plants are examples of such industries. Gradually automation was extended to the sectors of transport, communications and to those sectors (commerce and services) where machines began to replace, to amplify and to standardise the functions of the human brain. The above mentioned sectors of society, into which automation has penetrated are not isolated from each other; in fact, the overlap between the sectors renders to automation its fullest essence.

The idea of automation as a purely technological phenomenon is that which is most predominant in the view of the lay person
who sees it as the process whereby human labour is simply replaced by machine labour. But definitions abound: for example, automation has often been described as continuous automatic production achieved as a result of integrating certain highly mechanised processes. However, defined thus, automation would not seem to be radically different from very highly mechanised production where continuity and integration have already been realised. That which materially distinguishes automation, on the level of technology, is the intervention of electronic computers or robots. Control, retrospective effect and self-regulation or adjustment represent its main features. In this respect, the following definition is more complete:

"l'automatisation est la synthèse de quatre concepts: mécanisation, rationalisation, processus continu et commande automatique, conduisant au fonctionnment intégré ou continu d'un système de fabrication, utilisant des dispositifs électroniques, hydrauliques, pneumatiques, mécaniques à la place des organes humains d'effort ou de décision."23

However, to consider automation as a purely technological phenomenon is to lend it a narrow specificity that it does not deserve. Automation implies not only a change in techniques but a change in the organisation of work, in the nature of work and in the organic composition of the workforce.

Where the organisation of work is concerned one of the most distinctive features of automation is the system of indirect production whereby there is no longer direct involvement of manual human labour in the process of production. This implies a clear dissociation between the organisation of machinery and the organisation of work. Whereas during the stage of mechanised production, workers found themselves working along an assembly
line, each intervening in the creation of an object by the simple execution of a task which formed but a minute part of an entire process, in the automated setting this is no longer so. Not only does the worker cease intervening in the production process but he or she may be, geographically speaking, far removed from it and from other groups of workers.

The assembly line, a distinctive feature of mechanised production, is replaced by a system of work in which the "small team" or "crew" is a fundamental working unit and represents a new division of labour. This new division of labour is less marked than that which exists in assembly line production. It breaks down patterns of authoritarian hierarchy which were previously legitimised by the old division of labour as being necessary to the needs of technology. Hence, although a pyramidal structure exists within the automated enterprise, the "small teams" or "crews" are not subject to patterns of authority in the same way as were workers in the mechanised factory. "Small teams" exist at various levels of the structure of the enterprise and individuals are grouped under a specialist group or team leader whose knowledge of certain processes would not necessarily encompass the disciplines of those in his or her team. An individual worker would then have to take orders from several team leaders placed either at the same level or at higher levels of the structure. Hence, although workers adhere strictly to the basic guidelines of their work task, they may also have to consider decisions emanating vertically, horizontally, or diagonally from various sources in the enterprise. However a
certain degree of control is maintained by workers over their functions.

Under automation, human labour moves away from the level of manual intervention in the production process to the level of intellectual intervention. However, as automated techniques develop, human intervention in production decreases so that in the final logic of automation, human beings will be eliminated from the stage of object production, when machines will be capable of self-adjustment, self-correction and even of producing themselves. In such a setting, the intervention of human beings would be restricted to areas of work preceding and following the production process, for example: planning and design, scientific and market research and sales and advertising and general management respectively. However with reference to the latter half of this century, how is the nature of work being transformed within an enterprise as it moves from mechanised to automated production? According to the intensity of the impact of automation on their content, work tasks in general can be divided into three main categories: those which are made obsolete; those which are newly created; those which are modified. The last two categories overlap depending upon the level of advancement of automation and upon the type of automation prevalent in industry.

In the first category tasks are of a manual nature and are eliminated for economical and practical reasons. Those tasks which are most seriously threatened by technological advancement are:
"those involving machine tending, feeding and offbearing, materials handling and materials processing . . . job duties involving lifting and carrying heavy objects are fast becoming obsolete."26

The tasks of material handling and processing and tasks of a repetitive nature such as those of feeding and offbearing machines are replaced, in automated systems, by operations of push button on control panels or by handling of automated assembly lines by operators who stop and start the functioning of lines and machines without manual intervention. Operators also observe various signals on panels, indicating the functioning of major machine parts and are prepared to communicate any faults or stoppages to supervisors and maintenance workers. These tasks fall into the third category.

Tasks which fall into the second category are usually linked with continuous-flow type of automation. In this context, the newly created tasks (pertaining mainly to supervisory and control type tasks) include the monitoring and adjustment of machinery, the maintenance of output quality and the prevention of breakdown. Particular tasks of an operator may include the observation of gauges, controls and other devices in order to make decisions concerning output and the periodic writing of reports and records of performance of the production process. Other work tasks in this category include those of equipment design, production scheduling and systems analysis to name but a few. Thus newly created tasks are of a predominantly intellectual nature.

One of the areas of work where tasks have been modified and where new elements have been introduced (an area thus straddling
both the second and third categories of work tasks) is that of maintenance and repair. In an automated setting the tasks of maintenance and repair do not lose importance; on the contrary, this area of work is highly developed, often to the detriment of actual production work, for the reason that the costs of breakdown in terms of lost production are enormous and therefore prevention of breakdown becomes an urgent matter as does the scheduled overhauling of machinery in the shortest time possible. The nature of this type of work often remains traditional although the new element is the development of a very qualified worker, often closer in status to the highly skilled technician than to the skilled worker of the mechanical stage of production. Like the work of supervisory and control staff, this work requires a global comprehension of the process of production and of all techniques involved (whether mechanical, electrical or electronic). At the same time, these workers are specialists in certain types of machinery whose entire functioning will be known to them. This level of specialisation is necessary because of the nature of maintenance and repair work under automation. Whereas under mechanisation, a cause of failure can be found in a relatively short time as opposed to the vast amount of time spent in rectifying that failure, under automation repair is relatively simple as opposed to the major task of analysing and finding the source of failure or trouble. However, in practice, the prevention of mistakes and of accidents is emphasised, rather than repair work itself. This maintenance and repair remains the only form of work, in the automated setting, where manual labour is directly linked to the functioning of machines. All other
work takes on an intellectual content.

Accompanying the transformations in the organisation of work and in the nature of work is a transformation in the organic composition of the workforce. The clearest indication in this context is the reduction in the numbers of the unskilled labourers and of the semi-skilled workers and the increase in numbers of: machine operators, supervisors, maintenance and repair workers. At a higher level of the firm's structure one observes an increase in the numbers of other skilled personnel such as researchers, designers, planners and managers.

This pattern is not applicable in exactly the same way to all industries. It is most representative of the key sectors which represent the most advanced line of technical progress. In the case of industries which produce "high technology" (electronics, aeronautics and some branches of heavy industry, for example, hydroelectronic), the production process often retains many traditional features of mechanisation although an advanced research and promotions section is developed. In industries which use high technology to produce simple, traditional products (cars, textile, food etc.) the semi-skilled personnel is greatly reduced, whereas in industries using high technology production processes to produce high technology products (chemical, petro-chemical, nuclear etc.), the classical balance of the work-force is modified to the very obvious disadvantage of the traditional working class. In general, however, it appears that in key industrial sectors in France (energy, textile, steel, chemicals, automobile, computers,
aerospace, transport) the amount of manual work available is either diminishing or stagnating while the amount of intellectual work available is increasing.

In this chapter, I have tried to outline the development of new intellectual strata in society, with particular emphasis laid upon the intellectual (technical) strata who incarnate the scientific rationale within the sphere of production. This development cannot be seen as a movement in its own right but as one which is inextricably linked with the eruption of science and technology and of the scientific mentality in the whole of society. This eruption of science and technology represents technological advancement which itself is influenced by and which exerts influence upon the laws of an economic system based on need for profitability. It is in this sense that the links between the type of production system (which forms the basis of a certain economic system) and the advancement and application of science and technology, which have been traced in this chapter, become highly relevant in relation to shifts in social structure.

I have deliberately left out mention of the consequences of automation upon the material conditions and upon the social consciousness of intellectual workers, as this aspect will be highlighted, within the context of the debate over the qualitative and quantitative significance of the latter, within the social structure, in Parts Two and Three of this thesis. Also a more detailed statistical presentation of the quantitative evolution of new strata of intellectual workers is presented in Chapter IV of this thesis.
CHAPTER III

THE PCF AND INTELLECTUALS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (1920-1955)
In this chapter we examine the attitude of the PCF towards intellectuals (with regard to the social situation and role of the latter) during the period 1920 to 1955. However, the following points should be taken into account. Firstly, although the numbers of intellectuals increased gradually during the period 1920 to 1955 and many of these began to enter the ranks of the salariat, the PCF made no attempts to analyse the changing social structure of French society. Indeed the necessity to do so did not arise as the changes which were taking place, and their implications regarding the electoral fortunes of political parties, did not become fully apparent to political observers and sociologists of the Left, in France, until the 'fifties. For the PCF the majority of intellectuals undoubtedly formed part of the urban petite bourgeoisie or middle classes while some belonged to the bourgeoisie proper. During this period, the idea that intellectuals could perhaps form part of a "new" type of working class would have been unthinkable.

Secondly, whereas the Party recognised the need to attract the support of middle classes in general, in order to advance electorally (elections were considered a useful means of transmitting Communist ideas and not as a path for the working class to gain power) it did not aim to seek votes amongst intellectual strata specifically. However, the PCF did find it necessary to develop relations with intellectuals as a "special" group within the middle classes in view of the important role they could play in furthering the aims of socialism. How could intellectuals further the aims of socialism? Firstly
intellectuals as a group hold vast stores of knowledge and information which are useful to the working class to gain political consciousness and, through its party, to become a vanguard for change. Lenin, quoting from Karl Kautsky wrote:

"Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Indeed modern economic science is as much a condition for socialist production as, say modern technology, and the proletariat can create neither the one nor the other. The vehicle of science is not the proletariat, but the bourgeoisie intelligentsia (K.K.'s italics): it was in the minds of individual members of this stratum that modern Socialism originated and it was they who recommended it to the more intellectually developed proletarians who . . . introduce it into the proletarian class struggle . . ."!

Not only could intellectuals bring knowledge to the working class from the outside but as creators and transmitters of ideas, they could also provide the working class and its party with "politically useful" works, thus reflecting the positions of the latter. This particular aspect of the role of intellectuals was stressed by the PCF throughout the period under study except during the time of the Popular Front and the years leading up to the Second World War when nothing was "asked" of intellectuals but support against fascism.

Secondly, intellectuals constituted a "bridge" between the Communist Party and the middle classes. As part of the middle classes themselves, intellectuals shared with the members of these classes similar lifestyles, cultural references, preferences and discourse. Consequently communist ideas and propaganda articulated by intellectuals among members of their own class would be more readily acceptable. A party seen to represent the interests of the working class could not approach
the middle classes directly and without great difficulty. Hence the PCF had to approach intellectuals who, because of their special knowledge of the workings of capitalist society, were the first amongst the middle classes to voice criticism and discontent. By channelling this criticism and discontent into political action linked with the intellectuals' field of cultural activity (action culturelle) and by thus gaining support within intellectual strata, it would be possible for the PCF to dictate a programme of action in which the middle classes could be engaged. The idea of intellectuals as a link between itself and the middle classes came to the fore in PCF thinking after 1932.

Thirdly, one has to ask why it has been necessary to undertake this study of the PCF's approach to intellectuals when the main focus of the thesis lies on intellectual workers. One reason is that the notions of "intellectual" and "intellectual worker" remain interconnected in PCF thinking despite the fact that in its recent history the Party has treated the questions of intellectual workers separately. That this interconnection exists is demonstrated clearly in the PCF's discourse in which it prefers to use the term "intellectuals" even when speaking of intellectual workers. In addition to this, the PCF continues today to preface its allocations to intellectual workers with references to its past relations with intellectuals in order to prove the persistence of its commitment, through history, to l'intelligence française. This study is also useful in that it provides a historical perspective to the question of the PCF's approach to intellectual workers as well as a source from which elements of comparison between the Party's approaches to
intellectuals and intellectual workers can be drawn by the reader.

Finally, one last remark, has to be made which is that the PCF's approach to intellectuals during the period 1920 to 1955 (as its conduct in general) was influenced by the Party's interactions with the Soviet Union through the Third Communist International (CI). For this reason references to the USSR and the CI are frequent but relevant throughout this chapter.

I. A party in search of a "raison d'Être": 1920-1923

The Parti Communiste Français was formed at the Eighteenth Socialist (Section Française d'Internationale Ouvrière - SFIO) Congress of Tours, in December 1920, when the majority of delegates voted to support a motion put forward to join the (Third) Communist International. Inevitably, the emergence of the new party signified the decline of socialist unity and the temporary relative decline of the SFIO. Large numbers of intellectuals (particularly those members of the young Parisian intelligentsia) transferred their allegiance from the SFIO to the PCF to become active party propagandists and regular contributors to L'Humanité. Most intellectuals had joined the new party, either through humanitarian and pacifist convictions or through admiration of the Russian Revolution and the new Soviet State which seemed to reflect their image of socialism. They played an important part in the early history of the PCF. In fact only four of the newly-formed 32 member Comité Directeur had working-class credentials in 1920.
The years 1920 to 1923 were years of confusion for the Party. The split at Tours had resolved nothing; on the contrary it presented new problems, regarding the identity of the Party, its structure, its role and functions. The resolution of these problems was to prove a major task for the Party, composed, as it was, of an uneasy alliance between those tendencies still retaining the old social-democratic conceptions and methods of organisation and structure from their days in the SFIO and those tendencies on the Left of the Party, which were anxious to adhere to guidelines of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), in order to develop a disciplined party based firmly upon Marxist-Leninist principles, as set out in the Twenty-One conditions. As a result of the Party's preoccupation with its internal organisation, one observes that cultural (scientific and artistic) issues and the question of the role of intellectuals in the working class movement and in society were left unaddressed as indeed were other important issues. Therefore it would be true to say that although the Party welcomed sympathetic intellectuals of high standing as members or as "fellow travellers" (especially at a time when it faced extreme political isolation under the hostile regime of Millerrand and Poincaré and at a time when the revolutionary current which had swept through Europe was beginning to dissipate), it was relatively uninterested in intellectuals as a social group, and therefore made no attempt to elaborate a cultural policy whereby this element of the population could be drawn into the revolutionary movement. Certainly the need for analyses of the social situation and role of intellectuals in
capitalism had not arisen.

At a time when an important debate, on the role of intellectuals in the development of a proletarian culture, was unfurling in the Soviet Union, the PCF chose to abstain from actively contributing to such a debate, the fragmented nature of its organisation preventing all coherence in matters of theory and practice. The idea of the development of a proletarian culture, in the USSR, had materialised before the October Revolution. Indeed the organisation Proletcult, whose task it was to aid the creation of a proletarian culture, had been set up during the time of the Kerensky government. The organisation which flourished after the Revolution was, nevertheless, riddled with contradictions. The majority of intellectuals, employed to develop a proletarian culture, were of bourgeois origin and of those many were hostile to the ideas of Bolshevism. Proletcult's divisions, to an extent, were also a reflection of the disagreement (on the issue of proletarian culture) which prevailed within the ranks of the Bolsheviks. Lenin recognised the ideological necessity of a proletarian culture, but judged the undertaking of its development, in the USSR, as premature and lending itself to sectarianism:

"Proletarian culture is not something which bursts forth from an unknown source. It is not the invention of those who call themselves experts in proletarian culture. . . . Proletarian culture has to be the result of the natural development of the gains of human knowledge, accumulated under the sway of capitalist society, of a society based upon property, of a bureaucratic society."5

Trotsky, however, went further, in denying the existence of a contemporary proletarian culture and even the chances of such a
culture materialising under socialism:

"it is fundamentally incorrect to oppose a bourgeois form of art and culture to a proletarian form of art and culture. The latter will never come into existence because the regime of the proletariat is temporary, a transient phase. The historical significance and the moral grandeur of the proletarian revolution consist in the fact that the latter lays down the basis of a class-free culture, one which will be the first truly human culture."6

There were yet others who were convinced that proletarian culture had to be based upon a firm and clear communist ideology which rejected any and every petty-bourgeois current and the tolerance by a communist party of compagnons de route. These conflicting ideas were to be considered closely during the year 1924, at a meeting of Soviet party officials and intellectuals where it emerged that, the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) would encourage the proletariat to gain cultural hegemony, but, that in doing so it would not favour any particular group (within the Proletcult) and that it would adopt a tolerant attitude towards artistic freedom within non-proletarian circles, sympathetic to the revolution, and thus towards "Les formes idéologiques intermédiaires."7

How did the PCF react to this debate? On a practical level, it had in 1920 participated in the organisation set up by the Second congress of the CI (Communist International) known as the International Proletcult. The aim of the organisation was to develop a European proletarian culture through the establishment of "brigades" of working class writers, poets, musicians,
artists, etc. However, the French delegate (Raymond Lefebvre) to International Proletcult, who was responsible for the establishment of the Proletcult project in France, was killed in an accident at sea. As a result of this, the initiative for the definition of proletarian culture, in France, was left to the contributors of L'Humanité and Clarité. The intellectuals who contributed to the Party press were very far removed from the ideas of a proletarian culture. The majority of them were deeply imbued with classicist and humanist notions; L'Humanité's literary page and rubric entitled La Vie Intellectuelle remained attached to a certain bon goût which could be related more to other social-democratic newspapers than to proletarian culture. Those who supervised the cultural activities of the Party (Georges Pioch, Georges Chennevière and others) wrote articles, signed petitions, attended meetings as intellectuals first and foremost and it could not be said that a single intellectual, especially during the early part of this period, changed his or her literary style as a result of his or her experiences within the working class movement. However, despite criticisms from the CI, it would seem that the French Party preferred to bask in the friendship and sympathy of a band of well-known intellectuals (until 1923 at least), who were capable of rallying workers and other strata of the petty-bourgeoisie to the Party, rather than risk further isolation in France through the adoption of a doctrine, the elaboration of which had already proved complex in the USSR:

"Le rôle des intellectuels dans le mouvement révolutionnaire prolétarien fait encore l'objet de controverse entre communistes. Gardons-nous
The question of proletarian culture and intellectuals was not raised in the Party until 1926.

The PCF failed to define a cultural policy which would allocate specific functions to intellectuals; it also failed to rally intellectuals within the framework of an electoral policy. This was not for want of consciousness, within the CI, of the importance of "new social strata". At its Third Congress, in July 1921, the CI had mentioned the importance of "proletarian middle strata" in the victory of the proletarian revolution:

". . . in Western Europe the conditions of life of parts of the peasantry, large parts of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, and the broad stratum of the so-called new middle-classes, white collar workers etc, are becoming more and more intolerable under the pressure of the rising cost of living . . . a ferment is at work among these masses which is shaking them out of their political indifference and drawing them into the fight between revolution and counter-revolution. The bankruptcy of imperialism in the defeated countries, and of pacifism and social-reformism in the victor countries, drives one section of these middle strata into the counter-revolutionary and another into the revolutionary camp. The communist party must give constant attention to these strata."  

This was in keeping with adoption of the United Front theses by the CI in 1921. Although the adoption of these theses had caused a major crisis in the PCF, they were finally accepted so that at its First Congress at Marseille, in December 1921, the party pledged to take its propaganda not only to the working class but also to other "couches de la population perméables à nos idées." However, this pledge to win over intellectuals, and through their support, other middle strata was not carried out in
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"nationalist" propaganda in its persistent demands for the freedom of tendencies to co-exist and to express themselves within and outside the Party and in its denunciation of the ECCI, especially since the adoption of the United Front theses. The conflict was finally brought to an explosive end at the Fourth Congress of the CI which was held in November and December of 1922. Here it came to light that a large number of intellectuals, grouped within the conservative tendency and within the centrist leadership, were members of the Ligue des droits de l'homme and of Free-masons' lodges. As both organisations were regarded as vehicles of bourgeois ideology, membership of a communist party could not be compatible with membership of the above-mentioned organisations. The PCF was therefore instructed to exclude those of its members who had not publicly renounced their affiliation with either or both organisations, by 1 January 1923:

"l'avant-garde communiste de la classe ouvrière a besoin naturellement d'intellectuels qui apportent à son organisation leurs connaissances théoriques, leurs dons agitateurs, ou d'écrivains, mais à condition que ces éléments rompent absolument et sans retour avec les moeurs et coutumes du milieu bourgeois, brûlent derrière eux tous les ponts les rattachant au camp d'où ils sont sortis, ne demandent pour eux, ni exceptions, ni privilèges et se soumettent à la discipline à l'égal des simples militants."13

The adoption of such a resolution by the French Commission of the CI provoked angry outbursts from the intellectuals concerned, who had been spoiling for a fight since May of that year when the ECCI had stepped in to expel Henri Fabre, the editor of Le Journal du Peuple, for engaging in propaganda which caused
divisions amongst Communists. A "committee of resistance" was set up by Georges Pioch and Victor Méric. The committee defended its members' links with Free-masonry and the Ligue des droits de l'homme, warning intellectuals that this sort of "arbitrary discipline" would soon prevent them from being members of even pacifist organisations such as Clarté or the Association républicaine des anciens combattants (ARAC). The committee also charged the PCF's Politbureau with fanning the fires of anti-intellectualism within working-class circles:

"Nous nous élevons contre la division que l'on voudrait faire dans le parti entre les ouvriers manuels et ceux que l'on qualifie d'"intellectuels". La volonté de discréditer ceux-ci en bloc en les rendant suspects à ceux-là contrevient dangereusement au véritable communisme. Il n'y a, dans une internationale communiste, que des camarades égaux en droits comme en devoirs, chacun le servant selon ses aptitudes et le mérite de chacun étant fait de son zèle et de sa sincérité dans l'action."15

The Politbureau of the PCF defended itself against the charges of anti-intellectualism. It made clear that the PCF was only against arrivistes intellectuals whose aim was to further their own careers at the expense of the Party and of the working-class:

"... quant aux honnêtes et sincères intellectuels qui ont embrassé la cause révolutionnaire, leur place, dans l'avenir comme dans le passé, se trouve côte à côte et coude à coude avec l'ouvrier et le paysan qui ne sauraient s'en passer."16

Many intellectuals did, simply through pressure or through the type of ouvrierisme often displayed by bourgeois intellectuals themselves renounce their associations with Free-masonry and the Ligue des droits de l'homme; others who did not were excluded. The PCF had forsaken several very eminent young intellectuals. In addition to the measures of expulsion the CI
Fourth Congress resolution also decreed that journalists would not be allowed to contribute to the communist press if they were also writing for the "bourgeois" press and more significantly that 90 per cent of communist election candidates would, in future, comprise workers and peasants.

Had the PCF, in fact, displayed an anti-intellectual attitude as alleged? In this instance it would be true to say that the Party's primordial object (following that of the CI) had been to dislocate its right-wing which had long proved to be a thorn in the flesh although the adoption of the Fourth CI congress resolution calling for the expulsion of Free-masons and members of the Ligue des droits de l'homme had been unplanned. In addition to this it would seem that the PCF's actions had not been perceived as anti-intellectual by intellectuals in the Party generally, if one is to consider the fact that, at the end of 1922 and beginning of 1923, the PCF was able to mobilise vast numbers of intellectuals in its campaign against the occupation of the Ruhr.

In fact, contrary to what one might have expected, the Party's shift towards a more left-wing ideology was to attract new groups of intellectuals in the following period when steps towards ideological unity were furthered.

II. Bolshevisation and the establishment of ideological unity: 1924-1926

The slogan "bolshevisation" was launched at the Fifth Congress of the CI in July 1924 as a result of the conclusion reached that the revolutionary fervour of the early years of the
Twentieth century, had died down with the stabilisation of capitalism in Europe. The time had come when efforts of communists everywhere had to be channelled into the development of national communist parties, based on the Russian model. Bolshevisation may be regarded as the application of Marxist-Leninist principles and of the lessons learned from the experiences of the Bolsheviks to the Western communist parties and in this sense, as the continuation of the transformation of old socialist parties into instruments of revolution as set out in the Twenty-One conditions. However, on a more profound level, bolshevisation represented the beginning of a power struggle, after Lenin's death, between Trotsky on one hand and Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev (the "troika") on the other. The way in which bolshevisation, in the European parties, was finally carried out was indicative of the establishment of dominance, in the CPSU, of the "troika" to the disadvantage of Trotsky. In this context bolshevisation may be seen as the process whereby the European communist parties were "Stalinised" and were developed as a re-inforcement of Soviet power, in order to protect socialism in the USSR. The process of bolshevisation, as representative of the drive towards "Stalinisation" and the struggle against Trotskyism was to affect the PCF's attitude, towards a great many Communist intellectuals, more than any other European party.

Trotsky had always taken a special interest in French political affairs and had entertained close relations with the PCF; consequently his prestige and influence there were greater than anywhere else. The vast majority of French Communists who
supported Trotsky over issues dividing the Soviet leadership, and hence the CI, were intellectuals, some of which held key posts within the PCF. As the anti-Trotsky campaign was orchestrated in the USSR, these intellectuals formed themselves into an effective pro-Trotsky campaigning group within the Party. Their refusal to support the condemnation of Trotsky which had been pronounced at the Thirteenth Conference of the Russian party in January 1924 as well as their constant criticism through *Le Bulletin Communiste*, of the PCF leadership, convinced the ECCI (headed by Zinoviev) of the necessity to isolate the French Trotskyists. The ECCI and the PCF leadership were to wait for the Fifth Congress of the CI in order to deliver a decapitating blow to the Trotskyist opposition and thus to intellectuals within the French party.

Once again the treatment of Trotskyist intellectuals was to further contribute to the development of an *ouvrieriste* tradition which would affect the Party’s perceptions of intellectual groups in society far into the future. At the Fifth Congress of the CI the fundamental features of a truly bolshevised party were laid down. Of the Congress prescriptives aimed specifically at the liquidation of the Trotskyist opposition was that forbidding the existence of factions, tendencies and groups. The PCF was especially reminded that one of its most important tasks in the achievement of ideological unity was the elimination of "right-wing" tendencies. In addition to this the Fifth Congress subordinated the press, educational and publications services of all communist parties to
those of the CI. These measures taken by the CI, which called into question the position of a large section of Party intellectuals led to the formation of an even bigger opposition in the PCF marked by an intellectual Trotskyism. The development of this current produced an anti-intellectual crisis within the PCF. Anti-intellectual sentiments were manifested in several ways. Pressure on Trotskyist intellectuals (posing a threat to the leadership of the PCF and CI) with the intention of forcing them out of the Party, was successfully applied. Anti-intellectualism was also reflected by the Party's press: l'Humanité's page "La vie intellectuelle", controlled by Trotskyist intellectuals was swiftly removed; the main theoretical journal, Le Bulletin Communiste which, under Souvarine, had become an organ of opposition was replaced by Cahiers du Bolchevisme whose object was the purging of Trotskyist ideas within the Party. Both Cahiers du Bolchévisme and l'Humanité waged war against the:

"groupe fractionnel infime des intellectuels de l'opposition... qui s'est lui-même déjà moralement exclu du parti et de l'internationale."28

In addition to this, Party members were given a warning by the Central Committee of the PCF to break off all contacts with oppositionist intellectuals grouped round Le Bulletin Communiste and La Révolution Prolétarienne. Although many Trotskyist intellectuals left the PCF, a large number still remained within the Party while Trotsky was still a member of the CPSU (for example the surrealists). However, by 1932 these intellectuals were either "neutralised" or were to leave the Party altogether. The effect of bolshevisation, in terms of an anti-Trotsky
struggle, had touched the PCF and its intellectuals profoundly for reasons already mentioned. The fact that this aspect of bolshevisation did not affect other communist parties to the same extent, for example, the Italian Communist Party, and that the latter remained unmarked by virulent ouvrierisme and has therefore approached the question of working class alliances with intellectuals and later with intellectual workers in a more positive manner, cannot remain without significance.

Apart from the repercussions of bolshevisation, as an anti-Trotsky struggle, on the fate of intellectuals in the PCF, this same process, as a means of transforming the structure and organisational base of the Party, led to the exteriorisation of large numbers of intellectuals, although not from the latter's choice. The policy of bolshevisation laid emphasis on revolutionary practice rather than theory and accordingly on the role of the proletariat. Therefore, in order to give the Party a firm working-class base, local sections were suppressed and replaced by factory cells. In theory, an intellectual member could have easily been attached to a factory cell if his or her local section had been suppressed; in practice, however, this was not the case, because an intellectual member would often find that the local factory was in fact a long way away from his or her home. The PCF had been particularly inept in its introduction of new organisational and structural procedures. The Party had ignored the CI's advice to hold an "explanation campaign" in advance and had also overlooked the guideline in the original ECCI resolution allowing for the provision of street
cells in cases where it was not possible for members to join
factory cells. Consequently, a great many intellectuals made
no efforts to renew their Party membership. Frequently, when an
intellectual member joined a factory cell, he or she felt out of
place as cell life was geared towards the formation and practical
education of the militant worker with little or no attention paid
to intellectuals. Intellectuals were only welcomed either as
militants in the PCF's service or as persons able to rally
others. Bolshevisation provided no framework wherein
intellectuals may put to use their particular skills. This
continued negligence on the part of the Party, in the matter of
involving intellectuals as themselves, in the class struggle has
been recognised by PCF members in recent years:

"... rien n'est fait pour retenir dans le parti
"bolschéviste" les éléments étrangers au noyau
prolétarien ... on n'accepte pas en fait
l'intellectuel que dans la mesure où il se nie en
tant que tel."

To this extent, the period of bolshevisation, 1924-1926, does not
represent a change in the Party's attitude towards a recognition
of intellectuals as a social group. Bolshevisation in terms of
transformation of structure and organisation was merely a part of
the painful process of a party, born of social democracy, in
search of a clear ideological identity. However, the effect of
this process was to enhance anti-intellectualism.

The continuing turmoil and disorganisation of the years of
bolshevisation also led the PCF to ignore other middle strata.
This is apparent by the incoherent manner in which the
legislative election campaign of 1925 was conducted. Whereas in
1924, in the wake of the "witch-hunt" against Souvarine and other
Trotskyists, the PCF categorically refused "class collaboration" and thus made no effort to reach Socialist and Radical rank and file in its propaganda, in 1925 the Party abandoned its principles (of non class collaboration) and rules governing the selection of working class and peasant candidates as opposed to those of intellectual background. It withdrew its lists on the second ballot where they were behind those of the Cartel des Gauches in return for Socialist and Radical support where they were ahead and even merged with the SFIO in a United Front list in certain areas. These conflicting tactics (a consequence of the confusion which prevailed over the application of the United Front theses, (especially after the German fiasco of 1923) demonstrate the PCF's lack of serious reflection and independent thought in the matter of mobilising middle strata and intellectuals in the French context. The peremptory mention of intellectuals and other middle strata, in the programme of the bloc ouvrier-paysan, not surprisingly, failed to attract the latter sections of the population to vote for the PCF in substantial numbers. The Party thus emerged, from the 1924 election having made no inroads on the middle class vote.

The preoccupation with bolshevisation also gave the Party a fine excuse for continuing its non-involvement in the question of proletarian culture and the role of intellectuals in its development.

III. The closing of ranks: 1927-1934

The year 1927 marked the beginning of a period of political
isolation for the PCF as a result of the definition by the CI of a new line of strategy embodied in the slogan "class against class." This line of strategy was adopted as a logical consequence of new analyses by the CI, initially presented at its Eighth plenum in May 1927, of the situation of capitalism in the late 'twenties. According to this analysis, capitalism in Western Europe was changing as a result of an intensification of the class struggle on national levels and of an increasing threat of war by the West against the USSR. The intensification of the class struggle, a result of the capitalist crisis, was linked with what the CI saw as the political evolution of the reformist Left from a position of social democracy to positions of social-imperialism and social-fascism. Consequently CI sections were put on a war footing in order to be able to defend the USSR. These analyses, synthesised and adopted formally at the CI's Sixth Congress in July and August of 1928 called for the abandonment, by the CI sections, of the United Front tactics of previous years in favour of non-collaboration on class lines. Once again it may be argued that the imposition of the new tactics was dictated largely by the struggles within the CPSU, although it would be true to say that "class against class" was, to some extent, the outcome of disappointment at the failure of the United Front policies which preceded it. However, by and large the application of "class against class" was an effective weapon in the battle against Trotskyism: Trotskyists (mainly intellectuals) were seen as "objectively" acting as agents of fascism by continuing their support for United Front tactics and by apparently undermining the construction of socialism in the
USSR through their opposition against Stalin's domestic policies.

As the CI increasingly lost any rigid criteria by which to judge the soundness of a policy or tactic (a policy was correct by virtue of it being adopted; any resistance to such an adoption of policy was considered a deviation) then more and more policies proved to be irrelevant at best or at worst disastrous for the European communist parties. Moreover, to ensure that policies and tactics recommended by the CI were easily digested by its member parties, the ECCI encouraged the promotion of its own supporters to the leaderships of communist parties. Thus it is in this framework that the "class against class" tactics affected the PCF's approach to intellectuals. In 1928, at the Sixth Congress of the CI, young leaders of the Jeunesses Communistes, Henri Barbé, Pierre Célor and Henri Lozeray (who had consistently remained on the left of the PCF and who had seldom deviated from the CI line), were encouraged by the ECCI to take a more active role in Party affairs. The prominence accorded to this group of young communist leaders by the ECCI enabled it to be elected to the Politbureau of the PCF at its 1929 Congress, in favour of "rightists" such as Sellier and Renaud Jean who were excluded and Sémard whose post of general-secretary was suppressed while he was in prison. The new leadership of the Party which displayed an acute anti-intellectualism (linked with the desire to purge the Party of Trotskyist and other "right-wing" elements) was to retain power until the beginning of 1932. The leaders Barbé and Célor faithfully echoed the suspicions voiced at the Sixth Congress of the CI that intellectuals were, by virtue of their
social origin, class enemies, likely to be involved in acts of "deviation", sabotage and anti-working class activity. This theme was further orchestrated in the PCF after the "Industrial Party" trials of December 1930 in which eight of the USSR's leading engineers were convicted of forming a secret party, of attempting to sabotage Soviet industry and of conspiring against the USSR aided and abetted by France. Leading Fabians (Sidney and Beatrice Webb), in the main sympathetic towards the USSR at that time wrote that the trials:

"inaugurated a veritable reign of terror against the intelligentsia... Evidence was not necessary. The title of engineer served as sufficient condemnation." 33

Thus purges against intellectuals in the CPSU were followed by purges in the PCF. Despite the fact that the leaders (Souvarine, Monatte, Rosmer) of the PCF's Trotskyist tendency had been ejected from the Party, in 1927 there still existed a group of Trotskyist intellectuals within the PCF, within the group of Surrealists led by André Breton. These intellectuals had posed a threat to the Party leadership since the early days (1925) of their contact with the Party's Clarté group; this was as a result of the independent stance taken by the group in their efforts to preserve surrealism as a literary method within the Party. However, the title of their publication La Régolution Surréaliste 34 was taken as indicative of an attitude of intellectual superiority and subversiveness which supposedly presumed to take away all revolutionary initiative from the working class. The PCF leadership therefore made every effort, between 1930 and 1932 to rid the Party of the group. Apart from
attempting to censor surrealistic publications or pressurising selected Surrealist intellectuals to condemn certain issues of "Le Surréalisme au Service de la Révolution," the leadership churlishly cancelled the Party's tenth anniversary exhibition, the organisation of which had been previously entrusted to the Surrealist group. The leadership's drive to purge the Party of oppositionists resulted in a large number of Surrealist intellectuals being either expelled or leaving the Party of their own accord. Those who remained (Aragon, Unik, Alexandre) became completely integrated within the Party, relinquishing all responsibilities to surrealism and to their former colleagues in the group. Thus by 1932 the arty had managed to split the remaining oppositionist tendency and by 1933 Trotskyist intellectualism had been well and truly purged.

The year 1927 also marked the emergence of ouvriérisme in cultural circles in the CPSU and the debate on proletarian culture began to take a new turn as the USSR entered a new phase of economic development in response to the intensification of hostility of the West towards it. This economic development which concentrated on the edification of heavy industry demanded immense support of the Soviet population; all efforts were to be directed towards this development in the name of "socialism in one country". In these conditions, the contribution of science was obviously crucial but so was that of artistic and literary creation which was not allowed to operate outside this sphere. Hence the principle theme in proletarian culture was the importance of cultural creation in industrial development:

"L'Union Soviétique est entrée dans l'époque de
l'édification du socialisme. Elle suit d'un pas frénétique un plan déterminé et seule la littérature la retardé dans cette marche en avant. Il faut que la littérature et l'industrie aillent de pair, il faut donc que la littérature adopte le même rythme accéléré pour prendre part au mouvement général."37

For the theoreticians of the group RAPP (the association of Russian proletarian writers), which became dominant in the cultural domaine, all works of art (whether in the form of a play, a novel, a film etc) had to be considered in terms of a contract between socialism and the creator of the work. Consequently, "fellow travellers" either became committed communists or were not permitted to associate with proletarian organisations in the sphere of culture:

"La seule place pour le véritable écrivain soviétique se trouve au milieu de la classe ouvrière révolutionnaire de notre pays, qui est en train de construire le socialisme. Il doit inconditionnellement et de façon franche, sans prolonger les hésitations et l'autoanalyse habituelles à l'intelligentsia, relever ses manches et entreprendre avec le prolétariat et son parti l'imense et joyeuse tâche de la construction socialiste; il doit prendre une position ferme sur le front de la révolution culturelle qui demande énormément de force et beaucoup de travail."39

This effort to assimilate art and literature into industrial development was most rigorously applied until 1932.

In accordance with these events which took place in the USSR, the CI encouraged its national sections to take up the question of proletarian culture in earnest and to organise the creation of cultural circles amongst the proletariat. In France this task was assigned to Henri Barbusse who had in April 1926 taken over the literary section of L'Humanité. Thus in June 1928 Barbusse founded and became director of Monde ("hédosdadaire d'information littéraire, artistique, scientifique, économique et
sociale") whose principle tasks were: to create a French proletarian culture; to influence and to rally creations of art and culture, on the Left, to the cause of the working class. It is the fact that Barbusse tried to carry out the two, almost contradictory, tasks which led him to concentrate on the second to the detriment of the first. Barbusse's own background as a writer, born of the classical French literary tradition, and as a pacifist led him to express doubts as to whether a proletarian culture was realisable as an immediate phenomenon cut off from previous forms of art:

"... elle doit à mon sens, se référer au passé. Non pas au passé immédiat ... mais à la grande tradition populaire elle-même."40

Thus during the years 1928 to 1930 Barbusse became critical (although not overtly) of Soviet orthodoxy in this matter and in the latter's expectations of intellectuals.

Barbusse's critical stance earned him and his colleagues in Monde the full wrath of the CI at the Congress of Kharkov which was held in November 1930. Barbusse was condemned for having neglected proletarian art and literature in favour of petty-bourgeois writers and creators. The majority of directives of the Congress were mainly levelled at the PCF which appeared to be the only party within which reigned confusion over the notion of proletarian culture; this confusion was indicated by the number of different literary tendencies, which existed in the Party. Thus for the first time a clear directive was given to the PCF, specifically, as to the aims of developing proletarian culture, although the precise form and style of the latter remained
undetermined. Firstly, the Party was instructed to supervise the formation of a **noyau d'initiative** comprising intellectuals of the Left who would be prepared to combat two tendencies (described as "erronées et néfastes") which existed within the PCF. The two tendencies represented "right-wing intellectual opportunism" (Trotskyism) on the one hand, and an ultra-left opportunism, which regarded all intellectuals of bourgeois origin as superfluous to the working class movement, on the other hand. Secondly, this **noyau d'initiative** would have to undertake to train workers in various intellectual disciplines which would lead the latter to produce works reflecting a truly proletarian character. Finally, PCF leadership was urged by the Congress to supervise the organisation of a French association of revolutionary writers and artists modelled upon the RAPP.

The PCF leadership's negative reaction to the directives of the Kharkov conference were unexpected. Barbusse was never condemned by the Party and the formation of proletarian writers was not seriously initiated as one might have expected of an **ouvriériste** leadership which had hitherto led a concerted anti-intellectual campaign. There are several reasons for the Party's unexpected response or even rebuff to the Kharkov leaders. The first reason is concerned with Barbusse's own standing within the Party. He had chosen to enter the PCF at a time in his career when he could well have chosen to increase his prestige and standing within the intellectual elite of bourgeois society; consequently his "rupture" with his class of origin was all the more important to the Party as an arm in its ideological weaponry. Barbusse had also proved to be an ideal mouthpiece,
for the PCF, by which it could reach those intellectuals who were potential allies of communism. Barbusse appeared a fine example of national cultural traditions which the PCF greatly prized and of which, it proclaimed, it was the defender. The Party was therefore reluctant to forfeit an important "asset" for the sake of a doctrinal divergence (on Barbusse's part) on an issue with which it had never particularly felt at ease. Secondly, the movement in the USSR which had managed to integrate thousands of workers into the new cultural infrastructure began to wane as the popularity of "industrial literature" diminished and Soviet readers began to criticise the inferior quality of works produced. Finally the PCF was finding it increasingly difficult to exist in isolation. The excessively ouvrière disposition of the Barbé-Celol leadership had turned many members, disillusioned, away from the Party whereas the application of the tactic class against class, during the election campaigns of 1928 and 1932, seemed to have convinced all but the very loyal voters that the PCF had moved too far to the left and had thus provided the government's anti-communist campaign with a further boost. Thus the process of bolshevisation which had already cut off a great many non-working class members and voters from the PCF, was now extended during the period 1927 to 1932. Not only had the Party distanced itself from Socialist and Radical rank and file voters but it had lost a substantial section of its own sympathisers through its sectarian attitude towards non-working class members of the electorate.

The period from May 1932 to 1934 can be seen as intermediary, during which time, although the PCF remained
faithful, in theory, to the analysis of the role of social democracy and to the application of class against class strategy, it was nevertheless being forced by events to prepare the ground for the politics of rassemblement.

The accession of Hitler to power and the growing threat of fascism in Europe, as a result of the economic crisis, compelled the CI and its sections to rethink its approach to this threat. In practical terms it meant the abandonment of sectarian attitudes and the search for unity with social-democracy, for the analysis on the implementation of fascism had revealed that the latter depended heavily upon the mobilisation of sections of the middle class. In this context, as the PCF saw it, in order to prevent fascist ideas from spreading within the middle class the question of alliances between the working class and sections of the middle class became primordial. Consequently, Maurice Thorez insisted upon the necessity of developing a strategy for an action culturelle as a means of establishing contact with the masses and particularly with sections of the middle class through intellectuals. The development of such action meant that the PCF would have to actively revive the notion of "la main tendue aux intellectuels":

"Les rapports entre le parti et les intellectuels se transforment parce que se transforme le rapport entre la classe ouvrière et les classes moyennes, parce que la question des alliances se pose en des termes nouveaux."48

Thus it was with the aim of reaching sections of the middle class which it had previously ignored that the PCF gave its firm support to the world congress against imperialist war (organised
by eminent intellectuals such as Barbusse and Romain Rolland) which took place in Amsterdam in August 1932.

A year later the PCF dominated Amsterdam movement, which had emerged from the congress of 1932, joined a committee of the European anti-fascist workers' congress (held in Paris at the Salle Pleyel) and became known as the Amsterdam-Pleyel committee. The PCF, through intellectuals such as Barbusse had taken a leading role in the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement which at once welcomed, without conditions, not only Socialist but also "bourgeois" intellectuals, such as those from the Ligue des droits de l'homme. It was only specified that, in turn, those who joined the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement could not expect the PCF to deviate from its own mission, that of developing the consciousness of the masses.

As a result of the liberalisation of the Party's attitude towards intellectuals, by September 1933 forty sections of the Jeunesses Socialistes, against their party's (the SFIO) ruling, had joined the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement which, upon the PCF's initiative, had set up sections all over France. The participation of Socialist intellectuals, in large numbers, in a Communist inspired movement had certainly not been foreseen by the PCF for the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement had not been created specifically as a vehicle of the strategy United Front "from below", in other words of class against class. However, the PCF was able for the first time during the period 1927-1934, to claim real success in organising a United Front "from below" and thereafter, until July of 1934 when the pacte d'unité d'action was signed with the SFIO, proceeded to "unmask" the leaders of
social-democracy by launching virulent attacks on the latter through the pages of L'Humanité. The Party's enormous support for the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement, other "politico-intellectual" events and its tolerance of intellectuals of varied backgrounds ("bourgeois liberals", "progressive churchmen", "honest conservatives" etc) in order to develop an action culturelle against fascism is not without significance. Not only did this allow the PCF to claim that it had successfully achieved a united front "from below" and not only did it place the Party in a relatively strong and influential position within the future rassemblement of the Front Populaire, but it was to enable the Party to develop and exploit the theme that it alone could preserve French culture and the heritage of the nation and thus protect the interests of intellectuals together with those the toiling middle classes. However, although the idea that intellectuals could somehow be used to get across to the middle classes was surfacing within the Party, at this point it remained rather ill-defined.

IV. The working class party becomes a national party: 1935-1947

The departure of the PCF from the tactics of class against class after the signing of the pacte d'unité d'action with the Socialists, was given official approval at the Seventh Congress of the CI which was held in July and August of 1935 when sections of the CI were instructed to abandon these tactics in favour of "anti-fascist united front" tactics. For the first time in the history of the Third International was it openly advocated that
the long-term struggle - that to overthrow capitalism - would take second place to the critical question of the day (the struggle against fascism); that the defeat of fascism (with whatever allies) was justifiable in terms of attaining the final overthrow of capitalism. As a result of this reversal of tactics by the CI, the PCF (like other communist parties) found itself in a situation previously alien to itself: that of being allowed and even encouraged to formulate its own policies in accordance with the conditions prevalent in its own sphere of operation. In this respect 1935 marks an important date in the history of the PCF, as the beginning of the period during which it firmly entrenched itself in the national political life of France and thus began to play a role in influencing the political events to come. However it is the means employed by the Party to entrench itself in French political life which provides us with the framework of the its policy towards intellectuals and culture.

The movement towards rassemblement which was initiated by intellectuals within or linked with the Party became, in 1935, primarily a political affair, as the idea of Popular Front began to present itself as a reality in the context of the forthcoming legislative elections of 1936. The realisation of a popular front government (which, Thorez often pointed out, symbolised a contract between the working and middle classes) would require the gathering together of vast numbers of people, beyond the scope of a mere unité d'action with the Socialists. Consequently, as was mentioned before, the question of class alliances became essential for the PCF. The latter had, during the 'twenties, pursued alliance policies with regard to the
peasantry, but the situation of the 'thirties demanded that these
policies encompass a far greater portion of the population which
included even large sections of the "reactionary" but
nevertheless "exploited" middle classes. The PCF, dismissive of
drawing support from the middle classes during the "class against
class" period, was now prepared to apologise for the reactionary
class character of middle class ideology. This stance was illustrated,
for example, in an article entitled "Pour l'alliance avec les
classes moyennes" appearing in Cahiers du Bolchévisme:

"Nous regardons d'un œil méfiant le travailleur de
base portant du Petit Parisien ou de L'Ami du Peuple.
Le mouvement de masses, qui a réalisé la grève du 12
février est composé par millions de ces travailleurs
soumis depuis des années à l'influence de la presse
bourgeoise de toutes nuances, organisé pour beaucoup
d'entre eux dans des sociétés ou groupements d'un
caractère parfois réactionnaire. C'est en lisant leur
journal est non le notre, c'est avec le poids de leur
formation, de leurs illusions, de leur croyance, et
non avec nos idées qu'ils ont fait grève néanmoins."49

Clearly aware of the fact that the middle classes were capable of
reacting massively against their deteriorating objective
conditions despite their conservative ideology, the article
implied that it was up to the PCF to mobilise the potential of
middle class action to safeguard working class interests rather
than allow it to be guided by extreme right-wing or fascist
rhetoric.

In order to justify its call for an alliance with the
"toiling" middle classes, the Party quoted amply from the texts
of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Marx and Engels had realised the
importance of political alliances, based upon the idea that even
in pre-monopoly capitalism, the peasantry and sections of the

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middle classes suffered deterioration of their material conditions. In the *Civil War in France*, Marx noted that the lessons of the Paris Commune had shown that the opposition between the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie and the working class was not founded upon separate economic interests but upon past prejudices which were exploited by the bourgeoisie. It was therefore possible and desirable to bring non-working class strata into alliances with workers against capitalism.

Lenin who developed the ideas of Marx and Engels argued the necessity for the working class to ally with other non-capitalist classes thus. Class political (or revolutionary) consciousness required by the working class to become a vanguard for socialist change cannot be brought to it from the sphere of economic relations between workers and employers, but from the sphere of interrelations between all classes. In order to understand, analyse and finally influence the interrelations between all classes of society, the working class, through its party, must extend its activities beyond its own bounds, among all classes and particularly among those disadvantaged by capitalism. Hence the working class party should be able to react firstly to every manifestation of tyranny or oppression regardless of which class or stratum it may affect and secondly to every voice of protest or discontent against capitalism. Only when the party is able to generalise all manifestations of oppression to produce a single picture of capitalist exploitation and all voices of protest to produce an all round political struggle, can the working class become a vanguard for revolutionary change:
"The proletariat becomes revolutionary only in so far as it does not restrict itself to the narrow framework of craft interests, only when in all matters and spheres of public life, it acts as the leader of all the toiling and exploited masses." 52

Thus in the situation of the 'thirties where it faced a fascist threat the PCF used the arguments of the "masters" outlined above as a theoretical basis for its alliance strategy.

What was done to achieve successful alliances and thus gather together as many people as possible? It was not a straightforward matter of supporting the economic demands of various sections of the middle-class through militant action, for the poorest sections of the middle classes, including intellectuals, were already being influenced and lured to fascism not through action based on concrete material interests but through action based upon a more abstract notion - that of nationalism. In order to gather behind it and render homogeneous a mass of people, the PCF would have to provide one single common denominator based, not upon the type of nationalism espoused by fascism, but upon the more "legitimate" nationalist sentiments prevalent amongst the middle classes. This "legitimate" nationalism was found in the following theme: the defence of the French nation through the defence of French heritage and culture against bourgeois decadence and fascism. In order for the PCF to pursue this theme as a means of gaining contact with the mass of workers and middle classes it would have to use intellectuals in their very large numbers and diversity for the organisation of the necessary action culturelle. In France, the linkage between the working class and middle classes through culture (hence through intellectuals who create and promote culture) is deeply
rooted in history and has thus remained of particular interest to Parties claiming to represent the interests of one or more of these classes. The emergence and nature of this linkage and the PCF's interest in promoting it during the mid-'thirties has been explained by Danielle Tartakowsky, a PCF intellectual specialising in the history of the Party.

This linkage was formed during the period of the French Revolution when the bourgeoisie, in order to crush the power of the aristocracy, organised and relied heavily upon an alliance (bloc jacobin) between the newly emerging urban petty bourgeois (middle) and working classes. The intense struggles waged by the Jacobin alliance, against the old order, produced a culture, strongly associated with the political will to change society, which became the common national heritage of all the constituent parts of the alliance. This culture, characterised by a critical rationalism, has been developed by intellectuals (Voltaire, the Lumières, later Zola and others) who have sought to change society to the benefit of those (middle or working) classes which, after the Revolution, were done out of their share of power by the bourgeoisie. For political parties in France, therefore, the support of intellectuals, which would allow them to "control" this culture and hence revive and channel the spirit of Jacobinism within the "people", is of the utmost importance. The PCF had recognised this fact and the rapprochement towards intellectuals, which had already begun in the latter half of 1932, now took on the aspect of unashamed courtship. The Party's Eighth Congress, dubbed "congrès d'unité de la classe ouvrière et
des intellectuels" put an official seal on this courtship. In its appeal to intellectuals to rally to the working class in the struggle against fascism, the Party denounced the decadent culture which had spread under the bourgeoisie causing it to abdicate from its "national responsibilities". At the same time it counterposed the memory of the philosophers, writers, who had contributed to the development of the culture born of revolutionary struggles in the past:

"Dans le pays qui a donné Rabelais, Corneille, Racine, Molière, Voltaire, Beaumarchais, Flaubert, Balzac et Emile Zola, la décadence est effrayante . . . La culture française sombre, mais le gouvernement de M Laval n'a pas craint de réduire par décrets-lois les crédits pour les universités, les bibliothèques et les laboratoires, les secours aux étudiants pauvres. Il a réduit les crédits pour l'encouragement aux savants et aux gens de lettres."34

"Les travailleurs de la France" (the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie) were assured that under a Popular Front government the tradition of the great French philosophers, together with the revolutionary traditions of the Jacobins, would be continued with the specific support of the PCF. In its attempts to rally as many intellectuals as possible, the Party flattered the latter as never before. Famous anti-fascist intellectuals (Jean Perrin, Paul Langevin, Romain Rolland and others) were repeatedly quoted by Thorez and other Party leaders. L'Humanité at times went one step further and even began to praise those intellectuals who were only vaguely anti-fascist (for example Julien Benda). The Party's own intellectuals had been instructed not to entrench themselves too firmly in ideological positions and thus alienate the masses:

"Il faut voir grand avec la volonté d'opérer un large
rassemblement d'hommes qui peuvent ne pas penser comme nous, mais qui ne veulent pas laisser sombrer la culture dans l'abîme du fascisme... votre devoir de communistes artistes et écrivains c'est d'être parmi les artistes et écrivains. 56

This compromising posture was pushed even further by PCF leaders, later on, when the Party, abandoning its ideological apparatus of the previous decade, went as far as to separate the creations of the intellectuals' work from his or her political opinions, as is demonstrated by the following statement:

"En premier lieu, nous ne confondons nullement littérature et propagande politique, et nous pensons qu'un homme ne peut être considéré comme un grand littérateur uniquement en raison de ses opinions politiques. 57

This statement, with its implication that the Party was prepared to welcome a person by virtue of the fact that he or she was an intellectual rather than by virtue of his or her political convictions, is astonishing coming from a Communist leader. However, as one among many other similar statements it is significant in that it shows the extent to which the PCF was prepared to compromise in order to maintain the support of intellectuals throughout this period and especially from 1937 onwards, in the face of a weakening Popular Front. But it also indicated that the PCF was desperate to integrate into the mainstream of French politics and culture after suffering isolation as a result of having the strategy class against class foisted upon it by the CI.

Where the organisation of action culturelle and of intellectual participation on a practical level was concerned, the Party's record was relatively impressive. Apart from the organisation of prestige events (such as the Congress of writers
for the defence of culture which took place in September 1935) which were successful in that they boosted its image as a promoter of culture and as a provider of a broad forum for discussion, the PCF through its local organisations, set up various cercles d'études, art and music groups in work places and more importantly local sections known as amicales populaires which had the task of providing, on a general level cultural knowledge, and on a specific level a technical education to its members. Again the success of these organisations and groups were presented by the PCF as the success, in concrete terms, of its policy of alliance between workers, intellectuals and the middle classes. However, it must be noted that, because it was geared towards immediate political goals, this cultural action was not based upon a global cultural theory although at local level certain PCF federations or municipalities (particularly in Paris) did set up study groups to tackle the question of culture on a theoretical level. Thus the inter-war period, despite the failure of the Popular Front, closed with the PCF having entrenched itself firmly in national life and, more importantly for itself, in the political system with the kind of support it had not previously ever enjoyed.

Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, the PCF was disbanded as a legal organisation and for this reason one cannot continue to examine the Party's approach to intellectuals during this period ending in 1945. During the war all the efforts of the Party were channelled into building and sustaining effective resistance to the occupation and in these efforts it was aided by
workers and intellectuals of various disciplines and ideologies. The majority of widely dispersed intellectual groups or amicales, organising illegal activities, came under the Communist umbrella, until, with a membership of 100,000 they formed the Union Nationale des Intellectuels. Through this organisation the PCF continued to exert influence among intellectual strata until the end of the war. In the circumstances of occupation the Party had constructed a veritable alliance of workers and intellectuals working towards the same goal of preserving the French nation. However, this alliance, cementing diverse working class and intellectual strata under the PCF’s leadership, had emerged purely due to the conjuncture and to the nature of the common goal to be achieved rather than to any policies specifically adopted by the Party, in relation to intellectuals. This war-time alliance did enable the PCF to build up support among non-working class strata from which it could confidently launch its post-war initiatives and policies as premier parti de la France.

The end of the war brought the PCF out of the shadows of secret organisation into the limelight and into an atmosphere of intense nationalist sentiments. The Party itself enjoyed an enhanced status at this time due to its own Resistance record whereby it had proved its patriotism and its capacity to represent le peuple français as a national party, and also due to the renewed admiration, particularly amongst intellectuals, of the USSR. Partly as a result of the USSR's improved relations with the West, national communist parties found, just as during the immediate pre-war period, that they were able to shape future action according to domestic circumstances and consequently the
French Party continued with the mot d'ordre: "Au service de la France: renaissance, démocratie, unité."

Whereas the Party's main task, before the war, had been presented as preservation of the French nation and heritage, its principle task, after the war, emerged as the reconstruction or renaissance of the French nation. This entailed the building up of the economy ("la bataille de la production") in the immediate and future interests of not only the working class but of intellectuals and other sections of the middle classes who were also victims of rapacious trusts and monopolies. Thus patriotism and nationalist pronouncements were elaborated very much in the expression of a desire for a healthy peacetime economy. At home the PCF extolled the virtues of hard work in the interests of France and went as far as to castigate striking miners. However, reconstruction of the economy constituted but one element in the plan for "la renaissance de la nation." The other element was the expansion and encouragement of scientific and artistic creation:

"On ne saurait refaire la grandeur de la France sans entreprendre un immense effort de renaissance morale et intellectuelle . . . Il est . . . nécessaire d'aider et de coordonner la recherche scientifique et technique, d'encourager la création artistique, de permettre à tous les intellectuels de donner à leurs travaux une pleine efficacité, pour le bien de la France."

The immediate post-war period saw then the continuation of "la main tendue aux intellectuels", although not in the same way as during the pre-war years. The post-war PCF was in a far stronger position than it had ever been. This was confirmed by the legislative elections of October 1945 when the PCF polled
twenty-six per cent of the popular vote. In addition to being stronger, it would seem that the Party was tending towards a greater heterogeneousness, in terms of social composition, in that it was becoming less overwhelmingly working class. In 1945, the PCF vote was more evenly distributed throughout France than in 1936. In his *Histoire du PCF*, Jacques Fauvet notes:

"En 1936 le parti occupait trois places fortes ... En 1945, les trois zones n'en fait qu'une de Dunkerque à Marseille."64

This suggests that the Party had made inroads not only into rural areas where the *maquis* had been successful but also into urban middle class areas. This was particularly true of the Parisian suburbs beyond the red belt where it polled, on average, 35 per cent of the vote. The increase in votes cast by middle class voters suggested that the Party had managed to influence a sizeable section of the intellectual strata which were gradually expanding as the result of the technological changes taking place. The PCF itself had perceived the extent of its own success amongst intellectuals:

"Les plus grands maîtres de la pensée et des arts sont parmi nous ou près de nous. Nos succès électoraux parmi les classes moyennes des villes prouvent le rayonnement de notre Parti dans les milieux intellectuels et demi-intellectuels."66

As a result of its improved status amongst intellectuals, the PCF was not obliged, as it was during the Popular Front era, to make promises, pleas and ideological compromises; it was now in a position to welcome intellectuals but on its own terms. The year 1945 therefore represents a turning point where the PCF's attitude towards intellectuals was concerned because it was for
the first time that the Party was to make attempts to move towards the elaboration of a cultural policy and certainly to categorically state the main task of intellectuals in the class struggle. The primary tasks of the latter were set out at the Tenth Congress by senior spokesmen Roger Garaudy and Georges Cogniot. On examination of the two spokesmen's respective discourse it would seem that two contradictory currents of opinion existed on the matter. Whereas Garaudy clearly set out specific tasks for intellectuals in the communist movement, Cogniot remained vague, adhering more to the compromising verbiage of the Popular Front era: "notre parti... n'impose bien entendu à des adhérents aucune esthétique particulière." Was this due to confusion, regarding the means of tackling the issue, on the part of the leadership? It would be fair to assume that although the Party did not wish to antagonise intellectuals (hence Cogniot's reconciliatory stance), there prevailed a rigorously disciplinist mood (despite the experiences of the Popular Front and the Resistance) amongst Communist leaders which explains Garaudy's more demanding posture. In the long term, the fact that two currents of opinion might have existed is irrelevant as Garaudy's vision of the intellectuals' tasks triumphed over that of Cogniot.

Garaudy outlined the intellectuals' tasks as follows:

"Le Parti attend de ses intellectuels, qu'ils soient des militants mais pas seulement lorsqu'ils viennent aux réunions de cellules et aux manifestations, pas seulement des militants du dimanche et du mardi, mais dans leur vie de chaque jour, dans leur travail intellectuel. Le premier devoir d'un ingénieur communiste, c'est d'être un bon technicien. Le premier devoir d'un artiste communiste c'est d'être un grand artiste. Le premier devoir d'un historien
This was in fact a complete reversion of that which had been required of intellectuals during the first decade of the Party's history when the latter's specificity in terms of his or her profession was a secondary consideration if at all. However, although Garaudy's demands were exacting, he seemed to suggest that, in their professional and creative activity, intellectuals would enjoy a certain amount of autonomy by emphasising the content of their work as opposed to using their position solely to promote the positions of the Party. It is difficult to know whether Garaudy had the support of the rest of the PCF leadership and whether in practice his pronouncement would be taken seriously in a Party where the actual content of intellectual or cultural activity had been accorded little importance.

This sudden interest taken in the intellectual's profession and the attempts made to encourage the latter to employ scientific Marxist methods in their works rather than abstract concepts or purely empirical observations, although unsuccessful on the whole, had important reasons. The euphoria over the defeat of fascism had led the PCF and many others to believe that the death-knell of capitalist society had been sounded and that indeed a new society was about to emerge. In all of this the Party was trying to ensure its own role as the indispensable instrument of any forthcoming changes. Consequently intellectuals were required to defend, propagate and illustrate the policies and ideology of the Party in society at large. This
support from intellectuals was urgent as, to a degree, changes were already taking place. Not only were intellectuals needed to educate the large numbers of new Party members but their skills were essential in the sphere of economics and the rebuilding of French industry, as were the results of their research into scientific and social phenomena in order to give the practical struggle against the bourgeoisie a firm theoretical grounding:

"nous n'avons pas de travail actuel sur l'économie politique. Il faut faire les recherches nécessaires pour illustrer de chiffres ou de faits nouveaux les démonstrations du 'Capital' de Marx ou de 'l'Impérialisme' de Lénine. Il faut pouvoir fournir à chaque région du parti la documentation économique concernant les liaisons financières des entreprises de leur localité pour qu'elles étayent de faits précis et locaux leur campagnes contre les trusts. Ce serait décupler la force de notre propagande et de notre presse du parti."70 (his italics)

The Party was able to indicate, for the first time, the precise nature of the services that an intellectual could render and perhaps it could be said that this was because it was, for the first time in its history, that the PCF was actually participating in the government of France. The concrete situation of governing had enabled the Party to assess the intellectuals' usefulness in a way that had previously not been possible. For example, four key ministries, giving it virtual control of French industry in a crucial period of reconstruction, had been entrusted to the Party. The post of Minister of Industrial Production was conferred on Marcel Paul, that of Munitions on Charles Tillon and that of Labour and Social Security on Croizat. It is obvious that this situation had to be exploited by the Party if it was to extend its influence amongst
manual and intellectual workers within these key sectors of the economy: non-Communists were therefore often replaced by Communists. Tillon, for example, replaced the majority of non-Communist officials, engineers and managers in the aircraft industry with their Communist counterparts from the Union Générale des Ingénieurs et Cadres. Marcel Paul also appointed Communist intellectuals or those sympathetic to the PCF to posts in the ministry of industrial production after November 1945. Additionally, the PCF gained control of the nationalised coal mines by the appointment to their board (by August Lecoeur - Paul's under secretary of State) of several Communists representing the trade-unions, the state and consumers.

The applicability of intellectual labour in the spiritual, moral and cultural education of the French people was as important as in the field of political economy and was also unequivocally stressed at the Tenth congress. Garaudy compared the place of the Communist intellectual amongst his or her non-Communist counterparts as that of "le levain dans la pâte" and urged the whole body of intellectuals to participate together in the endeavour to raise the cultural consciousness of the nation. The Party was prepared to support intellectual ventures to this end:

"Il faut céder des entreprises rentables de production intellectuelle. L'édition rapporte. Les spectacles de masse rapportent. Il n'y a aucune raison pour que la gestion financière de nos organismes intellectuelles ne soit pas saine. On peut et l'on doit payer les créateurs et les chercheurs." 74

Consequently, after the war the Party press flourished with the publication of several new journals, the majority of which were
aimed at intellectuals and run by intellectuals. These included: Démocratie Nouvelle, La Pensée, which dealt with questions of a political, scientific and historic nature; Europe and Les Lettres Françaises displayed a mainly literary content. In addition to these the PCF sponsored various specialist professional journals such as La Raison, La Nouvelle Médecine and Droit Français as well as numerous regional newspapers catering for diverse urban, rural and trade-union interests. By far the most ambitious project undertaken, however, was the compilation of the Encyclopédie de la renaissance française which, continuing the traditions of France's greatest thinkers, was to cover a wide range of disciplines from architecture, music and painting to medicine and engineering. The publication of these diverse journals and particularly of the Encyclopédie fulfilled, for the PCF, an important function: that of providing a link between itself and the middle classes including intellectual strata, a forum within which non-Communist and Communist intellectuals could work together and thus advance towards a common ethic in the cultural domain:

"Il s'agit avant tout de donner aux intellectuels des tâches particulières. L'Encyclopédie répond à ce besoin: elle peut mobiliser les intellectuels de toutes les spécialités pour des tâches de l'intérêt national. Il est également absurde de faire travailler les intellectuels communistes en vase clos. Ils doivent entraîner aux tâches que l'Encyclopédie leur offre des intellectuels de toute opinion, sous la seule condition qu'ils soient décidés à apporter à des tâches nationales et constructives toute leur compétence technique ... L'Encyclopédie de la Renaissance Française servira de lien entre les intellectuels communistes et non communistes ... Elle peut mobiliser un nombre illimité de chercheurs ... "76

Although Garaudy's statement seems to imply that any intellectual
would be tolerated it is important to realise, in view of what had been said before, that "compétence technique", as the primary condition of tolerance, was assumed to involve a scientific reasoning as opposed to an idealistic one. In fact, apart from their utility in the mobilisation of the masses in the reconstruction of France, intellectuals were being asked to prepare the ground for the future when a communist ethic (one which was nevertheless compatible with retention of traditional national values and heritage) would become acceptable to the vast majority of the salaried masses. However, the Party's ambitious programme for a national economic and cultural regeneration of the French nation was not allowed to progress as a realignment of forces on an international level generating repercussions on French domestic politics led to what has been termed by Edgar Morin as the "seconde glaciation stalinienne".

It is important to stress that in its attempts to "direct" national culture (thus hoping to influence the middle classes in particular) during the period 1935-1947, the PCF's overtures to intellectuals were designed mainly to harness the goodwill of the latter. The Party still seemed to be oblivious of the need to consider intellectuals as more than just a link with non-working class strata in view of the fact that the number of intellectuals as part of the active population was growing. There are indications however (Garaudy's emphasis on the importance of the intellectual's professional activity rather than on the latter's willingness to militate) that certain individuals in the Party leadership were becoming aware of the importance of
intellectuals, as a social grouping, in its own right, in society.

V. Cold War Sectarianism: 1948-1955

The year 1947 saw a major realignment of forces on an international level: a cold war atmosphere was setting in, heightening tensions between the USA and the USSR while France, together with the rest of Europe, was to provide the setting in which these tensions would be played out. The declaration by the USA of the Truman doctrine and Marshall plan, aimed at bringing its Western allies under its firm tutelage, was paralleled by the reinforcement of links between the USSR and communist parties of Western Europe. Consequently, a meeting of nine communist parties, including the PCF, took place in September 1947. The meeting, convened to demonstrate the unity between communist parties, became the inaugural session of the Kominform. A report presented by Zdhanov affirmed that there existed two diametrically opposed camps: the anti-democratic, imperialist camp (whose interests were connected with the waging of wars) led by the USA and the democratic, anti-imperialist camp (interested in the maintenance of peace) led by the USSR. As a result of this new analysis of the international situation, the communist parties of Europe were called upon to lead the struggle against American expansionism and domination and to expose its auxiliaries in Europe, especially right-wing socialists (for example Blum and Ramadier). This struggle, stressed Zdhanov, would be carried out on three levels: not only on the political and economic level but equally importantly, on the ideological level. Apart from struggling against imperialism, communist
parties were asked to note that the battle for peace was also a priority.

The contents of the report were especially significant for the PCF, in that the latter had received a heavy dose of criticism for its persistence in presenting itself as a party of government and of thus undermining the struggle for peace and against American imperialism in France. Jacques Duclos (one of the two PCF delegates, the other was Etienne Fajon) was therefore obliged to pronounce a criticism of his own party and pledge it to carry out firmly the tasks set out by the Zhdanov report. Clearly the course of the PCF's future actions had been mapped out by the Kominform until 1956 at least when the latter was dissolved. Thus the beginning of the Cold War marked the end of the policy of union nationale. Once again, ideological unity amongst communists was prioritised as the battle to rally the masses "against imperialism and for peace" commenced. In order to fulfill that point of the Zhdanov report which called for the battle to be waged on an ideological level, it is clear that the Party would have once again to depend heavily upon intellectuals to inform and influence the masses as they had done during the period 1935 to 1947. There was however a difference. The theory of the two camps (imperialist and anti-imperialist), applicable on the national level and thus corresponding with the notion of the existence of two main classes (the bourgeoisie and the working class) was now incompatible with the strategy of class alliance. Consequently the PCF was unable to welcome to its ranks (as it had during the Popular Front era and the immediate
post-war period) intellectuals of varied backgrounds and on the contrary required intellectuals to use their positions in society solely to promote Party propaganda and thus demonstrate their unconditional allegiance to the values and interests of the working class. The doctrine of socialist realism which had been resisted by the PCF before 1947 because it would have conflicted with the policy to rally as many intellectuals as possible, was now integrated into the theory of the Party. The movement towards the adoption of the doctrine of socialist realism had begun at the PCF's Eleventh Congress of June 1947 when Laurent Casanova, warning intellectuals of the attempts made by the USA of a "dressage de l'esprit français" (through the exportation of decadent American culture), informed his audience:

"Il y a un art qui pautage (sic) aussi dans la réalité quotidienne, et même dans celle d'hier. C'est l'art réactionnaire. Il y a une politique qui devance son temps parce qu'elle est une politique de principe. C'est la politique communiste. Il y a un art réactionnaire comme il y a une politique réactionnaire... il y a un art d'avant-garde, comme il y a une politique d'avant-garde." 79

In order to oppose the forms of reactionary art and science responsible for the adulteration of French culture, it was necessary that the products of intellectual labour be made useful to the masses, in particular the working class. During this period the role of intellectuals as a link with the middle classes became secondary. Now intellectuals were wholly at the service of the working class and its party. It would seem that the PCF had found it necessary to gear the ideological battle, to a great extent, towards intellectuals in the Party who represented, sometimes overtly, "dangerous political currents"
manifested in the:

"- refus d'adopter la position du parti dans le combat idéologique,
- esprit de suffisance dans l'appréciation des rapports qui doivent s'établir entre la classe ouvrière et les intellectuels, telles sont les sources où s'alimentent ces courants dangereux."80

Thus, not only was the Party concerned with informing and influencing the masses against the adversary, but it was equally keen to act upon the domains of intellectual creation with the aim of transforming these to reflect working class interests and values and to integrate intellectuals within the Party by changing their sense of engagement from one based upon patriotism or humanitarianism to one based upon considerations of class.

With these objectives in mind, a section idéologique was set up under the guidance of Casanova who had become the chief spokesman on intellectual affairs. The section comprised three branches: one concerned with education and training of Party cadres led by Léo Figuères, one concerned with questions of scientific research and development headed by Georges Cogniot and the commission of intellectuals led by Casanova himself. One of the first measures undertaken by the section was to disband the groups of intellectuals (amicales) which had operated during the war. This measure was taken because these groups were found to be working outside the regular decision-making structures of the Party: "Les intellectuels communistes ne vivaient plus la même vie que l'ensemble du Parti." Intellectuals were regrouped, according to their profession, into cercles idéologiques (for example, cercle de biologistes, cercle d'ingénieurs etc.) closely linked to the section idéologique. The function of the circles
was to:

"familiariser les intellectuels avec les formes collectives de travail et l'usage de la critique et de l'autocritique communistes."82

The circles were instructed to discuss and publish articles on the themes of bourgeois conceptions of science, art, geography and so on as opposed to proletarian science (as embodied by Lysenkoism, for example) and art. Several critiques on the above subjects were published in the Party's newly founded intellectual review *Nouvelle Critique*, but could hardly be considered to have contributed originality to the subject areas concerned. The critiques either consisted of ritual denunciation of bourgeois theories without the presentation of original alternatives or of presentations of arguments based on Party positions in defence of cultural Stalinism. There was no longer any room for serious study or research which had always been encouraged in the past by the Party although certain rules had to be adhered to. Now the intellectual was considered as no more than a medium for words which were formulated by the leadership.

"La direction voulait qu'on fasse le commentaire instruit de la politique du parti. Ce que le parti présentait: il met son talent au service du parti, pour aider ... Le biologiste devait faire la rhétorique de Lysenko etc. Les textes existent clairement là-dessus. Le problème était le suivant, c'est que, il n'y avait pas de place pour la recherche propre."83

Another result of the activity of the circles was the organisation of *journées d'études*. In March 1953, for example, just over six hundred intellectuals, of various disciplines participated in such an event. The primary objective of these study days was to boost support among intellectuals, for the PCF
by generating interest in the Party's organisation of specialised intellectual disciplines. It is difficult to know whether the study days achieved their objective although nine months later it was claimed that many new intellectuals had been recruited to the 84 Party. On the whole the circles' contribution to the batailles d'idées was limited in quantity. This however, did not seem to concern the Party for on the whole they were left to function without interference where general organisation was concerned. It was only when signs of hesitation or criticisms of the Party's position became apparent that the circles were quickly brought to heel. Consequently, in drawing his conclusions of the study days Georges Cogniot congratulated those groups (such as the circle of chemists and historians) which had in their presentations, integrated the tenets of zhdanovism or socialist realism, but castigated those who had displayed hesitation (flottement).

In addition to organising the cercles idéologiques the PCF often convened large meetings of intellectuals. Of these some were convened on a regular basis, for example at the beginning of each academic year of the Université Nouvelle, intellectuals of the Seine federation heard a member of the Bureau Politique outline their tasks as militants and ideologues. Other more important meetings were specially called either when a new idea had to be 'diffused', when a change in policy or theory had been effected or when intellectuals needed to be disciplined. These meetings could be directed at specialist subject areas (for example when only doctors and psychiatrists attended a meeting in December 1948 on psychoanalysis which was condemned as a
bourgeois science) or at all intellectuals (for example the meeting of intellectuals with Casanova which took place in February 1949 at the Salle Wagram in Paris). This meeting was significant in that its sole purpose was to bring to order intellectuals who had been voicing their doubts and this was done very harshly without any possibility for intellectuals to reply to criticisms or discuss the matters in question. Casanova’s denunciations of those intellectuals who had displayed "des remous, des incompréhensions, des oppositions parfois violentes" on the subjects of the two sciences and Lysenkoism, were particularly directed towards Marcel Prenant (a well known Communist biologist) and Claud Cahen (a lecturer from Strasbourg University). Prenant, in an article published by La Pensée, had tried to distinguish theoretical research from practical applications and while unwilling to condemn Lysenkoism completely, was unable to accept the notion of the two sciences, in this instance, without precise proofs. Cahen, on the other hand, in a letter to the Party, had asked the latter to provide "à nos biologistes le matériel proprement scientifique sur lequel leur confrères soviétiques ont élaboré leurs théories nouvelles." The two men together with others were accused of helping the enemy in not taking up the ideological positions of the Party. Intellectuals were also accused of retaining a bourgeois outlook on life and of demonstrating an unwillingness to carry out practical tasks:

"Il est temps pour chacun d’admettre qu’il faut prendre sur soi et sur son temps pour consentir aux tâches pratiques d’organisation. Qu’il faut lutter en nous contre la survie de cet individualisme propre à l’intellectuel bourgeois; et l’idée commode qu’il
In conclusion, Casanova asked intellectuals to practise the theory of socialist realism and to rally to the ideological positions of the working class party, holding up as examples of good Communist intellectuals Fougeron the painter and Daquin the film-maker who was to point out that on joining the PCF, an intellectual was signing an alliance contract with the working class which should remain intact under all circumstances. The intellectual must always display unquestioning loyalty, in order not to threaten the alliance with the working class. That part of the bataille idéologique that was not directed towards the Party's own intellectuals but towards the working masses, essentially took place in the frame-work of la bataille du livre the aim of which was outlined as:

"établir un contact directe entre l'écrivain et le lecteur . . . gagner d'autres milliers de lecteurs au livre progressiste et . . . chasser des foyers, des bibliothèques, des devantures de librairies, toute une littérature de haine, de perversion, de pornographie dont nous inondent les impérialistes américains."90

The bataille du livre required writers, artists and other intellectuals to travel from region to region with a view to promoting their works in factories and other places of work, local markets, shops etc. Meetings and discussion groups were organised by the Party federations and in this context Communist intellectuals were flattered and promoted. These meetings were often turned into prestige events especially if the intellectual being promoted was well-known. It would seem that the campaign was successful in that it increased considerably the sales of the
works of Communist intellectuals and certainly went some way towards reaching a wide public outside the working class for it was noted, with some regret perhaps, that:

"l'élément prolétarien et plus particulièrement l'élément communiste est insuffisamment représenté."91

However it is certain that the bataille du livre did nothing to stem the flow of American cultural imperialism in France and thus did not in any way contribute to "political victories" for the PCF as the Party press had optimistically claimed during those years.

The ideological battle against American Imperialism was but one aspect of Zhdanov's report to the inaugural meeting of the Kominform. The report's other major element was the struggle for peace which in fact became an essential part of the PCF's political strategy as the isolation, suffered by the Party during the cold war period, had imposed limitations upon the latter's habitual forms of political participation. Unlike the waging of the ideological battle, which had re-inforced the Party's isolation in the political domain and widened the gap between the latter and intellectuals (both Communist and non-Communist), the struggle for peace contained a unifying ideal. In the PCF's view it therefore provided the only frame-work within which it could (during a period of isolation) pursue alliance strategies and use its own intellectuals to further these. The PCF's participation in the peace struggle therefore went some way towards counterbalancing the negative effects of the Cold War on the Party's image amongst intellectuals and other middle class strata. French Communist involvement in the peace movement
commenced in earnest after August 1948 when the Kominform, together with the Polish Communist Party, organised a "World Council of Intellectuals for Peace". The Soviet Union's own isolated position on an international level, blocking its normal channels of foreign policy and diplomacy, had led it to the realisation that an ancillary organisation, such as an international peace movement, would have to be utilised in order for it to make an impact on international relations. It was with this in mind that the Kominform adopted a resolution in November 1949, affirming that a peace movement was to become the focus of the entire activities of communist parties.

In France, the Kominform's resolution was followed by the founding congress of the Mouvement de la Paix which took place in November 1948. This new organisation led by Casanova, Tillon and others, non-Communists such as Yves Farge, succeeded in rallying many non-Communists, mainly intellectuals, through the establishment of local "peace councils" all over France and through the diffusion of its publication Défense de la Paix. The importance of the movement to the PCF was evident through the stance adopted by the latter, on the issue of peace, at its Twelfth Congress in April 1950. Whereas the Party remained intransigent in its attitude and language on the issue of intellectuals reflecting the ideas of socialist realism in their works, it was prepared to adopt a relatively conciliatory tone (reminiscent of the Popular Front era) in urging intellectuals to take up the issue of peace:

"Communistes, socialistes, cacholiques, républicains, hommes et femmes, jeunes et vieux, ouvriers et
paysans, manuels et intellectuels, patriotes de toutes opinions politiques, convictions philosophiques, croyances religieuses, construisez ensemble, solidement le front uni de la paix.”

The PCF's use of the peace movement and of intellectuals to improve its political and electoral standing, was multiform. Apart from organising prestige events, such as the first World Congress of Peace Partisans led by the eminent Communist intellectual Joliot-Curie, the Party took part in various campaigns such as that for a "Peace Ballot" in October 1949 when several million signatures from people of varying social background were gathered in support of peace. It also took the opportunity of imposing the peace issue upon social and economic demands of workers when, for example, it coordinated, with the CGT, a number of illegal strikes during the early months of 1950, in defence and defence-related industries. But the PCF's attempts to mechnically attach peace issues to socio-economic ones were eventually to contribute to the failure of the peace movement. This failure occurred because, by and large, workers were not prepared to subordinate the economic struggle to that for peace. For them the two issues remained unrelated and for its part the Party had made no effort to explain the relation between the two issues.

Thus although it can be said that the issue of peace went some way, during the Cold War years, towards preventing a total isolation of the PCF from intellectuals and other sections of the middle classes, it failed (mainly because of worker opposition) to bring together an alliance of "the people" under its lead. Fortunately for the PCF the Cold War atmosphere, which had posed
a threat to its existence, began to gradually recede after the
death of Stalin in March 1953.

During the period following Stalin's death (in March 1953)
up to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the Soviet
leadership began to make moves towards liberalisation in its
policies and internal organisation. These moves were paralleled
by similar shifts within other European communist parties. For
the PCF, the path was once more cleared for the pursuit of a more
independent line. Such a line began to be reasserted by Maurice
Thorez in matters of culture and of the Party's approach to
intellectuals although he remained resolute in his refusal to
carry out any liberalisation or de-Stalinisation where the PCF's
internal structures and organisation were concerned.

Where the issue of culture was concerned the PCF, at its
Thirteenth Congress of June 1954, repudiated firmly the doctrine
of Socialist Realism. In his cultural manifesto to the Congress,
Aragon stated that a party could only define cultural tendencies
but that it was up to intellectuals to translate such tendencies
into artistic or scientific reality. In an assuring tone he
asserted that the PCF would not engage in promoting sectarian and
schematic cultural forms. In a gesture to demonstrate that the
PCF had renewed its outlook on cultural creation Marcel Prenant,
disgraced in the Lysenko controversy, was rehabilitated to his
former position in the Party's hierarchy of respected
intellectuals. The PCF was once again hoping that intellectuals
would serve as a convenient link with the middle classes whose
support was necessary for its re-integration into the political
processes of French society. The Party's strong desire to be
welcomed back into the fold of legitimate politics was evident during the period 1953 to 1956. Starting from a position where, at its Central Committee of June 1953, it made a call for a popular front of the 'fifties (that is an alliance between the working and middle classes) the Party went on to espouse the idea of a renewed union nationale in which "tous les bons français" were courted. The theme of saving the French nation and its culture was promoted this time in a campaign against the integration of France into a European entity (in this case the European Defence Community). Once this campaign against France's integration into Europe had lost its momentum, the PCF continued until 1956 to make vague and intermittent calls, now for front populaire, now for union nationale indicating that it was unsure of which path to follow in constructing alliances and thus extending its base beyond the working class. The need to extend its base beyond its traditional constituency was to become more urgent to the PCF in the late 'fifties as it embarked upon an electoralist course and as the changes in the social make-up of France's working population, due to the modernisation of her economy, were to become more evident.

Having examined the PCF's approach to intellectuals during the period 1920 to 1955 a number of points need to be reiterated. Firstly in its approach to intellectuals, during the period under study here, the PCF made no attempt to undertake a theoretical analysis of the social situation of intellectuals in French society. Intellectuals, whether salaried or otherwise were considered as belonging to the "petty bourgeois" or middle
classes. However the fact that the social situation of intellectuals, and in particular of those belonging to the ranks of the salariat, was in many ways changing was being recognised by individuals within the Party. By 1955 members of the PCF's Économie et Politique collective had published a few articles suggesting that Party ought to begin to consider the changes taking place in French social structure generally and within the group intellectuals more specifically. Secondly, the Party's interest in intellectuals stemmed mainly from the fact that the latter could play a useful role in the process whereby the working class became a vanguard for social change. Thus, intellectuals were considered either as a channel through which the middle classes could be reached or as providers of knowledge and information to the working class. In order to fulfil either role they were expected to produce works which were "politically useful" to the working class and its party. However the parameters for works considered politically useful were drawn by the Party. Intellectuals could not be relied upon to do so because of their non-working class origins—they were in general "alliés chancelants". Inevitably, the requirement to work within the framework set by the PCF also meant that intellectuals had to accept without question or doubt the ideological positions of the Party. The exception for such a requirement to be met was made during the period preceding the Second World War. Generally, however, the PCF remained uninterested in the results of intellectual labour or cultural creation unless they served a political purpose.

However the massive entry of intellectual labour into the
sphere of production from the 1950's onwards meant that the PCF could not afford to remain uninterested in the intellectual workforce. The ideological problem of determining correct class differences and relations within the context of building alliances was to become of paramount importance for the PCF.
CHAPTER IV

EMPIRICAL SOCIOLOGY AND THE UNIVOCAL CLASSIFICATION OF
INTELLECTUAL WORKERS ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION: THE INSEE APPROACH
This chapter presents the INSEE's conception of social structure in France with particular reference to the social situation of salaried intellectual workers (ITC, teachers, researchers, scientific workers). The INSEE's conception of social structure is based upon the classification of the working population into occupational strata. These classifications are made according to information (yielded from population studies) presented in statistical form and thus assume the mantle of neutrality. Is a statistical approach to the study of social structure to be considered free of ideological restrictions? The fact that certain assumptions are made in constructing occupational groups or categories and that data are collected and assessed by human beings with particular subjective views of the world suggest that the approach cannot be neutral or non-ideological.

Prior to presenting a social "portrait" of intellectual workers (based on the INSEE's occupational categories), this chapter examines the principles governing the construction of categories and inadequacies or restrictions relating to data collection and assessment. The presentation of a social "portrait" is useful in that it enables one to trace the general trend in the quantitative evolution of intellectual workers. The decision to present the INSEE system of classification, as opposed to others, is significant: the INSEE plays a central role, nationally, in the production of empirical data relating to the French population and consequently, this data related to its system of classification is employed by various bodies (governmental and otherwise) and political parties including the PCF.
The statistical survey of a pre-defined population (for example, the number of persons in a country at a certain date) constitutes a major method of studying social structure or the differences and similarities between diverse social groupings. The most common form of such surveys is the population census where statistical correlations between different written responses, by individuals, to pre-formulated questions, are studied in order to draw conclusions regarding the latter's position in the social structure as well as general behaviour patterns of individuals grouped together.

Statistical surveys, in the form of opinion sounding, became very popular in France in the 1940's, when government departments, public and private organisations began to carry out opinion polls in order to establish patterns of consumer intake of goods and services. In order to facilitate use and interpretation of results, individuals were classified into large groups, using as indicators of group membership, criteria such as ownership of and access to certain material goods and services respectively. The use of such crude criteria gave way to a method of dual classification which used simultaneously, as indicators of group membership, an individual's occupation (activités individuelles) and the economic activity of the establishment employing the same individual (activités économiques). The notion of status was also incorporated into this system of classification (albeit unsystematically) so that a person could be classified as a lathe worker in a car factory of the nationalised sector; this primary classification could then be completed by the addition of the information that the person's occupation was exercised as a foreman as opposed to a skilled
worker or apprentice. Although this system produced relatively accurate classifications of individuals, the wealth of details presented forced classifiers to divide the working population into a multitude of small groups whereas it was, clearly, more convenient to work with fewer and larger groupings. In June 1947, the INSEE (which supplanted the Statistique Générale de la France) published for the first time a nomenclature of occupational titles (Code des Métiers) as distinct from that pertaining to economic activities.

However it was not until 1954 that a new code classifying the entire working population into social categories, based on similar occupations (Code des Catégories Socioprofessionnelles, CSP, used in conjunction with the Code des Métiers) was adopted by the INSEE as an important contribution towards the empirical study of milieu social. This code of CSP remained in use for 28 years, in more or less the same structural form, until 1982 when a new system of classification (according to the Nomenclature des Professions et Catégories Socioprofessionnelles - PCS) came into use. The use of both systems of classification are discussed in this chapter.

A rational use of the CSP and PCS classifications presupposes a profound reflection, on the part of the user, upon the inevitable constraints involved in the construction of CSP and PCS and in the collection and treatment of statistical information. The subjection of the INSEE systems of classification to critical comment is therefore necessary.

On a general level the CSP and PCS codes, pretending to a certain neutrality as statistical instruments of classification
are aimed at satisfying as many users as possible. These users had, for a long time, demanded an official classification of the population into a limited number of large and homogeneous occupational groups or categories which would ease the handling and coding of information collected and enable users to obtain immediately interpretable results. In the final analysis, whether or not these aims have been achieved remains a question of formality for despite reservations and criticisms these systems of classification (according to CSP and PCS), by virtue of the central role played by the INSEE in information gathering and statistical production, have been widely used and will continue to be employed thus respectively. However, it must be pointed out that the uncrirical use of statistical information, produced by the INSEE, would devalue conclusions drawn therefrom.

I. Principles of construction and inadequacies relating to the system of classification according to CSP

The use of the empirical method, by the INSEE, in the construction of CSP consisted of choosing an appellation, for a particular category, which could be presented as the archetype of a large number of occupations (for example cadres administratifs moyens). The category could then be completed by including in it a certain number of occupational titles (as listed in the Code des Métiers) which were considered as entirely representative of the category in question (cas typiques) and a number of occupations which are not wholly typical. The occupations were chosen in this manner for two reasons: firstly, that their
incumbents display a number of attributes, such as a particular sex, age, income level, education, area of habitation, which are popularly recognised as pertaining to the archetype of a category, as in the case of agricultural workers or ouvriers agricoles (these are "uncontrolled" attributes); secondly, because the occupations in question are juridically recognised as constituting a category as in the case of Ingénieurs (this is a "controlled" attribute). Boundaries of the category were then drawn up by the indication of the types of occupations which are untypical, but which might, mistakenly, be included. In addition to this, general outlines regarding the content of a category were presented as a complementary definition (the main definition was constituted by the list of included occupations) after the CSP title (see Appendix 1).

The CSP were then distributed between nine aggregate occupational groups (see Appendix 2) across which operated a series of major oppositions between: salaried and non-salaried occupations; manual and non-manual occupations; skilled and unskilled occupations. These oppositions, while facilitating the delineation of CSP boundaries, reflected, to an extent, the existence of pre-established inter-group and intra-group hierarchies (a reflection of popular perceptions of social status) which were further reinforced in the collection of data used for classifying individuals. This is discussed below.

There are a number of major criticisms to be made here. Firstly, one concerning the construction of CSP is that an archetype of a certain category may no longer display the same uncontrolled or popularly recognised attributes as the
occupations or professions attached to it by virtue of the fact that the category in question has evolved, over a period of time, so that "socially" it no longer constitutes the same group of people as before. In this case an archetype has become historically dated. For example, in taking as archetypes (of the categories constituting the aggregate occupational group ouvriers) skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled male manual workers (with long standing membership of the labour movement specifically and of the salaried population in general), one is liable to misinterpret the fact that the number of manual workers increased by 500,000 between 1968 and 1975 as more than half this increase was due to the arrival, in the industrial workforce, of women workers. The latter displayed attributes which at once contradicted those of the archetypes for the majority of them were unskilled. Also, on average, they were younger and lower paid than their male counterparts. The same observation can be made of the category employés de bureau which, to a larger extent, underwent a process of feminisation between 1954 and 1975.

Secondly one may also criticise the fact that in some cases, archetypes representing juridically recognised occupations or professions did not themselves correspond to appellations of categories as set out in law by collective agreements (conventions collectives). Here one has in mind, the supplementary distinction made by INSEE between cadres supérieurs and cadres moyens (which does not appear in any collective agreements) to distinguish between those wielding economic or
cultural power on behalf of their employers (cadres administratifs supérieurs, ingénieurs, professeurs, professions littéraires et scientifiques) and those executing decisions or orders emanating from the preceding group (cadres administratifs moyens, techniciens, instituteurs, services médicaux et sociaux).

The category cadres in the majority of collective agreements is limited to salaried professionals in the higher echelons of private enterprises only and to certain other salaried employees found in slightly lower echelons of the hierarchy. In this particular case, it would seem that the authors of the CSP code attempted to take into account the multiplicity of definitions of the term cadres. The lack of correspondence between different definitions of the category cadres and indeed of other categories has to an extent contributed to the arbitrary nature of boundaries between the INSEE categories and groups where complete discontinuity does not really exist, and therefore to problems regarding the classification of individuals. However, and this constitutes a third criticism, this arbitrary imposition of boundaries also reflects past relations and conflicts between social groups, which may bear no relevance to the present period. For example, the classification of occupations into manual and non-manual groupings reflects an opposition which was most obvious at the beginning of this century between those who worked in workshops and on factory assembly lines and those who worked in offices and at shop counters. This opposition was based upon a number of divisive elements: salary differences, differences in hours of work and working conditions (high noise levels, grime and dirt on factory floors), differences in stability of
employment, differences in education and even in manner of dress at work. Many of these differences are either disappearing completely or have been reduced; thus the extension of the patterns of division of labour from the factory floors to offices (as testified by the growth of typing pools), the decrease in stability of employment of non-manual workers, the reduction in differentials of the pay of manual and non-manual workers all seem to indicate a lack of technical reasons for this opposition.

Methods of collection of information and the manner in which information is used to classify individuals into CSP reveal inadequacies of the system on another level. Information used to classify individuals into CSP is collected from written declarations made by individuals in census surveys and employment surveys (enquêtes emplois). In asking individuals to make statements concerning their occupation, it is assumed that the INSEE's classifications and use of terminology correspond with most individuals' perceptions of occupations and social groups or categories. Thus the authors of the CSP code stress that persons classified in a category are expected to:

"Être susceptibles d'entretenir des relations personnelles entre elles, avoir souvent des comportements ou des opinions analogues, se considérer elles-mêmes comme appartenant à une même catégorie, et être considérées par les autres comme appartenant à une même catégorie."7

However, this assumption disregards the fact that different individuals' perceptions of social and occupational categories vary according to respective experiences and relations vis-à-vis the political and economic institutions of the social system of which they form a part and also according to the most prevalent
folk wisdoms (of which social stereotypes are engendered) in a certain place and at a certain time. Thus too great an emphasis is placed upon coincidences which may not take place in practice. There will be many cases where a person may be considered by a neighbour, a friend or an employer as belonging to a particular category but where the person concerned may disagree. This lack of coincidence of perceptions of CSP contributes to the widening of boundaries between categories, thus rendering inconsistent distinctions made between them and to the distortion of the size (in numbers) of CSP. For example, the distinction between ouvrier spécialisé (OS) and ouvrier qualifié (OQ) is often rendered inconsistent as a result of the divergence in perceptions of occupations as reflected by the replies of workers and of their employers. It is often found that while the workers themselves base their replies upon the functions they perform and upon their own levels of skills and training, employers do not necessarily do the same. Therefore an employer may place an OS, or a group of OS in the category OQ as a result of wages conflict whereby it was in the employer's interests to justify the increase in wages of this particular group of unskilled workers by promoting them to the grade of OQ (without their functions changing or changing slightly) rather than face the economic costs of salary increases for all OS or of restructuring the company's salary scales. Such practices are not limited to the group of manual workers but affect other categories of non-manual workers also:

"Est cadre celui que l'entreprise a décidé d'appeler ainsi, celui à qui l'entreprise a décidé d'attribuer
ce statut puisqu'il s'agit dans les faits d'un véritable statut reconnu par les conventions collectives et la jurisprudence ( . . . ) Cette tautologie ne poserait pas de problème si toutes les entreprises avaient des critères communs d'appartenance au groupe cadres. Or, ce n'est pas exactement le cas ( . . . ) Telle personne qui est cadre dans telle entreprise ne le serait pas nécessairement dans une autre. Ceci peut même se produire dans une même entreprise et un contremaître promu cadre dans une certaine usine ne l'aurait peut-être pas dans une autre. Telle fonction qui est attribuée ici à un cadre l'est là à un agent de haute maîtrise. Ainsi de fait la délimitation du groupe cadres varie considérablement d'une entreprise à l'autre, d'une branche d'industrie à l'autre."

In addition to divergences in opinions of employers and employees, in many instances it has been found that the opinions of the same individuals vary from one survey to another, thus affecting the accuracy of figures established for certain CSP.

Another minor factor, affecting the accuracy of numbers in a category, is the incompleteness or overlooking of questions, on survey forms, by respondents simply because questions have not been well understood or judged indiscreet by the latter. This is recognised by the INSEE in its classifications.

The classification of persons into CSP takes into account several aspects of the notion of occupation or profession:
- that of occupational title (thus the distinction between the main groups of manual workers, employees, etc);
- that of economic activity (thus the recognition of categories such as miners, seamen and fishermen);
- that of self-employment as opposed to salaried status (for example the distinction between skilled manual workers and individual craftsmen (artisans);
- that of professional qualification (for example the distinction
between OS and OQ);

- that of hierarchies within groups of salaried workers (for example the distinction between OQ and supervisors or foremen (contremaitres);

- hierarchies within the groups of self-employed persons governed by the size of an enterprise (for example, the distinction between individual craftsmen and factory owners (industriels), between small shopowners (petits commerçants) and large shopowners (gros commerçants)).

However, the use of the different aspects of occupation, in determining an individual classification, is not systematic, in that if one aspect serves as a criterion the definition of one category, it does not in the case of many others. Only one aspect of the notion of occupation is systematically applied in defining categories: that of occupational title as declared by respondents. Therefore whereas manual workers are asked to state the professional qualification of their jobs, others are not, and whereas the opposition between the self-employed and salaried persons serves to distinguish independent craftsmen from skilled manual workers, other occupational categories such as autres personnels de service comprise both self-employed and salaried persons. This unsystematic application of diverse aspects of occupation as criteria, could be defended on the grounds that: a systematic application of all criteria would lead to the creation of numerous smaller categories thus defeating the original aim of presenting fewer but larger categories; that INSEE classifiers accumulate a wealth of information (through access to results of other surveys and reports and from guidelines contained in
collective agreements) aiding interpretation of declarations made by respondents. However, the validity of the second part of the justification could be undermined by the fact that although INSEE classifiers do acquire a wealth of information from other sources, this information is not used in the same way by different classifiers who, to a certain extent, develop their own individual systems for dealing with complicated or incomplete declarations. Although some classifiers will have more knowledge and experience regarding criteria for classification and thus apply the latter rigorously others will not necessarily do the same. In addition to this, INSEE classifiers cannot be expected to perform their jobs from a uniformly objective standpoint; as part of certain social categories themselves, their perceptions of occupations will be affected according to their own experiences and relations with the social, political and economic institutions of society.

The criticisms expressed above are of a general order and although they do not constitute an exhaustive list they reflect by and large the doubts, expressed by users of the INSEE classifications, in relation to the neutrality or objectivity of such a system. The inadequacies or restrictions of the INSEE system have to be considered altogether in determining whether assertions of objectivity are justified. Taken individually a certain inadequacy may acquire greater significance than another. I have found it difficult to establish a hierarchy of importance in relation to the inadequacies or restrictions listed above although, clearly some are more easily overcome than others. The
examination of the PCS code below recognises that the INSEE has attempted with varying degrees of success to do away with some of the inadequacies and problems relating to the old CSP system.

II. The new nomenclature of PCS: principal innovations and limitations

The decision, taken by the INSEE, to establish a new system of classifications of occupations, was based upon the recognition that the social structure of French society had evolved greatly between the years 1954 (when the CSP code was first put into use) and 1979 (when the process of construction of a new system of classification commenced) as a result of the advances of technology in industrial production. Furthermore, it was becoming increasingly difficult to use the CSP code to present even an approximation of social reality. The new system of classification of individuals into PCS was first used in 1982 for the interpretation of data collected during the March population census and the employment survey of April and May of the same year. The new PCS code includes some fundamental innovations which go some way towards answering some of the criticisms, of the CSP code, outlined above. Unlike the old system where the CSP code, although used in conjunction with the Code des Métiers, was completely separate from the latter, the new PCS code integrates a nomenclature of professions (equivalent to the old Code des Métiers) or occupations together with a nomenclature of CSP so that in fact the former represents a subdivision of the latter on a far more detailed level.

Although the structure of the new PCS nomenclature resembles
that of the old system, one important modification of the principles of construction has affected the contents of certain groups and PCS as explained below. As with the old system, an appellation, characterising the archetype of a number of occupations, is chosen for each PCS which is articulated upon four levels. The first level, noyau (equivalent to the old cas typiques) consists of the names of occupations which are most representative of the archetype or PCS title. This level falls above that comprising cas assimilés which are, in the main, more vague but substitutive appellations for those found on the first level. The third level, cas limites inclus, represents occupations which are untypical representations of the archetype but which are included as they could not be included in any other PCS. Finally, the fourth level, that of cas limites exclus lists apppellations of occupations which are not included in the category but which symbolically mark the outer limits of the category in question. This listing of occupations on four levels constitutes the main definition of a PCS and, as in the case of CSP, is preceded by a brief description of the category (see Appendix 3). The 32 categories or PCS, representing the working population, are then divided between six aggregate occupational groups (see Appendix 2) which as well as retaining the principal oppositions of the old eight group classification (between salaried and self-employed, manual and non-manual, skilled and unskilled) has integrated complementary oppositions such as those between fonction publique and entreprise and between those manual workers engaged in industrial type activity
and those engaged in artisanal type of activity.

The modification of principles governing construction of PCS concerns the criteria for choosing certain occupations as representative of the archetype of a category. This modification has affected mainly the salaried categories of group three (Professions Libérales et Cadres Supérieurs) and group four (Cadres Moyens) of the old CSP classifications. Previously the INSEE's classification of salaried occupations into CSP were based upon two criteria: that the occupations in a category possessed the same uncontrolled attributes as the archetype of that category; that the occupations possessed the same controlled attributes as the archetypes of that category. However, where categories of cadres were concerned, a contradiction appeared between the archetype cadres and the occupations attached to that archetype by virtue of the fact that all the occupations chosen by the INSEE authors were not juridically (that is in the terms of collective agreements) recognised as representative of the archetype cadres. It was with the view of eliminating discrepancies between the INSEE's classifications of salaried occupations and those of the collective agreements that only one group of cadres has been retained in the new PCS nomenclature. Under the new nomenclature only those who are cadres, in the sense of the collective agreements, will be classified in the new group three: Cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures. Consequently, the new group four has been renamed professions intermédiaires.

Although the method of collecting information used to classify individuals in categories remains the same under the
new system (that is from individuals' written declarations regarding their occupations, in census or employment surveys), changes have been instituted where the process of classification of salaried individuals into PCS is concerned. Thus, where in the past only one aspect of the notion of occupation (that of occupational title as declared by an individual) was systematically applied as a criterion in the determination of an individual's classification, under the present system, several aspects of the notion of occupation are systematically applied to all salaried individuals in determining PCS membership. For example, the notion of hierarchies within groups, which was previously only applied to the self-employed (through consideration of the size of a business or company) and within salaried occupations, to manual workers (through consideration of the qualification of their jobs—OS, OQ, manoeuvres (labourers), contremaîtres as based on classification of occupations in collective agreements), is now applicable to non-manual or intellectual salaried workers also, through consideration of the classification of their occupations as established by their employers, based upon the classifications set out in collective agreements. Those who work in the sector fonction publique (fonctionnaires) are required to state the grades of their occupations. Therefore whereas under the old system an accountant (comptable) would have been automatically classified in the category Cadres administratifs moyens according to the occupational title (of the Code des Métiers) comptable, chef comptable (see reference note 12), under the new system he or she
could be affected to a number of categories depending upon the
classification of his or her job according to the employer. An
accountant could in fact be in charge of a company's audit in
which case he or she would belong to the group cadres, or he or
she could be a junior office accountant in which case he or she
could belong to the group employés. Although the systematic
application of the criteria of job classification to all salaried
individuals enables classifiers to determine more accurately an
individual's PCS membership, the problems of employers using
different classifications for the same occupation, as well as
that of employees having different perceptions of occupations
from their employers, still remain, thus contributing to false
images of the size of many PCS. Other criteria considered in the
classification of salaried workers are those of function,
monthly income and social origin (by virtue of one's father's PCS
membership). Once again, individuals cannot always be relied
upon to give correct or objective replies to questions regarding
income and father's CSP membership. Questions on income are
usually judged indiscreet by the majority of respondents and are
therefore seldom answered correctly. Where social origin is
concerned it is possible that where individuals are ashamed of
their background, questions will either be left out or answered
incorrectly; for example it is often found that students tend to
downgrade their social origin, so that it would seem that most of
them come from families of average means. Inversely, those
from humble backgrounds may tend to elevate their social origin.
Therefore although the application of these additional criteria
aids classifiers to make individual classifications according to
PCS, it cannot contribute towards an exact depiction of social reality.

It is important that the critical remarks made above are taken into consideration upon the reading of the following section, which briefly sets out the terms in which intellectual workers, linked directly or indirectly with the industrial and technico-commercial sectors of the economy have been perceived by the INSEE in relation to the French social structure based upon the division of the population into socio-occupational categories. However the reader is not expected to consider each criticism separately in his or her reading of the following section but to keep in mind the general point of all criticisms made, which is that because of the intervention of the subjectivities of the human mind in the construction of occupational categories and in the methods of data collection and assessment, the social "portrait" of intellectual workers presented below ought not to be accepted as a true representation of social reality. In the following presentation the classifications of the current system (based on the PCS nomenclature) have been referred to although classifications according to CSP are mentioned where relevant.

III. The identification of intellectual workers in French social structure, based upon classification into PCS

A. Cadres according to the INSEE

The notion of cadres in the PCS nomenclature is based explicitly upon the definition of this group in the majority of
collective agreements. Hence in general the term designates those persons who, in exercising functions of command and supervision, put into use technical expertise and knowledge acquired through studies in the following fields: science, law, administration, finance, commerce and other social sciences. That such studies have been carried out has to be proved by the obtention of a higher diploma or degree. However, those who put into use such knowledge, in their occupations, through long years of experience are also considered as cadres.

The core of the group cadres located in group three of the INSEE classifications is represented by the PCS cadres administratifs et commerciaux d'entreprise which comprises 549,000 individuals (30 per cent of group three), whose functions are mainly linked to the fields of administration (administrative and financial organisation, planning and control, recruitment and training of personnel and day to day management of enterprises); promotions (marketing of products and public relations and selling for enterprises); banking and insurance. Contrary to the image present in the definition of the group cadres (in the collective agreements) only 36 per cent of cadres administratifs et commerciaux have diplomas or degrees indicative of a higher education. In general, the category is predominantly male and tends to group younger sections of the working population.

Adjacent to this category is that of cadres de la fonction publique which is composed of 244,000 individuals including top level civil servants at central and local government level, magistrates and high ranking police officials as well as those
occupying responsible posts within trade unions and political parties. The majority of these public servants exercise administrative or technical duties. This category also includes those ingénieurs who work for local and central government but whose functions resemble those of ingénieurs in the research and design units of enterprises. This category of cadres is far more qualified than cadres administratifs et commerciaux d'entreprise (56 per cent of persons have higher diplomas or degrees compared with 36 per cent of those in the enterprise sector of the economy), and is comprised of more women and young people than the latter. The two categories together correspond to that of cadres administratifs supérieurs of the CSP nomenclature although this old category included top salaried company bosses but not cadres commerciaux. Consequently it is difficult to give figures for the evolution of individual categories although it is known that the CSP cadres administratifs supérieurs progressed in numbers at a high annual rate of 4.2 per cent during the years 1954 to 1975, so that whereas in 1954 it represented 1.5 per cent of the working population, in 1978 it represented 3.0 per cent. However the annual growth rate for this category had decreased to 2.3 per cent from 1975 to 1982 indicating that the numbers of cadres administratifs in general, are levelling out. Only cadres commerciaux can be said to be increasing in numbers although to some extent this is a consequence of the introduction of the new PCS nomenclature.
B. Ingénieurs according to the INSEE

In theory ingénieurs (like cadres) are recognised by the INSEE (according to the definition set out in collective agreements) as:

"collaborateurs qui ont une formation technique constatée généralement par l'un des diplômes d'ingénieurs reconnus par la loi ou une formation reconnue équivalente."

Only then is their function linked with the use of initiative, creativity and responsibility delegated by an employer. However, this definition which stressed the possession of a higher diploma has more to do with preservation of prestige and a certain elitism than with providing a common characteristic of all ingénieurs. In fact only 38 per cent of those calling themselves ingénieurs claim to have obtained such diplomas.

The majority of ingénieurs are categorised with cadres techniques in the PCS ingénieurs et cadres techniques numbering some 372,000 agents. The main divisions in this PCS operate along the following lines: production (represented by 27 per cent of ingénieurs and cadres techniques) and research and design (represented by 33 per cent of ingénieurs and cadres techniques). The division between ingénieurs et cadres techniques in production and those in research and design has further been accentuated by the fact that the latter comprises highly qualified young persons (mostly male) concentrated in large companies and in large towns while the former comprises not so well qualified older men dispersed throughout the country in medium-sized enterprises and towns.

The growth rate of the number of ingénieurs has been
spectacular at six per cent per year until 1975. Since then it has decelerated to 4.4 per cent which, nevertheless, could indicate the propensity towards a continuous rise in numbers in the future. The rise in numbers during the past thirty years can be attributed to the advances made in computer electronics.

C. Techniciens according to the INSEE

According to the INSEE, the term technicien pertains, in a general and extended sense, to persons occupying an intermediary position between cadres on the one hand and employees (employés) and manual workers (ouvriers) on the other, who are expected:

"d'après des instructions de caractère général portant sur des méthodes connues ou indiquées laissant une certaine initiative sur le choix des moyens à mettre en œuvre, exécutent des travaux administratifs ou techniques d'exploitation complexe ou d'étude."36

The term also refers, on a more specific level, to those required to:

"assumer des responsabilités d'encadrement, c'est-à-dire, techniques et de commandement, dans les limites de la délégation reçue."37

and to persons who, having received certain instructions from a cadre or employer which confer upon them some responsibility, are expected, in addition to carrying out their own duties:

". . . de distribuer et de coordonner le travail d'un ensemble d'employés et d'ouvriers mais aussi d'assurer et de contrôler le rendement et la discipline."38

Thus, technicien can refer not only to those who in their work put into practice certain techniques upon the instructions of superiors, but also to those who, in addition, organise the operation of certain techniques as per instructions received from
superiors and who are in charge of minimising or effacing any social tensions within the workplace caused by the execution of orders.

That part of the working population which is covered by these definitions of technicien is located in the following PCS:

- professions intermédiaires administratives et commerciales des entreprises;
- professions intermédiaires administratives de la fonction publique;
- techniciens; and
- contremaîtres, agents de maîtrise.

All these categories except for the last one comprise both techniciens who execute duties of a technical nature and those who are additionally charged with supervisory functions. The latter are not categorised with contremaîtres, agents de maîtrise (although their job may be designated, by their employers, as that of agent de maîtrise) because they are only charged with supervising their colleagues doing the same work as themselves as opposed to those whose only function is to oversee the work of manual workers and technicians.

The category of professions intermédiaires administratives et commerciales des entreprises is mainly constituted by administrative professions (techniciens and agents de maîtrise in accounting and general administrations, directors secretaries, intermediary banking and insurance officers), commercial professions linked with marketing and general commercial administration in enterprises and a small group of agents linked with communication and tourism (for example, translators,
interpreters, couriers, press attachés) and the arts (draughtsmen, commercial artists, etc.). The majority of these agents (72 per cent) work in the commercial and service sectors of industry while the rest are to be found in production and construction based industries. This category linked with the enterprise sector is very much larger than professions intermédiaires de la fonction publique which groups a total of 277,000 administrative agents as opposed to 932,000 in the former category. That which distinguishes the administrative personnel working in the central and local government sector is the high level of educational qualifications and feminisation. The categories professions intermédiaires administratives et commerciales d'entreprise and professions intermédiaires de la Fonction Publique correspond to the old CSP cadres administratifs moyens which has expanded considerably since 1954 although its growth rate has been slower than that of many other non-manual categories. Since 1975 this rate has stagnated further (at 1.4 per cent per year) to the detriment of the commercial professions rather than the administrative ones.

The category techniciens, in the sense of those whose function is to execute tasks of a technical nature is essentially composed of 656,000 salaried workers whose main task is to assist ingénieurs and cadres techniques in their functions of design and research, monitoring and testing of machinocraft, organisation of production and maintenance of machinocraft. These individuals linked directly with the production process, compose the core of the category techniciens. However, also
classed in this category are technicians (for example, console operators, laboratory technicians) who carry out simple tasks upon the orders of superiors without the use of personal initiative or expertise. The new PCS techniciens (corresponding to the CSP techniciens) has, since the 'fifties expanded more rapidly than other categories of intellectual workers (excepting teachers in secondary and higher education) with an annual growth rate of 6.7 per cent. This growth rate has declined since 1975 (to 2.8 per cent) but has mainly affected those technicians in industries outside the technology-intensive sectors, such as electronics, petro-chemicals.

Finally, within the category contremaitres et agents de maîtrise (numbering 550,000 agents) individuals possess levels of knowledge or expertise similar to those of technicians in the general sense (through work experience and training) but they are clearly distinguishable from the latter as they do not use their technical expertise in the execution of their function: that of supervising manual workers and also technicians. Contremaitres and agents de maîtrise work mainly in the industrial or agricultural sector but are also to be found working in the sectors of commerce, catering, warehousing and services (mainly transport). This category, by virtue of its transitional status between the groups Professions Intermédiaires and Ouvriers (contremaitres were previously included in the group ouvriers), is typical of neither group but possesses a combination of characteristics of both. This is particularly true of contremaitres as opposed to agents de maîtrise who very often start as manual workers and through promotion, accede to posts of
responsibility. In reality, the function of contremaitres and agents de maîtrise in places of work and the level of their remuneration sharply separate them from the group ouvriers. The evolution of the PCS contremaitres et agents de maîtrise which corresponds to the old CSP contremaitres parallels that of the group ouvriers of which it is issue. Thus, the numbers of contremaitres and agents de maîtrise increased steadily during the period 1962 to 1975 but began to level out during the period 1975 to 1982 as a result of the economic crises and the development of high technology industry which have in the main, contributed to the decline in growth of traditional manual worker categories.

D. The teaching professions, scientists and researchers in INSEE classifications

The majority of persons exercising a teaching profession are situated in the INSEE PCS professeurs et professions scientifiques (numbering 349,000 agents) and in instituteurs et assimilés (grouping together some 759,000 individuals). Teachers and head teachers in the first category are highly trained agregés (having passed the highest competitive examination for teachers) or holders of the post-graduate teaching certificate for secondary education (certificat d'aptitude pédagogique d'enseignement secondaire) who teach in secondary or higher education establishments. Grouped together with teachers in this PCS are education administrators and inspectors, researchers in public bodies and scientists including
salaried doctors, pharmacists and other highly qualified paramedical professionals.

Those teaching (including head teachers and auxiliary teachers) constituting nine-tenths of the PCS *instituteurs et assimilés* are not as highly qualified as those in the first one. They teach for the most part in primary and lower secondary education. The appellation *assimilés* refers to administrators at primary and lower secondary level and a number of local community sports and cultural animators.

Both categories (PCS) discussed above, grouping the teaching professions, scientists and researchers (particularly that of *professeurs et professions scientifiques*) followed a pattern of high growth from the mid-'fifties to the mid-'seventies paralleling the development of other strata of intellectual workers. Although the growth rate has declined since 1975, the underlying trend is still towards an increase in numbers of the teaching professions, scientists and researchers.

Finally it should be noted that intellectual workers are also to be found in categories other than those mentioned so far, for example information specialists or *cadres artistiques* in the PCS *professions de l'information, des arts et des spectacles*. However their numbers are small and difficult to assess as these categories consist of high proportions of the self-employed.

By and large, the information presented above promotes the view that intellectual workers constitute a sizeable section of the working population which is likely to continue to expand (albeit at a slower rate) in future.

The above portrait of intellectual workers in relation to
social structure can only be considered as an approximate representation of the social situation of these salaried intellectual workers as a group on one hand and as individuals on the other. This can be concluded from the critical remarks marshalled in this chapter as to the use of statistical instruments such as the CSP and PCS nomenclatures in the study of social structure. The latter incorporate the experiences accumulated by society through its historical development (thus the evidence of certain stereotypes and hierarchies within both nomenclatures) and at the same time, serve to influence the social realities of the period during which they are put to use, in that their construction and diffusion (together with a gamut of legal and administrative mechanisms responsible for the constitution of classifications in the domain of collective agreements, labour laws and so on) lend a consistency to and legitimise the divisions already operating in workplaces and in society as a whole. This legitimising function of the INSEE classifications demonstrates particularly well the extent to which certain dominant ideologies have been integrated into an apparently neutral method (of statistical analysis). Furthermore, the use of the nomenclatures to classify individuals only takes into account the social situation, determined by occupation of those individuals at a particular point in time (for example, at the time of a census survey) rather than during their entire life-cycles (very few individuals do not experience changes in relation to occupational structure). Therefore, what are eventually regarded as "fixed" categories, displaying "fixed"
attributes, in fact, no longer correspond with on-going changes in the reality of social structure and promote the idea that the status quo will always remain the same in society. However, the statistical information presented by the INSEE, in the framework of the notion of occupational categories, provides users (including theorists of social structure who may wish to support their theories with empirical data) with a picture of some differences or similarities between groups of individuals and of approximate patterns of the quantitative evolution of these groups. It also provides its many users with a common terminology. The notion of occupational categories does not, however, take into account the links between individuals and institutions or individuals and the system of production and therefore should not be identified with notions of social classes which are discussed in the following chapters.

Finally, the statistical information offered in this chapter, in relation to intellectual workers, provides a necessary backdrop to the question of the PCF's strategy towards these strata for the following reason. Part of the PCF's argument that the working class, as opposed to intellectual workers, remains the leading force for change in France today rests upon its assertion that the working class has always constituted the largest section of the working population and will continue to do so: the Party maintains that the working class is still expanding rapidly.

INSEE figures do not corroborate this view in the long term. According to the INSEE the number of ouvriers in France (using the PCS code) totalled 7,007,000 in 1982 while the growth rate
for this group reached 0.1 per cent with the strong likelihood of decreasing further. The number of intellectual workers on the other hand had by 1982 reached 4,688,000 with a considerably higher growth rate being maintained. The INSEE figures do however support the position of certain "new class" theorists who argue that the role of the working class as the leading force for social change has been taken over by intellectual workers whose intervention (direct or indirect) in the production process and whose numbers are continuing to increase. Both the PCF and "new class" theorists manipulate INSEE figures to support their arguments in the "numbers debate".
CHAPTER V

CONTemporary Marxist approachEs To class in france regarding the
situation and role of intellectual workers in social structure
This chapter presents the debate, initiated in the 1950's by theorists of the French Left, upon the class membership and role of intellectual workers in contemporary France. This presentation constitutes a necessary backdrop to the examination (carried out in Part three) of the PCF's approach to the question of intellectual workers. It both informs the reader of general problems of applying the Marxist class model to social reality and introduces the various ("new class") arguments faced by the PCF as it set out, from the mid-'fifties onwards, its own analyses of the class membership and role of intellectual workers in order to formulate a suitable strategy by which to extend its electoral base among these latter strata.

The approaches, of theorists of the French Left, considered in this chapter can be separated into two categories: Marxist-Leninist and "neo-Marxist". As the body of literature in both categories is vast, the examination here is limited to the writings of Serge Mallet and Alain Touraine in the "neo-Marxist" category and of Nicos Poulantzas in the Marxist-Leninist category. The writings of these three authors (as indeed those of other French Marxists or "neo-Marxists") can be considered as a response to political conditions of the 'sixties in which the two major parties of the Left, and especially the PCF were failing to seriously consider, in their theory as well as practice, the crucial role of new intellectual workers in bringing the Left to power. This consideration of the role of intellectual workers required a theoretical understanding of their position in the social structure of France; were they part of either of the two main social classes or were they related to
neither? The answers to such questions would determine the effectiveness of the Left's tactics in gaining the support of intellectual workers. The conclusions reached by Marxists and "neo-Marxists" as to the position of intellectual workers in the social structure are various. The difficulty of reaching a unified conclusion arises from the fact that Marx never provided an exhaustive definition of social class. The final chapter of Capital (Volume III), entitled "Classes", comes to an abrupt end after an introduction which leaves the question: "What constitutes a class . . . ?" unanswered. One is therefore left to reconstruct Marx's theory of class through an interpretational review of all his writings on the subject. Such a review is further complexified if one takes into account claims that the writings from the 1844 Manuscripts to later works do not constitute a homogeneous Marxism but that, as Marx's thought developed there emerged ruptures between one problematic and another. As the arguments considered in this chapter fall within a broad Marxist frame-work, the section below is given over to a study of the notion of class in capitalist social structure as found in the writings of Marx.

I. Marx and the concept of class

Upon reading of Marx's writings on class one finds that the concept of class operates on two levels: on an abstract level it is used as an analytical tool to explain major social changes which have taken place in history; on a concrete level the concept is used to describe the empirical reality of particular
societies. In his discussions and analysis of capitalism, Marx refers to class in both the abstract as well as concrete senses as will be demonstrated below.

On the abstract level, Marx presents the view that, with the exception of very primitive societies, all societies known to history up to the present time conform to a dichotomous system of class founded upon property relations, such that a property-owning class is counterposed with another non-property owning class. Neither of these classes can be viewed as self-contained entities, definable solely in terms of internal characteristics as, genetically, classes appear with the birth of a certain mode of production and can therefore only continue to exist in relation to that mode of production and to each other. Although both the classes (of property owners and the propertyless) are dependent upon each other to survive within a certain mode of production, their interests are mutually exclusive. This opposition of interests exists because the propertyless class stands in an "exploitative" relation vis-a-vis the owners of the means of production who live off a surplus product produced by the former. The concept of exploitation through the extraction of surplus value is fundamental to a system of class relations and was treated with greater precision, by Marx, in relation to capitalist class relations. The dominant position of non-producers in the mode of production is further strengthened by their political domination of the propertyless who are therefore not only exploited but oppressed. The dual subordination of the latter leads to class antagonisms and class conflict which constitutes the principle motor of social transformation. It is
in the sense of the abstract model then that Marx wrote:

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles . . . that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes."10

Marx's detailed analyses of concrete economic and political struggles in the era of capitalism required him to move away from his abstract model of class and to recognise the existence of a multiplicity of classes and intermediary groupings in between the property owning, exploiting non-producers (the bourgeoisie) and the propertyless, exploited producers (the industrial proletariat). He notes:

"In England, modern society is indisputably most highly and classically developed in economic structure. Nevertheless even here the stratification of classes does not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate strata, even here oblitermate lines of demarcation everywhere (although incomparably less in rural districts than in the cities)."11

However, the integrity of the dichotomous model is retained through the operation of the concept of "transitional classes" which can be treated either as social types surviving from a previous mode of production or as the premature formations of social types which would come into existence with the establishment of a new mode of production. For example, landowners and tenant farmers (remnants of the "feudal classes"), although distinguishable from the bourgeoisie and the proletariat could nevertheless survive in modern capitalist society. On the other hand, the existence, in the middle ages, of workshop owners and craftsmen heralded the formation of a new mode of production in feudal society. Together transitional classes, by virtue of
their position between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, form what are referred to as "middle-classes" or a heterogenous middle class, which, as capitalism develops and class conflict sharpens are absorbed into the two major classes. This process which Marx regards as a distinctive feature of capitalism, is referred to as a "simplification" of classes.

Marx's consideration of the middle classes was inextensive compared with that of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It is clear that in his view certain strata of the middle classes, such as small traders, handicraftsmen, small manufacturers (the petty bourgeoisie), form a transitional class which was linked to the feudal system of industry and would either eventually disappear or be reduced to an ineffective social force under modern capitalism. However, Marx did not specifically speculate upon the fate of salaried workers who performed labour of an intellectual nature and who, even in his time, were increasing in numbers with the expansion and technological advancement of capitalism, although mention of the role of "clerks" or "commercial wage-workers" is made in his discussion of "Commercial profit". In this discussion Marx firstly argues that as "commercial wage workers" are non-producers of surplus value they do not stand in precisely the same relationship to capital as the proletariat. But he also indicates that as these workers are responsible for the realisation of surplus value (i.e. the transformation of surplus product into value), their work would in the long-term become more important leading to an increase in their numbers.
secondly, Marx argued that as capitalism advanced, leading to a greater division and simplification of mental labour and consequently to a diminution of skills required on the one hand and to the expansion of education amongst lower social strata on the other hand, the material conditions of "commercial wage workers" would deteriorate and resemble to some extent those of certain sections of the working class. From this argument one assumes Marx's implication is that in the long term these workers, whose status is similar to that of skilled manual workers and whose labour power contributes to the realisation of surplus value, may well be assimilated within the working class; it must be stressed that this is not stated but that the assumption is based upon his statement in the Manifesto regarding the "lower strata of the middle class" who would:

"sink gradually into the proletariat . . . partly because their specialised skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population."15

Where supervisory elements of commercial and industrial wage-workers are concerned, an opposite tendency is observed. The labour of supervision and management is necessary wherever production is carried out by a large number of people but this labour under capitalism has a bifarious character; thus:

"all labour in which many individuals co-operate necessarily requires a commanding will to co-ordinate and unify the process, and functions which apply not to partial operations but to the total activity of the workshop, much as that of an orchestra conductor. This is a productive job, which must be performed in every combined mode of production."16

but in capitalism such labour also emerges because of:

"the antithesis between the labourer, as the direct producer, and the owner of the means of production."
The greater his antagonism, the greater the role played by supervision."17

Therefore, although managers and supervisors are, in a formal sense, workers, in reality they are representatives of the capitalist, so that just as the development of early capitalism witnessed a demarcation of judges and administrators from owners of land (whom the former continued to represent nevertheless), in modern capitalism:

"the mere manager who has no title whatsoever to the capital, whether through borrowing it or otherwise, performs all the real functions pertaining to the function of the capitalist as such, only the functionary remains and the capitalist disappears as superfluous to the production process."19

Clearly in Marx's view all those managers or supervisors who act as the "functioning capitalist" belong to the capitalist class. Again the problem of the fate of those who supervise in the lower echelons of the managerial hierarchy remains unstated. The question of the long term interests and assimilation of the "transitional" middle classes in a dichotomous class system will remain problematic as long as the concept of class is regarded in purely objective terms.

Up to this point, it is only Marx's discussion of classes as objective elements in relation to the means of production, that has been considered. Classes are, however, aggregates of individuals who not only play a common role in relation to the means of production but who also relate to similar sets of institutions, consequently to similar ways of life and hence, one supposes, to a common class mentality or consciousness. A class, therefore, represents both objective and subjective reality. It is the subjective elements to which Marx is accused of having
 accorded insufficient importance and of therefore falling into a reductionist trap by treating ideological and political aspects of class and class action as mechanical manifestations of the "economic base". Whether such accusations are justified depends very much upon individual interpretations of Marx's writings. Marx and Engels were certainly aware of such accusations and defended themselves against the charge of treating the subjective nature of class as an automatic reflection of the economic base. Engels himself apologised on behalf of younger followers of Marx who espoused an economic determinism upon their study of the latter's works:

"Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasise this main principle in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place, or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights."20

Later on Marxists such as Lukács and Gramsci condemned those who misinterpreted Marx in stressing economic determinants:

"The claim presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism that every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure [i.e. base], must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism, and combatted in practice with the authentic testimony of Marx."21

Thus a preliminary reading of the Manifesto in which the question of the relations between economic and political aspects of class and class action are left undeveloped ought, according to the defenders of Marx, to be followed up by readings of his other "empirical" writings.

From the Manifesto's sketchy outline of class and class
conflict one understands that under capitalism the common conditions of existence and sentiments of alienation from their labour brings workers together not only physically but in their ways of thinking. The era of modern capitalism witnessed confrontations, between capitalists and workers, which increasingly took on the aspect of collisions between two classes, as workers began to organise themselves into class organisations or trade unions. The class consciousness, of workers, which led them to struggle against their economic subordination also directed them to wage a political struggle. The process which contributes to the "organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party" is, one assumes here, automatic for in fact "every class struggle is a political struggle." That class consciousness is determined by class in its objective form is undeniable according to Marx:

"Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life? What else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed?"24

However, it is the unexplained equation between the "economic" and the "ideological"/"political" in the Manifesto as implicated by statements such as "every class struggle is a political struggle" which brought Marx accusations of reductionism. In his later writings and particularly in those on France, the ideological and political aspects of class can be seen to gain importance in relation to the economic aspects. It is in The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that he presents the idea that at its birth a class is no more than an object, unaware of itself. Later, it progressively becomes conscious of itself and consequently constructs its own institutional organs and ideology against those of another or other classes; only a class which is conscious of itself is capable of playing an active role in the historical process. Thus, in his discussion of the French peasantry he observes:

"In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national land, no political organisation amongst them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name."26

Elsewhere, Marx also developed further the links between the political and economic levels of the class struggle waged by the class conscious proletariat.

"The political movement of the working class has as its ultimate object of course, the conquest of political power for this class, and this naturally requires a previous organisation of the working class developed up to a certain point and arising precisely from its economic struggles." On the other hand, however, every movement in which the working class comes out as a class against the ruling classes and tries to coerce them by pressure from without is a political movement. For instance, the attempt in a particular factory or even in a particular trade to force a shorter working day out of individual capitalists by strikes etc is a purely economic movement. On the other hand, the movement to force through an eight hour, etc, law is a political movement. And in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say, a movement of the class, with the object of enforcing
its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force. While these movements presuppose a certain degree of previous organisation, they are in turn equally a means of developing this organisation. 27

Here Marx demonstrates the independence of political class consciousness as manifested in a political struggle, characterised by a challenge to the established laws and order of the bourgeoisie from purely economic action which is localised in particular factories or industries and which as such does not present a threat to the bourgeoisie as a whole. Marx also suggests here (in the opening sentence) that once a class has been politically organised, then the political movement (although a product of the economic actions of class) ought to and does in fact gather a certain momentum or "internal determination" of its own, which may be propelled by an accumulated knowledge from earlier ideas or previous thought, so that every political change affected by that movement does not necessarily reflect a corresponding economic change.

Additionally, as implied by the final sentence, the political organisation of a class may react retrospectively upon that which it arises from. This does not however detract from the fact that the class consciousness which fuels political struggles is articulated or corresponds within a certain mode of production to the forces and relations of the "economic" base. Marx's greatest justification for the validity of the ultimately determining effects of the economic sphere arose from the situation whereby those who depicted social change as the outcome of religious, moral or philosophical ideas were unable to indicate the origin of such ideas.
Marx's discussion of the development and limitations of class consciousness in relation to particular classes in capitalism is not easy to assemble as a whole in view of the fact that his comments on the subject of consciousness are to be found scattered in his writings and also in view of the diversity of interpretation of those writings. Consequently, his views as regards the class consciousness of "transitional" or middle classes are perhaps not entirely clear cut. In Marx's view the perspectives of middle classes were ambiguous, their intentions not to advance or to transcend capitalism in the long term, while in the short-term they occupied a position where "the interests of two classes are simultaneously mutually blunted." (the two classes in question being the bourgeoisie and the proletariat). There are however, according to Marx, certain conjunctures in history when the middle classes are able to consciously play an active and decisive role, for example when their interests coincided with those of capitalism (as during the French Revolution), when feudal estates were abolished) or if in the future their interests coincide with those of socialism. Thus Marx remarked of the middle classes:

"If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat."

It would seem then that the nature of the objective position of transitional middle classes, in capitalism does not permit the development of a true middle class consciousness. Middle classes
display elements of bourgeois and proletarian consciousness or a "false" consciousness and hence, strictly speaking, do not constitute a class capable of furthering its own interests in the long term; a class "for itself". It is precisely because of the contradictory elements of middle class consciousness that it is important for the proletariat and its political organisation to be able to demonstrate to the middle classes, at a decisive moment of the class struggle, that as the advance of capitalism cannot be halted, their best interests do not lie with those of the bourgeoisie. Marx recognised the important role played by consciousness in the determination of political alliances between the working class and the middle class in Nineteenth century France and the effects of such alliances upon working class action.

This examination has shed light upon some of the questions which hang over Marx's theory of class, social conflict and change and which in fact constitute part of the problematic legacy left to contemporary Marxists attempting to analyse capitalist society in its growing complexity. Two major problems have been highlighted, both of which Marx was aware of and tried to deal with as certain "mitigating" texts suggest. The first one which relates to the determination of classes, based upon the production and appropriation of surplus value (linked to the broader criteria of being propertyed and propertyless), has put before Marxists the question of how to deal with the propertyless who neither create nor appropriate surplus value (those "in the middle") without departing from the basic dichotomous model of
class. For today's Marxists, this question assumes even greater importance as the numbers of those "in the middle" (intellectual workers especially) continue to expand at a rapid rate. The second major problem relates to the link between class as object and class as subject which Marx was accused of viewing as "automatic" and hence in an economist or reductionist manner.

The following section draws out critically the analyses, made by Mallet, Touraine and Poulantzas, of the social situation and role of intellectual workers in contemporary France and illustrates the extent to which these theorists have sidestepped, modified or resolved problems relating to Marx's theory of class, class conflict and social change.

II. "Neo-Marxist" interpretations of the class situation and role of intellectual workers

In his consideration of new strata of intellectual workers, Serge Mallet conforms largely to Marx's schema of class; thus he recognises the conflict between a "classe propriétaire et gestionnaire des moyens de la (sic) production" and a "classe productive" as constituting the main catalyst of socio-economic change. These conflictual relations of production occupy a central position throughout Mallet's historically based analysis of modern industry up to the stage of automation in the capitalist era. According to Mallet, the development of automation has brought into being new types of workers, thus rendering obsolete conventional notions of what constitutes the working class which in any case has never represented a unified entity:
"L'extension du capitalisme 'en profondeur et en surface' entraîne sans cesse de nouveaux éléments dans le cycle de la production industrielle; mais en même temps, la transformation des rouages économiques et des techniques de production crée dans la classe ouvrière des nouvelles catégories . . . le développement continu des techniques de la production, tend normalement toujours à la différenciation sociologique de la classe ouvrière. La co-existence, en même temps et aux mêmes lieux, de plusieurs stades de production la perpétue. Et l'action . . . du mouvement syndical lui-même contribue encore à l'accentuer . . ."33

In addition to those new workers involved in the production cycle, automation or the era of "neo-capitalism" leads to an increase in numbers of salaried workers who are not directly involved in the production process - "couches vivant de la distribution - sociale ou commerciale". Hence, what Mallet refers to as the "new working class" comprises all new salaried intellectual workers involved in production, the majority of salaried intellectual workers outside the sphere of production (of which a large number is recruited from the shrinking peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie) as well as the decreasing numbers of traditional industrial workers. Given that Mallet equates the notion of "class of producers" with that of working class:

"Economiquement et politiquement, la classe ouvrière existe en tant que classe indépendante occupant dans la production une certaine fonction et une seule qualité: celle d'être détenteur de la force de travail créatrice des valeurs. Tant que les moyens de production ne seront pas socialisés . . . la notion d'une classe ouvrière opposée à la classe capitalisthe gardera toute sa validité . . . indépendamment de son importance numérique, croissante ou décroissante, de son genre de vie et de son integration sociale."34

How does he justify the inclusion of those workers who are not directly involved in the production process? It would seem that
in order to dispense with the problematic task of differentiating between productive and unproductive labour, in the determination of the objective class membership of all salaried intellectual workers, Mallet makes use of Marx's concept of the "collective worker". As the collective worker is an "agent of the collective labour process" which includes the participation of different labour powers (manual and intellectual) and of which some produce surplus products and others contribute towards the realisation of surplus value, Mallet is able to include all those salaried non-productive strata in the class of producers and thereby extends the boundaries of the working class. For Mallet ample justification is found for his method in Marx's observation that:

"In order to labour productively, it is no longer necessary for you to do manual work yourself: enough, if you are an organ of the collective labourer, and perform one of its subordinate functions."36

Mallet also justifies inclusion of non-productive strata in the working class by the argument that in the era of "neo-capitalism" maximum surplus value is not extracted from individual workers (through extension of working hours or increased work rates) but from the work force as a whole through overall changes in the work organisation (or the division of labour) where the close interdependence of manual and intellectual labour is a key to the achievement of increased productivity. Thus his criteria for the extension of working class boundaries, to admit all salaried intellectual workers, rest resolutely upon notions of proletarianisation of intellectual labour in relation to the means of production; Mallet rejects arguments that intellectual
workers are or will increasingly become proletarianised as a result of the erosion of living standards, in turn a consequence of a drop in salary levels or of poor working conditions. On the contrary, Mallet argues that under automation, the participation of the entire workforce in a collective work organisation (which enables workers to relate to each other and to the products of their labour from the beginning to the end of the production process) as well as added stability of employment (it is far more difficult to replace an electronics engineer than it is to replace an unskilled worker) all contribute to a "véritable négation dialectique de la parcellisation du travail."

Mallet's examination of the subjective reality of the "new working class" leads him to identify three different types of class consciousness: that displayed by the traditional industrial workers; that displayed by intellectual workers removed from the production sphere of the economy (those very "couches vivantes de la distribution - sociale ou commerciale") and that displayed by intellectual workers involved in the production sphere of the technologically advanced industries (ingénieurs, techniciens, and certain categories of cadres). In Mallet's view the revolutionary consciousness of traditional industrial workers, which according to Marx, would draw the latter into conflict with the bourgeoisie and eventually lead to the capture of political power by the working class, no longer exists as a consequence of the change in the nature of trade-union action linked with the increasing participation of the working class in electoral politics. The class consciousness of traditional industrial workers, embodied by workers' unions, ceased to be grounded in
the sphere of productive activity as unions forged stronger links with political parties and thus began to rely increasingly on the latter for support and protection of their members. As "dialogue" with employers in the form of free collective bargaining is accentuated, struggle and conflict with the aim of overthrowing capitalism recedes into the background. It follows from this then that the traditional industrial working class organisation is no longer capable of effectively fighting the capitalist system:

"De même que dans sa manière, la petite paysannerie qui fut en 1789 un facteur révolutionnaire n'a pu comprendre les problèmes posés par la commune, de même la classe ouvrière des secteurs archaïques de l'industrie ne peut formuler de manière positive une alternative à la société néo-capitaliste." 39

Where salaried intellectual workers of the non-productive sphere are concerned, Mallet recognises that a contradictory or "false" class consciousness is displayed by the latter:

"Cette couche, salariée, mais détachée du courant même de la production, se caractérise évidemment par sa malléabilité politique. Petite bourgeoise par ses aspirations, prolétarienne par sa situation juridique, impuissante sur le plan économique, elle oscille de la gauche réformiste à la droite modérée, voire à l'extrême-droite en période de crise aiguë: ..." 40

However he does not go further to suggest if and how the contradictory nature of this consciousness could be overcome while maintaining that these workers remain part of the "new working class".

Finally, Mallet identifies within the "new working class" a new revolutionary consciousness - that demonstrated by intellectual workers in the technologically advanced, productive sphere of industry. This revolutionary consciousness, which
makes these technical and professional strata of intellectual workers the natural vanguard of the working class, arises, it is argued, from the conditions of the production process in the era of automation. The new vanguard, with its specialised technical knowledge now working in an environment where employment is stable and well remunerated and where fragmentation of work and isolation of the worker is reduced, hence freeing him or her of the need to make short-term material demands, begins instead to question its exclusion from the decision-making and controlling instances of enterprises. These workers' overall knowledge of the production process and capacity to inflict "scientific" stoppages in the key sectors of the economy enables them to exert pressure upon capitalist employers and to effectively contest decisions made by the latter as regards the organisation and management of work. While these contestations may initially be made on the level of individual enterprises, eventually they would be levelled at the capitalist economy and mode of production in general:

"Précisément parce qu'elle est placée au centre des mécanismes les plus complexes du capitalisme d'organisation la nouvelle classe ouvrière est amenée à réaliser plus vite que d'autres secteurs les contradictions inhérentes à ce système ... Sa situation objective la place ainsi en mesure de saisir les failles de l'organisation capitaliste moderne, et d'accéder à une conscience d'un nouveau type d'organisation des rapports de production, seuls capables de satisfaire les besoins humains qui ne peuvent pas s'exprimer dans le cadre des structures actuelles."42

The anti-capitalist protest of the "new working class" would be led by the union organisation of its technically advanced strata. Unlike the traditional working class unions, the "new working
class" unions would not tend towards bureaucratisation as a result of the high level of grass-roots participation in union activity on the one hand and because of mistrust upon the part of these new unions towards traditional forms of political conflict (through links with political parties) on the other hand. This type of unionism may, according to Mallet, be termed "modern anarcho-syndicalism".

Mallet's theses on the "new working class" have subsequently attracted much attention in the form of severe criticism. While some of the criticism has been more concerned with the application of his criteria of working class, other criticism is levelled at Mallet's "reductionist" view that the "new working class" vanguard will display a revolutionary consciousness by virtue of its position vis-a-vis the means of production. While it may be acceptable that the objective class membership of those intellectual workers, who in the application of their knowledge directly produce surplus value, is that of the working class, Mallet's inclusion of all salaried intellectual workers, on the basis of the latter's participation in productive collective labour may be construed as an abuse of this notion as originally presented by Marx. Consequently Mallet's implications that the division between manual and intellectual labour is superseded by the integration of productive and unproductive labour within the activity of the collective worker is rejected by more mainstream Marxists such as Poulantzas (whose analyses of new intellectual strata is examined further on) who stress the division of mental and manual labour not as a mere technical division of labour but
as representative of a division in society between those who carry out directive functions or oppress and those who are oppressed.

Mallet's postulation, that the technically advanced sections of intellectual workers constitute a new revolutionary vanguard of the working class, is based upon questionable assumptions which to him appeared as validated by the events, in France, of May 1968 when students (intellectual workers in the making) and a large number of intellectual workers became leading elements of protest movements calling for autogestion or workers' self-management. His general assumption that the "new working class" vanguard would display a revolutionary consciousness, in its eventual questioning of the capitalist mode of production as a result of the material demands being satisfied is considered with some scepticism by sociologists and theorists such as Duncan Gallie and André Gorz. Gallie's own studies of two oil refineries (representative of wholly automated process production plants) in France (at Dunkirk and Lavera) indicate that much of Mallet's argument, on new forms of consciousness and conflict, is contradicted. Although it is true, as Mallet states, that automation removes some of the worst traits of mass production (dirt, noise levels, high cadences, intense division of labour, etc.) workers nevertheless remained subjected to strict managerial control, deprived of initiative and suffered frustration due to the nature of shift work, undermanning, repetition of tasks and threat of redundancy. Automated industry, it would seem was not shielded from the vicissitudes of the capitalist economy as implied by Mallet. Thus worker
attitudes resembled those in the traditional industries and traditional grievances (regarding salaries, shorter working hours, shift reform and manning levels) had not been replaced by demands for control within the work organisation. Hence between 1963 and 1972, out of a total of 24 strikes which took place at the oil refineries, 11 were staged to demand higher wages, four to demand a reduction of working hours compared with one strike (at Lavera) calling for more democracy within the refinery and two strikes (one at each plant) in support of students in 1968. Although this in no way implied that the workers were satisfied with the existing power structures, the issue of control and democracy remained a priority of a minority of militant trade-unionists while generally, management "remained sovereign within the enterprise." However, as Gallie's study remains valid for just two factories, one cannot accept his findings as applicable to all workers in automated industries, although they do constitute a significant empirical analysis of workers attitudes to conflict, which may be compared with theoretical analyses. While Gallie's criticism of Mallet is mainly aimed at the latter's lack of data bases for his theories, Gorz's objections to the revolutionary role attributed by Mallet to the "new working class" vanguard, are expounded on the level of theory. Thus Gorz accuses Mallet of having failed, in his theorisation, to consider the following as subjective elements influencing the role of intellectual workers in class conflict: that technical expertise may constitute an auxiliary and legitimising element in occupational roles, mainly characterised
by control over subordinates; that technical expertise, itself a
product of a hierarchically divided social and educational
system, once acquired may lead intellectual workers (the majority
of whose class origin is located in various strata of the middle
class) to regard themselves as superior to traditional industrial
workers and to therefore contribute towards the protection and
perpetuation of such privileged knowledge. According to Gorz, it
is the subjection of this privileged knowledge to the structures
of the capitalist production process, accompanied very often by
the erosion or loss of material privileges, that fuels the
collective struggles and protest movements, of intellectual
workers; these must therefore be considered as "anti-hierarchy"
or "anti-authority" rather than "anti-capitalist" struggles and
protest. Gorz argues:

"La possibilité de ce genre de ralliements ou de
conversions idéologiques ne signifie toutefois pas
leur nécessité. Elle ne signifie assurément pas que
les travailleurs techniques sont destinés à un rôle
d'avant-garde, tout au contraire: la nature de leur
fonction ne les porte pas et ne les prépare pas à
vouloir l'affrontement de classe et à y assumer un
rôle dirigeant. Leur comportement en période
dafrontement dépend principalement de leur éducation
politico-idéologique préalable. Cette éducation ne
s'acquiert pas dans les cours de formation mais quand,
dans la lutte et sous la pression des ouvriers
radicalisés, les techniciens sont amenés à découvrir
qu'ils ont plus à gagner par l'abolition de la
division hiérarchique du travail . . ."50

Until intellectual workers "discover" their true class interests,
Gorz concludes, they will remain "ouvriers mystifiés" who rebel
not as proletarians but against being treated as such. Although
Gorz indicates certain deficiencies of Mallet's arguments, he
does not draw out the full implications of his own analysis of
the role of intellectual workers as part of the working class, in
class conflict. By singling out intellectual workers as a stratum of the working class which has adopted a "false" consciousness, Gorz in fact implies that consciousness is purely a reflection of subjective values and identities articulated in isolation from the objective reality of class. If this is so then Gorz fails to explain why some traditional industrial workers do not also display such a "false" consciousness (when in fact many of them do). If it is that consciousness is not a reflection of subjective values, then the fact that intellectual workers display a consciousness which is different from other workers must be due to a difference in their relation to capital from that of the latter; it would then follow that they cannot objectively be part of the working class. It is more logical to argue that intellectual workers display the same type of consciousness as manual workers who, in the main, also struggle against employers in order to arrest the erosion of their material conditions and who do not wage anti-capitalist struggles. It would seem that Mallet, unlike Gorz, in maintaining that "productive" intellectual workers, as part of the "new working class" vanguard, demonstrate the same type of revolutionary class consciousness as traditional industrial workers did prior to the bureaucratisation of their unions, retains a more thorough Marxist logic in his argumentation, if his criteria for the determination of class membership are accepted in the first instance. However, it should be noted that Mallet follows the same argument as Gorz where "non-productive" intellectual workers are concerned. He includes the latter in
the "new working class" while recognising that they articulate petty-bourgeois aspirations.

Touraine's interpretation of the class membership and role in class conflict of salaried intellectual strata diverges considerably from that of Mallet (and Gorz) in that the bases of his historical models of class societies are dissimilar to those found in Marx. Thus whereas in Marx, it is the mode of production which determines the characteristics of a certain type of social system, in Touraine's model "historicity" (a given society's fundamental processes of thought and reasoning and concepts of self-understanding) replaces the mode of production. This "historicity" does not remain unchanged as this would imply that one type of society persists throughout history. On the contrary, in Touraine's dichotomous class models of all societies, the "historicity" of a society is at the centre of class conflict with one class controlling its development (the dominant class) and another subordinate class striving to either gain control of that "historicity" (thus advocating evolutionary change) or to replace it with entirely new modes of thought, reasoning and self-understanding (thus advocating revolutionary change). It is this conflict between the dominant and subordinate classes which constitutes the principal motor of the transformation of societies. He thus recognises, like Marx, that industrial capitalist society emerged from the resolution of conflicts which had taken place between classes in agrarian and merchant societies. However, just as these had gradually disappeared, so "industrial" society will give way to the emergence of what Touraine terms as "post-industrial" or
"programmed" society; the present period represents a transition from "industrial" to "post-industrial" society and it is for this reason that the present era has born witness to the emergence of new social groupings (consisting mainly of "knowledge workers") which will eventually constitute a new class in "post-industrial" society. The "historicity" of "industrial" society presents economics and economies as cultural models, whereby class conflicts take place between those who own and control economic enterprises and organisations (the bourgeoisie) and those whose labour is exploited for profit-making (the working class). However, the "historicity" of "post-industrial" society presents advanced technical knowledge (used to "programme" social, economic, political and cultural change) as its cultural model so that class conflict is waged between those who use technical expertise and scientific knowledge to make decisions and control society (the ruling "technocratic" class) and those who possess knowledge and expertise but who have not accumulated enough in order to become part of the new ruling class and are therefore alienated from the decision-making and controlling instances of society (intellectual workers). Touraine considers that struggles emerging in "post-industrial" society will be led by the new vanguard of the subordinate class with a view to decentralising decision-making and to introducing autogestion. The terrain for new forms of conflict will be large bureaucratic corporations and universities (centres where knowledge is produced and applied) just as in "industrial" society the factory (a centre for the production of material goods) is the terrain of
conflict between the working class and its capitalist employers. By this, Touraine does not imply that conflicts in the production sphere will cease to take place, just that those producing material goods will not be able to achieve any social power. The conflicts between working class unions and employers will concern organisation of production and material benefits for workers and will therefore become institutionalised. However Touraine also recognises that any significant socio-political movement in "post-industrial" or "programmed" society will have to include the working class although they will be firmly motivated and led by new intellectual or "knowledge" workers.

Like Mallet's theory of the "new working class", Touraine's account of a new class of intellectual workers in "post-industrial" or "programmed" society may appear compelling in that it seems to explain certain phenomena distinctive of contemporary times: for example, the increased application of science and technology in all spheres of life, the expansion of higher education, the growth of protest movements - anti-nuclear, feminist, environmentalist, gay liberation and others - led mainly by the new intellectual strata. Upon closer examination, however, the flaws of Touraine's line of argumentation become apparent.

Firstly Touraine's use of the terms "post-industrial" or "programmed" tells the reader little of the socio-economic and political orientations of a society given either of the above appellations. Rather it tends to carry the implication that all technologically advanced societies have evolved in the same way and contain similar socio-economic and political formations.
This implication is false for it is known that not only do fundamental differences exist between the advanced countries of the Soviet and Western blocs but differences exist also between the countries within each bloc. Secondly, it is erroneous to distinguish between the use of scientific and technical knowledge in the present era from that in centuries past — a practice which had led Touraine to conclude that while "industrial" society is geared to the production of material goods, "post-industrial" society is geared to the production of knowledge. Although it is true that this century has heralded an unprecedented complexification and generalisation of scientific techniques and knowledge, it is also true that the application of theoretical knowledge to productive technique is not a distinguishing feature of present times. The Industrial Revolution was the consequence of the application of theoretical knowledge to the productive order. Indeed Marx had already foreseen that as capitalism advances so "science itself becomes a productive force." However, even the acceptance of the idea that "post-industrial" society is distinguished, from previous societies, by the production of knowledge (which establishes the frame-work for Touraine's discussion of the formation of new classes) does not preclude the problems posed by the rest of Touraine's argumentation.

In Touraine's frame-work of "post-industrial" society, the two major classes are defined in terms of those who have the power to make decisions and thus control society and those who are excluded from participating in the control of society and are
thus alienated. The power held by the ruling class is derived from the cumulative knowledge possessed by that class. Several difficulties arise from this proposition. The first concerns the equation between knowledge and power. It is quite clear that, in many circumstances, those who possess specialised knowledge do not hold any effective power and this, it would seem, is recognised by Touraine in that the subordinate class in "post-industrial" society is excluded from power and control of society despite its possession of knowledge. Yet herein lies a contradiction for Touraine does not provide adequate explanation as to why, amongst those of whom all possess knowledge there should appear just two classes as opposed to one or even more. If knowledge leads to the power to control why is the subordinate class excluded from this control? Touraine offers the following by way of explanation. Education is the principal mechanism by which one enters a particular social class. He argues that those who attend the Grandes Ecoles through strict selection procedures go on to form the main core of the ruling technocratic class. This argument implies that although "post-industrial" society has a different "historicity" it nevertheless retains the institutions of education and culture of "industrial" society which reflect striking bourgeois - working class divisions. One may therefore assume that the new technocratic class owes its power to its (bourgeois) class origin based upon economic privileges. This then goes to contradict the entire dynamic of Touraine's model of historical development. Thus, Touraine fails to explain convincingly the process by which certain amongst those with knowledge accede to power while others do not. If
this process cannot be adequately explained then it must be that criteria other than the power to control or be controlled distinguish the ruling class from the subordinate class. The second difficulty concerns the issue of control itself. In the majority of institutions one finds a graded hierarchy of power and control rather than a simplified two-tier system where one level includes all those with power to control and another includes all those who are controlled. Thus several layers of controlling power exist between the technician and the managing director or between the university student and university administrators. The problem lies in indicating a strict line of demarcation between controllers and controlled within such hierarchies. Again one has to ask why those in the middle layers of control cannot be considered as some kind of middle class(es) and whether Touraine's dichotomous model of class is aptly used. A third difficulty concerns the exercise of control which does not necessarily provoke a conflict of interests between controllers and controlled. A conflict of interests can be either maximised or minimised depending upon the type of objectives an institution is committed to, the means used to achieve objectives and upon the extent of representation and sanction of the controlled in relation to controllers. It is quite conceivable therefore, that in an organisation where workers are not strictly controlled (for Touraine himself remarks that in "post-industrial" society a proportion of "technocrats" will be of liberal persuasions), conflict may be minimised. Finally, Touraine assumes that the controlled class (by virtue of
their weaker objective position in relation to the means of accumulating knowledge) will automatically display a consciousness enabling it to play a leading role in new social conflicts and thus in promoting social transformation. Touraine also lays himself open to charges of reductionism.

In general, it would be true to say that the weaknesses of Touraine's argumentation (like that of Mallet) are attributable to the fact that his theory of the development of new classes and conflict in "post-industrial" society is based very much upon his own impressions of changes which have taken place in the French economic and social structure as well as the events of May 1968. The theory, thus derived, is then put forward as globally explicative of developments taking place in all technologically advanced societies of the world. In other words Touraine may be accused of simply finding a theoretical model which allows him to "prove" conclusions arrived at on the basis of impressionistic observations; such an argument gains weight given that Touraine makes little attempt to seek empirical verifications for his theoretical model. It is for these reasons then that his sociology (as indeed that of Mallet) must be received cautiously and must not be viewed as necessarily explicative of the changes (which, in the long term, may or may not be durable) taking place in the technologically advanced societies of the West.

III. A contemporary Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the class situation and role of intellectual workers

Poulantzas's writings on class are set within a Marxist-Leninist framework which must nevertheless be distinguished from
that within which "orthodox" Marxist writings, also identifiable by the labels "reductionist" or "economist", are found. He operates with an approach associated particularly with the "structuralist Marxism" of Louis Althusser. Although it is not possible to give a full account of structuralist Marxist philosophy at this juncture, some brief comments may aid the comprehension of Poulantzas's approach to the question of class in capitalist society.

For structuralists it is not the conscious activity of human beings as subjects that leads to one's understanding of society as "social formations", but the existing unconscious structure within which such activities take place. All social structures may be examined on three levels or "instances": the economy; politics; ideology. Each of these levels develops according to its own rhythm which means that at certain historical conjunctures one level may be more dominant than another thus contributing, to some extent, to the determination of other levels and to some aspects of the structure itself. However, the determining role of each level is unequal (as autonomy between levels is only relative) so that ultimately it is the economy which always serves as the determinant of the overall structure of society. Thus structuralist Marxists make an important distinction between levels which are dominant and those which are determinant, stressing that a dominant instance is itself determined by the economy.

In his approach to classes, Poulantzas, in following the Althusserian logic of rejecting human beings as subjects of
history, excludes all references to human ideas, in the form of consciousness, as indicative of the (subjective) reality of class. At the same time he also rejects the reductionist view that explains political struggles and social ideologies as mere reflections of economic forces. Hence he describes the structural determination of classes in advanced capitalist societies, that is, the manner in which the objective positions of classes are reproduced within the social division of labour, recognising that although there are overall similarities between different capitalist societies, their respective structural developments have generated some differences in socio-political structures and behaviour. This reproduction of classes does not only take place on an economic level but also on the political and ideological levels which Poulantzas greatly accentuates.

In his description of the structural determination of classes in contemporary capitalism, Poulantzas identifies two major classes, the working class and the bourgeoisie, together with a very tangible middle class, the petty bourgeoisie. He goes further to make a key differentiation, within the petty bourgeois class between those belonging to the "traditional petty bourgeoisie" (small factory owners, shopkeepers, self-employed artisans etc.) and those belonging to the "new petty bourgeoisie" (salaried intellectual and non-productive workers including the ITC). How does Poulantzas arrive at the structural class determination of the new "petty bourgeoisie"? For Poulantzas, the criterion of ownership/non-ownership of the means of production loses its significance unless it corresponds to a relation of exploitation within the framework of the direct
creation and appropriation of surplus value in the production process. Thus intellectual workers belong neither to the bourgeoisie, owners of the means of production and appropriators of surplus value, nor to the working class, defined as comprising those excluded from the means of production who create surplus value through their involvement in materially productive labour. While Poulantzas excludes unproblematically from the working class those groups of intellectual workers involved in the realisation and distribution of surplus value (even though these processes may be undertaken by industrial enterprises themselves), those who work in the service sector (including manual workers), on the basis that their labour is purchased and consumed directly as a "use-value" and not exchanged against capital but against income or revenue, as well those "bearers of science" not involved in the material production of value (scientists, researchers, producers of information etc), on the grounds that science itself is non-productive of surplus value unless applied to the production process, he accepts that those scientific workers directly involved in the creation of surplus value (mainly subaltern engineers and technicians) are not easily excluded from the working class. Poulantzas nevertheless excludes these workers, stating at this point of his argumentation that the economic criterion (a negative criterion in that it only indicates what salaried intellectual workers are not rather than what they are) is inadequate:

"Les rapports économiques de l'ordre de la distinction entre travail productif et travail improductif sont insuffisants pour délimiter les frontières mêmes de la classe entre la classe ouvrière d'une part et
certaines franges de cette nouvelle petite bourgeoisie, franges qui, elles, sont directement impliquées dans un procès de production matérielle: c'est le cas des surveillants du procès de travail et des ingénieurs et techniciens. 57 (his italics)

Unlike Mallet and some other Marxist writers, Poulantzas rejects the use of the concept of collective worker as a means of including even productive intellectual workers in the working class, arguing that although the collective worker emerges as a result of the socialisation (or "extended cooperation") of the labour process, this same socialisation takes place under certain politico-ideological conditions in capitalism and serves only to deepen the division between intellectual and manual labour. Poulantzas's justification is sought from Marx's definition of the collective worker:

"As far as the labour-process is purely individual, one and the same labourer unites in himself all the functions, that later on become separated ... As in the natural body head and hand wait upon each other, so the labour process unites the labour of hand with that of the head. Later on they part company and even become deadly foes." 58

Poulantzas points out that the French translation of the above extract omits the last sentence, giving the impression that the division between intellectual and manual labour is superseded.

According to Poulantzas, this division between intellectual and manual labour cannot be considered merely in terms of production technique but in terms of the general division of society into classes (a structure supported by the political and ideological relations between the dominant class and the dominated class). This notion is also central to the approach of André Gorz (mentioned earlier). Thus, the criterion of the division between intellectual and manual labour is seen, by

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Poulantzas as a positive means of the structural determination of class of productive intellectual workers on the ideological and political levels.

"Or, ces techniciens et ingénieurs ont tendance à faire partie du travail productif capitaliste, car ils valorisent directement le capital dans la production de la plus-value. S'ils n'appartiennent pas, dans leur ensemble, à la classe ouvrière, c'est que dans leur place à l'intérieur de la division sociale du travail, ils réalisent les rapports politiques et idéologiques de subordination de la classe ouvrière au capital (travail intellectuel/travail manuel) et que cet aspect de leur détermination de classe est l'aspect dominant."60

The distinction between intellectual and manual labour (as the concentrated form of specific political and ideological conditions) does not constitute an indispensable criterion in the positive class determination of productive intellectual workers only but of all "new petty bourgeois" groupings. Poulantzas pre-empts any criticism of the use of this criterion as indispensable in the definition of the place of the "new petty bourgeoisie" in the structural class determination by adding:

"Cela ne signifie pas que pour les deux classes fondamentales, la bourgeoisie et la classe ouvrière, les rapports de production détermineraient exhaustivement leur place dans la division sociale du travail: la détermination structurelle de toute classe sociale, quelle qu'elle soit, recouvre sa place à la fois dans les rapports de production, dans les rapports idéologiques et dans les rapports politiques. Mais la question revêt une portée toute particulière pour les classes autres que les deux classes fondamentales, notamment pour la petite-bourgeoisie: celle-ci, n'étant pas au cœur des rapports d'exploitation dominants d'extraction directe de la plus-value, subit la polarisation qui produit des distorsions-adaptations très complexes des rapports politico-idéologiques au sein desquels elle se place. L'attention particulière que requiert dans son cas l'examen des rapports politiques et idéologiques, ne tient pas à ce que ces rapports ne revêtent d'importance que pour elle ... et n'est pas non plus
Having established the importance of the intellectual/manual division of labour as a means of positively defining classes, Poulantzas goes on to illustrate how, by virtue of its particular position in the intellectual/manual labour dichotomy, the "new petty bourgeoisie" serves the bourgeoisie as a relay of exploitation and oppression of the working class. Like Gorz, Poulantzas argues that the division of labour in capitalism, takes place in order that the owners of the means of production may maximise their power and control over the working class and thus create the best conditions for the extraction of surplus value and accumulation of capital. Hence work is rendered stolid not because workers are unintelligent but in order that the latter may no longer retain control over their own work and use that control against their employers. The instrument used by the bourgeoisie to achieve such conditions is technology in the "scientific" organisation of work. However, the bourgeoisie needs agents to create and plan technology, to manage and supervise the efficient running of the production process, to convert surplus product into value and thereby increase the value of capital. The tasks of management and supervision, in particular, become "la reproduction directe, au sein même du process de production, des rapports politiques entre la classe capitaliste et la classe ouvrière." Such agents are recruited to these tasks precisely because they possess a certain level of
knowledge and technical know-how supported by formal qualifications. The latter is gained from an education system which reproduces the intellectual/manual division of labour by training potential intellectual workers to monopolise and guard knowledge and to relate to a set of cultural symbols (how to write, speak and present ideas in a certain way etc), thus legitimising their position in a future of financial, social and cultural privilege. Such agents, including the lowest-rank technician or clerical worker, in representing the skills and knowledge that the manual worker has been deprived of, represent the latter's most immediate foe both within and without the sphere of production. Not only does the intellectual/manual division of labour create a class barrier between the working class and the "new petty bourgeoisie" but it also produces barriers within the "new petty bourgeoisie" class by considerably influencing the formation of a "new petty bourgeoisie" ideology which is not autonomous but is the adaptation of dominant bourgeois ideology and of some elements of working class ideology (itself influenced by the dominant ideology) to "new petty bourgeoisie" aspirations. The controlling and "streaming" procedures of the education system instills in the "new petty bourgeoisie" a spirit of competitiveness and individualism which brings about the belief that individual effort will be rewarded with success. This sort of individualism, leading to a fractionalisation of the "new petty bourgeoisie", coupled with the penetration of working class ideology into this class generates within its lower fractions what is commonly termed "reformist" ideology which welcomes state intervention in the
economy, seeks participation in management and involvement in trade-union affairs without wishing to promote fundamental socio-economic change. Poulantzas identifies three main fractions of the "new petty bourgeoisie" which, in the intensification of the class struggle between the two major classes, will tend towards a "polarisation objective prolétarienne". The first and second fractions comprise of non-productive routine employees in the commercial and service sectors of the economy, of subordinate office workers and civil servants (including teachers) in public and private bureaucracies respectively while the third fraction embraces all subaltern productive engineering and technical personnel in the industrial sectors of the economy. Presumably all other fractions of the "new petty bourgeoisie" (which include subaltern and middle managerial and supervisory staff) tend towards an objectively bourgeois polarisation. Poulantzas closely follows Marx's argument that as a class the "new petty bourgeoisie" (and the traditional petty bourgeoisie) has no long-term autonomous ideology or political organisation although in some short-term conjunctures the "new petty bourgeoisie" may take a leading role as a relatively autonomous social force (for example in May 1968). However at most times, Poulantzas views the "new petty bourgeoisie" as located in the balance of forces between the two major classes so that ultimately his concern regarding the problem of establishing a boundary between the working class and the "new petty bourgeoisie" is not with pure theory but with questions concerning the role of the working class and its alliance with other classes in the transition to
socialism.

There is much in Poulantzas's work that is subject to criticism. The first main criticism concerns the economic criterion used by him to define the working class in the structural determination of classes; that only those producing surplus value in the process of material production may be considered as working class. This distinction which rests on the assumption that surplus value is only created in the production of material or tangible commodities poses problems where certain types of labour are concerned. For example, following Marx, Poulantzas accepts that the transportation, storage and distribution of tangible commodities and raw materials, although often undertaken by commercial enterprises, may be considered as a continuation of the production process, in the process of circulation, as the labour performed in these processes increases the exchange value of commodities on the basis of capitalist use values and thereby generates surplus value. Hence those performing labour in these processes may be considered as part of the working class. However, Poulantzas would not accept that a train driver transporting passengers, rather than goods, belongs to the working class because the latter's labour, performed in the service sector, is consumed as direct use value and is paid for from income rather than capital. Poulantzas's assumption that surplus value cannot be produced in non-material production would seem to be contradicted by Marx who argued:

"That labourer alone is productive who produces surplus value for the capitalist, and thus works for the self-expansion of capital. If we may take an example from outside the sphere of production of
material objects, a school master is a productive labourer, when, in addition to belabouring the heads of his scholars, he works like a horse to enrich the school proprietor. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage factory, does not alter the relation."

Furthermore, after adhering strictly to the use of the main economic criterion of productive labour in determining the working class, Poulantzas decides to abandon this criterion where discussion of the class determination of engineering and technical workers (who are materially productive) is concerned, although he does not deny the latter's productive capacity. It would seem, in this case, that Poulantzas contradicts the very basis of his theory which is that economic criteria ultimately play a principle role in the determination of classes. Apart from the theoretical hitches posed firstly by his equation of productive and materially productive labour and secondly by his inconsistent use of the economic criterion, he is faced in practice, by an extremely small working class and a comparatively expanded petty bourgeoisie; Poulantzas could thus encounter difficulties in attributing a leading role (in any alliance of the two classes) to the working class. He claims, however, that this is not so for the following reasons. Firstly that in the discussion of classes in contemporary capitalist societies one has to take into account the imperialist context so that in referring to the productive work-force subjected to American capital for instance, one considers not only the domestic working class but also those workers working for American companies especially in the Third World. Secondly, that the questions of the transition to socialism and the hegemony of
the working class are political rather than numerical so that an addition of an extra five or ten per cent of the work-force to the working class would not necessarily lead the latter to gain hegemony in the transition to socialism. While the second argument remains acceptable, the first one (relating to classes in the imperialist context) would prove problematical in that it would open up discussion as to how workers in one or more (dependent) countries could play a role in promoting working class hegemony in other (imperialist) countries.

Another major criticism of Poulantzas's theory concerns his use of the intellectual/manual dichotomy in the structural determination of class. Poulantzas fails to present an inexpugnable argument as to the reasons for which the intellectual/manual dichotomy is used to determine the class boundary between the "new petty bourgeoisie" and the working class as opposed to an internal division within the working class.

Poulantzas agrees that a large number of intellectual and manual workers are in a similar position vis-a-vis capital but goes on to separate them into two classes on the basis that the latter are subjected ideologically (through lack of knowledge) and politically (through supervision and management) to the former. At the same time he concedes that the intellectual/manual dichotomy reproduces relations of privilege and domination, leading to divisions, not only within the "new petty bourgeoisie" but also within the working class. He states:

"En ce qui concerne le travail manuel, celui de la classe ouvrière, il est net que son organisation capitaliste en "qualifications" n'est pas une simple
division technique, mais que les qualifications OP, OS, manoeuvres etc, sont elles-mêmes marquées par une reproduction de la division travail intellectuel/travail manuel (on touche ici, de blais, à la question de l'aristocratie ouvrière). La reproduction induite de cette division n'est ici, sous cet aspect, que la figure des effets des rapports idéologico-politiques capitalistes, au sein même de la classe ouvrière, voire au sein même de procès de travail capitaliste."67

Although admitting that the labour aristocracy is partly a product of the intellectual/manual dichotomy within productive labour, and that the ideological and political characteristics displayed by this labour aristocracy are of a bourgeois nature, Poulantzas refuses to exclude the latter from the working class. This, on the grounds that the politico-ideological characteristics displayed by this labour aristocracy are conjunctural and that they will be weakened by working class ideology (eventually determined by the economic instance):

"Certes, la politique de la bourgeoisie consiste précisément à faire interioriser ce type de rapports au sein de la classe ouvrière; mais elle se heurte ici au noyau irreductible de la socialisation du procès de travail productif, qui conduit constamment la classe ouvrière à la subversion de ces rapports, et c'est là précisément le propre des revendications antihiérarchiques de la classe ouvrière et qui se distinguent en général, dans leur contenu de celles de la nouvelle petite-bourgeoisie. Ce n'est pas par hasard si la bourgeoisie doit passer, pour introduire ces rapports politico-idéologiques au sein de la classe ouvrière, par le biais tout particulier de l'"aristocratie ouvrière' et des 'bureaucraties syndicales de collaboration de classe' (Lenine). Ces coordonnées restent ... co-substantielles à la domination de la bourgeoisie sur la classe ouvrière, mais elles sont constamment subverties, par les rapports de travail au sein de la classe ouvrière (l'"instinct de classe") ... " 68

Conversely, the bourgeoisie finds it relatively easy to "internalise" its relations of domination/subordination within the "new petty bourgeoisie" by virtue of the latter's position in
the social division of labour. Here Poulantzas fails to offer examples and evidence (as elsewhere in his writings) of how working class demands differ from those of the "new petty bourgeoisie" nor does he offer any insight as to how those demands would enable the working class to weaken bourgeois relations of domination/subordination within its own ranks. Also, the idea that the reaction of the working class to bourgeois ideological relations is in part due to "instinct" (which has no objective basis) would seem to be out of keeping with one of the main principles of structuralist thinking which is the denial of the subject and hence of class as comprising of subjective elements. Finally the class determination of productive intellectual workers remains inadequately explained. In accordance with Poulantzas's use of politico-ideological criteria (as reflected in the intellectual/manual division of labour) to establish a class boundary between productive manual and productive intellectual workers, one could also use sexism, racism, imperialism as relations of domination/subordination, within the social division of labour, which divide a class of women workers from men workers, a class of black workers from white workers, and a class of Third World workers from workers in imperialist nations. Yet Poulantzas would agree, in conformity with Marxist structuralism which recognises the primacy of the economic instance in the determination of social structures, that division within the ranks of productive workers (based on relations of domination/subordination) between skilled and unskilled, white and black, women and men workers or between
workers in Third World and imperialist nations, cannot be equated with class divisions.

From the criticisms made above Poulantzas finds himself in a curious position of being accused on the one hand of presenting a sophisticated but nevertheless economistic analysis of class (particularly of the "new petty bourgeoisie"). This situation arises, it would be fair to say, because Poulantzas's attempts to theorise the structural determination of classes in contemporary society constitute a secondary project. His primary project remains one of ascertaining the structural bases for potential class alliances in a conjuncture of class struggle to ensure the pursuance of correct political strategies by working class parties. This project itself emerges as a consequence of Poulantzas's opposition to the "anti-monopoly alliance" policies of European communist parties. One could therefore say that many of Poulantzas's arguments are marshalled to "fit in" with predetermined conclusions concerning the structural class determination and role of intellectual workers in the transition to socialism. Thus although Poulantzas's writings form an important part of current, more "traditional" Marxist theories of class, their usefulness is perhaps more evident if they are taken as contributions to the current strategic debates of the communist and socialist parties in Europe.

The criticisms made in this chapter of the approaches to the question of the class membership and role of intellectual workers show that the two major problems - that of identifying "middle" classes in a dichotomous model and that of making a "non-automatic" link between class as object and class as subject - in
applying Marx's class model to social reality have by no means been resolved by contemporary Marxist theorists.

The presentation in the following chapter examines the methods used by liberal or Weberian sociologists in the construction of class models which, when applied to contemporary capitalist society, make a positive identification of one or more "middle" levels corresponding to the objective social situation of intellectual workers. Furthermore, in Weberian class models the objective situation of a class may influence but will certainly not determine its collective ideology and political behaviour.
CHAPTER VI

WEBERIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CLASS SITUATION AND ROLE

OF INTELLECTUAL WORKERS
This chapter presents contributions to the debate on the class situation and role of intellectual workers from a non-Marxist standpoint. Whereas the Marxist perspective emerged mainly in France the "liberal" or non-Marxist one has been offered by American and British sociologists. In France these perspectives have been taken up by sociologists such as Raymond Aron and Pierre Bourdieu. The latter do not, however, represent an original non-Marxist thinking on the specific question of intellectual workers and therefore have not been included in discussion in this chapter. This separation, far from being coincidental, has to do with the types of political culture from which the two opposing perspectives have emerged. In France, revolutionary ideologies have prevailed through various epochs of socio-economic and political change down to the present period. However, where Britain and the USA are concerned, neither society nor their respective labour movements display revolutionary fervour linked with the desire to change society. In both countries, the labour movements are seen to have contributed, by their cooperation with corporatist forms of decision-making and by their acceptance of ideals and beliefs approved of by the upper and middle classes or strata of society, to the stability of capitalist institutions. Hence, leading British and American sociologists have heralded the emergence of intellectual workers as a firm indication of the non-validity of Marx's dichotomous model of class and class conflict. The rapid and continuing rise of intellectual workers paralleled by the decline of the working class on one hand and of the traditional "upper" classes on the
other hand has led non-Marxist or liberal sociologists to predict the rise of a pluralist society free of both class ideology and class conflict. It is in this sense that the USA has been hailed, by such sociologists, as the first "middle class society". Underlying contemporary liberal arguments, surrounding the social situation and role of intellectual workers, are classical Weberian notions of class. It is therefore necessary to present a brief summary of Weber's writings on class and society.

Some of the most influential reflections in non-Marxist or "liberal" class theory since the time of Marx, have come from Max Weber, whose principal ideas (on class), elaborated during the period 1890-1920, constituted a major contribution towards attempts to provide a significant critique of Marxist sociology. Weber's main criticism of Marx centres upon his judgement that, in making the economy the primordial determinant of class structure and in regarding class conflict as the necessary outcome of clashes of material interests, the latter fails to realise that contradictions of economic interests which produce classes do not always correlate with feelings and perceptions of communal identities. For Weber, these can generate a separate and independent factor of stratification which Marx considered as directly contingent upon class interests, that of "power". Thus for Weber, and conventional sociologists after him, it was not only the struggles between classes but also those between different status and power groups which played a part in history. A contemporary orthodox Weberian, Frank Parkin, in a critique of the Marxist theory of class, writes:
"The Marxist preoccupation with the realm of production, increasingly held up as its mark of theoretical rigour, obscures from view any recognition of the possibility that some line of cleavage other than that between capital and labour could constitute the primary source of political and social antagonism. To accept that social inequalities and injustices stemming from racial, religious, linguistic and sexual divisions could have a reality sui generis not reducible to causes buried deep in the capitalist mode of production, would look suspiciously like a Weberian approach with all its peculiar fascination for distributive patterns and outcomes." 2

There are, in fact, a number of different "Weberian" analyses of class, but no universal method of approach. This is partly owing to the fact that Weber was probably not interested in universals and partly to the fact that the brevity of Weber's discussion of class allows a considerable scope for interpretation and that Weber failed to adopt a systematic approach to the question of class: indeed most of his writings on this subject were published after his death. Because of the boundless literature available on the subject of intellectual workers from contemporary Weberians or "neo-Weberians" one is compelled to make a selective review, broadly representative of the spectrum of prevailing views and methods of approach. Following a brief introduction to the principal ideas of Weber's theory on classes in social stratification, the main discussion in this chapter is centred upon the treatment by C Wright Mills and particularly by Anthony Giddens of the role and class membership of intellectual workers in contemporary capitalist society. The analyses of these sociologists provide an important counterposition to those put forward by sociologists of the French Left (including the PCF). The latter have been unable to ignore the existence of a vast
non-Marxist literature on society and class in constructing their own models of class and class conflict to apply to contemporary French society.

I. Max Weber and the notion of class in social stratification

Whereas, in Marxism, the economy (or mode of production) is regarded as the principal determinant of classes in society and class conflict as the motor of social change, Weber, it could be said, derived his model of historical development from a reverse process of reasoning in which it is usually but not always the "political", or political power in particular which overrides economic power. Thus political change constitutes a propeller for socio-economic change.

At first glance it would seem that, for Weber, "class" is defined according to the Marxist criterion of the relationship of people to the ownership of property which produces a dichotomous model:

"'Property' and 'propertylessness' are . . . the basic categories underlying all class situations . . ."5

However matters are not so simple, as Weber went on to state that:

"Within this framework . . . class situations may be further differentiated in terms of the nature of property which is a source of income, on the one hand, and in terms of the nature of services offered on the market on the other."6

Accordingly Weber recognised two types of classes: "property" classes (determined by the differences in relation to material property ownership) as well as "acquisition" classes (determined by the opportunities held by members of these classes to consume and sell goods and services on offer on the market).
Furthermore, and most importantly, since offers and purchases of goods and services, whether by owners or non-owners of property, were conducted through the "market", one's class situation, which is determined by an individual's supply of goods, living conditions and various other "chances" in life, in turn dependent upon the power or lack of power to market goods and skills, becomes in effect equivalent to "market situation". A cluster of class or market situations, with common social and occupational mobility chances, form a third type of class, termed "social class", in Weber's intricate typology of classes. Hence it could be said that Weber had extended Marx's conception of class in terms of its relationship to the means of production to that which included a relationship to the means of consumption (the market place). However in extending the concept of class he placed an overwhelming emphasis upon the relationship between class and the market place.

In the case of "property" and "acquisition" classes Weber made further distinctions between "positively privileged" and "negatively privileged" classes lying along a continuum. For example landowners and very highly skilled salaried workers were considered part of the "positively privileged" "property" and "acquisition" classes respectively while the propertyless poor and unskilled workers were considered part of the "negatively privileged" "property" and "acquisition" classes respectively. At certain points of the scale, where an overlap occurred between "positively privileged" and "negatively privileged" classes, there existed, to use Weber's term, "middle classes".
Also along this same continuum of classes, Weber found a place for "social classes". These were smaller groups distinct from those lying on either side of them because of a combination of characteristics which were particular to them. Groups thus specially picked out were the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. This intricate network of classes between which overlaps occurred frequently fitted in with Weber's view of society as a constantly evolving entity in which the development of new potentialities (for example the advance of industrialisation) led to the complexification and diffusion of classes rather than to a polarisation of classes as Marx believed.

Because of this rapid complexification and diffusion of classes whereby groups of classes could be displaced quickly by others, Weber considered that a class was most likely to be, although not always, an objective entity without a sense of its own interests, that is without a class consciousness and he criticised Marx for making what he regarded as an automatic link between class and class consciousness:

"... a class itself is not a community, and it would be misleading to treat classes as conceptually equivalent to communities ... it is wrong to operate with such concepts as those of 'class' and 'class interest' in the kind of pseudo-scientific way which is all too common today, merely on the strength of the fact that men in the same class situation, faced with situations as emotionally charged as those of economic life, regularly react to mass action in the direction which best approximates to their average interest ... The most classical expression of this pseudo-scientific use of the concept is the conception of a gifted writer that the individual may well mistake his own interests, but the 'class' is 'infallible' about its interests."

Thus generally Weber was unwilling to recognise common actions of
workers (such as "the 'go-slow' or deliberate restriction of output by tacit agreement among the workers." ) in badly managed enterprises as manifestations of class consciousness; rather they were dismissed as disjointed or coincidental actions "of an amorphous kind" which did not necessarily lead to the emergence of workers' organisations or associations. However, he believed that classes could emerge as subjective entities in certain situations: for instance, if a class was led towards specific comprehensible goals (during a time of intense economic upheaval) set out by people who are not members of that class (for example intellectuals). To an extent one can see that Weber was perhaps compelled to make exceptions to his general rule that classes were objective entities as during his own life and up to the time of his death he could scarcely have failed to recognise the rapid emergence of class organisations (particularly of the working class) and the increasing importance of the concept of class and class struggle in Europe as the industrialisation process was accelerated. Nevertheless, Weber insisted that the situations in which class as a subject, held maximum sway were not necessarily of a long-lasting nature:

"Those ages and countries in which the naked class situation is of a prevailing importance are generally periods of technological and economic upheaval; while every deceleration of the process of economic change immediately leads to the growth of 'status' structures and restores the significance of 'social standing'."11

Thus it appears that the greatest obstacles in the development of class as subject are "status groups" and the way in which political power is distributed in society, mainly through "parties". While class situation does not always provide the
basis for conscious collective action, status groups, phenomena of the social order and made up of clusters of similar "status situations", provide a source of conscious collective identity and action.

Status groups, of which Weber defined four main types (educational, occupational, hereditary, political and hierocratic) were therefore seen by him as cutting across boundaries of class so that the class situations of a school teacher and a judge may be different without affecting the closeness of their status situations based upon similar patterns of educational privilege and upbringing. However, Weber admitted the likelihood of coincidence in class (as founded upon differentials of economic interests) and status positions:

"Status situation may depend on class situation, either directly or in a roundabout way. But it is not determined by it alone: possession of money and the position of an entrepreneur are not, in themselves alone, qualifications for status, although they may tend in that direction; conversely, lack of wealth is not in itself a disqualification from status, although it may tend in that direction."13

Finally parties, as another mode of group formation, in society, are also a source of conscious collective action by their members and cut across class boundaries (as well as status group boundaries) so that a party may be representative of several different classes (and status groups). Weber recognised that individual parties may be founded on the basis of the representation of certain class interests and may therefore recruit members predominantly from that class. But, if the concept of class is accorded insufficient importance in the writings of Weber, then that of class conflict is considered as
scarcely relevant to the historical development of society, since class conflict is, in his view, overshadowed by other predominating types of conflicts such as those between status groups, between parties and between national states. Additionally, although according to Weber, classes may assume greater importance during the period of advanced capitalism, he opposed Marx's view that society would be polarised into two major warring classes. On the contrary, he believed that the development of capitalism, paralleled by a complexification of the market and the emergence of large-scale bureaucracies, would generate an even greater number of classes and especially of intellectual or white collar workers. Furthermore the spread of bureaucratisation removed the focus of workers' "alienation" from the sphere of the economy to the sphere of institutions (political, social or cultural). Bureaucracy is thus seen as the major variable, explicative of social change in modern capitalist society, by virtue of the fact that it generates a hierarchical, even conflictual, division of labour which operates independently of the class structure of society.

Weber's "theory" of class is open to a number of both general and detailed criticisms. The first general problem of Weberian theory concerns the market, which in determining the acquisition patterns of skills and resources, and therefore of goods and services, becomes the basis for the reproduction of classes in society. It would seem, for Weber, that the market simply existed spontaneously. Explanation for its existence did not constitute a part of his frame-work of class analysis and one
is left to wonder why it is that skills and resources and goods and services have emerged as marketable commodities within the economy. Indeed Weber was unable to explain the existence of the market without emphasising the one element of the economy which he deliberately sought to underplay: that of the mode of production. He considered the economy in terms of "only the mode of distribution and consumption of economic goods", thereby denying the importance of the process of material (or non-material) production which underlies and characterises all social and economic relations at a given point in time. In general, therefore, Weber may be said to have provided an inadequate analysis of class structure by virtue of taking, as his starting point, the market.

Another general problem of Weber's class theory, linked to the first one, concerns the determination of class boundaries. The Weberian emphasis upon "market chances" ("life chances" in relation to the market) as the fundamental determinants of class leads to the identification of a continuous spectrum of "classes" without apparent breaks in between. It may be argued therefore that any imposition of class structure upon such an array amounts to an arbitrary exercise of classification. Certain Weberians or neo-Weberians have recognised this problem; thus Frank Parkin puts forward the solution of "social closure" or:

"the process by which social collectivities seek to maximise rewards by restricting access to rewards and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles."15

However as it is impossible to give a general account of where closure lines should be drawn, then the application of Parkin's solution also becomes an arbitrary exercise of classification.
Anthony Giddens presents, as a solution, the notion of "structuration" which will be discussed further on in this chapter. In general, therefore, Weberian theory does not allow for the meaningful drawing of class boundaries and hence implies that such boundaries hardly exist.

Where less general problems of theory are concerned the following are the most apparent. Firstly, Weber's concept of acquisition class and the differentiation between positively privileged and negatively privileged acquisition classes is of doubtful significance. The validity of the notion acquisition class as distinct from property class appears questionable as there is considerable overlapping between property classes and acquisition classes. Weber pointed out that located between negatively and positively privileged classes are:

"'middle'-ranking classes, including all those social strata which draw a livelihood from their property or their educational qualifications."17

and that:

"Some of these classes may constitute 'income classes', as do the privileged class of entrepreneurs and the unprivileged class of proletarians. But not all do: for instance, peasants, artisans and officials."18

However, it would seem that not all peasants, artisans and officials are exempted from membership of acquisition or income classes as Weber goes on to identify, between positively and negatively privileged acquisition classes, "the 'middle classes' of peasants and artisans . . . also officials (public and private) . . . " Also of dubious use is the distinction between negative and positive privileges within the context of
acquisition classes. For example, Weber drew a line of cleavage between entrepreneurs and professions exercising the "closed shop" principle (positively privileged) and skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (negatively privileged). Yet positive/negative privilege distinctions exist both within the ranks of the monopolised professions (a private doctor will earn more than his or her salaried counterpart in a state hospital) and of manual workers (unionised workers are positively privileged compared with non-unionised workers). Also, in relation to this, Weber offered no explanation as to why routine white collar or intellectual workers (especially those in the lower income brackets) are explicitly separated from the three negatively privileged acquisition classes of manual workers, to form, instead, part of a number of middle class groupings located in between the two main types of acquisition classes. Thus it would be true to say that this sort of complexification of the class model of society was promoted by Weber in order to add weight to his argument that advancing capitalism generates a multitude of classes and in turn leads to the dissolution of class conflict. The acceptance of this argument leads one to admit that class conflict cannot play a motor role in social transformation. This is one of the main reasons why Weberian concepts have been anathema in the "new class" debate in France where it has been dominated by the Left. For the French Left class must always play a dynamic role in history.

Finally, Weber's concept of social class (which, he pointed out, as having certain parallels with that of "status group") is unsatisfactorily explained. If a social class is defined as a
cluster of similar class or market situations (with approximately equal mobility chances), it is unclear, for example, why Weber regarded all manual workers as comprising a social class when at the same time they appear to fall into three different acquisition classes. Despite the criticisms made above Weber cannot be ignored as some of his insights on class are of potential use. For instance, the Weberian class model allows sociologists who feel constrained by Marx's dichotomous class model to include in their analyses of contemporary social structures the concept of middle class(es). However, the inclusion of the Weberian concept of middle class(es) into analyses of social structure is not unproblematic and contemporary Weberian sociologists, in their study of new strata of intellectual workers, have been obliged either to refine original Weberian concepts or to introduce new elements in their own theories. This is demonstrated below.

II. A contemporary Weberian approach to intellectual workers and class.

Mills's analysis of new strata of intellectual workers, covered in his writings by the expression "white collar workers", conforms explicitly to the general Weberian framework of class. Mills wrote in the early 'fifties within the American context where the rapid emergence of those in white-collar occupations, paralleled by the decrease in numbers of industrial wage-workers, farmers, the self-employed, and entrepreneurs, led him to suppose that the sociology of modern capitalist society (especially in
America) could only be well understood through the study of white-collar workers as part of "new middle classes". Thus he wrote:

"By examining white-collar life, it is possible to learn something about what is becoming more typically 'American' than the frontier character probably ever was. . . . The troubles that confront the white-collar people are the troubles of all men and women living in the Twentieth century."21

For Mills the rise of "new middle-classes" represented the key to the dilution of class conflict between the working class and classes of ruling elites, and consequently to an enduring stability of capitalism. This view of new middle classes constituted an essential element of prevalent American ideology. Like Weber, Mills stressed a pluralistic conception of classes which may be defined objectively according to varying conditions of property ownership or non-ownership (property classes) as well as according to levels of income (acquisition or income classes). Furthermore, and continuing to follow the Weberian model, Mills identified four major social class groupings. These four major class groupings are the working class (comprising all manual workers), the "old middle classes" (equivalent to Weber's petty bourgeoisie), the "new middle classes" (including managers, salaried professionals, salespeople and office workers) and those privileged groups of elites of society wielding power through ownership of property and knowledge. While Mills recognised that the preponderant criterion in the determination of classes may have been based upon the ownership or non-ownership of property in Weber's time, he believed that during the period of advancing capital, and with
the unprecedented expansion of the salaried mass, it is the
notion of acquisition or income class that predominates. Thus
more than ever today "'class situation' in its simplest objective
sense has to do with the amount and source of income" rather
than property. However, more fundamentally, because one's income
depended (for the majority of people) upon the selling of
services on the market or in other words upon one's occupation,
it was the latter which, in determining one's life-chances,
became the objective basis of class. This, according to Mills,
is particularly applicable in the case of new groups of salaried
intellectual workers for, on the basis of the latter's
relationship to property, they could be included in the working
class. However, inclusion of salaried intellectual workers in
the working class on such a basis alone would be ingenuous which
is why one would have to "go beyond the common fact of source of
income and consider as well the amount of income," to discover
that, in terms of occupational income, they are "somewhere in the
middle".

Occupations are indicative not only of incomes but they are
also connected with the subjective factor of prestige or honour
and hence reflect a status situation. Here it is important to
note that although Mills made a clear conceptual separation
between class and status (as did Weber), he linked the two
notions in his empirical analysis; hence different status
considerations were most likely to reflect and to reinforce
"objective" differences between occupational or class groupings.
For Mills social prestige worked decisively in differentiating
the class situation of salaried intellectual workers or white-
collar workers from that of manual workers. White-collar workers enjoy greater prestige or social status than manual workers although this prestige may have declined relatively in the past few decades with the extension of large-scale bureaucratically administered occupation structures. The prestige of white-collar workers is derived from a number of sources. Firstly it is derived from the historical conditions which have led to the emergence of white-collar groups; that is, that in place and type of work white-collar workers have gradually replaced the "old middle classes" and have to some extent "cashed in" on the prestige attached to the latter's class situation. Secondly, the fact that white-collar workers have traditionally worked in small units and in close contact with employers who have rewarded individual loyalty and initiative also adds to enhancement of social status. Thirdly, most white-collar functions remain physically separated from shop floor activities which are carried out routinely, under strict supervision and often in insalubrious conditions indicative of a lowly status. Fourthly, white-collar workers derive prestige from the fact of having pursued their education to a level far superior to that of manual workers. Finally, occupation is also tied to power which, like status, superposes the objective class differences between white collar workers and manual workers. Mills argued that:

"Given occupations involve specific powers over other people in the actual course of work; but also outside the job area, by virtue of their relations to institutions of property as well as the typical income they afford, occupations lend power."24

Hence white collar workers cannot be included in the working
class on the basis that a large number of white-collar occupations require direct supervision and authority (albeit delegated to them by the decision-makers) over other workers (in particular female white-collar and manual workers). On the whole that which emerges as characteristic of the class situation of white-collar workers is that it is mainly definable in terms of relative differences between the latter and other occupational groups rather than in absolute terms.

Having thus accorded white-collar workers an objective class situation (based upon income generating capacities of occupations) as well as a subjective class situation (founded upon status considerations), Mills went on to consider the question of political class consciousness leading to class conflict in relation to the "new middle classes". Mills rejected both the Marxist model of political consciousness on the grounds that it is steeped in economic determinism (this point has already been discussed in chapter five) as well as that model, put forward by subscribers to liberalism, which assumes that once given certain rights, the individual citizen would almost instinctively become politically motivated to act in his or her own political interests. Mills rejected the latter model as utopian, pointing out that in reality individuals have little time to reflect upon political alternatives and choices, which are, in any case, governed by the influence of the media, the education system and other bodies. Mills dismissed both models of political consciousness as inadequate on the basis that neither allow for the view that a social stratum, group or class may have no specific political direction at all as indeed this is
the case of the "new middle classes". Thus although the rate of white-collar unionism has increased throughout the latter half of this century, apparently indicating the emergence of a middle class consciousness and conflict potential, it is only in keeping with the general trend of increasing affiliation to Western trade-union movements and does not necessarily have political content. Moreover white-collar unionism, like that of manual workers, has become "another vested interest, an agency of political regulation at an economic price." Mills was also unsympathetic to Marxist views that the "new middle classes" would become polarised so that eventually a section of them would take up the position of the working class. He considered as spurious the Marxist claim that society would be polarised into two major classes with opposing interests; this on observation that neither pauperisation of the working class nor of the middle classes existed in reality. If it seemed that the material and social conditions of the "new middle classes" had deteriorated it was only because those of the working class had improved vastly thus narrowing the gap between the lifestyles of the two class groupings. Finally Mills (following Weber) argued that the further expansion of the "new middle classes" would contribute to a dilution of class conflicts as this class grouping became increasingly heterogeneous and devoid of coherent politics other than political indifference or tendencies to support political interests that were in the ascendent. Like all the other major class groupings, it has a pyramidal structure and this suggests that more conflicts will take place within class groupings.
between different strata or status groupings rather than between the major class groupings themselves.

Several criticisms may be made of Mills' analyses of the relation of intellectual or white-collar workers to class in social structure. However as his analyses are based explicitly upon Weberian theories of social stratification, many of the pertinent criticisms have already been touched upon in the preceding paragraphs (dealing with Weber's writings). The two main criticisms applying to Mills also, concern his failure to give consideration to the process of production which underlies and characterises the economic and social relations at a given period of time and to suggest a solution as to how boundaries could be imposed upon the vast array of "new middle classes". In addition to this the problems which arise in the construction of social categories or classes based upon occupation have been discussed at length in chapter four. In general it would be true to say that Mills' writings on class simplify much of Weber's analyses. Furthermore, despite his writing in a certain empirical tradition, he fails to provide the reader with an explanation of his methods of approach: for example in what sense do various occupations with slightly differing life chances share a common class position? Mills's ideas on the connections between class and political class consciousness also remain obscure so that, while he rejects the Marxist and liberal models of consciousness, he does not clarify what factors are responsible for the production of particular forms of political class consciousness however vague or incoherent they may appear to be in reality. Thus although Mills offers an interesting
portrait of an increasingly middle class society, the mechanisms by which his study is launched are of questionable use.

III. A contemporary "neo-Weberian" view of class determination and role of intellectual workers

Anthony Giddens's analyses of the question of class (as a means of stratification) and the role of intellectual workers in the historical development of society, have constituted one of the more innovative approaches in the framework of Weberian or "neo-Weberian" thought in recent years. Giddens himself has disputed the attachment to his work, by other sociologists and particularly by those of Marxist persuasion, of the label "neo-Weberian". He claims to have drawn selectively upon the most useful ideas of both Marx and Weber in order to defend the centrality of the notions of "class" and "class conflict" against the theorists of the New Left (for example Marcuse) as well as against those involved in academic sociology (for example Mills) who, for different reasons, have predicted the waning in significance of "class" and "class conflict" as capitalism advances.

Giddens's starting point for a construction of a theoretical class model is the rejection of what he considers as inadequate in the theories of both Marx and Weber. While supporting Weber's emphasis on market capacity as a crucial determinant of class situation Giddens does not however accept the Weberian model of class as it stands. His reason is that in the Weberian model there exist as many classes and possibly, forms of class conflict
as market positions and that Weber failed to specify how a large number of class situations could be reduced to a manageable number of classes whereby one could explain the main components of class structure and processes of social change. He also criticises Weber for paying insufficient attention to the influence of production relations upon class determination.

Where the Marxist interpretation of class is concerned, Giddens shares, with Marx, the view that all societies, except for the most primitive ones, embody relations of exploitation and that exploitation based upon class represents one form of organisation of such relationships. He also accepts that because of relations of exploitation, based upon class, conflict between classes is inevitable. However Giddens's conception of exploitation itself does not converge with that of Marx and in consequence he is compelled to reject the latter's labour theory of value as the axis for a dichotomous system of classes. According to Giddens, a dichotomous system of classes does not, in any case, facilitate the conceptual recognition of a middle class or middle classes which constitute an empirical reality in capitalist society.

Giddens argues that according to Marx, only two unambiguous classes are identifiable: producers of surplus value (the exploited class) and non-producers who live off surplus value (the exploiting class). The implications of this, according to Giddens, are two-fold. Firstly, a large number of intermediate propertyless groups in society would be considered exploiters. Secondly, given that socialist production techniques would resemble those of capitalist production, a classless society
could never emerge. However, Giddens wrongly imputes to Marx the view that non-producers of surplus-value are automatically exploiters. In Marx's analysis, exploitation depends upon the monopolisation of the means of production by a minority of people and their consequent capacity to appropriate surplus labour. Thus, in an order where the means of production were not monopolised by a minority, the appropriation of surplus value and associated class relations of domination and exploitation would cease to exist by definition and regardless of the techniques of production.

However, having rejected, both in the theories of Marx and Weber, that which he considered as inadequate, Giddens proceeds to a radical reappraisal of the concept of class in capitalist society. For Giddens the principal form of social structuring, in capitalism, is based upon classes which he defines as large-scale, open groupings made up of individuals with broadly similar life chances in the market or with similar "market capacities". "Market capacity" in Giddens's terms refers to the various attributes (such as educational qualifications and technical skills for example) brought by individuals to the bargaining counter in the recognition and formation of a capitalist labour contract. Here Giddens makes it clear that his use of the term "market capacity" is at variance with that of Weber:

"In using the term 'market' capacity, I did not intend to follow Weber's equation of 'class situation' with 'market situation'. I wanted rather to stress the centrality of the labour contract to the capitalist system."27

He goes on to argue that disparities in market capacity are used
as resources by employers and workers with the aim of obtaining maximum personal or group advantage although it is almost always the case that the enhanced market capacity of employers brings maximum rewards to the latter at the expense of workers. Thus it is the unequal relations in the use of market capacity that constitute relations of exploitation between classes:

"In class structures, the system of exploitation operates through differentials in market capacity" 28

Thus establishing exploitation as the basis upon which opposing groups emerge Giddens confronts the problem of deriving a manageable number of social classes as "structured forms" from an almost infinite number of situations which are reflective of market capacity. Prior to examining Giddens's specific treatment of intellectual workers, it would be useful to gain some insight into his model of class society. Giddens puts forward two types of class structuration: "mediate" and "proximate" whose combined application creates three main classes which are considered as generic to capitalism. The application of mediate structuration (the principal form) thus gives rise to the upper class determined by the ownership and control of the means of production, the middle class distinguished by the "ownership" of technical and educational skills and the working class determined by the "ownership" of manual labour-power. The mediate structuration of classes is reinforced by proximate structuration. Sources of proximate structuration are the division of labour and authority relationships within the productive enterprise and the influence of "distributive" groupings. Giddens considers the division of labour (which is of
vital importance as an influence upon class consciousness) primarily as the division between manual and intellectual labour. Secondly, authority relationships reinforce the manual/intellectual division and also support structured class forms at a higher level. Thirdly, distributive groupings, as a proximate source of structuration founded upon consumption as opposed to production patterns, also exert a major influence upon the formation of classes. Distributive groupings, which may or may not be aware of their existence as such, refer mainly to patterns of urban neighbourhood or community segregation, which coincide with divisions between types of market capacity. Although the sources of structuration, outlined above, enable one to identify major classes, Giddens makes it clear that it nevertheless remains impossible for one, using this method of approach, to establish clear-cut class boundaries, with the result that some overlap between classes must occur. He argues, however, that the establishment of class boundaries should not become the major concern of any class analysis of empirical societies, rather that:

"one of the specific aims of class analysis in relation to empirical societies must necessarily be that of determining how strongly, in any given case, the 'class principle' has become established as a mode of structuration."34

Using his method of class differentiation in the consideration of salaried intellectual workers, Giddens concludes that the latter, in their vast majority, form part of the middle class proper. His arrival at this conclusion is explained as follows. That which most obviously distinguishes intellectual workers (or white-collar workers as Giddens prefers) as a part of the middle
class is the market capacity, conferred on them through ownership of educational or technical skills backed by appropriate qualifications, which allows access to occupations offering certain levels of income. These income levels are generally higher than those of manual workers. Although Giddens concedes that the income levels of certain intellectual categories have diminished relatively, he does not consider this factor as indicative of a "proletarianisation" of white-collar workers for the simple reason that attached to their work situation are other favourable conditions (more job security than for manual workers, more promotion opportunities, shorter working weeks, more fringe benefits such as sick pay, pensions, higher tax allowances etc). However he points out that the market capacities of skilled manual workers and those of poorly qualified and of women white-collar workers often converge, thus creating a "buffer zone" between the middle and working classes, in which all mobility (upwards or downwards), between the classes, takes place.

Secondly, the division of labour in enterprises effectively separates those exerting intellectual labour power from those exercising manual labour power in terms of job content as well as in terms of physical location. This division is reinforced by the fact that white-collar workers, although subjected themselves to authority, form part of the administrative structure and thereby participate in the delegation of commands to manual workers.

Finally the influence of distributive groupings, in the form of neighbourhood segregation, upon class structuration highlights
the class location of white-collar workers even further. Because white-collar workers fall between certain income levels they are able to afford houses in certain geographical locations which on the one hand would be desirable but unaffordable to manual workers with lower market capacities but on the other hand would appear undesirable to those in the upper class with higher market capacities. Again Giddens accepts that overlaps may occur between "respectable" working class neighbourhoods and the bottom end of middle class neighbourhoods although these would not serve to blur class divisions. On the whole, while Giddens indicates that sources of mediate and proximate structuration also give rise to divisions within the three classes identified by him (for example between highly qualified and highly-paid professionals and routine clerical workers), he rejects the suggestion that such divisions constitute class divisions.

So far, discussion has been centred upon Giddens's concept of class in terms of objective structured forms, based on largely material considerations, although he also identifies classes in terms of social realities where class members are aware of the fact that they manifest common patterns of behaviour, attitude and belief linked to similar lifestyles. However, Giddens makes an important separation between "class awareness" and "class consciousness" and explains this as follows:

"'Class awareness' . . . does not involve a recognition that these attitudes and beliefs signify a particular class affiliation, or the recognition that there exist other classes, characterised by different attitudes, beliefs, and styles of life; 'class consciousness' by contrast . . . does imply both of these. The difference between class awareness and class consciousness is a fundamental one, because class awareness may take the form of a denial of the
existence or reality of classes". (his italics)

Whereas the existence of class awareness may be simply explained in that it is linked directly to that of objective structured forms, that of class consciousness presents some complexities. According to Giddens, this is because a number of different elements may be identified as constituents of class consciousness. However not all these elements combine automatically to form the consciousness of a given group or class. Here Giddens's argument joins forces with that of Touraine who recognises three constitutive "principles" or elements of class consciousness; the principles of identity, of opposition and of totality:

"Il existe un grand nombre de combinaisons possibles entre les trois principes dont un assemblage très particulier constitue la conscience: le principe d'identité qui est, plus encore que la définition d'un groupe d'appartenance, la définition d'une contribution, d'une fonction sociale et donc le fondement des revendications; le principe d'opposition, c'est-à-dire la définition du groupe antagoniste et plus précisément celle des obstacles au contrôle des travailleurs sur leurs œuvres; le principe de totalité qui définit le champ social dans lequel se situe la relation définie par les deux principes précédents."36

Following the outline of this model Giddens distinguishes between three different types of class consciousness which are: "undeveloped consciousness" where members of a class recognise their existence as such and as distinct from other classes; "conflict consciousness" which not only involves the identity principle" but also the recognition of the existence of opposing interests between classes; "revolutionary consciousness" where members of a class realise that social change may be brought about through their collective action against the existing social
order. In differentiating between "conflict" and "revolutionary" consciousness Giddens also acknowledges the usefulness of the Leninist conception of consciousness in which Lenin made a separation between "trade-union consciousness" and "revolutionary consciousness". However, Giddens does not accept Lenin's assertion that the gap between trade-union (or conflict) and revolutionary consciousness would be bridged by a vanguard of revolutionaries drawn mainly from progressive intellectual strata. Thus Giddens maintains that conflict consciousness (as manifested when demands for higher wages are made) emerges as a result of the unequal distribution of market capacities in capitalism and leads to a constant struggle on the part of unprivileged strata or classes to gain greater access to the market. The emergence of revolutionary consciousness, on the other hand, cannot be linked to differentials of market capacity:

"If the most important factor advancing conflict consciousness is visibility of class differentials, the most important factor influencing revolutionary consciousness is relativity of experience within a given system of production." 37 (his italics)

Giddens offers two explanations for the rise of revolutionary consciousness. The first explanation draws upon the theory of "uneven development" (proposed by latter-day Marxists such as Althusser) according to which revolutionary consciousness is fuelled by a "merging of contradictions", which occurs due to the "uneven" or unbalanced development of capitalist production within a post-feudal economy.

The second explanation has to do with the development of "neo-capitalist" production during which phase the focus of
conflict would move away from the question of the size of wage increases to questions of power and control in enterprises; the conflict consciousness of workers would be superseded by a revolutionary consciousness. Here, some parallel may be drawn between the arguments of Giddens and Serge Mallet (see chapter five).

Giddens's assessment of the role of intellectual workers, as part of the middle class, in the age of capitalism is based upon the results of a number of well known studies on social classes. Drawing upon the evidence presented in such studies, Giddens asserts that class awareness rather than class consciousness typifies the cognitive style of middle class intellectual workers who perceive society in terms of a hierarchical structure of occupations. Additionally, upward social movement within this structure is attributed, by intellectual workers, to the individual's talent, initiative and competitive zeal. Although such perceptions do not always disallow recognition of one's class membership, Giddens believes that they do tend to destroy possibilities for the formation of certain types of consciousness and especially revolutionary consciousness. He concludes:

"... the typical modes of class structuration, and the pervasiveness of class awareness, within the middle class inevitably tend to diminish the specific social (or cultural) influence of the latter in relation to the centrifugal pull of the working class on the one side, and upper class on the other. This means that the middle class rarely tends to play a direct role in manifest class struggles."41 (his italics)

However, Giddens does not rule out the possibility that white-collar unionism could become well integrated with the labour movement, in which case the emergence of militancy and
revolutionary consciousness, among intellectual workers, would parallel similar orientations of consciousness occurring with the labour movement in general in a given capitalist society. From this one would assume that so far there has been no significant integration of white-collar unionism with the labour movement in class societies but one is given no explanation, by Giddens, as to the means by which or the circumstances in which such integration could occur.

Although Giddens has attempted to solve a number of problems which have recurred in Weberian approaches to the question of "class" (for example by limiting the number of classes in existence), certain aspects of his own class theory must be questioned. Firstly, Giddens is open to similar criticism as Weber in regarding the "market" as the basis of class reproduction in capitalism although, unlike the latter, he does give consideration to production relations on the secondary level of proximate structuration. However if it is accepted that production relations underlie market relations, a class analysis derived from primary consideration of the former would appear to be more complete.

Secondly, Giddens maintains that the combination of mediate and proximate structuration gives rise to a three-fold class model which is "generic to capitalist society". Nevertheless it remains unclear why such sources of structuration should produce just three class groupings with internal divisions rather than a multiplicity of classes. The use of mediate and proximate sources of structuration should, in fact, allow one to separate
routine non-manual employees as a class distinct from highly-skilled professionals. For example, it is obvious not only that a low-grade office clerk possesses fewer marketable skills than a doctor but also that he or she occupies a different and unequal position in the hierarchy of authority relations and in the division of labour (in terms of job content) and finally that he or she, particularly in the case of a principal bread-winner, is likely to live in a less affluent neighbourhood. Thus the use of mediate and proximate sources of structuration would justify in a Weberian or "neo-Weberian" framework the recognition of supplementary classes such as an upper middle class as distinct from a lower middle class for example.

A third criticism concerns Giddens's model of class as subject. While Giddens recognises the objective reality of a middle class he refuses to ascribe to it any role of significance in class conflict and thereby in general denies its (conflict or revolutionary) consciousness potential. The main conflict of interests, according to Giddens, exists between the upper class and the working class. If this is the case, then Giddens fails to explain why, during a period of heightened class conflict, the middle class (having no consciousness of its own interests) should not go over either to the side of the upper class or to the working class and thus contribute to a polarisation of society into two major classes as Marx had predicted. A contradiction occurs between Giddens's trichotomous model of class as object and his apparently dichotomous model of class as subject.
Finally, Giddens does not adopt a consistent approach in his analysis of the emergence of consciousness. He stresses the primacy of market relations (as opposed to "proximate" production relations) in the emergence of conflict consciousness but he is compelled to move away from the market framework of his analysis in order to explain the emergence of revolutionary consciousness. The fact that Giddens focuses entirely on the development of capitalist production relations with regard to the emergence of revolutionary consciousness casts doubt upon the comprehensiveness of the market-based class analysis of neo-Weberian approaches.

With the notable exception of those such as Giddens, it would be true to state that, in their approaches to "class", Weberian sociologists are more concerned with the nature of stratification than with the question of why stratification occurs. Consequently Weberian approaches are not so much analytical as descriptive and classificatory. In concentrating upon visible attributes (for example occupation, income, education, status etc) of classes, Weberian sociologists tend to ignore the often invisible but fundamental structural determinants of classes. For example, while one is able to derive a vast amount of information regarding the quantitative evolution of different classes, one does not find adequate explanations of the reasons behind such a change. The omission of the question as to why stratification exists in a given society cannot be attributed to mere short-sightedness. The implication that there exists a hierarchical distribution of classes in a pyramidal structure, so that social status increases
from base to apex, represents a willingness to legitimise the social order as it is. Weberian approaches directly contradict Marxist approaches whose principal aim remains to question the legitimacy of class society.

The presentation in this chapter of non-Marxist analyses of the class situation and role of intellectual workers in contemporary capitalism has been useful for a number of reasons. Firstly, in terms of methods of approach to the study of class and class conflict it constitutes important "balancing" material to that presented in chapter five. Secondly, it demonstrates that sociologists and thinkers other than those of the Left have followed and analysed changes in the social structure of contemporary capitalist societies wrought by technological advances in industrial production. Furthermore, the analyses of these sociologists, of the significance and implications of intellectual workers as a new social force, indicate that the arguments of this debate have not been exhausted by the French Left. Finally, the conclusions reached by liberal sociologists, regarding the objective and subjective determinations of intellectual workers are significant in that they tend to lend weight to the arguments of Marxists (for example, Poulantzas) who urge political parties of the Left to exercise caution in their consideration of intellectual workers as either, almost "automatic" allies of the working class or as a new revolutionary class in society.
CHAPTER VII

THE QUESTION OF INTELLECTUAL WORKERS COMES TO THE FORE

IN PCF THINKING: 1956–1967
This chapter examines the approach of the PCF towards intellectual workers from 1956 to 1966. This period sees the Party shift from a position where it regarded intellectuals as creators and propagators of culture, who could be used either as a "bridge" between the working class and the middle classes or as a valuable tool for creating working class culture and promoting working class interests, to a position from which it began to view intellectuals as an important social force of salaried workers intervening directly or indirectly in the production process. One notes in particular the emphasis, placed by the PCF, upon intellectual workers engaged in productive activity. The Party's approach to intellectual workers must be considered in the light of the increasing urgency for alliances with non-working class strata during this period. The necessity for an alliance strategy arose due to: the renunciation of the revolutionary road to socialism, the increased polarisation of political life in France between Left and Right, the need to react politically to the sociological changes taking place in French society.

I. A period of transition: 1956-1957

The year 1956 marked an important point in the history of the international communist movement as a result of the proceedings of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. It was at this Twentieth Congress that the concept of "peaceful transition to socialism" (as well as that of peaceful coexistence between East and West) was introduced officially. The new CPSU line argued that with the development of a high level of class
consciousness and able leadership, the working class and its party could

"win a solid majority in parliament, transform it from a tool serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people... and provide the necessary conditions for a peaceful socialist transition."2

As revolution no longer constituted the main strategic model for communist parties, the successful participation of communists in bourgeois elections as a means of achieving power would become all important. The implication which followed logically from this was that, in order to achieve power, communist parties would have to seek alliances with certain non-working class sections of the voting population and thus formulate new policies to this end.

However, the essential part of the proceedings of the Congress were devoted to Khrushchev's report urging the need for a firm denunciation of Stalinist errors and crimes. The PCF found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand it was unwilling to accept the Khrushchev report for an acceptance would have amounted to an admission of the iniquity of its own position during the Stalin era. On the other hand it could not be seen to isolate itself within the communist movement. Thus it is significant that the Party loudly hailed that part of the CPSU line which advocated the "peaceful road to socialism" while it made every endeavour to sweep under the carpet revelations of Stalinist errors. It may be said that the PCF's enthusiastic and immediate readiness to abandon the revolutionary path to socialism had, at that particular point in time, more to do with
its own situation within the international communist movement than it did with its reaction to the changing sociological face of French society.

The acceptance by the PCF of the "peaceful road to socialism" was officially summarised at the Fourteenth Congress in 1956. The implications of the adoption of such a concept were clear enough. The Party had to win votes amongst non-working class strata. The question of winning votes amongst non-working class strata was, as we have seen, not new for the PCF. What was new, however, was that the social structure of France had evolved in such a way that whole new strata of salaried intellectual workers had emerged while classes which had been traditional allies of the working class (for example the peasantry and certain sections of the middle classes such as independent artisans) during the 'twenties, 'thirties and 'forties, were fast decreasing in numbers. The question to be posed, therefore, was which of these "new" sections of the working population would make the best political allies of the working class in the struggle for socialism? In order to answer this question it was also very important to understand where exactly these potential allies stood in terms of their position within the social structure. As has been shown (in chapter VI) these questions had already been posed and debated amongst non-Marxist sociologists in Germany, the USA and Britain) in order to inform the political strategy of social democratic or other non-Marxist parties in those countries. In France the need for a similar debate was being recognised within the Left but the debate did not get into full swing until 1958.
In the PCF questions about the evolution of social structure and the spectacular rise in numbers of salaried intellectual workers were being posed on very much an ad hoc basis by some intellectuals contributing to the review Economie et Politique. As early as in 1954 the review had presented a one-off article on the category of "intellectuels qui appliquent leur effort de création directement dans le processus de production capitaliste." However, the authors had restricted themselves to presenting much factual information about the evolution of this category of intellectual workers without pursuing any serious debate as to their precise class membership or role in the struggle for socialism. It was not until late 1955 that the review presented another article which proved to be controversial. Its author, in his study and discussion of white-collar office and commercial workers and basing his arguments upon selected texts from Marx (Capital volume 3, section on commercial workers) and Lenin (The Great Beginning), arrived at the following unequivocal conclusion: "Employés et ouvriers appartiennent à la même classe, la classe ouvrière, le prolétariat." Furthermore the author had set out quite clearly the importance of a serious analysis of the question of class membership of salaried non-manual workers:

"L'intérêt de cette question est considérable. L'accroissement du nombre des employés au cours des cinquante dernières années est incontestable . . . Leur détermination politique ou leur flottement, leur indécision peuvent jouer un rôle important. Si la masse des employés appartiennent aux classes moyennes ou constitue, comme le voudraient les sociaux-démocrates, une classe à part, elle doit être considérée comme une catégorie sociale conservatrice de l'état des choses actuel . . . Si, par contre, la masse des petits et
This article provoked enough interest and debate among readers of *Economie et Politique* for the review's editorial committee to present a "discussion" on the class membership of employees within its pages. In the "discussion" three sets of arguments, said to reflect the typical views of the review's readership, were presented. The first argument, put forward by readers in their letters, followed an *ouvriériste* line in maintaining that the working class had nothing to gain by welcoming to its ranks other salaried strata and that it was up to the latter to ally with the working class in order for their interests to be served. The second argument maintained that employees and other such salaried strata belonged to the petty bourgeoisie. The third argument presented was of most significance in that it maintained that employees were neither part of the middle classes nor part of the working class. This argument reflected a position which was later to be taken up by the PCF. As interest in the subject increased, *Economie et Politique* enlarged the scope of the debate, publishing articles which dealt with the class membership of other categories of salaried and "independent" intellectual workers. For example during the latter half of 1956, the review published a lengthy article, in two parts, on the French "middle classes". Here the author, Robert Delille, drew clear distinctions within the middle classes between non-salaried or
independent artisans, businessmen, and intellectuals (writers, painters, liberal professions etc.) on the one hand and intellectual workers within industry, commerce, and the state sector (civil servants, teachers etc.) on the other hand. Furthermore, the author devoted a large part of his discussion to the social situation of intellectual workers in relation to the working class, and in view of potential alliances, argued that technicians and agents de maîtrise could be considered as archetypes of the working class of the future although for the time being they formed that part of the nouvelles classes moyennes which was placed "à la 'limite supérieure' du prolétariat" and which could be considered as an ally of the working class. However the author did not fail to stress that despite the convergence in the objective situation of the working class and new strata of technicians and agents de maîtrise an opposition could emerge between the latter and manual workers:

"... il peut exister, dans certaines conditions, des tensions sérieuses entre elles et la masse des ouvriers (par exemple: les contrenaîtres dans le cadre des campagnes de productivité). Ces couches peuvent être également l'objet d'efforts particuliers de corruption (idéologique et 'financière') de la part du patronat et se transformer, dans une certaine mesure, en une sorte d'aristocratie ouvrière."

The author was very careful to distance himself from other notions of "new class" by insisting that certain strata of the middle classes were "new" only in the sense that:

"le capitalisme crée des conditions favorables à leur développement, ce qui les distingue de la petite entreprise. Mais leur 'nouveauté' s'arrête là ...".

It is clear, from the presentation of these articles that the importance of analysing the social situation of new groups of
intellectual workers, as a means of gauging their political orientation, was being recognised in certain influential circles of the PCF. The articles were important in themselves as the subject of class membership of salaried intellectuals or intellectual workers had never been broached in this open manner before although rare individuals, such as Jean Préville, had in the past touched upon the subject without being heard and had even suggested that the boundaries of the working class may be extended in the future. Indeed there had never been any question on the part of the Party (even when the PCF had welcomed them with open arms as in the late 'thirties and after the Second World War) that intellectuals (salaried or otherwise) belonged to any class but the middle classes. It was also significant that these questions were raised within the pages of Economie et Politique, in that this review had always (under its first editor Jean Baby as well as under Jean Prontea) encouraged, without treading the path of "dissidence", a certain amount of research which did not fit strictly into the mould of Party thinking. Articles such as these appeared neither in Cahiers du Communisme which had been under the influence of more orthodox Communists such as Georges Cogniot or Léo Figuères, nor in La Nouvelle Critique whose editorial committee was, during this period, gradually being entirely replaced as a means of silencing dissident intellectual voices raised against the PCF's refusal to de-Stalinise and to condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary. In any case Economie et Politique ceased, at the end of 1956, to present the debate on the class membership and political orientation of intellectual workers, at least in the form it had
taken so far. According to Phillippe Robrieux, it was probable that the tone of the articles had not found favour in higher instances and besides, Thorez's reflexions on "paupérisation absolue" had become a major theoretical preoccupation of the PCF. The debate would only resume after the Fifteenth Congress of 1959 with the Party's seal of approval. Thus while the PCF had accepted the concept of "peaceful transition to socialism" it made no efforts to present in concrete terms a reformulated strategy for the conquest of power. Nor did the Party leadership find it necessary to undertake a study of the social situation of expanding strata of intellectual workers in order to determine the possibilities of their participation in the struggle for socialism. Moreover, on the level of practice the PCF seemed to have gone out of its way to alienate a large number of voters outside the working class by its obstinate refusal first to denounce Stalinism in the light of the revelations of the Khrushchev report and later to condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary. In an interview Jean Rony put forward the view that the PCF's stance on de-Stalinisation and the Soviet intervention in Hungary which had provoked a critical outcry within the Party, mainly from intellectuals, had also damaged the Party's future prospects of winning over non-working class strata, in particular intellectual workers, to an alliance with the working class. Moreover, according to Rony, the PCF's harsh treatment of its own intellectuals who had dissented against its stance on Hungary and the Khrushchev report was taken by many intellectual workers as indicative of the PCF's general attitude towards those who were
II. *Unity above all: 1958 - 1962*

It would seem that the PCF had barely emerged from internal tensions engendered by the proceedings of the Twentieth CPSU Congress and the events of Hungary when it plunged deep into others. Firstly, the Party suffered a double electoral catastrophe in September 1958, when it called on electors to vote “no” in the Referendum (on the adoption of the constitution of the Fifth Republic) and in the legislative elections of November of the same year when it suffered its heaviest vote loss (1,606,640 votes or one-third of its voters) since 1932. The reasons for this defeat were complex and hinged partly upon the PCF’s stance on Hungary and de-Stalinisation, and partly upon its interpretation of de Gaulle’s return. The Party presented de Gaulle’s accession to power as a retrograde step which could favour the rise of fascism in France and therefore devoted all its energies, prior to the elections, to the defence of the constitution and institutions of the Fourth Republic, which up to this point it had vehemently opposed. The Party argued that given the new adverse relation of political forces in France, wrought by the adoption of a new constitution and whereby a polarisation had occurred between Left and Right, Communists could not separate the defence of working class interests from the defence of the (Fourth) Republic and its institutions. The seeming ease with which the PCF shifted positions from one where it had arraigned the "corrupt bourgeois" Fourth Republic and its
institutions to one from which it began to defend the same Republic caused consternation amongst its own voters and confused and consequently turned away other potential voters including traditional protest voters. The "battle for Republican democracy" became the PCF's main priority. Secondly, the Party began to face once more in 1958 increasing dissent from its own intellectuals whose opposition to the Algerian war was growing stronger and who felt that having accepted the idea of "peaceful transition to socialism" the Party ought to have been formulating a strategy for the peaceful conquest of power taking into account the necessity for alliances with new intellectual strata or intellectual workers. So far the Party had only shown interest in building alliances "at the top", in this case with the Molletists, prior to the legislative elections of 1958. Many dissenting intellectuals, denied the opportunity to voice such sentiments within the Party, did so through "oppositional" reviews such as Voies Nouvelles which was set up by the clandestine Etincelle group (revived in April 1958). However, some did openly speak out within the Party. For example, on 10 October 1958, the Sorbonne-Lettres cell in Paris wrote a critical letter, to the PCF leadership, following resolutions taken at one of its earlier meetings. The letter criticised the Party leadership on a number of counts, amongst which was that of its lack of insight in developing a "vériable analyse marxiste" of the changes which were taking place in French society and hence of not confronting seriously the different possibilities of "voies françaises du socialisme." The letter also reminded the
leadership of its proper place within the Party:

"Le parti n'est pas un organisme où certains ont pour fonction de penser, de décider, de commander, les autres se bornant à exécuter les tâches pratiques. Le parti est une organisation politique de combat de la classe ouvrière. La libre discussion politique entre communistes, à tous les échelons, sur la base du marxisme et dans une perspective de classe, l'échange des expériences du haut en bas, l'information réciproque organisée entre militants de la direction et ceux de la base tels sont, dans le centralisme démocratique, les principes que la direction a le devoir de respecter..."18

These criticisms of the Party's conduct were hardhitting and more importantly they came from an official cell composed essentially of intellectuals, specialists in their respective disciplines and highly influential within student and intellectual circles in general. One of these intellectuals was Serge Mallet who had held two full-time posts within the Party before being demoted following disagreements between himself and his colleagues over the questions of the Party's relation to its base and of the structure of the working class. Since being demoted Mallet had remained a cell-member putting forward a new analysis of Gaullism as a capitalist technocracy and of modifications within the internal structure of the working class. These analyses were presented and debated publicly for the first time in November 1958 in Paris (at the Salle des Horticulteurs) together with contributions from Alain Touraine, and PCF specialist on Trade Union affairs André Barjonet amongst others. These analyses which put forward the idea of a "new working class" which included intellectual workers and which would form the vanguard for social change had increasingly found favour amongst Communist students, intellectuals within Economie et Politique and France
and even to some extent Politbureau members Servín and Casanova (see chapter V for a detailed presentation of the analyses of classes in contemporary capitalism put forward by Mallet and Touraine).

The Party's reaction to the Sorbonne Lettres cell was slow and cautious because of latent sympathies within the leadership for the Sorbonne Lettres line. These sympathies were expressed by Central Committee members Jean Pronteau (editor of Economie et Politique), Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont (editor of France Nouvelle) and Politbureau members Servín and Casanova. The Party's acknowledgement of the letter (made by Léon Feix) at a Central Committee meeting of 13 January 1959 was a low-key affair. The fact that Feix felt it necessary to conduct a defence of the Party first rather than launch a straightforward attack on the intellectuals concerned was surprising in itself. Eventually two Sorbonne Lettres cell members, Pierre Crouzet and Durand Dastié were suspended from the Party for a period of six months while the cell was officially censured. Other cell members such as Mallet left the PCF. The period that spanned the end of the Sorbonne Lettres cell affair and the Fifteenth PCF Congress of June 1959, saw the Party beginning to move towards an understanding of the need for some kind of strategy which would bring non-working class strata over to the side of the working class. Firstly, the PCF stopped making public denunciations of Communist intellectuals who continued to "dissent", realising that an aggressive attitude towards the latter only served to frighten away the increasing numbers of new intellectual strata. Secondly, Thorez's theory of absolute pauperisation of the
working class was less frequently referred to by Party leaders in their discourse. This conciliatory stance was particularly evident during the regional elections of that year which produced better results for the PCF than it had expected. The Party thus approached its Fifteenth Congress in an atmosphere of relative calm and with a certain amount of confidence.

The Fifteenth Congress was important in that it exposed the PCF's strong desire to disengage itself from an isolationist ghetto and it presented for the first time, since the Twentieth CPSU Congress, the PCF's remodelling of revolutionary strategy insofar as alliances with other political forces were concerned. While it emerged that organisations and movements of both the labouring peasantry and the urban middle classes were the favoured allies of the working class within a vast "republican" movement led by the latter, the emphasis within this alliance was very much upon the middle classes. In his Congress speech Waldeck Rochet resoundingly reminded delegates of the Party's new mot d'ordre:

"A tout prix front unique de la classe ouvrière, à tout prix rassemblement de la classe ouvrière et des classes moyennes: tel est le mot d'ordre du parti communiste."20

In addition, delegates to the Congress were given a brief lesson in the social structure of France, by Maurice Thorez, to show how the situation for new alliances had come about. Here Thorez rejected the analyses of "reformist and revisionists", in France, such as Chalandon (General Secretary of the Union Nationale Républicaine) and the Socialists Lucien Laurat, Chaplaz and Jules Moch who were accused of being influenced by American sociology
and who claimed that capitalism was being transformed into a "middle class society" in which the role of the proletariat was invalidated. He counterposed the Party's view:

"L'analyse scientifique des classes moyennes établit au contraire que l'intérêt véritable de ces couches est d'être les alliés du prolétariat dans sa lutte contre la grande bourgeoisie des monopoles, dont les intérêts sont et demeurent inconciliables avec ceux du peuple."21

The "scientific analysis" of the middle classes also demonstrated that a "double evolution" was taking place within these classes. The scientific nature of this analysis was emphasised, by Thorez, by the frequent citation of official statistics throughout his discourse. One assumes that Thorez had made selective use of studies and findings carried out by organs such as Économie et Politique and the Central Committee's economic section. This evolution indicated a marked decrease in the numbers of the traditional middle class strata (artisans, businessmen) on the one hand and a rapid expansion of new strata on the other:

". . . le capitalisme moderne produit de façon permanente ce qu'on appelle les nouvelles couches moyennes: fonctionnaires, employés, cadres de l'industrie, intellectuels etc."22

Furthermore, the importance of the newest elements of these middle class strata, as producers, was emphasised:

"La couche des ingénieurs, cadres et techniciens est créée par le développement technique. Cette couche comporte une grande diversité de situations sociales, et l'on ne doit pas oublier l'interpenetration de ses éléments supérieurs et des milieux capitalistes. Cependant l'avenir des ingénieurs et des techniciens, comme réalisateurs et créateurs dépend du libre développement des forces productives. La prise de conscience de leurs intérêts supérieurs peut les amener à se ranger du côté du prolétariat."23

This part of Thorez's conference speech (in the context of the
PCF's remodelled revolutionary strategy based on the theme of unity) announced the Party's new alliance policy towards the majority of intellectual workers and its special interest in those intellectual workers intervening in the process of production, the ITC. It also informed interested circles both inside and outside the Party that the PCF had entered the debate upon the political implications of the emergence of new intellectual strata or classes, that as far as the Party was concerned, the initiative for debate was taken out of the hands of individual intellectuals working within organs such as Economie et Politique, and that the Party leadership would now set out the parameters within which all official debate on the subject may be engaged. The Party's main "specialists" André Barjonet, Gilbert Mury and Maurice Bouvier-Ajam officially set to work on the question of the social position and role of intellectual workers within contemporary French society. All three "specialists" formed part of the Economie et Politique collective and worked closely with the Central Committee's Economic Section. The names of those (for example Delille and Dumoulin) who had first launched studies and discussions, in the pages of Economie et Politique in the mid-'fifties, on new intellectual strata, did not reappear now. A plethora of articles by the three "specialists" appeared in the Party's press over the next few years (1959-1962) (particularly in France Nouvelle, Economie et Politique, Cahiers du Communisme, La Pensée and La Nouvelle Critique). The volume of research within the Party, on the subject of intellectual workers (as part of the
middle classes) was enormously increased. In general two main conclusions were drawn again and again. The first conclusion was that of the various strata of intellectual workers, the ITC constituted the most important group in that they contributed to the creation of value and wealth and in that their growing numbers projected their increasing role in the struggle for a socialist society. However despite their productive role ITC did not form part of the working class:

"Nous pensons qu'il serait formel de ne retenir que la seule caractéristique de travailleurs productifs pour déterminer l'appartenance de classe de cette catégorie sociale. D'autres critères sont à considérer tels que l'origine et la situation sociale, ou encore le caractère de leurs rapports avec le patronat dans le processus de production capitaliste ... Il s'ensuit ... que si on parle de rapprocher la catégorie des ingénieurs, cadres et certains techniciens d'une classe de la société, il est plus conforme à la réalité objective de la rapprocher des classes moyennes que de la classe ouvrière, c'est-à-dire de la considérer comme couche intermédiaire entre la bourgeoisie et le prolétariat."25

The second conclusion was that while intellectual workers had an important role to play in an anti-monopoly alliance with the working class, this role did not override that of the working class:

"Nous rejetons tant la tendance à nier la place particulière que tient l'intellectuel dans le mouvement ouvrier que celle qui voudrait le privilégier au point de contester le rôle dirigeant et la mission historique au prolétariat."26

Moreover, that cross-class alliances between the working class and intellectual workers only constituted a primary stage in the peaceful struggle for socialism which eventually would be succeeded by a stage in which the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat would become necessary in order
to destroy the machinery of the capitalist state. Thus intellectual workers were seen very much as a force d'appoint with no specific interests of their own and whose long term welfare depended upon whether or not they were prepared to support the positions of the working class. These conclusions were drawn at an official level, not only in the Communist press but also within "discussion" forums led by Party leaders. For example the PCF's national conference on ITC in May 1963 reiterated familiar themes and although the conference was called ostensibly to give an opportunity to Communist ITC to outline problems that they faced in the workplace and means for the Party to help them counter such problems, it was largely dominated by Party leaders who set the tone of the discussion. This was also true of the Journées d'étude (on ITC) organised in December 1961, to treat the themes of "la technique et les monopoles", "l'ingénieur et l'entreprise monopoliste", and "l'ingénieur et la nation", but which essentially provided the Party leadership with a platform from which self-congratulatory speeches (on the PCF's activity amongst intellectual workers) were made and attacks were launched upon theorists such as Mallet and Touraine. It would be true to say that events such as the Journées d'étude and the national conference were organised by the PCF in order to give the impression to intellectual workers that it was interested in their problems and that it was trying to work out solutions with them to such problems. In reality, however, little importance was given to the contributions of intellectual workers present at such events; the Communist press only reported what Party leaders had said, seemingly, in the hope that if it was repeated for long
enough, it would be understood by intellectual workers who would then come over to the side of the working class.

However, it is true to say that a certain amount of real debate (that is unfettered by obligation of adherence to the "Party line") on the question of intellectual workers was carried on within the Party. The Centre d'Études et de Recherches Marxistes (CERM) which, since its foundation at the Fifteenth Congress, provided PCF intellectuals with a framework for relatively independent research, continued to keep its distance from the leadership, allowing animated discussion on the subject of the class membership of intellectual workers to take place. According to both Jean Rony and Yvonne Quilès, discussions took place within small "intimate" intellectual circles within the Centre and a number of intellectuals who participated were interested in Gramscian concepts and theories. This interest was, however, never expressed beyond the rooms and corridors of the CERM. In addition to this, France-Nouvelle under the editorship of Kriegel-Valrimont (who did not entirely favour the Party's analysis of French social structure) occasionally gave space, under its rubric Enquêtes for example, to divergent opinions regarding the class membership and role of intellectual workers. Ideas of including intellectual workers in the working class through use of the concept "collective worker" were put forward tentatively, albeit through implication rather than directly. The concept of "collective worker" had been used by Mallet in justifying the existence of the "new working class". A discussion of "collective worker" in Marx and in Mallet's works
has already been undertaken in Chapter V of this thesis. Divergences in theory occurred at leadership level as well. As mentioned previously, some of Mallet's ideas had found a sympathetic audience in the persons of Jean Prontreau, Kriegel-Valrimont and Politbureau members Servin and Casanova. All four men had manifested their sympathies with Mallet's ideas at a Central Committee meeting of 31 June/1 July 1960 when Casanova had presented a radical analysis of capitalist technocracy and the growing role of youth, students and intellectual workers in new forms of protest. Furthermore, Casanova, supported by the other three, had encouraged the Party to support these sections of the community in their protest actions against Gaullism.

Even Barjonet, one of the PCF's front-line specialists in the attack on "new class" theories, was beginning to distance himself ideologically from the majority "Thorezist" group in the Central Committee and the Politbureau. The group led by Thorez had always violently condemned the view of "new class" theorists such as Mallet and Touraine, that a change in the organic composition of the working class (due to "technicisation") could lead to a reformulation of working class demands towards issues of control over the economic affairs and production process within the capitalist enterprise (see chapter V for an analysis of this view). This "technical" approach to socialism, which in fact reinforced the political role of trade-unions to the detriment of political parties of the working class, was for this reason considered by the Thorezists as an utopian ideal engendered by capitalist propaganda and brought into the working class movement by intellectual workers and students who were still attached to
petty-bourgeois ideas. The pro-Thorez leadership of the Party insisted upon the validity of Lenin's view that trade-unions merely developed conflictual consciousness while the Communist Party alone, as vanguard of the working class, was capable of developing a political consciousness and thus of formulating political demands in the struggle for socialism. These differences regarding the role of the working class (and therefore of its Party) in leading the political struggle against the bourgeoisie, were inevitably manifested at the level of strategy, and no more acutely so than in October 1960 at the time when a demonstration calling for peace in Algeria was organised in Paris, jointly by the national union of French students (UNEF), the PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié) and non-communist trade unions. Thorez and Waldeck-Rochet on behalf of the Party leadership, declined an invitation to the PCF to join the demonstration considering that it was not for trade-unions to organise political demonstrations thereby relegating parties to a position where they would only act as a force d'appoint. The leadership's refusal to join the demonstration was not supported by Servin, Casanova and their allies whose attitude to such actions had been previously clarified at the previous Central Committee meeting mentioned above. In any case the leadership's ban on attendance at the demonstration by Communists was flouted by many Communist students and intellectual workers, particularly trade-unionists within the UGICT (Union Générale des Ingénieurs, Cadres (et Techniciens) - affiliated to the CGT. It should be noted that the UGICT was not officially formed until
1969. Prior to this the organisation grouping cadres within the CGT was called UGIC while techniciens were officially considered part of the group ETDA (Employés, Techniciens, Dessinateurs, Agents de Maîtrise). However it is more convenient to refer (albeit anachronistically) to the UGIC as UGIC(T) as in practice technicians were considered, by the CGT and the PCF, in the same instance as engineers and cadres. Those who attended were denounced by their local cells or sections while in some cases militant Communist technicians and cadres who had held important positions within the UGIC(T) at the level of their firm, were removed upon the instigation of local PCF leaders. This was the case of ITC militants at the Bagneux branch of the Thomson-Houston company (accounting for some 60 per cent of the CGT's executive committee there) who were condemned for their participation in the demonstration by their CGT branch secretary (who was also secretary of the Communist cell in Bagneux) and were later eliminated. Not only was the PCF's reaction to the events of 27 October indicative of differences in position of Communist leaders in relation to the debate on the "new working class" but it also manifested the divergence between the theory and practice of the Party's anti-monopoly alliance. However, despite such reactions on the part of the PCF, in general the Party was beginning to promote a relatively favourable image amongst intellectual workers. It was during this period that the CGT had, with encouragement from the PCF, "relaunched" UGICT (originally formed in 1948 in order to combat the influence of the CGC, it had declined during the 'fifties) with the stated aim of making a closer study of the problems specific to ITC. In
addition to this the Party had been active in other intellectual circles, organising conferences and study days, while encouraging the participation of non-Communist intellectuals. The most successful of such events had been the first Semaine de la Pensée Marxiste held in December 1961 attended by an estimated total of 20,000 persons from diverse intellectual categories. This week-long meeting, during which the subject of "humanism, dialectics and Marxism" was debated by such eminent personalities as Sartre, de Beauvoir, Georges Friedmann, Jean Hyppolite and others, went some way towards convincing intellectual workers and students (in particular those on the Left who had been alienated from the Party after 1956) that the PCF was genuinely attempting to de-Stalinise and move away from ouvrieriste positions. If for no other reason, the Party's image was enhanced in the eyes of some in view of the fact that it had appeared to constitute the only consistently anti-Gaullist force in France. The improvement of the PCF's standing amongst intellectual workers was reflected by its score in the 1962 elections when the percentage of its vote increased from 19 per cent (in 1958) to 21.8 per cent. The number of Communist deputies returned to the National Assembly rose from 10 to 41.

III. The road to Argenteuil: 1963-1966

This four year period, highlighted towards the end with an entire session of the Central Committee devoted to "intellectual" creation and problems of ideology and culture (the first since 1937), witnessed an unprecedented increase in the activity of the
Party in relation to its alliance policy with new middle strata, otherwise mainly intellectual workers. Again, one must be reminded that the PCF's policies in the direction of intellectual workers cannot be separated from the thrust of its general unity policy at party political level and from a continuing process of de-Stalinisation within the Party aimed at creating a more open and democratic face of communism which voters could relate to. By 1966 not only had the Party adopted the concepts of "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful transition to socialism", it had also declared that such a transition could be achieved by the joint effort of several parties, thereby hinting at the possibility of a real alliance with the Socialists. The PCF's desire for a more preponderant role in the political life of France and hence for a formal alliance with parties of the non-Communist Left (but mainly the Socialists) was demonstrated amply during this period. Thus, within this context, the relevance of its policy towards intellectual workers may be understood.

From 1963 onwards the PCF continued to consolidate the work that it had begun with regard to the study of the question of intellectual workers and to the promotion of a favourable image to voters. On the theoretical level the Party kept up its contribution to the debate on the class membership of intellectual workers. Firstly, in this context, it greatly reinforced its attack upon "reformist" technocratic theories of class as put forward by Mallet and Touraine, arguing that they facilitated the process of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie. Apart from the recurrence of this attack in Party newspapers and periodicals, the PCF was quick to point out the
inadequacies and dangers of such theories at gatherings of intellectual workers and stepped up its efforts in putting forward its own conception of social classes and the place of intellectual workers in French social structure. Thus the theme of "class and society" dominated the second Semaine de la Pensée Marxiste which took place in March 1963. The event attracted a large audience of students and other intellectual categories and allowed the Party to "prove" its commitment to open dialogue and debate, for participants of the six main debates of the week included an impressive number of eminent non-Communist specialists. The first two seances of the week are the most relevant in that they concerned the respective roles of the traditional working class and intellectual workers in the construction of socialism. The first meeting was opened by Maurice Thorez who, in one of his last major public speeches before his death, spoke about "notion de classe et rôle historique de la classe ouvrière" while the topic of discussion "la lutte des classes est-elle dépassée?" (at the second meeting) was debated by Georges Frischmann, Henri Claude, Mury, Touraine and F. Perroux. While the format of such open discussions suggested a new approach on the part of the PCF to dialogue with non-Communist intellectuals, their content did not herald changes in the Party's theory. In his speech Thorez emphasised the role of intellectual workers as allies but insisted upon the centrality of the working class in the struggle for socialism:

"De toutes les classes de travailleurs que comprend la société bourgeoise, seule la classe ouvrière est
révolutionnaire jusqu'au bout . . . du fait même de sa position dans la production, de sa privation de toute propriété sur les moyens de production. Seule, elle est concentrée massivement . . . Seule, elle est rattachée à la grande industrie, c'est-à-dire aux forces productives modernes et d'avenir. C'est pourquoi elle est l'animatrice et la dirigeante naturelle de toutes les forces anticapitalistes. Ni la paysannerie, ou en général la petite bourgeoisie, ni le génie créateur des savants et des ingénieurs, ou en général l'élite intellectuelle, ne peuvent constituer la force sociale qui dirige la renouveau du monde."44

Thorez further affirmed that the basic struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie would be considered foremost by the Party in the formulation of its policies, that:

"on peut raisonner à l'infini sur les problèmes des fameuses 'couches nouvelles': quelle que soit leur importance intrinsèque, ces problèmes ne sauraient fournir l'axe d'une politique socialiste."45

It is clear that the Thorezian leadership of the Party could not attribute any role to intellectual workers which would rob the working class and therefore its Party, of the slightest initiative in the construction of a socialist society. At this point in time intellectual workers would have to satisfy themselves with a place in an alliance where they were unequal partners merely aiding to promote working class interests. However, Thorez's speech together with the other debates of the week were on the whole well received by the audiences (composed mainly of students and intellectual workers) which were so large that speeches had to be relayed via a microphone into the adjoining hall. Thorez's statement that all students regardless of their social background were considered, by the PCF, as allies of the working class was welcomed enthusiastically by those present. Moreover, although a great proportion of Left-wing
students were far from content with the PCF's policies due to the "dégenéréscence" of the leadership, the vast majority made huge political and ideological concessions as far as the general "party line" was concerned and refrained as much as possible from criticising the Party in view of the fact that it appeared at the time as the only political force constant in its opposition to Gaullism.

On the whole the Semaine de la Pensée Marxiste did not mark any progress or new departures on the question of intellectual workers as far as the PCF was concerned. What was new perhaps was that the Party had not attempted to control the debates as at other such events and both Communists and non-Communists alike had put forward freely their ideas without the threat of censure from the PCF leadership. However, it should be remembered that such events were never held, by the Party, with the intention of reaching new positions as a result of an exchange of ideas. They were "show-piece" events designed to gain prestige and popularity and as such were extremely successful during this period. In addition to the Semaine de la Pensée Marxiste (which was in fact followed up by another one in January 1964), 1963 saw the publication of the PCF's first major theoretical work on the subject of class structure in France. Les Classes Sociales en France (in two volumes) by Mury and Rouvier-Ajam constituted a more sophisticated affirmation of official theory than that made, for example, by Maurice Thorez at the Semaine de la Pensée Marxiste. The first volume of this work (nearly 1000 pages long) which paints a highly original and interesting portrait of social classes in France since the time of the Gauls is of little
relevance here. The second volume is of greater importance in that it presents a theoretical analysis completed with an empirical study of French society in the 'sixties as viewed by the PCF. Although the authors reiterated the view of French society along classical Marxist lines as composed of two major opposing classes (the bourgeoisie and the working class) and a series of intermediate or middle classes, they could be congratulated for devoting a considerable amount of space to a lucid discussion of the question of the class membership and role of intellectual workers. The latter, as is to be expected, were considered part of the middle classes although their increasing participation in the anti-capitalist struggle put them, in terms of "social practice", in the ranks of the working class. This work was noteworthy from the point of view that it took an unpropagandist and relatively pragmatic approach (compared with the PCF's later works) to the whole question of changing social structure in capitalism and the possibilities for social change. The authors were even careful to stress the merits of some of the works of non-Communists, for example, Touraine's original studies, on the French working class, undertaken in the 'fifties. Interestingly, according to Mallet the entire work was nothing more than a "dogmatic affirmation" of official PCF theory while in Poulantzas's view the analyses put forward by Mury and Bouvier-Ajam were of high merit.

While the PCF succeeded in making widely-known its world view, there were oppositionist groups in the Party putting forward their own opinions. Thus there emerged at that time a
little-known group of Communist militants who anonymously collaborated under the collective name of Jean Dru to publish an essay entitled *Le parti démocratique*. The group advocated the concept of *polynodysme* whereby the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was repudiated so that each communist party would have the right to decide upon its own priority areas in its struggle for accession to power. It also advocated cooperation between communists and reformists as one of these priorities in order to install a "pouvoir démocratique des travailleurs manuels et intellectuels" in place of a dictatorship of the proletariat although it did not specify how this alternative might be achieved. Furthermore the group arraigned the PCF for being "figé dans sa carapace stalinienne" but again did not provide an analysis as to how and why the Party was in this situation. Unfortunately little more is known about Jean Dru and this seems a pity as it seemed to be challenging some important ideas. Of those PCF members and ex-members I interviewed in Paris, in 1983, all professed ignorance of the group's existence although *Le Monde* had claimed that a number of Jean Dru's members had held important Party posts prior to the publication of their essay.

Phillippe Robrieux, interviewed, suggested that the group may well have been linked to the Rabelais cell in the Orsay section of Seine et Oise as this cell had some time later, at the PCF's Seventeenth Congress in 1967, put forward an amendment to the draft Congress resolution substituting the expression "dictatorship of the proletariat" with "pouvoir politique". The Rabelais cell was known for having long favoured the rejection of the concept "dictatorship of the proletariat". In any case the
PCF ignored Jean Dru completely.

Another "revisionist" document, which surfaced in the summer of 1963, was published by the UNEF (Union Nationale des Etudiants Français) whose PSU orientated leadership commanded considerable support from Communist students to the disapproval of the PCF leadership. The document entitled Travail Etudiant claimed that students were engaged in productive labour by virtue of being creative (thus implying that creative activity equalled productive activity) and by virtue of performing work which contributed to the valorisation of the students' future labour power (thus implying that all students would ultimately perform productive labour). This argument was put forward primarily as a justification for that claim that students were entitled to have a salary as apprentice intellectual workers. The question of student salaries as opposed to grants was, during this period, the subject of numerous discussions in university circles. The Party engaged Barjonet to refute the students' arguments which pretended to a certain Marxism. A reading of the students' arguments in Barjonet's answer suggests that these were loosely formulated and not based solidly in theory thus leaving several loopholes. For example, if creative activity was productive and hence deserving of a salary it followed that all those who performed any sort of creative activity (virtually everyone in society) outside the labour market were entitled to salaries including primary and secondary level pupils, housewives and so on. In view of the weakness of the student argument, Barjonet's task of refuting it was easily executed. Nevertheless,
Barjonet's responses had been carefully worded in order to avoid the least deterioration in student-Party relations and even included praise of the students' efforts to confront the problem of their creative activity within a Marxist schema.

On a practical level, the Party's efforts, in engaging intellectual workers in an anti-monopoly alliance, were geared for the most part towards the most "dynamic" strata, that is the ITC. Thus the Party contributed to and organised two national conferences (in Paris) with a view to "dégager les revendications propres à ces travailleurs, de renforcer encore leur alliance avec la classe ouvrière." On a local level, the PCF's federal sections took upon themselves the responsibility for recruiting and working among intellectual workers. For example, certain Paris federations (notably those of Seine-Sud and Seine-Ouest) as well as provincial ones (notably Alpes-Maritimes) set up working-parties charged with the application of alliance strategies with regard to intellectual workers. It should be noted that the most active federations in this case were those in areas with a heavy concentration of technologically advanced industries. Thus the work of the Seine-Ouest federation was geared mainly in the direction of intellectual workers attached to Renault, that of Seine-Sud towards workers at the Thomson, Rhône-Poulenc, Orly-Port, Messier and other companies (the Seine-Sud federation found itself in an area with a particularly heavy concentration of technologically advanced companies) and that of Alpes-Maritimes towards IBM, Sud-Aviation and the Centre d'Études des Engins Téléguidés. Of the federal sections mentioned, that of Alpes-Maritime seemed to have carried
out the most active policies with the aim of realising an alliance with intellectual strata. The federation had set up a commission du travail parmi les intellectuels at the end of 1962 which brought together intellectual workers of various disciplines. The commission, which met every month, was responsible for organising meetings and other activities. The commission also set up groupes de travail amongst diverse categories of intellectual workers including ITC and teachers, admitting that the most difficult categories to penetrate had been those of ITC. The aim of the working groups was to rally support for the PCF amongst intellectual workers and at the same time to act as a relay for the expression of problems and interests of these workers to the PCF federation via the commission. Thus intellectual workers were encouraged by the working groups to put forward propositions of how the Party could best serve their interests and help resolve their problems. In reality the federation found it difficult to move to a position where the interests of intellectual workers could be considered independently. This was amply illustrated when the working group at Sud-Aviation managed to mobilise ITC (mainly technicians) to participate in actions, calling for a fourth week of paid holiday for manual workers, on the basis that an improvement in the conditions of the lower-paid manual workers would automatically benefit them too. The motives behind the federation's work amongst intellectual workers is difficult to gauge. Was it merely trying to give the impression that the PCF was "interested" in order to make short-term electoral gains or was
it formulating a long term alliance strategy on a local basis? Certainly where the federations of the Paris region (Seine-Sud and Seine-Ouest) were concerned, long-term strategic aims would (or should) have been the overriding motive as they were in real danger of declining in the face of the rapid de-proletarianisation of their constituencies.

Finally, at the level of practice, the Party continued to encourage the revival of the UGIC(T), stressing its importance as an organisation which, within the framework of the CGT, could realise the alliance between the mass of manual and intellectual workers in industry. Hence although the UGIC(T) had existed for almost thirty years by this time, its first congress took place in May 1965 with the aim of responding to the interests and problems of the rapidly increasing strata of ITC, under monopoly capitalism. Also, to improve its image the union launched a new glossy monthly magazine entitled Options. Its editorship (headed by René Le Guen and André Jaëglé, both influential members of the PCF) proclaimed its intention that Options would not become an ideological instrument of the CGT, but that the magazine would, in addition to publishing quality articles on economic and cultural issues, provide a forum for dialogue with all non-CGT ITC. Serge Mallet’s view was that while the UGIC(T) did (through its main organ, Options) prepare some excellent dossiers on economic questions, its entire campaign in attracting intellectual workers was based on the PCF’s anti-monopoly doctrine which firstly negated Le Guen and Jaëglé’s claim to an independent position and secondly signified that once again the interests of the ITC were best served through their
support of the manual industrial working class. However some change was taking place.

Thorez's death (in July 1964) led to a certain amount of liberalisation within the PCF. This was most evident in 1965 when the Party decided to prioritise support of François Mitterrand in the Presidential elections of that year over its relations with Moscow. The CPSU had, during the presidential campaign, given its support to De Gaulle whose foreign policy at that time happened to serve Soviet interests and furthermore, had shown its disapproval of Waldeck Rochet's speech of support to Mitterrand by refusing its publication in Pravda. The effects of this liberalisation also brought a slight change in the PCF's attitude to intellectual workers in that a number of themes which would certainly have been suppressed under Thorez were allowed to emerge. Paul Dupré (a Communist journalist) felt able to argue that, as intellectual workers (particularly the ITC) became more active in trade-unions, bosses introduced greater repressive measures against them; to the extent that in some cases their freedom of expression was more limited and contested than that of manual workers. The same author, in a later article, endeavoured to demonstrate that intellectual workers could not be held responsible for their ideological make-up which was moulded by their psychological formation within the education system.

Not only was Dupré exhibiting extreme magnanimity towards intellectual workers but he had actually made use of subjective analyses such as those found in the disciplines of psychology or psychotechnique. The practice of such disciplines amongst
Communists had previously been taboo - a legacy of the socialist realism years.

Garaudy and his supporters within the Party had, without a great deal of opposition, embarked upon the question of whether or not there existed a Marxist humanism. Garaudy's conclusion that there existed a Marxist humanism was set out in his book De l'Anathème au Dialogue. In fact this was to constitute a major part of the discussion at the Comité Central of Argenteuil in March of 1966. In so far as the debate on class was concerned, the clearest divergence from the Party line established under Thorez, came from Barjonet. The latter made clear his position at an international conference on "Tendance du Capitalisme contemporain" held at the Gramsci Institute in Rome in June 1965. Barjonet, representing the review Économie et Politique, put forward the view that 70 per cent of France's working population was represented by the working class. This working class, he continued, was made up of a nucleus (the manual industrial working class) and a periphery of salaried workers including employees (employés), certain ITE, and agricultural workers. Thus one could speak specifically of a working class in the "strict sense" of the term and generally of a working class in the "broader sense" of the term. Although the major part of the working class in the strict sense was composed of ouvriers spécialisés (the rest was made up by ouvriers qualifiés and even certain techniciens de fabrication) whose numbers were seen to be rising, Barjonet stressed:

"... cette augmentation ne signifie pas pour autant, que l'O.S. soit 'l'ouvrier de l'avenir'."55
Barjonet's reasons for including employés in the working class (in the broad sense) were as follows. Employés were working in situations which more and more resembled factories. The content of their work had been simplified (through the expansion of automatic machines) to the extent that it was rendered monotonous and repetitious. Also a double evolution, that is the subjection of employees to stricter supervision (job evaluation etc) on the one hand and particularly the generalisation of monthly salary systems to include manual workers on the other hand, had narrowed the gap between the two groups. He concluded:

"Il ne semble pas douteux que si cette évolution se poursuit, disparaîtra ainsi un des derniers éléments qui séparaient de façon spectaculaire les ouvriers des employés."56

Where the ITC were concerned he was careful to separate technicians from engineers and cadres.

"A vrai dire les 'techniciens' sont des ouvriers de très haute qualification. Il n'en est pas de même des ingénieurs et encore moins des savants."

While the majority of technicians were assimilable into the working class, not all engineers and cadres were:

"Bien entendu, il ne s'agit pas d'assimiler grossièrement ces travailleurs intellectuels avec les ouvriers d'usine au sens habituel du mot. Leur origine sociale et familiale, leurs revenus, leur collaboration parfois assez proche... avec les chefs d'entreprise sont autant d'éléments qui les éloignent des ouvriers."57

However, in the case of engineers and cadres who were directly involved in production (it should be noted that the vast majority of cadres were not directly involved), Barjonet could see no reason as to why they should not, objectively speaking, form part of the broader working class:
As to whether they formed part of the working class subjectively speaking, Barjonet found it perfectly acceptable that not all sections of a class acceded to class consciousness at the same point in time as in general there existed a time lag between ideological phenomena and objective factors:

"Il ne me semble pas exagéré de dire qu'en dehors peut-être de quelques exceptions, les hommes ne vivent pas encore à l'heure de l'automation... Ce retard global s'accompagne naturellement des retards sectoriels qui expliquent que toutes les catégories de la classe ouvrière ne vivent pas encore au même temps, ou, plutôt, au même 'tempo'."  

Barjonet's theses had gained some support within the Party, notably from Mury. It is significant that both Mury and Barjonet were to leave the Party: the former to join the pro-Chinese Communist Party (PCMLF) in 1966 and the latter to join the PSU after May 1968. However, the fact that extracts of Barjonet's speech (outlining a major revision of the Party's conception of the working class) were printed by France Nouvelle and were not followed up by denunciations from the leadership demonstrates the extent to which the mood of the PCF had changed under Waldeck Rochet whose primary preoccupation concerned tactics (unity with the socialists) and not ideology. This is not to say that previously tactics had always been subordinated to ideology. The change of mood in the PCF was also reflected by the decision to devote an entire session of the Central Committee in March 1966 to the discussion of ideological and cultural
problems and the role of strata, which was held to coincide with
the fourth Semaine de la Pensée Marxiste whose main theme was
"Démocratie et Liberté". This fourth "week of Marxist thought"
proved to be an important and successful public relations
exercise for the PCF which was amply praised in the columns of Le
Monde for providing an atmosphere in which frank discussion and
genuine debate took place with eminent Socialist, Radical and
Christian, academics and politicians (including François
Mitterrand, André Callard, Georges Montaron, Pierre Bourdieu and
others) on the possibilities for Left unity at the top and the
establishment of true democracy in France. The Party gained a
considerable amount of credibility among non-Communist voters
especially those in intellectual strata as it appeared to be the
initiator of Left unity. The meeting was also important in that
a number of themes which emerged, relating to "democracy and
liberty" were to be incorporated later in the manifeste de
Champigny.

IV. The Argenteuil meeting

The significance of this Central Committee meeting, held
from 11 to 13 March 1966, cannot be underestimated for a number
of reasons that are made apparent below. The meeting can be seen
as the culmination of efforts made by the PCF during this period
to increase its support base among intellectual strata as a means
of taking the Party back into the mainstream of French politics.

The resolution (debated and adopted by the Central
Committee) was important in three major respects. Firstly it
officially announced the definitive liquidation of cultural
Zhdanovism or socialist realism.

Secondly, the resolution announced a new tolerance on the part of the PCF towards the creators and diffusers of science and culture. In this context, the Party conceded that the individuality of the creator must be reflected in his or her creation.

"... le créateur n'est pas un simple fabricant de produits desquels les éléments sont donnés, un arrangeur. Il y a dans toute œuvre d'art une part irréductible aux données et cette part c'est l'homme même. Tel écrivain, tel artiste était seul capable de produire l'œuvre créée."63

In addition to this, scientific and artistic creators would enjoy a greater freedom of expression in their work while plurality of thought would be encouraged by the Party:

"Le développement de la science nécessite les débats et les recherches. Le Parti communiste ne saurait contrarier ces débats ni apporter une vérité a priori, encore moins trancher de façon autoritaire des discussions non achevées entre spécialistes. La création artistique ne se conçoit pas non plus sans recherches, sans courants, sans écoles diverses et sans confrontation entre elles. Le Parti apprécie et soutient les diverses formes de contribution des créateurs aux progrès humain dans le libre déploiement de leur imagination, leur goût et leur originalité."64

But this statement was qualified:

"Il [the party] souhaite qu'ils [intellectuals] comprennent et soutiennent les positions idéologiques et politiques de la classe ouvrière."65

However, the tone of the qualification was conciliatory. The use of the word "souhaite" reinforcing the PCF's softer approach, contrasted with past attitudes where creators of art and science were expected to put themselves "at the service" of the Party. As proof of its new non-authoritarian stance in matters of creation the PCF's criticism of Louis Althusser (whose
structuralist interpretation of Marxism had caused great interest among Communist intellectuals and invited much disapproval from the leadership) was limited. Althusser was neither criticised personally nor was his position at the CERM threatened. Thus, having pointed out the pitfalls of Althusser's method, Waldeck-Rochet concluded in a relatively benign manner:

"Certes, s'il me semble nécessaire de porter une appréciation critique sur la façon dont le camarade Althusser et d'autres philosophes communistes traitent certaines questions cruciales de la théorie marxistleéniste, cela ne veut pas dire que nous rejetons en bloc leur travail ou que nous condamnons leur effort de recherche, mais nos observations tendent au contraire à faire en sorte que cet effort de recherche s'accomplisse sur des bases plus assurées, plus fécondes."66

Again, the treatment of Althusser contrasts with that of past philosophers or theorists such as Henri Lefebvre who was made the target of particularly base personal attacks before being expelled from the Party. Le Monde commented at the time that the new posture adopted by the Party was "déchirante" for some 67 Communists.

Thirdly, the resolution's accordance with Garaudy's view that Marxist humanism did exist, opened up a debate on the nature of Marxism - something which had never taken place previously. Phillippe Robrieux remarks that of particular significance is the fact that such a debate took place at all at leadership level for the Party had had no history of real theoretical discussion at this level.

Garaudy's launching of the topic of Marxist humanism contributed to PCF efforts designed to persuade those of Christian faith to ally themselves with the Party. In this
respect the PCF's Marxist criticism of religion had changed style
as it attempted to distance itself from sectarianism. Hence the
resolution called on all Christians as opposed to "travailleurs
chrétiens" (as at the Seventeenth Congress) to share the
socialist vision of the working class without fear of
compromising their religious beliefs:

"En tendant la main aux chrétiens, le parti communiste
n'a jamais masqué l'opposition qui existe entre la
philosophie matérialiste et le principe de toute
religion. Les efforts communs pour une vie meilleure
n'impliquent pas de convergence philosophique mais le
respect des convictions de chacun." 69

Undoubtedly, this new posturing of the PCF on matters of
ideology and culture had a great effect both within and outside
it - optimism on the part of many thousands of Communist
intellectuals looking forward to a future of change within the
Party and total silence from those who disapproved.

It is difficult to judge whether the meeting at Argenteuil
had been held as a pure tactical manoeuvre in the framework of
the PCF's alliance policy or whether there had been some genuine
attempts to open up theoretical discussion and chart a new future
for diverse intellectual categories within and alongside the
Party. According to Jacques Brière (ex-Central Committee
member), the Argenteuil resolution was more progressive than many
of the Central Committee members realised which is perhaps why
(he muses retrospectively) a great many of the members, unused to
the consideration of theoretical issues voted for it without too
much fuss. For a number of Communist and non-Communist
intellectuals even today, the Argenteuil meeting represented more
than a tactical manoeuvre. Among those I interviewed the general
feeling was that it marked the beginning of a period (albeit one which was not to last) when the PCF seemed to show a real inclination to "aller à la recherche de la société réelle et de sebrancher sur les aspirations réelles des gens." The optimism shared by Communist intellectuals vis-a-vis the Argenteuil meeting during that period was best summed up by Antoine Spire:

"C'est un texte capital, le texte d'Argenteuil, qui disait, par exemple, que la culture ouvre des voies à la politique. Donc, il disait bien que la culture non seulement a une autonomie mais qu'elle ouvre des voies à la pratique politique. Voilà un moment où on respectait la spécificité idéologique des intellectuels."72

Yet the fact remained that despite all the talk of freedom and autonomy of "intellectual creation" the Party had not moved from its position where it considered that intellectual workers had to be brought over to the side of the working class. The resolution concluded:

"C'est une tâche essentielle du Parti tout entier d'aider tous les intellectuels à prendre, aux côtés de la classe ouvrière, leur part dans la construction de l'avenir."73

Thus the interests of intellectual workers were to be best served through the recognition and support of the leading role of the working class in the long term.

In the short-term, however, the conclusions of the Argenteuil meeting were reiterated at the Party's Eighteenth Congress in January 1967 and it would appear that the Party's allure had increased amongst intellectual workers, its parliamentary allies (the Socialists) and electors in general. In the legislative elections of March 1967, the PCF increased its
share of the vote from 21.8 per cent in 1962 to 22.5 per cent in 1967. The PCF's success or otherwise in attracting intellectual workers to its ranks may also be judged to a certain extent by a study of the changes in the social composition of its conference delegates from 1956 to 1967. It would seem in the case of the ITC (who became the prime target of the PCF during this period) that the Party had made considerable progress in attracting these intellectual workers to its ranks, for at its Fifteenth Congress in 1959 ITC made up 3.55% of delegates present while at its Eighteenth Congress in 1967 the number of ITC had doubled to represent 7.2% of delegates present. In fact the percentage of intellectual workers in general (with the exception of teachers) representing delegations to the Congress of 1967 had increased in comparison with 1959. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make similar judgements based upon the social composition of PCF membership as only one global survey of membership (carried out by the Party) took place during the period 1956 to 1967 (that is, in 1966). Upon examination of the results of this survey one finds that the proportion of intellectual workers in the PCF's total membership is much lower than the proportion of intellectual workers amongst Congress delegates. Thus ITC, for example, only represented 1.93% of the PCF's membership. George Marchais' message to the Party, upon citing of membership figures for intellectual workers, called especially for "une activité plus soutenue parmi les ingénieurs, techniciens et cadres pour la defense de leurs intérêts . . .".

The figures above suggest that the Party had gone some way towards bringing itself out of isolation and increasing its
public appeal during the period 1956 to 1966. In his book Les Elections en France, Frédéric Bon (a student "dissident" who left the PCF after May 1968) suggests that the policies pursued by the PCF had largely paid off in terms of electoral success. He finds, through a study of two IFOP (Institut Français d'Opinion Publique) surveys carried out in 1952 and 1968, that the proportion of manual workers, employees, and cadres moyens (covering a large number of salaried intellectual workers) within the PCF electorate had risen faster than the proportion of these categories within the population. Furthermore, the Party's support base in the peasant milieu had shrunk more rapidly than this social group's global evolution within the population. Finally, the proportion of "independent" strata (composed of the liberal professions, cadres supérieurs and commercial and industrial business people) in the PCF electorate had remained more or less the same, reflecting the evolution of these strata in society. Bon therefore concludes that the PCF vote had, during this period, tended to slightly anticipate the structural evolution of French society; that this finding contradicts suggestions the Party was suffering from a general "sclerosis". Philippe Robrieux more or less shares this view of the Party's progress when he comments:

"Il progresse considérablement à la vérité plus en haut qu'en bas. En effet, c'est à l'intérieur de la société civile, en direction des intellectuels, des cadres, des journalistes, et de la classe politique que les progrès du Parti sont les plus spectaculaires, tandis qu'en bas, lors des élections législatives de 1967, les progrès sont infiniment plus modestes . . . "31

In general the period under study here shows that from the
late 'fifties onwards, the PCF, like other political forces in Western capitalism, came face to face with a world of new social realities in which fresh understandings and strategies were required. Thus the PCF began to understand a major new social reality - that intellectual workers constituted an important social force in post-war France whose objective and subjective orientations had to be studied in order for the Party to formulate effective political responses to the emergence of this force in particular, as indeed to the changes in the class nature of society in general.

As this chapter progresses, it becomes apparent that although the PCF had understood, after 1956, the need to consider the social situation and role of intellectual workers and the political implications of their emergence and rapid expansion, it was not until the 'sixties, towards the end of Thorez's leadership, that official sociological studies, such as those carried out by Mury and Bouvier-Ajam, were undertaken. These studies revealed that the PCF had not changed, in fundamental terms, its view of French society. The Party continued to see society as composed of two major opposing classes with a series of middle classes in between. What had changed was the Party's view of the nature of the middle classes. The latter were seen to have become more and more representative of intellectual workers than of the traditional urban petty bourgeois strata (independent artisans and small businesses) and small landowners. Moreover, as the middle classes became more identified with salaried intellectual strata, the PCF regarded their interests as
having moved further from those of the ruling class and closer to those of the working class. On the basis of such analyses, the Party began to gear its strategy of alliances with non-working class strata firmly in the direction of the salaried middle classes, in other words intellectual workers. However, on the whole, the Party's alliance strategy remained vaguely defined throughout the 'sixties period.
CHAPTER VIII

THE PARTY AND INTELLECTUAL WORKERS: 1968 - 1972
Although the need for an alliance between the working class and non-working class strata, in particular intellectual workers, had been recognised by the PCF, during the period 1956 to 1967, as a result of the Twentieth CPSU congress thesis on the peaceful road to socialism and of the situation of bi-polarisation imposed by the Fifth Republic constitution, the events of May 1968, which saw a massive explosion of strike action amongst salaried intellectual strata, put pressure upon the Party to consider with urgency its entire approach towards the question of cross-class alliances. The pattern of the May events which had appeared to favour the "new vanguard class" theses of theorists such as Mallet and Touraine forced the PCF to realise that a thorough analysis of all the possible political and ideological implications of the sociological transformation of French society was crucial in the formulation of a successful alliance strategy.

The four-year period (under study in this chapter) following the events of May 1968 saw the emergence, within the PCF, of a vision of French society which came to be characterised as state monopoly capitalist and which offered the potential for the creation of extensive cross-class alliances. The emergence of this vision marked a significant shift in the PCF's analysis of the nature of class society and formed the basis upon which its alliance strategy was to rest.

The PCF's efforts to establish cross-class (and political) alliances during the period 1968 to 1972 were coupled with practices designed to present a changed and "open image" of itself. Thus the Party adopted a certain critical attitude towards the USSR and its Eastern allies, for example, by refusing
to condone the USSR's military intervention in Czechoslovakia, the "Leningrad Trials" of Russian Jews who had tried to escape and the Gromulka regime's handling of the Polish workers' insurrection at Gdansk. At home the PCF's desire to show the non-working class electorate that it was an "open" Party was indicated by its increased political activity amongst intellectual workers and its willingness to place itself in the "hot seat" in public forums, responding to questions on its aims and methods for change in France. Finally the PCF's aim to form a firm political alliance with the Socialists (and which was achieved in 1972) was pursued in order to illustrate to the electorate its commitment to a French style (as opposed to Soviet style) of socialism and thus to make inroads into the ranks of electors beyond its own traditional constituencies.

I. **May 1968: the PCF takes a retrograde step**

The student uprising of May 1968 which subsequently sparked off the actions of some nine million manual and intellectual workers came as a total surprise to the PCF. Although the Party had, since the early 'sixties, acknowledged the importance of the growing numbers of students (future intellectual workers) and new salaried intellectual strata in society and had begun to undertake efforts to increase its public appeal amongst these strata (and in particular of the younger generations among them) it had failed to consider their aspirations and problems independently of those of the working class. Thus it had been unable to foresee any likelihood of the discontent of student and
intellectual workers being expressed in militant forms of strike action. In the past it had hardly been the case that the PCF was not involved in instigating any major explosion of dissent and discontent against established bourgeois regimes. Moreover, in the past, for example during the massive strike waves of 1947, it had been manual workers, organised by the Communists, who had taken the first actions thus precipitating strikes amongst bank workers, civil servants and other salaried intellectuals in the nationalised sectors. In May 1968, intellectuals, mainly students, had created a situation in which the Communists felt obliged to call out the mass of workers on strike. What was more threatening to the PCF which saw itself as the guardian of the revolution was that a large proportion of students and intellectual workers expressed, within their struggle, revolutionary sentiments coupled with ideas set out in "new working class" theories. So while students called for a change in society through their attack on the education system, many intellectual workers called into question the power of the existing managers of capitalist production through agitation round the issue of autogestion or workers' self-management mainly in technologically advanced industries. For example, ITC took over the running of the Donges oil refinery and similar situations arose, to name a few, at Rhône-Poulenc in Vitry, Alicatel in Montrouge, at the Institut Pasteur in Paris, at the EGF (Electricité et Gaz de France) research centre, at Thomson-Houston in Bagneux which already had a history of militancy amongst its intellectual workers. Other groups of intellectual workers such as para-medics, researchers, scientists also called
for increased participation in decision-making at their places of work and within their professional organisations.

The attitude of the PCF leadership towards the students and intellectual workers, who sympathised with the ideas put forward by the "new working class" theorists, was divided. Three different currents or factions may be identified. The first led by Georges Marchais and Waldeck Rochet (supported by the majority of the Politbureau) vilified gauchiste students and intellectual workers as unstable petty-bourgeois elements whose nefarious character had only served to strengthen Gaullist power and capitalist monopolies against the working class and its party. This faction tended to impose certain traditional and unchanging class characteristics upon intellectual workers and students, thus refusing to recognise a changing social reality and to adapt its approach accordingly.

The second current constituted by cégétistes Séguy and Frachon basically reflected the ideology of the first but saw the May events as an opportunity for the CGT to extend its influence amongst workers (manual and intellectual) while the students were considered at best a minor irritant, at worst a threat to traditional trade-unionism and who needed therefore to be segregated from the workers. Thus Séguy and Frachon favoured a softer approach to students by pointing to the legitimacy of their complaints against the Gaullists' education policies.

The third faction was led by Garaudy, who took a sympathetic view of the gauchistes. Garaudy had tried to argue that the collusion between students and workers in May 1968 was a
manifestation of the imminent integration between intellectual and manual labour caused by the evolution of capitalist means of production. As far as Garaudy was concerned the May events had shown the need for a renewed thinking in the PCF about the role of intellectual workers and the nature of cross-class alliances. From this point in time he was to tread a divergent path which would ultimately lead to his expulsion from the Party. Garaudy was supported in the Politbureau by François Billoux. Evidence of Billoux's opposition to the Marchais line was to be found in the May issues of a provincial Party daily called the Marseillaise which he edited. It expressed sympathy for student demonstrations and unlike the Marchais faction continued, throughout the events, to condemn the government for dissolving ultra-Left groups. However, it was the Marchais view which prevailed in the Politbureau and which was to be reflected in the official Party attitude to the categories in the forefront of the May struggles.

The reasons behind the PCF's attitude are multifold. Firstly the Party was anxious to preserve the new understanding that it had reached with the Socialists. The fear that unity of the Left would break was very real and all throughout the events L'Humanité maintained its appeal for union de la gauche. Secondly and more importantly it was unthinkable that the Party and the working class movement should constitute a support force to student intellectuals, and thus lend credibility to "new working class" arguments that the traditional working class and its party were no longer the forerunners in the change to socialism. It is for this reason that the PCF was obliged to
call out workers on strike for once the workers' strike had replaced the student/intellectual protest, the Party was in firm control. In addition the PCF geared workers' demands towards economic issues (higher wages etc) as a means of halting the trespass by intellectual workers, whose demands were related to "control" issues (and were thus of a political nature), into the sphere of political action. Finally, the PCF's violent repudiation of gauchiste ideas was intended to warn Communist intellectuals against being attracted to such ideas.

Not surprisingly, a number of Communist intellectuals were sympathetic to gauchiste intellectuals if not to the latter's ideas. The PCF's attitude had dismayed them and their departure from the PCF was catalysed because of it. Barjonet left the Party to join the PSU. Some intellectuals such as Serge Depaquit and Jean-Pierre Vigier were expelled for their "anti-party" activities, while others simply failed to renew their membership. Nevertheless discussion within the PCF, at cell level and in intellectual circles, about the attitude of the Party during the May events carried on quite freely to the extent that in many cell meetings it was often admitted that the PCF had committed some errors of judgement during the events. There were no attempts to curb such discussion it would seem. In this respect Nouvelle Critique also made bold steps in its June 1968 issue (devoted to the ideologies of May) by posing a series of fairly attacking questions to Roland Leroy (who was in charge of the Central Committee's intellectual section) regarding the Party's negative attitude to students and intellectual workers during the
May crisis.

The PCF emerged from the events of May convinced of two things. The first thing was that a united Left strategy, aimed at reaching a common programme of government, was of absolute necessity for in the Party's view it was the lack of such a strategy and programme that had prevented the Left parties from posing a credible alternative to Gaullism. Secondly, the PCF realised that its previous analyses of new intellectual strata had allowed it to perceive neither the real aspirations of intellectual workers (and students) nor the extent and nature of their grievances. The Party had certainly been unable to prevent a number of intellectual workers from being drawn towards "new working class" ideologies which offered them a greater role than that of the working class in the struggle for socialism. It is difficult to estimate the number of intellectual workers who had turned away from the Party due to its actions during the events of May. The PCF had found it necessary, prior to the legislative elections of 1968, to run a campaign through the pages of L'Humanité asking Communist and non-Communist intellectuals and intellectual workers to pledge their votes to the Party. This newspaper campaign (appel aux intellectuels) was accompanied by a series of réunions-débats within professional bodies of intellectual workers. The only known outcome of this campaign is that by 22 June 1968, 582 esteemed intellectuals and intellectual workers (mainly Communist) had pledged their votes to the PCF. If one refers to the professional elections of June 1968, one discovers that intellectual workers within industry had not turned away massively as might have been expected. According to
a global survey of results published in *Le Monde* approximately a third or 30.49 per cent of all cadres, techniciens and agents de maîtrise had voted for the CGT compared with 36.72 per cent for the CFDT while the CGC polled 17.12 per cent. Within the public sector the CGT had fared best of all the unions. Of course the assumption made here is that a vote for the CGT implies some kind of support for the PCF but it is a fair one in view of the fact that during the May events, more so than at other times, the CGT had acted as a direct relay of PCF views to the workers.

II. *Modification in theoretical reflections concerning the role and social situation of intellectual workers: 1968 – 1969*

Following the events of May the PCF set about the task of rebuilding its political and social alliances. The first step taken by the Party in this respect was to produce a manifesto in which it set out, for the first time, what a common programme of government would entail. The manifesto which was the product of the deliberations of a special Central Committee meeting (held at Champigny on 5 December 1968) re-acknowledged the importance of intellectual workers in the struggle against monopoly capitalism:

"Le nombre des ingénieurs, techniciens, chercheurs, enseignants, grandit sans cesse... En dépit d'une grande diversité de situations, l'immense majorité d'entre eux subit le poids croissant de l'exploitation capitaliste... Leur rôle grandit dans la lutte des classes."10

And while the Party could not deny that the events of May had forced it to realise the revolutionary potential of intellectual workers, it nevertheless stressed upon their attachment to a non-working class milieu on the one hand and upon
the decisive role of the working class on the other:

"Certes leur [i.e. that of intellectual workers] formation et leur origine sociale ne les prédispensent pas à reconnaître le rôle décisif de la classe ouvrière. Mais les luttes du printemps 1968 ont montré qu'une partie d'entre eux, beaucoup et plus considérable que dans la période précédente, en vient à participer activement au combat aux côtés des ouvriers et des employés."11

One also notices a slight reservation on the part of the PCF when it claims that only a section ("une partie") of intellectual workers will join the class struggle. This contrasts with the resolution of Argenteuil which had admitted the vast majority of intellectual workers ("les intellectuels dans leur masses") as "natural" allies of the working class. However, this reservation was a temporary one which was abandoned as soon as the idea of an anti-monopoly alliance began to occupy prime place in the PCF's strategy towards non-working class strata. Furthermore, where the question of alliances was concerned the Party announced its importance in the context of the establishment of a politically and economically advanced democracy:

"Cette alliance nécessaire de la classe ouvrière et des intellectuels, le Parti Communiste Français la considère comme une question capitale à laquelle il accorde la plus grande attention."12

Prior to the declaration of Champigny a vast literature had appeared in the latter half of 1968 on the subject of the class situation and role of intellectual workers in the Party's theoretical reviews. With the departure of Mury and Barjonet and the fall from grace of others such as Bouvier-Ajam, a new set of Communist theorists set about the task of analysing the political and ideological implications of social change. The new
names included those of Serge Laurent, Michel Simon and Antoine Casanova. The latter belonged to the **Nouvelle Critique** collective, while Laurent and Simon were part of the **Economie et Politique** collective which, since the time of Prouteau's departure, had been closely supervised by the economic section of the Central Committee. At the end of 1968 **Economie et Politique** published a lengthy essay, and for the first time, on the specific subject of the evolution of the notion and social reality of the group "intellectuals". In his discussion of the notion and general function of intellectuals the author, Serge Laurent, frequently alluded to Gramscian concepts (for example concerning the "organic intellectual" and the implications of the intellectuals' ideological activity for class structuration) without actually going as far as to use them in the PCF's analyses. This fact is worthy of comment as prior to this period Gramscian ideas had been taboo within the Party. Thus direct references such as those made by Laurent were indicative of a certain amount of tolerance within the PCF towards theoretical research which would not just collect dust in an anonymous filing cabinet of the CERM. Laurent's examination of the class situation of intellectuals also revealed a different conception of French capitalist society from that which had been laid down by Mury and Bouvier-Ajam in *Les Classes Sociales en France*. In fact Laurent had already presented this modified picture of social reality in a previous article according to which French society was composed of two fundamental classes only: the working class and the bourgeoisie. Between these two classes one could distinguish a vast array of middle and
intermediary strata (couches moyennes and couches intermédiaires) as opposed to classes. It is important to note that Laurent made a distinction between couches intermédiaires salariées (constituted by white-collar employees, ITC, teachers, researchers etc.) and couches moyennes (consisting of artisans, shopkeepers and non-salaried intellectual workers such as doctors, lawyers, free-lance artists etc). He also maintained that in reality a growing number of the salaried intermediary strata were in the process of being integrated into the working class although:

"Les couches qui s'intègrent ainsi à la classe ouvrière n'ont pas encore dans leur ensemble, une nette conscience de ce mouvement objectif. Elles tendent, par ailleurs, à introduire dans la classe ouvrière des idées et des attitudes héritées de leur passé."18

In this respect Laurent's line of argument follows that taken by Barjonet in a speech delivered at the Gramsci Institute in June 1965. Finally alongside these urban strata there existed a decreasing peasantry which did not constitute one class but an ensemble of couches sociales from agricultural workers to large land-holders. One discovers that the concept of "middle classes" (classes moyennes), which had figured predominantly in the analyses of Mury and Bouvier-Ajam, is done away with altogether to be replaced with that of couches. Laurent explained that the term couches was favoured to that of classes because the diversity of social categories which constituted the middle and intermediary strata did not permit one to speak of "classes" in the same sense as Lenin had done. However, a credible theoretical justification for the shift from the notion of
classes to strata was lacking. It should be noted that Marx had never presented the notion of strata as independent to that of class. In Marx's writings a stratum could only exist as part of a class (for example the labour aristocracy was considered by Marx as a stratum of the working class).

Where intellectual workers were concerned, the majority of them were attached to intermediary strata while approximately five per cent could objectively be attached to the working class. Those intellectual workers which could be objectively attached to the working class, through the extension of the notion of "collective worker", were the directly productive ITC and scientific researchers. Laurent had already claimed that the working class could be regarded as a "collective worker":

"... la classe ouvrière est un travailleur collectif qui comprend, dans les faits, sans que la conscience en soit toujours clairement perçue, aussi bien ceux qui accomplissent le travail physique que ceux - de plus en plus nombreux - qui concourent à la fabrication du produit par leur travail intellectuel ou effectuent diverses opérations auxiliaires."20

One senses here that perhaps Laurent had gone too far in equating the working class with the collective worker for it was in the same manner that Mallet had constructed his notion of "new working class". Needless to say this particular equation of working class and collective worker was rejected by the Party on the occasion of a national study conference on ITC held in January 1969. Here Laurent and Casanova were criticised by both Roland Leroy and Joë Metzger for making this simplistic equation which would allow one to include "dubious" categories of intellectual workers into the working class. Leroy, in
particular, stressed the "double function" of ITC as producers and collectors of surplus value which meant that the vast majority of them did not belong to the working class. Leroy concluded that the equation of working class with collective worker was false and that it was only possible to speak in terms of an alliance rather than identity or fusion between intellectual workers and the working class.

This same national study conference (Journées d'études sur les ingénieurs, cadres et techniciens) was organised with the intention of developing a clear and permanent basis upon which the PCF's activity amongst ITC would take place. The Party was eager to point out that these particular journées d'études were set apart from similar events of the past and that they marked a "new phase" in the Party's relations with ITC. Having taken into account the major part played by ITC during the strikes of May and June 1968, the PCF had decided to invite non-Communist ITC to participate together with Communists in the discussion and decisions taken during the conference. The decision to call upon the participation of non-Communists was also taken in order to respond to the criticism that the Party was incapable of developing an adequate analysis of French society as real confrontations of ideas were not allowed to occur freely within its structures.

While the study conference leadership welcomed the participation of non-Communist intellectual workers and reaffirmed the principles of the Argenteuil resolution, it also warned Communist intellectuals who criticised the Party from outside (particularly through such reviews as Politique
Aujourd'hui) that they could not be tolerated.

The Conference should, however, also be noted for the practical initiatives which were launched with a view to instituting close social and political ties with ITC and ostensibly to encouraging Communist as well as non-Communist ITC to contribute to the Party's analysis of French industry and economy. Firstly, the main thrust of the PCF's work amongst ITC was to be geared to the workplace. (According to a report presented to the CGT, ITC formed 25 per cent of those employed in industry. In the Paris region this figure reached 45 per cent). Party cells in the workplace would "act concretely" to achieve alliances between manual workers and ITC on the one hand and between Communist and non-Communist ITC on the other hand, in order to develop the struggle against capitalism at company level in particular. In this context the workplace cells were also called upon to reinforce the organisation of the UGICT within enterprises and to aid its expansion in companies where its organisation was either feeble or non-existent. Local neighbourhood cells were directed to militate in mass organisations, friendship and professional associations which brought together large numbers of ITC. Secondly, the activity of workplace and neighbourhood cells would be directed and coordinated by special federal commissions of the Party on intellectual workers. This idea of federal commissions on intellectual workers was not new. As we have seen, in the previous chapter, certain Communist federations (for example Alpes-Maritime, Paris-Sud) had already set up similar commissions.
in the 'sixties. The role of Communist ITC within the special commissions was set out thus:

"Les ingénieurs, cadres et techniciens communistes apportent une contribution particulière à l'élaboration et la mise en oeuvre de l'activité du parti parmi leurs collègues. Dans des commissions spécialisées, constituées auprès de la direction fédérale, ils élaborent des propositions d'action qui sont soumises à la direction fédérale, ils aident cette dernière à appliquer les décisions, ils conseillent les organisations du parti pour leur travail parmi ces catégories."25

The special commissions would also be responsible for organising open meetings and debates on questions or problems relating to their local and regional economy. In all this one thing was essential and that was the adherence to principles which were "politiquement juste" or in other words to the Party line.

Finally, the conference announced the PCF's intention to launch a new political review aimed at ITC. The review entitled ITC - Actualités was not in fact published until November 1969. Its main objective was outlined as follows:

"La parution d'ITC' permettra aux ingénieurs, techniciens et cadres, aux spécialistes communistes, de contribuer encore mieux à l'élaboration de la politique du Parti."27

The review was to accept contributions from Communists as well as non-Communists in debates over the problems arising from new relations between research and industry, upon transformations in industry linked to new techniques of management and so on. The PCF intended the launching of this particular initiative (the first of its kind to have been undertaken by a political party) to be seen as a confirmation of the Party's confidence in its relationship with ITC. Unfortunately for the Party, the review was not to survive for more than one year due to administrative
and financial difficulties.

This new address à visage ouvert was also directed to other categories of salaried intellectual workers. Significantly the spring and winter cycles of annual lectures at the CERM were opened in October 1968 to all intellectual workers, students, researchers and militants inside and outside the Party. The Party stated that the involvement of intellectual workers of all disciplines in the lecture cycles would allow the latter to participate in and contribute to the ideological and political efforts undertaken by the PCF. The aim of the lectures was mainly to examine the issue of intellectual workers in the struggle for socialism. More evidence that the PCF was expanding its efforts to develop a communist thinking among the various strata of intellectual workers, and to thereby recruit the latter into a tangible anti-monopoly alliance, was manifested through the Party's confidence in the editorship of its press. L'Humanité introduced a weekly page entitled Spéciale - Idées in January 1969 which encouraged Communist intellectuals to submit their ideas, results of their research to the newspaper in order to allow theoretical discussion to take place. The Spéciale - Idées page proved to be very successful in inviting contributions and covered a wide range of issues relating to the economy, new technology, social structure, culture, sexuality, philosophy, religion and so on. The editorship of L'Humanité provided room for real theoretical debate so that one 'viewpoint' could be counterposed by another from week to week. In fact, by 1970 the page had obviously gained a wide intellectual readership for its
articles were often commented upon or refuted by readers and writers of other reviews. For example, an article on sexuality (written by a Communist intellectual Dr Muldorff) in September issues of L'Humanité had provoked enough reaction in Le Monde and France Observateur to oblige him to reply to questions raised by readers of the latter newspaper and review respectively.

The tolerance of relatively free discussion and debate in the Party's press led to an amelioration in the quality and variety of theoretical works published by Communist intellectuals and many of the latter felt that it was for the first time that they were able to produce works which contained a specificity of their own and which did not a priori support the Party political line or the positions of the working class. This view was expressed, in interviews, by a number of Communist intellectuals involved in the Party's press, namely Antoine Spire, Maurice Goldring, Yvonne Quilès and Jean Rony. Maurice Goldring remarked that the period 1969 to 1972 represented the golden years of reviews such as Nouvelle Critique. Antoine Spire, as one of the directors, at that time, of the Party's publishing house, Editions Sociales, recalled the reigning sense of freedom which allowed him and his colleagues to accept for publication a wide variety of works which reflected an independence of spirit on the part of their authors, which were not propagandistic and more accessible to intellectual (and manual) workers outside the Party and which consequently promoted a favourable image of the Party among social strata imbued with liberal ideologies. It would seem then that efforts were made within certain circles of the Party to follow, in practice, some if not all of the principles of the
Argenteuil resolution.


There appears to be little doubt in the minds of several Communists that the clarification by the PCF, in the Manifeste de Champigny, of its strategic situation (that socialism in France could not be brought about before a period of advanced democracy in which all French people participated) accompanied by its growing "openness" had led to the Party to attract increasing numbers of intellectual workers to its ranks. For example, Jean Tornikian (an ex-journalist at France Nouvelle) recounted, in an interview, that a large number of his contemporaries had joined what they considered to be a dynamic and progressive party which was committed to defend the interests of all social strata opposed to capitalism. According to Tornikian, Communist cells in the Thirteenth arrondissement (where he lived) witnessed a sharp rise in attendances at their meetings. The rise in attendances could be attributed to the participation of intellectual workers whose numbers in Paris were growing rapidly. Philippe Robrieux (no longer a PCF member at that time) also notes that many students and intellectual workers joined the Communist Party having initially adhered to gauchiste groups and having been subsequently disappointed by the general impotence of these groups. In particular, he cites the case of intellectual workers at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme who were all mainly gauchistes but who turned towards the PCF at the
beginning of the 'seventies. Robrieux also adds that the movement of intellectual workers towards the PCF was reflected by the changes in composition of the Party's most active and responsible members. These changes were most evident in the case of the Paris federation. For example, at the federation's January 1970 meeting (in preparation for the Nineteenth Congress) almost 40 per cent of delegates were intellectual workers of diverse categories with ITC, teachers and students heading the list of categories in that order. Thus although the Party's alliance strategy had suffered a serious setback after the events of May, in 1970 the PCF emerged in a stronger position to pursue Left unity as a result of its surprisingly good performance in the 1969 presidential elections. Despite the lack of a political alliance between Communists and Socialists, the PCF collected 21.5 per cent of the vote in the first, low turn out, round of an election not traditionally favourable to PCF presidential candidates while the Socialist vote collapsed at just over five per cent. As the PCF's candidate Jacques Duclos was not qualified to compete in the second round, PCF electors were advised to abstain. Consequently, a high 31 per cent of abstentions or spoiled papers were recorded, signifying a victory of sorts for the Communists. The Socialists on the other hand, recognising that their own position was feeble without Communist support, were forced to think of a return to the pre-1968 dialogue with the PCF. The Party approached its Nineteenth Congress in February 1970 with complete confidence, which was reflected by the fact that the Central Committee commission in charge of opening and monitoring the Tribune de discussion in the
Party's press, prior to each Congress, allowed the widest spectrum of views to be expressed without fearing that criticisms of the Party line would in any way damage its image or undermine the positions of the working class. The Congress was important in that it put an end to two debates which had raged within the Party since 1968. The first debate concerned the question of what should have been the PCF's correct attitude to the "normalisation" of political life in Czechoslovakia while the second debate of relevance here, revolved around the type of cross-class alliance strategy the Party should have continued to adopt. Both debates had been fired by Garaudy's vastly divergent views on the subjects. Both debates also constituted the key subjects of the tribune de discussion in L'Humanité and France Nouvelle.

Garaudy's disagreements with the Party, regarding class alliances, began to take shape after the events of May and are set out in two of his works entitled Pour un Modèle Français du Socialisme and Le Grand Tournant du Socialisme. Garaudy began by condemning the PCF's refusal to recognise the crucial role played by students in the struggle against monopoly capitalism in May 1968. According to Garaudy this negative attitude stemmed from the tendency of the Party to resort to a vulgar and "mechanical" analysis of the social situation of students which only took into account their social origins (overwhelmingly middle class or petty-bourgeois) rather than their future role as intellectual workers, some of which would be producers of surplus-value. He went on to emphasise the need to make a clear
separation between new salaried intellectual strata (researchers, ITC, teachers, etc) and the traditional middle strata of artisans, businessmen etc. He viewed the latter as naturally conservative and as generally unstable allies of the working class while the salaried intellectual strata would have firm objective reasons (by virtue of the fact that they did not own the means of production and that some of them produced surplus value) for siding with the working class in the struggle for socialism. As a result the PCF, according to Garaudy, could not pursue the same type of alliance strategies in the direction of salaried intellectual workers (and students) and traditional middle strata:

"Avec les classes moyennes traditionnelles, il est possible de réaliser certaines alliances tactiques en attendant la prise du pouvoir. Avec de vastes couches d'intellectuels, il s'agit d'une alliance stratégique qui pourrait aller jusqu'à la construction du socialisme et à la pleine réalisation de celui-ci."38

Thus basically what Garaudy said tied in with that which others such as Poulantzas had previously stressed: that the traditional petty bourgeoisie or middle classes ought not to be readily trusted as alliance partners. At no time during the period 1968-1970, did Garaudy advocate that intellectual workers formed part of the working class or that they would play a greater role than the latter in the struggle for socialism. Although Garaudy maintained that intellectual workers formed an integral part of the "collective worker", he did not equate this concept with that of working class. Intellectual workers and manual workers did not form a single class but a "historical bloc". The concept of "historical bloc" was put forward by Garaudy to a hostile
Nineteenth Congress. Here, he pointed to the fundamental difference between the "historical bloc" which included, on an equal footing, both manual and intellectual workers and the traditional class alliances between the working class, the peasantry and the traditional middle classes or strata in which the working class played the leading role. Although Garaudy had been allowed his say at the Congress, it was patently clear that he was not to remain in the PCF, for he had already been accused of the gravest treachery to the Party. Garaudy was accused of the following: of renouncing the reality of the class struggle, of contesting the leading role of the working class, of rejecting Leninist principles of party and of renouncing dialectical and historical materialism as universal instruments of analysis of societies. The fact that Garaudy was allowed to have his say at the Congress may perhaps appear astonishing and again, to an extent, may reflect the concession made by the PCF to open discussion and dialogue within the Party. However, it is also true that the Party leadership, by now effectively in the hands of Marchais, would have caused an enormous outcry had it prevented such a long-standing member of its Politbureau from expressing his views. In fact it had been in the Party's best interests (and the leadership was aware of this) to allow Garaudy to construct his own scaffold in public rather than censure him in private for Garaudy did not have a support base either in the PCF's controlling instances or in its rank and file.

The PCF leadership had succeeded, at the Nineteenth Congress, in imposing its view of the road to socialism (through an alliance between the working class and intermediary and middle
strata in an "advanced democracy") but the debate on the social and ideological nature of alliances continued to be pursued on the outside amongst ex-Communists joined by Garaudy. Garaudy went on to animate, together with ex-Communists Frontéau, Kriegel-Valrimont and Charles Tillon, a series of appels ("appel des quatre", "appel des vingt-huit") against the PCF's line on internal party democracy, Czechoslovakia, cross-class alliances and the road to socialism. The PCF's analysis of French Society and its strategy of alliance became a prime target of criticism by Communist oppositionist groups from 1970 onwards. The main critic of the PCF was the Communist oppositionist grouping under the name of Centres d'Initiatives Communistes (CIC). The group (whose own strategy, encompassed in the slogan front de lutte socialiste, was based upon Garaudy's "historical bloc" thesis) dismissed the PCF's Champaigny manifesto for an "advanced democracy" as a failed analysis of French capitalism and social forces which had led the Party to falsely suppose that a political alliance (at the summit) between the Left parties, supported by a social alliance (at the base) between manual and intellectual workers would open the way to a socialist society. The CIC's analyses of the socio-ideological nature of class alliances were to be later taken up by the PS when it was to put forward its strategy of front de classe. The PS's front de classe is examined in the following chapter.

After the Nineteenth Congress the PCF was being increasingly forced to present unambiguously and more positively its strategy of political and class alliances for two reasons. Firstly, the
Communist Party did not perform as well as it had expected to in the cantonal elections of March 1970. The loss of eight seats in the Paris region was particularly significant in that the population of this region was undergoing a rapid process of de-proletarianisation. The election results therefore suggested that the Party's alliance strategy had not made as much impact as hoped for on the new intellectual strata here. These election results were noted and their implications drawn at the Party's Central Committee meeting at Arcueil that year. Secondly, the criticisms and alternative analyses of Communist oppositionists had to be countered. The PCF set about the task of clarification of its slogans and analysis and of answering its critics in a number of ways while at the same time stepping up its efforts to establish a common programme of government with the Socialists.

In the first instance the PCF sought to explain to the new intellectual strata the nature of their commitment to an alliance with the working class. For example, at a packed meeting organised by the Nouvelle Critique in March 1970 on the theme "PCF and intellectuals", the Party explained that the concept of alliance between intellectual workers and the working class had evolved since the 'thirties and 'forties:

"L'alliance avec la classe ouvrière prend donc une portée nouvelle. Elle n'est pas un contrat plus ou moins circonstantiel. Elle devient une entente profonde, durable."45

The same idea of entente was taken up in L'Humanité's spéciale- idées page in an article (by Henri Malberg) which outlined the way in which the PCF's concept of relations between intellectual and manual workers had changed as a result of the rapid emergence
of intellectual strata as a considerable social force:

"Cette évolution numérique, sociale, politique a évidemment déplacé la manière dont se posait, aux yeux des communistes, la question des intellectuels. Hier, parmi des étudiants et des intellectuels peu nombreux, issus dans leur immense masse des couches bourgeoises, le soutien d'intellectuel aux luttes ouvrières, l'adhésion au parti communiste apparaissaient par la forces des choses comme une rupture, comme un ralliement à la cause prolétarienne et révolutionnaire ... Mais le problème a changé de nature. Il ne s'agit plus de ralliement d'individuels, mais d'une entente à établir entre des couches sociales qui ont les intérêts commun et qui peuvent construire ensemble un avenir démocratique. D'où l'idée de l'alliance."46

The idea that "alliance" did not equal a rigid contract, the increasing use of the term "entente" in PCF discourse, and the fact that the Party had decreased its ritual stressing of the leading role of the working class indicated a willingness to present the intellectual-manual worker alliance as that of equal partners.

Also as part of its efforts to present its analyses of French society and politics more clearly to new intellectual strata, the PCF began to organise from the end of 1970 onwards, mass meetings (assemblées-débats) in large towns all over France where the public could enter into direct dialogue with the Party. These meetings were always well-attended (generally with audiences of thousands rather than hundreds) mainly by young intellectual workers and students. The meetings covered a wide range of topics for discussion (local affairs, the unity of the Left, alliance between intellectual and manual workers, gauchisme and liberties and repression in Eastern Europe) and appeared to improve the Party's standing amongst intellectual workers. According to Étienne Balibar young intellectual workers and
students were impressed with the Party's dynamic image in the early 'seventies and hundreds joined the PCF although often on a "conflictual basis":

"les gens avaient le sentiment d'entrer dans une phase historique ... le parti communiste, malgré tous ses défauts, représentait l'avenir et par conséquent il fallait entrer là-dedans et se battre aussitôt pour sortir du Stalinisme." 48

Also, at the beginning of the 'seventies the PCF appeared to offer far more exciting vistas of a socialist France to young intellectual workers than did the PS which was mainly concerned with its own reconstitution at the time. The Party's increased popularity was also borne out by the results of the professional elections of 1970 in which the UGICT made progressive and some spectacular gains in the technician and cadres colleges in industry. For example, the CGT made 10.7 per cent gain in votes in the technician college at Micheville-de Wendel Sidelor (Villerupt) and an 8.7 per cent gain in the technician college at Thomson in Gennevilliers. It achieved a spectacular result at Chelle-Manurhin at Alfortville where it obtained 62 per cent of the ITC vote compared with the CGC's 37 per cent. In 1968 the CGC had obtained 91 per cent of the vote.

Finally, in 1971, the efforts of the Party to pull together theoretical elements, on French capitalism and its social, political and economic aspects, put forward by Serge Laurent and others since 1967, materialised in the form of the Traité Marxiste d'Economie Politique : Le Capitalisme Monopoliste d'État. In a section entitled "Les Classes Sociales" the authors of the Traité outlined the social structure of France along the same lines as Laurent, Casanova and Simon had done —
that is, that apart from the two major contending classes, the monopoly bourgeoisie and the working class, there existed a series of salaried intermediary and independent or non-salaried middle social strata, as opposed to classes, which eventually would submerge either into the bourgeoisie or the proletariat (see Appendix 4). In the meantime, however, a large section of these intermediary social strata, in particular new intellectual strata, would, under the unfavourable conditions wrought by state monopoly capitalism, be propelled to struggle against the bourgeoisie alongside the working class. However, that which pushed these intermediary strata towards the working class was not just economic immiseration but a growing awareness on their part that socialism would liberate their human potential which had always been stifled by monopoly capitalism. Thus, stressed the authors of the Traité, the PCF recognised that new intellectual strata had interests in common with those of the working class but that they also faced problems related specifically to their type of work. The Party's role, as vanguard of the working class, would be, therefore, to defend the interests of new intellectual strata and thus take on board the new issues of alienation, freedom, autonomy of management articulated by the latter. Finally while the Traité made the point that the working class would as always play the leading role in an anti-monopoly alliance, it certainly did not labour this point, thus giving the impression that the authors wished to announce a move away from a discourse that might have been perceived as ouvriériste in any way. Overall the main element to
be noted in this new theory was that the era of state monopoly capitalism would see an unprecedented heightening of social conflict between the monopoly fraction of the bourgeoisie and the rest of the French nation. This new situation allowed for an increased network of alliances.

However, the Traité was subjected to enormous criticism from those on the Left who saw it as an explicit repudiation of the "middle class" or "third force" tendency and therefore subject to confusions and false principles. For Marxists such as Poulantzas the ideas of the Traité represented a denial of classical Marxist theory which admits the existence of strata and categories as part of classes but not as groupings alongside or in between classes. In Poulantzas's view the PCF was falling into the theoretical trap of accepting the existence of groupings external to classes much in the same way as empiricists have done. Indeed, noted Poulantzas, the PCF's intermediary strata (ingénieurs, techniciens, cadres, enseignants, chercheurs scientifiques etc.) were broadly based upon INSEE's classifications of the working population into CSP. Furthermore, warned Poulantzas, by refusing to confer class membership upon the various intermediary strata, the PCF was committing the grave error of including in its anti-monopoly alliance certain strata which could be perceived as objective class enemies of the working class. For non-Marxists on the Left such as Touraine and gauchistes on the other hand, the PCF was ignoring the emergence of new intermediary strata, as a revolutionary "third force", at its own peril. In any case, as they saw it, the orthodox Marxist schema of classes was anathema.
Whether or not the efforts made by the PCF to clarify its analysis in relation to the social structure of France and to its own alliance strategy, would pay off in electoral terms remained to be seen in the legislative elections of 1973. In the meantime, the Party had certainly impressed political opinion on the Left enough to persuade a "renewed" PS under Mitterrand to carry further positive dialogue and negotiations around a proposed common programme of government. A firm political alliance between the two parties was reached in June 1972 with the announcement of the Programme Commun de Gouvernement du Parti 53 Communiste et du Parti Socialiste. The PCF now presented the Common Programme as a solid basis upon which an alliance of all social strata, which were "victims" of the monopolies, could be advanced in the form of Union Populaire (led by a strong PCF). Furthermore, while the working class constituted the dynamic "nucleus" of such a union, intellectual workers were also seen as "une composante naturelle de l'union populaire" rather than as a force d'appoint. With the strategy of alliance thus established within the context of the Common Programme, the Party prepared to face the 1973 legislative elections - a major test of the viability of PCF policy towards new intermediary strata.

To conclude on the PCF's approach towards intellectual workers during the period 1968 to 1972 one can say that a number of changes had taken place on the levels of theoretical, strategic and tactical approaches. Where the Party's theoretical approach to the question of intellectual workers was concerned, a major change had taken place. This was the denial of class
membership to intellectual workers through the refusal to recognise any longer the notion of middle class(es). This shift from the notion of class to strata where intellectual workers were concerned would allow the PCF to pursue a strategy of extremely broad alliances around the working class. More importantly in the long term, it gave the Party room for theoretical manoeuvre when it could at any time, if it wished to, place intellectual workers in either of the two major class groupings depending upon socio-economic and political conjunctures.

On the level of tactics, the PCF began to organise a greater number of activities in which the participation of intellectual workers would add to the "open" image of the Party. The tactic of staging such activities was quite successful as it gave the impression that the PCF was genuinely interested in a changed scenario when in fact one fundamental orthodoxy persisted: the role of vanguard for social change remained exclusive to the working class. It would not be given over to or even shared by any other social grouping.
CHAPTER IX

THE PCF AND INTELLECTUAL WORKERS: 1973-1982
The signature of the Common Programme coupled with the PCF's official new analysis of French society (contained in the Traité) had brought a fresh wind of optimism into the PCF as far as enhanced possibilities for a strong alliance between the working class and intellectual workers were concerned. The Party saw itself entering a new era of success and popularity in which hopefully, as vanguard of the working class and as most powerful party in union de la gauche, it would lead France to a socialist future. The PCF could quite reasonably put itself forward as the "maker" of the Common Programme and thus hope to attract new support. Moreover in comparison with the PS it was stronger in electoral, party membership and organisational terms. The PCF had also made efforts to understand the changes taking place in French society and had thus tried, accordingly, to bring up to date its theory and strategy. It hoped that the changes in theory and strategy would enable it to recruit support amongst intellectual workers or "new intermediary strata". However this wave of initial optimism and hope was to give way to a long period of confusion and U-turns in alliance strategies as the development of union de la gauche began to take a course unforeseen by the Party and as the full implications of its participation in this union gradually unfolded. The "honeymoon" period of the Left union came to an end in autumn 1974 when it became clear to all that the PS had effectively used the united front platform in order to gain the support of the very new intermediary strata courted by the PCF.

For the Party this imbalance had to be corrected in order to avoid the situation where it would become a mere force d'appoint.
in a union led by the Socialists. This involved a shift in strategy in 1974 so that the PCF's conception of an anti-monopoly alliance changed from one which included, with the working class, certain middle strata (small entrepreneurs and artisans) and the majority of new intermediary strata, to one which embraced almost the entire population of France with the exception of a few "bourgeois monopolists". The contradictions and confusion ensuing from the sudden adoption of a new strategy only served, in the long term, to place a wide gulf between the Party and the constituency of new intermediary strata it had originally set out to win. This was amply illustrated by the results of the 1978 legislative elections.

The PCF's failure to reach the intermediary strata of intellectual workers provoked an explosion of discontent mainly among Party intellectuals demanding, firstly, a clear explanation from the leadership as to why changes in alliance strategy had taken place from 1974 onwards and secondly the right to develop, collectively, a sound theoretical analysis of French society from which would flow an unambiguous and credible alliance strategy designed to broaden the Party's base amongst intellectual workers. Thus began controlled discussion, within the PCF, over the question of alliances between the working class and intellectual workers in the struggle for socialism. These discussions continued in one form or another until the Party's Twenty-Fourth Congress in 1982 by which time many of those who had been instrumental in fomenting initial criticisms had either left the Party of their own volition, or were considered by the
leadership as having "placed themselves outside the Party".

By the time of the Twenty-Fourth Congress, the Party had reached an impasse as far as formulation of an analysis of French society and of a credible alliance strategy was concerned. The ideological crisis, resulting from the contradiction between the PCF's traditional view of itself and of its constituency the working class and the need to adapt to a changing social reality, had well and truly set in.

I. The PCF continues to court intellectual workers: 1973-1974

With the union de la gauche working fairly effectively during its early days, the PCF continued more optimistically than ever to push forward its analysis of French society and to reiterate its commitment to an alliance between the working class and intermediary strata of intellectual workers. The promotion of an "open-image" policy also designed to increase the Party's allure prior to the legislative elections of 1974, required, on the one hand, that it de-emphasize certain differences between itself and the Socialists and on the other hand that it make favourable pronouncements on issues dear to the hearts of voters from intermediary social strata: for example, its non-opposition to private property and the right to inherit.

The opportunity for the PCF to gauge the success of its approach to intellectual workers, since the events of May 1968, presented itself at the legislative elections of March 1973. The election results clearly spelled much hope for the future of the union de la gauche as a whole in particular where the vote of the salaried population was concerned. According to a post-
electoral survey carried out by SOFRES, 58 per cent of the French salariat had voted for the Left. However, while the Socialists had improved on their results in both the 1967 and 1968 elections, the PCF had only increased its share of the vote with respect to that achieved in 1968. With 21.4 per cent it had not matched its 1967 score, 22.5 per cent, although in any case it needed to go beyond the 25 per cent mark in order to become a dominant partner in a future government of the Left. Moreover, the PS had gained a higher proportion of the vote of intellectual workers and white-collar employees than had the PCF. In the category Cadre supérieur industriel et profession libérale (as drawn up by SOFRES) the PS captured seven per cent of the vote compared with the PCF’s six per cent. In the category cadre moyen, employé the PS attracted 23 per cent of voters compared with the PCF’s 17 per cent figure. In general the PS had, from an overall weaker position prior to the elections, increased its influence in all categories of the working population (including the working class) which had previously voted for the majority. The election results of March 1973 indicated a bright future for the Socialists.

If the Party’s instinctive reaction was to greet the election results with veiled attacks on the Socialists and with a certain amount of ouvrierisme it soon returned to a conciliatory posture. After all, it was still the largest party on the Left. However, more importantly, the overthrow of Salvador Allende and his Popular Unity government in Chile, in the autumn of 1973, had illustrated to the PCF (and other parties
of the Left) that the maintenance and strengthening of political and social alliances was absolutely essential. It was with this preoccupation uppermost that the Party threw its full weight behind Mitterrand's presidential candidacy in 1974 and again resumed its effort to extend its influence amongst intellectual workers and other intermediary strata. Thus 1973 also saw the publication of Marchais' *Le défi démocratique*. Not only was it published by a "bourgeois" publishing house, immediately rendering it more accessible to a non-Communist public, but it was also unhampered by the habitual jargon of PCF texts. Moreover, the message was clear - the Party was opting for socialism *aux couleurs de la France* (rather than for a soviet-style system) which meant that universal suffrage would be accepted during the transition to socialism and that the PCF would step down if defeated in subsequent elections. Additionally, in order to further the accessibility of the PCF to new intermediary strata two non-Communist journalists, André Harris and Alain de Sédouy, were allowed, for the first time, to freely investigate the day to day life and workings of Party structures and members. Where the question of intellectual workers was concerned the journalists Harris and de Sédouy found that certain Party leaders were making serious efforts to seek the establishment of alliances at various organisational levels. For example, an interview with René le Guen revealed the nature of the formal contacts which had been established between the UGICT and the CGC as a means of taking on board the grievances of all ITC. In general they found, within the PCF structures, amongst rank and file members and cadres alike, a strong desire.
to adapt the Party to the circumstances of a rapidly evolving society.

Undoubtedly such initiatives improved, to some extent, the Party’s standing in the eyes of intellectual workers. As in previous years the PCF continued to organise large public meetings where Party leaders, and Marchais more frequently than others, presented themselves for questioning by the public on particular points of Communist policy. Marchais, for instance, would introduce and debate, with an audience, the themes of *Le défi démocratique*. These events were mainly attended by intellectual workers, many of whom, at the end of an evening’s debate, would express an interest in joining the Party. Meetings such as these were a particularly useful means to convince non-Communist sympathisers of the Left to "franchir le pas" and join the Party. This account of the PCF’s meetings with the public was put forward by Antoine Spire who did nevertheless stress that his experience was confined to the Paris area and that he could not comment on whether similar meetings outside Paris were well attended or whether they made any impact upon intellectual workers. Spire also emphasised that his accounts were based upon his personal experience and impressions as local Party officials never undertook any kind of surveys during the meetings to gauge the Party’s impact on intellectual workers. Supporting Spire’s impressions, Phillipe Robrieux’s view was that up to this time the PCF was still managing to attract, to its membership, intellectual workers who had played an active role in the events of May 1968 but who had since become disillusioned with
gauchisme. However signing up members was one thing while attracting voters was quite another. It was the latter task that the PCF just could not get to grips with and by the autumn of 1974, a tendency towards electoral stagnation, if not decline, seemed to be cruelly accentuated again and again. For example in six legislative by-elections of October 1974 (in Moselle, Loire-Atlantique, Ardeche, Côte d'Or, Dordogne and Savoie) the PCF had improved on its March 1973 score in only one constituency (Dordogne) while the PS had made gains in all six constituencies and had even won over one seat (Savoie) from the Majority. Besides, what signalled most alarm in the PCF was the fact that the PS, in addition to attracting voters from new intermediary strata, was now beginning to gnaw away at the working class constituency and that of protest voters. For example the PS had picked up a considerable number of working class and protest votes in Moselle, where it overtook the PCF, scoring 9.17 per cent compared with 7.86 in March 1973 and only 3.66 per cent in June 1968. The pattern was repeated even more strikingly in Loire-Atlantique where the PS obtained 30.31 per cent of the vote compared with its 5.61 per cent in June 1968. The PCF took consolation from the high abstention rate which indicated that on average, in all six by-elections approximately a third of electors had not voted and from the fact that these electoral constituencies had never been Party strongholds. As the PS strode ahead electorally, it began to call into question the PCF's dominant role within union de la gauche. Not content with pronouncing that it would soon occupy the favoured position of "premier parti de la France", the PS also campaigned aggressively
to increase its influence in industrial workplaces (sacred territory to the PCF) through the CFDT. In addition to this, Socialist conduct at the Assises du Socialisme, held in early October 1974, did nothing to reassure the PCF as to its partner's commitment to union de la gauche as it had originally been conceived. At the Assises much to its dismay, the PCF witnessed a strengthening of the PS's anti-Common Programme wing (represented by Socialists such as Rocard, Delors and Attali) while the more Marxist and pro-PCF elements in the Party* (represented by Chevènement's CERES group) were marginalised. Finally, while all this was taking place, the newly elected president, Giscard d'Estaing, had been proposing to reform France's "inflexible" political system with a view to creating conditions in which the Majority might be enlarged to include the Socialists. Thus the PCF was threatened with two possible fates: either it would end up as a weaker partner in the union de la gauche, forced into political compromises with the PS or it could be isolated yet again in a political ghetto. Neither fate was enviable and the Party decided to modify its strategy to one which would restore, to its favour, the balance of forces within the Left. The Party had, in the meantime, already issued several statements warning the PS of the dangers of slipping back into the class collaboration mire from which it had been rescued (by the PCF).

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II. Union du peuple de France: 1974-1976

The change in strategy, marked by the introduction of the mot d'ordre union du peuple de France, was adopted at the Party's Extraordinary Twenty-First Congress held in late October 1974. Union du peuple de France was presented by the PCF as a logical development of union de la gauche, aimed at enhancing the quality of the latter rather than undermining it. However, such a qualitative enhancement could only be achieved, it would seem, through the implementation of a strategy which offered the PCF quantitative support in new sectors of society. If 13 million French men and women supported the Left at the time of the presidential elections in May 1974, then it was possible for 11 millions of others to be won over too. Thus while union de la gauche represented a union of political forces at the top, union du peuple de France was sociologically oriented and stressed the union of different social forces at the base.

Underlying the concept of union du peuple de France, the idea that a fundamental antagonism exists and grows, as a result of deepening capitalist crisis, between a monopoly bourgeoisie and a toiling majority basically remained unchanged. However, according to the PCF's analysis, by 1974, owing to an extreme concentration of capital on the one hand and the continued acceleration of the process whereby the majority of the working population was becoming salaried, the sociological map of France had changed even faster than expected. Continuing the theory of State Monopoly Capitalism, the PCF defined the monopoly bourgeoisie as a collective exploiter consisting of no more than 13 a few tens of thousands of persons. This noyau dur of the
bourgeoisie was solely responsible for the suffering of the rest of the French population including the petite and moyenne bourgeoisie. This is explained as follows:

"A notre époque, la bourgeoisie ne vit plus en harmonie avec elle-même comme elle avait essayé d'en accréditer l'image dans sa phase ascendante. Des tensions croissantes opposent entre elles les principales couches qui la composent . . . D'une manière générale, la domination de la grande bourgeoisie . . . tend aujourd'hui à reléguer toutes les autres fractions de la bourgeoisie . . . au niveau de couches satellites constamment ballottées entre le capital et le travail. En ce sens, l'antagonisme de classe fondamental n'est plus aujourd'hui celui qui opposerait la bourgeoisie en général ou le capital sans autre précision au prolétariat. C'est celui qui met face à face la classe ouvrière et l'ensemble des travailleurs salariés et indépendants d'une part, la grande bourgeoisie de l'autre."14

Following from this breakdown of French society the PCF concluded that the Programme Commun responded to the class interests of all except a handful of monopolies. Consequently, union du peuple de France extended beyond the parameters of simple cross-class alliances between manual and intellectual workers. Together with the working class, union du peuple de France included not only new intermediary strata but also small and medium sized farmers, independent craftsmen, small and medium sized entrepreneurs (couches moyennes). Furthermore this union was socially as well as ideologically heterogeneous and therefore welcomed Christians, "patriotic Gaullists", "democratic centrists" and others interested in protecting French democratic traditions (inherited from the Revolution) from the nefarious influences of foreign monopolies, NATO and the EEC. By inviting virtually the entire population of France to join the working class, it would appear that the PCF had moved to a totally non-sectarian position.
However, the role of the working class as the largest and ever-growing social force in the union and the most capable of bringing about social change, was most heavily emphasised by the fact that a decision to make industrial workplaces "privileged" locales for intense Communist activity was taken by the Party. The idea that only a strong working class and its party (as opposed to "reformist" socialists) could guarantee fundamental change was contained in the Congress resolution.

The contradictory nature of the resolution, which advocated the inclusion of all but monopolies in the union and which, at the same time, urged Communists to channel all their energies in political action amongst workers in industry, reflected an important split within the Party leadership. The conflict within the Politbureau regarding the alliance strategy of the PCF centred around the personalities of Georges Marchais and Roland Leroy. Despite the unsatisfactory showing of the PCF at the polls since March 1973, Marchais had continued to favour the maintenance and extension of social alliances with non-working class strata on the one hand and of political alliances with the PS on the other hand. This is made clear in Le Défi Democratique. As previously mentioned, the events of Chile, in the previous year had convinced Marchais of the importance of making strong overtures to intermediary and middle strata and of retaining good relations with the PS. He supported the view that in Chile the narrowness of Allendé's base (in the working class) and the conflicts between parties of the Left which had scared away large sections of intermediary and middle strata, had led to
the failure of the socialist experiment in that country. Opposing Marchais' position, Leroy was unwilling to make any allowances for the PS and called for a hard retrenchment of the Party in its natural support base - the working class. Where the socialist experiment of Chile was concerned, Leroy maintained secretly that Allendé had been naive about the capacity of certain intermediary and middle strata to accept socialist reforms and that manifestations of discord by the latter should have been crushed immediately in order to have prevented the coup d'état.

The Politbureau split was further amplified by the manner in which the final proposal of the Twenty-First Congress resolution emerged. The composition of the first draft proposal of the Congress resolution (circulated to Central Committee members) had clearly been presided over by Marchais and his supporters, for firstly it presented an optimistic future for the success of union de la gauche and secondly it stressed the importance of political action amongst non-working class strata affected by capitalist crisis. The final draft of the Congress resolution emerging from a 6 September Central Committee meeting was greatly amended under the influence of Leroy as secretary to the Committee. References to union de la gauche, suggesting the continuation of PCF-PS cooperation, became scant and were often replaced by mention of only the PCF's own role. The importance of the special alliance between the working class and intellectual workers, emphasised greatly from the late 'sixties onwards was ignored and a clear ouvrieriste orientation could be detected. For example, following a paragraph on various
struggles waged by the working class and other strata, this section of the draft proposal was amputated:

"Les luttes permettent le renforcement de l'union dans chaque catégories (sic) sociale et entre toutes les catégories spoliées par le grand capital. La relation devient plus perceptible entre les revendications et les obstacles politiques qui s'y opposent, entre les revendications et la nécessité des changements démocratiques que propose la gauche."19

It was replaced, in the final proposal, by"

"Il est nécessaire aussi de lutter pour les mesures proposées par le Parti Communiste pour faire face à la crise, réduire l'inflation, résorber le déficit de la balance des paiements, préserver le niveau de vie et l'emploi des Français."20

Moreover, the following crucial paragraph was added to the final proposal:

"Base indispensable du plus large rassemblement, la classe ouvrière en est en même temps la composante la plus déterminée, la plus dynamique, la plus attachée aux transformations démocratiques. En raison de cela, elle est le moteur de l'union. L'entreprise est un des lieux privilégiés de l'action politique pour l'union."21

Not surprisingly the proposal of the Congress resolution and union du peuple de France in particular was subjected to a considerable amount of criticism from within the Party and pro-PCF circles outside. Discussion and criticism of the final proposal of the Resolution was carried out relatively freely in the tribunes de discussion in L'Humanité and especially in France Nouvelle. In some areas cell meetings were open to non-Communists and criticism was registered in special cell bulletins. However this freedom to discuss and criticise was only tolerated up to section level. Thereafter, conflict and dissent were suppressed at federal meetings. In general, many
Communists were alarmed by the fact that a new orientation in strategy could be adopted so suddenly as this implied that a rigorous theoretical analysis of union du peuple de France had not been carried out and it had also prevented a wider debate of theoretical questions from taking place. The Resolution and the concept of union du peuple de France was seen to contain several weaknesses. Firstly the opposition of a handful of monopolies to the rest of the French population masked the real contradiction which existed within this union, for example between owners of PME (petites et moyennes entreprises) and their employees (manual and intellectual workers). By adopting union du peuple de France the PCF, it appeared, was making the mistake of forgetting that monopoly capitalism had survived and would continue to survive precisely because it was able to represent the general interests of the bourgeoisie as a class, including those of the PME. Secondly the adoption of union du peuple de France was not accompanied, as it should have been, by the emphasis that the working class and other salaried strata, would therefore continue to struggle against that section of their exploiters, the PME, even if the latter themselves were victims of the crisis of monopoly capitalism. Thirdly, the Party had invited "patriotic Gaullists", "democratic centrists" and other "dubious categories" to join the union without specifying who exactly these people were in class terms. For example, was the PCF referring to Gaullists as a political group or to working class and other salaried strata which had been attracted by and therefore lent electoral support to Gaullism? These criticisms of union du peuple de France were formulated mainly by those on
the Party’s Left, for example, Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar, Georges Labica, Guy Bois. These "Althusserian" Communists had called for a reorganisation of the Twenty-first Congress Resolution, which outlined union du peuple de France, along the following lines: a thorough analysis of the class composition of all non-monopoly strata was required so that people were not left with the impression that class struggle between salaried strata and PME was a thing of the past; the final aim of the Party’s strategy, that is socialism had to be reaffirmed more strongly and this entailed amputation of the "woolly" phrases of the Resolution such as "une politique au service de l’homme", of acritical references to the French revolution and so on; greater emphasis had to be laid upon the ideological struggle with the working class, large sections of which still had to be won over from the yoke of the Right. Althusserians were clearly interested in stressing the PCF’s role as a working class vanguard for real socialist change.

Criticisms of union du peuple de France were not only voiced by those on the Party’s Left. On the Party’s Eurocommunist wing alarm was expressed that the crucial importance of the alliance between working class and intellectual workers - "sans qui l’union du peuple de France ne pourra pas se faire" - was being lost under the welter of seemingly unprincipled alliances with PME and other couches moyennes (peasants, independent artisans etc). Also the Eurocommunists were concerned that the PCF’s political alliance policy was not stressed and that a hostile attitude was being adopted towards the Socialists. However, Eurocommunists, such as Spire, Maurice Goldring and Rony, were
not so much opposed to the content of the Twenty-first Congress Resolution as to the fact that the proceedings of the Congress revealed negative aspects of the way the PCF leadership had imposed decisions without allowing prior analyses and discussions to take place within the Party.

Clearly, these criticisms were not taken on board by the Party leadership either during the proceedings of the Congress or after. Major amendments, presented at section conferences, passed through the machinery of federal conferences only to emerge as minor corrections and precisions. In the months that followed the Twenty-first Congress, the PCF's attitude towards its Programme Commun partner hardened. Within the frame-work of a "polemic" launched against the PS, union du peuple de France was promoted aggressively to challenge the PS's strategy of front de classe, which requires some brief explanation here.

The concept of front de classe had been officially adopted at the "new" PS's first Ordinary National Congress at Grenoble in June 1973 while further analysis, of this strategy, were made at the Assises Nationales in October 1974. The strategy and its theoretical basis were developed more fully and unambiguously later on at the PS Congresses of Pau (January-February 1975) and Nantes (June 1977). Front de classe was approached from an incontestably Marxist perspective by the PS. Its necessary emergence had taken place, according to the Socialists, due to the evolution of productive forces and of production relations which had produced a structural crisis of capitalism. Front de classe was defined as "l'expression de l'homogénéité et de la
solidarité politique croissantes de toutes les catégories de salariés." In other words, the front de classe was composed of the working class (forming the core of this front because it was "la plus durement et la plus directement exploitée"), intellectual workers, employés and certain non-salaried workers such as peasants and independent artisans although a strong commitment was not shown to these two latter categories. Although the working class appeared as the core of front de classe, the PS refused to attribute to it a leading role in the struggle for socialism. Thus all constituent social groupings of front de classe were equally responsible for bringing about the transformation of society.

In opposition to union du peuple de France, the PS stressed that front de classe was not a defensive "attrape-tout" alliance of anti-monopoly strata and that it would therefore consider certain strata exterior to the salariat, ruined by monopoly forces, (for example the PME) only as possible allies while the rest were viewed as adversaries. The separation between possible allies and adversaries was, however, not always made clear. Finally, union de la gauche and the autogestion project were, for the PS, principal instruments for the transformation of front de classe from objective to subjective reality. It must be pointed out here that the PS's front de classe thesis was no more than a copy of Garaudy's historical bloc thesis and did not represent an original approach to the question of alliances on the part of the PS.

While union du peuple de France was being promoted, in reality the PCF focused its political and ideological activity
upon the industrial working class, in keeping with the aim of preventing the PS (aided by the CFDT) from making further inroads into its traditional constituency. Consequently the Party set up the *section grandes entreprises* which was linked directly to the Central Committee. The section's aim was to create 10,000 new cells in large industrial firms by 1976 and to involve the PCF directly in the staging and leading of industrial action by the working class. Up until this period 72 per cent of PCF cells were in urban neighbourhood or rural areas. Only 28 per cent were factory based. Hence, potentially the PS could have gained great influence within industrial workplaces and thus within the working class. The focus of the Party's attention on industrial workplace cells inevitably meant that urban neighbourhood cells, in which intellectual workers were most represented, were by and large ignored. The question of the alliance between the working class and intellectual workers, not so long ago of "capital" importance to the PCF, remained temporarily unemphasised. The effect of all this was that there occurred a sharp fall in the attendance of intellectual workers at cell and section meetings when compared with high attendances prior to the Twenty-First Congress. In addition to this many Communist militants registered, in their door to door neighbourhood canvassing, a clear waning of enthusiasm amongst intellectual workers for the *Programme Commun* and in particular for Communist policies even at municipal level. The PCF's lack of recognition, in its practice, of new intermediary strata caused grave concern amongst rank and file members at cell meetings who feared that the Party was likely to suffer electoral damage in the long term.
Fortunately for those (Eurocommunists) who had despaired at the Party's sectarian stance in favour of the manual working class, June 1975 witnessed an event which led to a change in its tune as the "soft-liners" led by Marchais gained the upper hand over the Leroy "hard-line" faction. It should be noted that although the division within the leadership into "hard" and "soft" liners is not entirely clear cut, it is perceived in this manner by a large number of Communists and is useful in explaining sudden and contradictory shifts in PCF strategy. The event which occurred was the success of the Italian Communists in the Italian regional elections. It was the first time since 1947 that a Western Communist Party had made it past the 30 per cent voting figure. Unlike the PCF, the PCI had begun to build support among middle and intermediary strata (which it viewed as middle class strata) since the early 'fifties. Its conception of social alliances was based upon Gramscian notions of "historical bloc" and envisioned greater, although not complete, equality between the working class and its allies. Furthermore, because of the strong "intellectual" contingent which had always been present within the PCI leadership, the Italian Party had fought off ouvrierisme within its ranks and had already assumed the features of a mass party with a large non-working class membership. The PCI victory brought a reminder to the PCF of the need for support from intermediary strata if union de la gauche was to succeed. A decision was taken, therefore, to abandon the "polemic" against the PS and once again to turn the Party's attention to militating amongst new intermediary strata of
intellectual workers. These "turns" in the PCF's attitude, following the Italian Communists' electoral success, are recognised as marking the official "Eurocommunisation" of the Party.

However, as the PCF had already launched into its grandes entreprises campaign, it was announced that in practice alliances between intellectual workers and the working class were best constructed within the workplace setting:

"L'entreprise est le lieu privilégié de l'alliance . . . C'est dans la mesure où l'alliance progressera dans l'entreprise qu'elle progressera à tous les niveaux, et dans toutes les circonstances. L'entreprise reste la priorité des priorités."34

The continued prioritisation of the industrial workplace despite the renewed emphasis on intellectual worker-working class alliances would appear to indicate that a compromise had taken place between Georges Marchais' Eurocommunist faction and the Leroy hardliners. By making the industrial workplace (where the working class was most represented) the prime location for the pursuance of alliance policies, the message that the working class was the leading force in the struggle for change nevertheless remained loud and clear. In addition, although the Party claimed to have understood that "l'exploitation ne s'arrête plus aujourd'hui aux portes de l'entreprise" it was once more the case that intellectual workers in industry, that is ITC, had become a favoured category among the working class's allies. Also favoured now was the active recruitment of Party members among intellectual workers in industrial workplaces:

"Un Parti Communiste fort à l'entreprise est un facteur de consolidation de l'alliance. C'est
The active recruitment of members among intellectual strata had not been emphasised before. The PCF had always been content to relate to the mass of intellectual workers through trade-unions and other Party "front" organisations composed of selected and committed intellectual cadres, with the aim of gaining long-term electoral support while preferring to conserve its overall working class character. Following the Italian example the PCF leadership had hoped to transform the PCF from a cadre party to a mass party, relaxing recruitment requirements and by reducing its demands upon rank and file members exterior to the working class:

"L'existence du Parti à l'entreprise n'entraîne nulle contrainte pour le cadre ... Elle est une garantie pour celui-ci qu'il ne sera imposé aucune tâche qui n'appartiendrait pas à son activité professionnelle dont il sera pleinement responsable."36

The "mass-focus" Italian approach brought the Party, to a considerable extent, the result it had hoped for and by the beginning of 1976 it boasted a membership of 500,000 including some 93,000 new members. In addition to the immediate increase in membership figures there had occurred a definite evolution of the socio-economic character of the PCF's membership since 1973 so that the proportion of manual workers had decreased while that of intellectual workers had increased. For example a survey (published by Jean-Paul Molinari in Cahiers du Communisme ) of the social composition of delegates to 97 federal conferences, preparing for the Twenty-first Congress, had shown that while the PCF had retained its overall working class character, the
proportion of intellectual workers amongst Communist militants had increased considerably so that teachers, for instance, were "over-represented" in the Party's debating forums and organisational instances. According to the survey's results 77.2 per cent of 20,000 delegates to federal conferences formed part of the salariat. Of these, manual industrial workers were represented by 32.2 per cent of delegates while intellectual workers (ITC and all the teaching professions) were represented by 25.4 per cent of delegates. Routine white-collar workers or employés were represented by 19.6 per cent of delegates. The relative increase in weight of intellectual workers was even more marked in areas with a high concentration of new technology industries. Hence in the Paris region, for example, over 15 percent of delegates to federal meetings were represented by ITC alone. The fact that the Paris Communist federations had lost, to a large extent, their working class character was also borne out by the results of a sociological study of 3593 Communist delegates to section conferences (in preparation for the Twenty-first Congress) published in October 1975 by the Revue Française de Science Politique by authors Platone and Subileau. This study revealed that in general in the Paris region only 16 per cent of Communist militants were manual industrial workers (that is of the categories OS, OP, contremaitres and manoeuvres) while 40 per cent belonged to intellectual worker categories (that is teaching professions and ITC). The results obtained by Molinari, Platone and Subileau contrast sharply with those, illustrating the social composition of Congress delegates, which
were presented by the PCF Commission des mandats at the Twenty-first and Twenty-second Congresses (see appendix 5) and which were used by the Party leadership to support its assertion that the role and representation of the working class in French society continued to grow:

"L'étude à laquelle la Commission s'est livrée montre que le Congrès est pleinement représentatif du parti, de son action et aussi de notre peuple . . . La classe ouvrière, dont le rôle grandit et grandira dans la lutte pour la transformation de la société, voit sa représentation progresser. 46,5% des 1522 délégués sont des ouvriers professionnels, des O.S., des techniciens de fabrication, des ouvriers agricoles, contre 44,8% lors de notre XXe Congrès. La présence de techniciens d'étude, d'ingénieurs, de cadres, d'enseignants et d'étudiants . . . prouve que notre Congrès est bien à l'image de la France qui travaille."43

In considering the results of these various surveys it should be noted that because of the deep-seated ouvrierisme of the PCF which prioritises the promotion of working class cadres, the Party assumes an increasingly working class character from the base to the upper echelons of the hierarchy. Following this pattern, delegates to Congresses are deliberately nominated, apart from their pro-leadership or lignard stances, because of their working class credentials. Hence Congress delegations are bound to reflect an overwhelmingly working class PCF compared with delegations to federal conferences (studied by Molinari) while the latter take on a more working class character than delegations to section conferences (such as those studied by Platone and Subileau). In view of this it would be fair to say that in general studies relating communists in the lower echelons or organisational instances of the Party would give a more accurate reflection of the social composition of PCF membership.
What is interesting in all this, however, is the selective use by the PCF leadership, of statistical information to affirm the leading role of the working class in French society.

While the role of the working class was asserted, the PCF made efforts to retreat from crude ouvrieriste positions. Marchais continued to exert most influence within the leadership and emerged as champion of the Twenty-second Congress many decisions of which (in marked contrast to those of the preceding Congress) were clearly taken to counter charges of ouvrierisme levelled at the Party and to appease intellectual workers and other non-working class strata.

The decisions of the Twenty-second Congress addressed many of the issues close to the hearts of intellectual workers. Firstly the Congress decided to abandon the concept of "the dictatorship of the proletariat". Two reasons were given for this. The term "dictatorship" conjured up, in the minds of the people, images of fascism:

"... la 'dictature' évoque automatiquement les régimes fascistes de Hitler, Mussolini, Salazar et Franco, c'est-à-dire la négation même de la démocratie."44

Also, the concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat" suggested to people that in a future socialist society non-proletarian groups would be subjected to the rule of the proletariat whereas, in fact, the Party's strategy called upon the peuple de France to participate in the socialist transformation of French society:

"Le pouvoir qui conduira la transformation socialiste de la société sera le pouvoir de la classe ouvrière et des autres catégories de travailleurs manuels et intellectuels, de la ville et de la campagne, c'est-à-dire de la grande majorité du peuple. Ce pouvoir se constituera et agira sur la base des choix librement
Secondly, the abandonment of the concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat" and accompanying terminology which tended to alienate intellectual workers was complemented by the extensive use of liberal expressions such as liberté, diversité, pluralisme, indépendance, justice sociale and so on. The PCF also appeared to be warming to ideas related to autogestion and "anti-statism" already long favoured by the Socialists and by large numbers of intellectual workers:

"... il faut que les travailleurs participent aux décisions économiques, en particulier à la gestion des entreprises... nationalisées et à la planification... Il faut que... tous les citoyens puissent véritablement choisir, décider, contrôler, gérer. Et il faut en particulier que les travailleurs puissent participer à la direction et à la gestion des affaires du pays à tous les niveaux - dans l'entreprise, dans leur localité, dans la région et au gouvernement lui-même."46

Finally, the line that the PCF could not criticise the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries, for fear of interfering in their internal affairs, was abandoned. "The Party was to adopt a more critical approach towards the issues of civil liberties and human rights in these countries. Again, the PCF's decision to align itself closer to its Western European counterparts than to those of the Eastern bloc went some way towards satisfying intellectual workers of the commitment of the Party to a style of socialism removed from that of the Soviet model. In an interview, Jean Rony described the relief of rank and file militants in the Party who felt that they would no longer have to duck the issue of civil liberties and human rights in the USSR in their discussions with people outside the Party, in particular
intellectual workers who brought up such issues more often than not.

Although the Twenty-second Congress reversed some of the sectarian orientations engendered at the Twenty-first Congress and which had subsequently been condemned by sections of the Party's membership, many still remained disturbed at the manner in which sudden changes of strategy kept being thrust upon them by the leadership without provision of opportunities for the discussion of such changes. Among those who expressed concern about the PCF's alliance strategy (changed according to whatever was politically expedient at certain conjunctures or according to the wishes of whichever leadership faction was wielding most power at a given time) were journalists and contributors (mainly Eurocommunists) to France Nouvelle, including Yvonne Quilès, Guy Konopnicki, Jean Rony, Jean Giard, Jean Tornikian and Maurice Goldring. The general belief of the latter was that the nature and practice of the Party's alliance strategy was vague and not well understood by intellectual workers (to whom it was mainly directed) for several reasons.

Firstly, according to Quilès (and other critics) the PCF seemed to believe, rather naively that for the (intellectual worker-working class) alliance to work successfully it was enough to relax recruitment rules and encourage intellectual workers to mix and struggle with manual workers in the prioritised enterprise-based cells. The implications of this belief were still, therefore, that intellectual workers should contribute to the battle of the working-class rather than struggle for socialism because it was in their interests to do so. Rather it
was for the Party to focus its activity not only in working class circles but also within the milieux in which intellectual workers were to be found.

Secondly, intellectual workers were sometimes unaware and therefore had to be told clearly that socialism, for them, would not signify the replacement of their capitalist bosses by working class bosses. ITC were often against a socialist transformation of society because they mistakenly assumed that the working class would be given powers which would counter their own freedoms to make decisions in their line of work. Hence it was also important for the PCF to explain to intellectual workers (and particularly to ITC) the exact nature of their role in the future management and control of enterprises.

Thirdly, the PCF was mistaken to think that only intellectual workers had to be won over to the alliance and that the working class had nothing to learn in this instance:

"... pour que l'alliance se réalise il faut que l'idée en progresse aussi bien dans la classe ouvrière que chez les i.t.c. Il serait utopique de penser que seuls les cadres sont 'à gagner à l'alliance' et que la classe ouvrière, à ce sujet, n'a plus rien à apprendre. La conscience n'est pas plus un processus automatique chez les uns que chez les autres."51

However, the fact that the decisions of the Twenty-second Congress amounted once again to just one more tactical turn on the leadership's part as opposed to a well-planned strategy meant that the observations of critics were scarcely paid any attention. In any case, the PCF was to embark upon a new course at the end of 1976 following the success of the Socialists in gaining greater electoral ground in seven legislative by-
elections (of 14 and 21 November) to the détriment of the PCF. It must also be remembered that the Socialists had made remarkable progress in the cantonal elections of March that year when they gained 10 out of 15 conseils généraux lost by the Majority. In fact having gained almost 30 per cent of the national vote the PS was now occupying the favoured position of premier parti de la France.

These successes of the PS augured badly for the Communists in view of the forthcoming municipal elections of March 1977 and the more important legislatives of March 1978. Communist strategy, it would appear, had worked well for the Socialists and by that token had reduced the PCF to a potential force d'appoint in a future government of the Left. As a result the Party took the decision once more of channelling all its energies into protecting its own traditional constituency on the one hand while on the other hand hoping at least to pick up extra votes from workers (for the most part unskilled and semi-skilled) who normally voted Gaullist.

III. The demise of union du peuple de France: 1976-1978

The first major indication that the PCF was beginning to move back to its sectarian position, of the Twenty-first Congress, from which it would only address the working class, had already come in September 1976. It was at this time that the Party made a major U-turn in declaring, through Georges Séguy, that a wage hierarchy could not be supported. The PCF would now only support a wage hierarchy of one to five as opposed to that of one to 900 in operation. This announcement shocked certain
Communists, notably those leaders of the UGICT (such as Le Guen, Moynot and Metzger) who, for years, had spent much time defending the concept of a wage hierarchy. The UGICT had always argued for the maintenance of pay differentials between the working class and majority of ITC on three counts: that the salaries of the ITC were not a great deal higher than those of the working class; that ITC paid higher taxes; and most importantly that it would be easier to fight for the raising of lower wages and thus protect the spending power of all categories of salaried workers if a hierarchy with a top wage was in operation. Moreover, the PCF had always affirmed that by supporting abolition of the wage hierarchy it would be playing into the hands of the capitalists who would be quite happy to safeguard the limit, each year, of the level in its overall salary bill. Séguy also declared that a campaign would be launched to defend salaries of under FF2000 per month while stressing that it was not in the CGT's and the PCF's scope of activities to protect salaries which rose above FF12,000 per month. The old slogan "Il faut faire payer les riches" was ressurrected by Séguy.

Intellectual workers both within and outside the Party were dismayed by these statements. For them, as for most people, the level of salary was a sign of the recognition of their work and value in social terms. Thus many of them saw the PCF's new stand on wage hierarchies as an indication that the Party was no longer willing to accept or recognise the importance of their professional roles and status, that the Party was accepting a devaluation of their work. Communist militants in local areas were faced yet again with the task of defending a policy which in
the view of many of them was indefensible. This was particularly true for those in the Paris region where Communist militants came face to face with intellectual workers more often than not.

Other indications that the Party was reaffirming its character as party of the working class came in November both prior to and following the legislative by-elections. Before these elections L'Humanité, in its call to electors to vote Communist, addressed only the "poor" ("ceux qui ont tant de mal à vivre"), claiming that a Communist vote was necessary "pour faire reculer la misère". In Paris where an electoral campaign was waged in the fifth arrondissement, the campaign coordinator, Jean Elleinstein, was criticised by the leadership for not paying enough attention to the plight of the poor. Yet it was clear to all (except for the PCF, it would seem) that the social composition of the electorate in this area of Paris was hardly working class. After the by-elections, the PCF held what it termed "une assemblée de luttes et de témoignages." The theme of this meeting was "le cahier de doléances des O.S." The idea was put forward that these workers had been neglected because too much time had been taken up with the organisation of propaganda work among intellectual workers. However some Communist leaders attempted to soften the harsh words of Séguy and those taking a hard line. Jacques Chambaz (Politbureau member responsible for the PCF's activity among intellectual workers) tried to demonstrate that it was perfectly compatible to call for priorité aux pauvres and for the defence of the specific interests of intellectual workers at the same time:
"... la misère et la ségrégation sont des tares de la société actuelle. Les faire reculer nous conduit à combattre le système qui les engendre et les hommes politiques qui les justifient. Cela nous conduit à mettre en cause ni le travail intellectuel, ni les intellectuels... Lutter pour une société meilleure, ce n'est pas reporter à demain la lutte contre les inégalités et les injustices... La lutte des masses populaires pour leurs revendications recoupe... les luttes des intellectuels pour défendre les conditions de leur activité professionnelle."58

The position of Georges Marchais is more difficult to gauge although it was more than likely that privately he still situated himself against the hard line in the leadership. But the overall impression gained is that the leadership of the Party was already burying the line of the Twenty-second Congress.

In March 1977, the results of the municipal elections contained no surprises. The Left had won the majority of the vote cast as opinion polls had predicted. Within the Left the imbalance, in favour of the PS, grew greater. The PS tended to attract, firstly, the bulk of the protest vote (from the traditional middle strata and from intellectual workers) which may formerly have gone to the PCF and secondly, the majority of new voters among intellectual workers. The PCF's main gains were made among the poorer strata of the working class in constituencies where it was already in power and particularly in areas with large run-down housing estates (cités HLM).

Despite the fact that it also made significant gains in 16 towns and cities of over 30,000 inhabitants, it failed to equal the scores of the PS.

The period following the municipal elections proved only to

* Habitations à loyers modérés
increase the difficulties of the PCF. The growing dominance of the Socialists in union de la gauche served to emphasise to the Party that its own position in such a union remained untenable and thus set the stage for the eventual break-up of the political alliance as the PCF launched what was to become a vicious and sustained attack on the Socialists up until the time of the legislative elections of March 1978. The crumbling of the political alliance between the PS and PCF bore an extremely negative effect upon the latter's strategy of social alliances. In distancing itself from the "class collaborationist" Socialists the PCF followed a time honoured pattern of defensive play and increasingly withdrew into sectarian positions.

In both the run-up to and during the campaign for the 1978 legislative elections, the calls faire payer les riches and priorité aux pauvres were echoed frequently and with greater intensity. The slogan union du peuple de France was hardly uttered in Communist discourse and might as well never have existed. Furthermore the Party continued to push the line that the industrial working class was the largest social force in France and that this force was increasing in quantitative terms all the time. In the autumn of 1977, a publication by the INSEE of a report claiming "un salarié sur deux se dit ouvrier" was seized upon by the PCF as justification of its analysis of the evolution of French social structure. Adding an extra 440,000 contremaîtres and 750,000 technicians to the INSEE's 8.5 million manual workers in the group ouvriers, the PCF calculated that the working class represented well over 40 per cent of the working population.
This kind of ouvrierisme, not surprisingly, frightened away some intellectual workers and simply angered many others. The Party leadership's disregard for intellectual workers was also made plain, for example, by the fact that it decided, at the end of 1977, that the time was no longer right for large open debates which were mostly attended by intellectual workers and students especially in large urban centres and university towns and cities such as Paris. It was decided that, at meetings, the PCF would take the lead and tell participants of the correctness of its line. This did not go down well with intellectual workers who resented "being told". One of the ways in which the PCF avoided potential controversies from emerging at public meetings was through the suspension of the use of the micro-balladeur (wandering microphone). In the past the wandering microphone had been passed to anyone in the audience who wished to question or counteract the PCF line. Often this had led to real and animated debate between audiences and PCF representatives. In any case the use of the wandering microphone had always contributed to good public relations and gave the impression at least that the PCF was not averse to criticism and discussion, although ultimately the freedom to criticise and discuss Party issues and policies did not amount to the freedom to participate in real decision-making. The crude ouvrieriste instincts of certain Party leaders were also manifested in the day to day work of Party organisms. For example, just a few weeks prior to the legislative elections, Communist militants in Ivry had expressed, at a section meeting of that area, their concern over the fact
that not enough was being done, in local neighbourhoods to attract voters amongst the strata of ITC, teachers and the liberal professions. They were instantly brought into line by Georges Gosnat (Central Committee member and parliamentary candidate for Ivry) for thinking in this way when they ought to have been concentrating on the Party's traditional constituency, the working class, of which, according to him, the population of Ivry was largely composed. Gosnat further added that the Party did not need the votes of intellectual workers and that he would be elected, as was usually the case, at the first round. Such blatant ouvrieriste campaigning backfired as the voting population of Ivry (which had undergone a considerable amount of de-proletarianisation so that the working class in fact represented only 34 per cent of its composition) decided, for the first time in many years, that a Communist candidate would not be elected at the first round.

Not all Party members, Eurocommunists in particular, approved of the apparent forsaking of cross-class alliances and in particular the alliance between intellectual workers and working class. At the highest level, Georges Marchais' "Sheraton" speech, to 2000 intellectual workers, which reminded the latter that the Party still believed in the principles laid down at Argenteuil, appeared to indicate that the PCF General-Secretary had been reluctant to allow the Party to follow the ouvrieriste direction favoured by Roland Leroy and other Politbureau hardliners. Other signals of disapproval came through the pages of France Nouvelle and La Nouvelle Critique, both of which were influenced by Eurocommunist thinking. In an article in
France Nouvelle, Maurice Goldring spoke of the difficulties that would inevitably be encountered in the construction of cross-class alliances. Goldring was not coy and criticised the PCF's tactical as opposed to strategic approach in this matter. He argued that such difficulties ought not to be shelved for the sake of political expediency but recognised and thrashed out in order to maintain a correct and long-term class perspective on the question of alliances:

"L'alliance est difficile... elle est d'autant plus difficile qu'elle est davantage possible... Plus le combat est difficile, plus notre politique doit largement se déployer. Ce combat est d'une telle intensité que nous avons parfois tendance à 'aller au plus pressé'. Nous avons parfois tendance à taper comme des sourds au lieu de combattre tous les sens en éveil. Les péripéties du combat, qui parfois irritent, ne doivent pas masquer le fond des difficultés: les discussions qui se mènent aujourd'hui font apparaître plus clairement le caractère de classe de l'alliance."66

Needless to say, such arguments remained anathema to the Party leadership.

The 1978 legislative election results spelled disaster for the Left, contrary to expectations of a victory which, up to the very end, had been fuelled by the positive predictions of opinion polls. In the event the PCF was able to congratulate itself upon achieving its aim of protecting its working class base from the Socialists. While the Party improved upon its 1973 (legislative elections) score in most departments with a strong agricultural or traditional industrial bias, it either failed to progress as it would have hoped to, or lost heavily in areas, such as Paris, whose populations had experienced a marked de-proletarianisation due to the implantation of new high-technology industry. Hence,
although the PCF, with 20.55 per cent of the vote, gained an overall 12 new seats in the new assembly, in Paris four Communist deputies out of seven lost their seats to the Majority. The Socialists' overall score just exceeded that of the PCF at 22.58 per cent. However, the PS made a good showing in areas such as Paris. In 1967 the PCF had held an average 22.3 per cent of the vote in 31 Parisian constituencies while the PS had only held 11.4 per cent. By 1978 the balance of power within the Left had changed enormously to give the PS 18.85 per cent and the Communists only 15.62 per cent. Most significant was the fact that the PS had not only increased its influence within the electorate in general but it had made most progress amongst the burgeoning new intermediary strata capturing, nationally, 15 per cent (compared with the PCF's nine per cent) of the vote of ITC and other intellectual professions and 29 per cent (compared with the PCF's 18 per cent) of the vote of other non-manual categories, namely routine white-collar workers (employés). Socialist progress amongst new intermediary strata is indicated by the losses sustained by the Right-wing Majority within these same strata. If the sociological evolution of France's working population was to continue to favour the increase in numbers of intellectual workers then the 1978 election results augured well for the Socialists, rather than the Communists, despite the Left's defeat.
IV. From Post-electoral crisis to ideological impasse: 1978-1982

The immediate result of the defeat of the Left and of the poor showing of the PCF led to a public outpouring of dissatisfaction from the Party membership and particularly from its intellectual strata. Although this outpouring of dissatisfaction was sparked off by the defeat of the Left, it can be seen as the apotheosis of a series of mini-disagreements concerning the manner in which the Party leadership had run things since 1972 or even since 1968. The critical outcry thus addressed several issues relating to inner-party democracy (such as the relevance of democratic centralism in a modern communist party, the horizontal circulation of ideas, free expression of thought and the "self-reproduction" of the leadership apparatus) along with the immediate issue of why the leadership had chopped and changed PCF alliance strategy since 1974 thus inviting defeat. Criticisms came from two major groupings of Communist intellectuals: the grouping recognised as "Eurocommunist" represented by Jean Elleinstein, Raymond Jean, Jean Rony, Antoine Spire, Maurice Goldring and others; the "Althusserian" grouping which included Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar, Georges Labica, Maurice Moissonnier and others. Members of both groupings contributed a multitude of articles to both the Communist and non-Communist press (although mainly to the latter) concerning the failure of the PCF to pursue a consistent alliance strategy up to and during the electoral campaign. While the views of groupings or currents coincided on certain points the overall doctrinal divergences remained obvious.

Firstly, both groups criticised PCF sectarianism which had
led to extreme forms of denunciation of the PS which in turn, it was claimed, had put off intellectual (and manual) workers from voting Communist at the second round of the elections. Both groups believed that Left unity was essential although the Althusserians maintained that real success could only be achieved through a radicalisation of socialist objectives.

Secondly, the PCF's ouvrieriste electoral campaign was attacked by Althusserians and Eurocommunists alike. However, while the Eurocommunists' main concern was that it had turned away intellectual workers in their thousands, the Althusserians criticised the lack of "class" perspectives in slogans such as priorité aux pauvres and faire payer les riches.

For example in the call priorité aux pauvres, pauvres was ill-defined and smacked of liberal-humanist notions of philanthropy and charity while one of the conquests of the working class movement had been precisely to bring workers to think of themselves not as poor but as exploited productive workers. Moreover, it was unclear as to who the poor were. As for those who were not poor, were they all rich? Were they all the ones to whom the slogan faire payer les riches applied? These, said the Althusserians, were important questions especially since it had been stated, at the Twenty-Second Congress, that all but a handful of people were exploited by the monopolies regardless of income. In addition, criticism was made, mainly by Eurocommunists, of the decision to field mainly working class candidates. This in itself appeared as an indication to voters from "intermediary strata", that despite
what was claimed, the PCF was not prepared to accept an equal sharing of power between the working class and others in a future socialist society.

Thirdly, the Party was criticised, again by Eurocommunists, for considering as marginal or secondary, to the class struggle, new forms of conflict, involving mainly members of new intermediary strata, which were not played out directly in the domain of production. These new conflicts were waged by the feminist, ecology and gay liberation movements for example. As a result of its economistic reflexes, the Party, the critics claimed, boarded the "bandwagons" of new movements too late and then presented analyses that were both superficial and opportunist. The consequences of all these "mistakes" made by the PCF was that thousands of intellectual workers simply did not understand its electoral campaign:

"Pendant la campagne électorale, notre politique à l'égard des intellectuels est devenue une chanson sans parole dont la musique s'était tu."72

The major divergence between Eurocommunists and Althusserians emerged in the assessment of the overriding reason for the PCF's electoral failure and how further decline could be halted. For the Eurocommunists the widespread disaffection felt by new intermediary strata where the Communist Party was concerned would condemn the latter to become a mere defence group for the poor and deprived. The slide in this direction, it was claimed, could only be halted by a reinforcement of the line of the Twenty-second Congress. Thus, that which separated Eurocommunists from leadership positions at that time was not a difference in strategic goals but in the manner in which these
goals were to be pursued. Althusserians, on the other hand, attributed the Party's electoral loss not upon its negative approach to new intermediary strata but upon its failure to recognise that it was working class unity which had to be achieved prior to and over and above unity between the working class and intermediary strata:

"Le butoir ne réside pas avant tout dans la petite bourgeoisie, comme on aime à le croire, mais dans la classe ouvrière elle-même. La classe ouvrière n'a voté qu'à 33% pour le parti, donnant 30% de ses voix au PS, 20% à la droite, le reste se réfugiant dans l'abstention et le rejet farouche de toute politique. Loin d'être un fait acquis, l'unité politique de la classe ouvrière est un objectif qui est devant nous."73

For Althusserians the PCF's decline could only be halted by a return to a revolutionary strategy which had finally been broken at the Twenty-second Congress (through abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat), which was necessary to the achievement of working-class unity and thus to the construction of unambiguous alliances on a firm class basis. Although the critical views above have been categorised as belonging to either the Athusserian or Eurocommunist grouping, it should be noted that neither grouping constituted a homogeneous bloc. In fact the fragmented nature of the contestation movement can be seen as one of the reasons contributing to its relatively rapid disintegration after the Twenty-third Congress.

Evidence that it was not just prominent Communist intellectuals but also rank and file intellectual workers who demonstrated the depth of their discontent with the PCF's zigzagging conduct since 1972, comes from Jean Tornikian.
According to Tornikian, *France Nouvelle* received thousands of criticising letters from teachers, *ITC* and other intellectual workers after March 1978. However, not a single one of these letters was published. They were all locked away in a cupboard in the editor's office never to be seen again. Furthermore, when members of the editorial committee (including Rony, Goldring and Quilès) decided to meet every Monday evening to discuss how the paper could answer its readers' questions, Henri Malberg (sent by the PCF leadership, to *France Nouvelle*, to "normalise" the review's Eurocommunist tendencies) refused to attend and to discuss the matter further. The greatest number of "dissident" rank and file Communist voices was heard in the Paris region:

"À Paris le parti est peut-être encore plus traumatisé qu'ailleurs. Sans tomber dans le schématisme, sans établir une correspondance directe entre la composition sociale et les réactions politiques, le parti à Paris a des caractéristiques particulières."76

As has been previously mentioned Parisian Communists came increasingly from non-working class backgrounds; thus it was in Paris that the negative effects of the PCF's *ouvriériste* campaign, upon an electoral population with a high proportion of intellectual workers, were most acutely felt.

The Party leadership's response to the dissidents was typical in that it refused to take any blame at all for the defeat of the Left and for the losses made by the PCF in areas with high concentrations of intellectual workers. Indeed it refused to concede that the Party had lost heavily in these areas:

"Quantitativement d'abord le PCF a maintenu ses positions: la perte est de 0,7%. Mais rien n'indique qu'il ait plus perdu dans les secteurs à forte concentration de travailleurs intellectuels . . ."78
In fact studies carried out after the elections would appear to show that the above statement was over-optimistic. For example, according to one such study, between 1954 and 1975 the proportion of the working class in the 20 arrondissements of Paris had fallen from 30.6 per cent to 22.2 per cent while that of the combined categories, professions libérales, cadres supérieurs and cadres moyens had increased from 19.2 per cent to 32.3 per cent. During a comparable period and within the same area the PCF's vote had fallen from 27 per cent, registered during the 1956 legislative elections, to 15.6 per cent at the 1978 legislative elections while significantly the Socialist vote had more than doubled from 9.1 per cent to 18.6 per cent.

Furthermore, in the eyes of Parisian Communist militants insult was added to injury when it was stated that if PCF losses did occur in such areas, it was because intellectual workers had themselves wrecked the possibility of a Left victory as they were taken in by Right-wing media propaganda and the ideological posturings of the new philosophers. Moreover, it was argued, in the final analysis the social alliance strategy would only have worked if the working class led by the PCF, remained the dominant force within union du peuple de France and the political union of the Left. Indeed, two years after the elections of 1978, it was revealed that the Party had deliberately adopted a policy to ignore the strata of intellectual workers and to temporarily bury alliance strategies as it was believed that "gagner les intellectuels au Programme Commun c'est rouler pour le parti socialiste".

By the end of May it seemed clear that the leadership was
prepared neither to answer any of its critics within the Party nor to make a serious analysis of PCF strategy from 1972 to 1978. Inside the Party, however, a number of intellectuals were beginning to undertake their own studies, of the state of the social forces in France, the results of which contradicted the official world-view of the leaders. Among these intellectuals, Bernard Edelmann argued that the working class had, over a period of time, been integrated well and truly into the bureaucratic and juridical structure of French labour law and consequently no longer constituted a revolutionary force in capitalist society. The same conclusion was being worked out by Jacques Frémontier who saw the working class as part and parcel of the system of bourgeois mores and culture. Jean Elleinstein, even to the embarrassment of his fellow dissidents within the Party, went as far as to say:

"Il existe aujourd'hui une autre disposition des forces sociales dans la France actuelle où les couches moyennes salariées prennent une importance nouvelle. Le symbole de cette alliance devrait être moins la faucille et le marteau que le marteau, le stylo et l'ordinateur."86

Many Communist intellectuals found Elleinstein's "extreme" remarks unhelpful as it allowed the PCF leadership to adopt a more self-righteous stand in its attack on them.

While a few prominent intellectuals continued to grapple with issues that the leadership refused to discuss, the majority of intellectual workers, who had initially joined in the protests, were beginning to feel demoralised and were drifting away from the Party. Attendances at cell meetings plummeted and local Communist activity stagnated or ceased altogether despite
appeals to members, from committed militants, to stay within the Party and fight for their ideas. At the same time the leadership was getting into deeper waters as the Party continued to live without a clear strategy. Vague signals were given out that the line to be pursued was union à la base but this only led to further confusion in that no-one, including PCF leaders, knew who exactly it would be geared to or to what purpose. Besides union à la base was a convenient slogan that the PCF had resorted to throughout its history whenever it moved from a united front to sectarian position. Certain federations, for example that of Paris, did take it upon themselves to pursue cross-class alliance strategies and relaunched recruitment campaigns by holding large portes ouvertes meetings. However, even these initiatives were quashed by a central Committee meeting of September 1978.

In fact the Party's strategy was completely blocked and would remain so unless it was prepared to subject its recent history to critical analysis and consequently to review its ideological position in relation to the question of classes and class alliances in France. In any case, some concessions at least had to be made, by the leaders, prior to the PCF's Twenty-Third Congress and to the European elections of June 1979, in order to challenge the public's image of a communist party which was fast alienating its most able thinkers and losing support amongst new intermediary strata. The concessions made were, in effect, relatively minor. For example a green light was given for a critical re-examination of the PCF's past relations with the USSR which would illustrate the negative effects that these
relations had had upon the former. Also, in November 1978, the PCF leadership announced its intention to meet Communist intellectuals as follows:

"L'alliance de la classe ouvrière et des intellectuels constituent plus que jamais une question capitale dans le processus de changement de société ( . . . ) Le bureau politique a entrepris, sur ces questions une réflexion d'ensemble ouverte et approfondie. Pour la poursuivre et faire parti de ses premières appréciations, il souhaite rencontrer des intellectuels communistes dans des conditions aussi favorables que possible à l'affirmation de leur apport spécifique, à l'échange des idées." 90

The meeting between the PCF leadership and 400 Communist intellectuals (those working for the Party's press, sections dealing with intellectuals etc.) was held ostensibly to prepare the groundwork for a document which would redefine the Party's cultural policies and the terms in which the intellectual worker-working class alliance were posed and which would therefore replace the resolution of Argenteuil. The new document, it was claimed, would be adopted after the Twenty-Third Congress of May. Attempting to reassure the Communist intellectuals that the leadership had no intention of lecturing them but was prepared for a two-way flow of ideas, Georges Marchais, in his opening speech, merely set out to give "information" to the audience of the Party's proposals.

Where the Party's approach to the question of intellectual workers was concerned, two main proposals were made by Marchais. Firstly, that following the Twenty-Third Congress a Central Committee meeting would consider the reorganisation of the Party's activity (up to this time "trop générale, insuffisamment différenciée") among intellectual workers. Marchais indicated
that not enough had been done in the direction of teachers and academics on the one hand and ITC on the other hand and that the Politbureau seriously considered the importance:

"... d'étudier les critiques, de corriger les défauts, de remédier aux insuffisances pour faire franchir une nouvelle étape à notre activité." 93

The second proposal was that the same Central Committee meeting would set up a working-party to study the question of the sociological evolution of social classes in France and in particular of new intellectual strata. In the meantime the leadership invited Communist intellectuals to contribute to the elaboration of a new analysis of French society and to join in the "ideological struggle" against the "new philosophers" and also against the "ideologists of social-democracy" such as Alain Touraine. Yet, the assembly of intellectuals was left in no doubt that above all "en toutes circonstances, c'est le parti qui doit conserver la maîtrise du débat nécessaire en son sein 94...

The meeting of a large assembly of Communist intellectuals, face to face with the full membership of the Politbureau was unprecedented in the PCF's history and it is therefore not difficult to understand why, for many Communist intellectuals, it appeared to represent the beginning of a new long-term approach by the Party towards intellectual workers. The proof that the meeting represented no more than a tactic, to placate Communist intellectuals and to stop the slow drift of thousands of rank and file intellectual workers away from the Party, is that in the weeks and months that followed nothing more was publicly heard of the proposals made by Marchais. On the contrary, immediately
after the Vitry meeting, at a Central Committee meeting of 12 and 13 December, the Party leadership was quick to criticise the Communist intellectuals, who had voiced their opinions at Vitry, for lacking commitment in defending the Party’s positions. Clearly despite all that had been said at Vitry by the PCF leadership, critics of the Party were considered a dangerous obstacle to the image of unity which would have to be developed prior to the Twenty-third Congress of the following year. One must also speculate that the abrupt changes in the leadership’s attitude from one day to the next, almost, was a manifestation of bitter disagreements within, concerning the future course of the Party. Again disagreements can be seen to have occurred between the pragmatists or "softliners" (centred around Marchais and Paul Laurent) who were keener to carry on with the (Eurocommunist) line of the Twenty-second Congress and sectarian "hardliners" (centred around Roland Leroy and Gaston Plissonnier) who wished for the Party to retrench itself solidly in the working class and to "go it alone". It can also be speculated that at the time of this December Central Committee meeting the balance of power within the leadership rested in Leroy’s favour.

The leadership also went on to launch an attack particularly on the way in which Communist intellectuals in Paris had failed to defend the Party’s line in the past and especially during the legislative elections of March 1978. Continuing to apply a narrow logic, the leadership calculated that, in Paris, the election had been lost by the Party because of the recalcitrance of Communist intellectuals (in the Paris federation) in adhering firmly to the campaign strategy. Finally adding insult to
injury, the general secretary concluded:

"Si le parti n'avait pas reculé dans la région parisienne, il aurait gagné nationalement. C'est donc dans la région parisienne que le parti a perdu ces élections."97

The blame for the PCF's severe losses in the elections was placed squarely at the door of Communist intellectuals in the Paris federation.

The Paris federation had, since the 'sixties, been at the forefront of campaigns favouring Left unity and the construction of cross-class alliances, driving increasingly towards a Eurocommunist perspective. It had also been most favourably disposed, amongst Communist federations, towards "new" issues, focusing on the environment, women's liberation, greater control in workplaces, new modes of living, which were predominantly raised by intellectual workers. Experiencing a progressive diminution in its electoral audience since 1958 the federation had decided that if it was to survive in the Paris region as a major political influence upon the sociologically evolving population then it had to adapt its approach accordingly. Also, the sensitivity of the Paris federation towards "new" issues resulted from the fact that its own sociology reflected a predominantly intellectual as opposed to working class membership. Thus when the PCF leadership decided to conduct an ouvrieriste electoral campaign in 1978 the Paris federation was loathe to follow its style and risk losing what support it had managed to build up over the years amongst new intermediary strata. In fact, the Paris federation had deliberately, both
prior to and after the March 1978 elections, played down ouvrieriste slogans hoping that the Party leadership would shift back to positions of the Twenty-second Congress. If it was that the balance of power rested in favour of "hardline" leaders, hoping to steer the Twenty-third Congress firmly away from the orientations of the Twenty-second, then it follows that the leadership chose this moment to denounce the "deviationist" tendencies of the Paris federation and of its leader Henri Fiszbin who, eventually, was to be forced to resign from his post.

The leadership's attempts to bring "deviationists" to heel did not stop at federal level. Very often cells and sections involved in building social alliances at grass roots level through campaigns on local issues received unwritten but firm directives from "up high" to abandon their activities which were seen to favour the Socialists. Such directives were delivered through special "trouble-shooters" sent in by the leadership to keep an eye on "troublesome" cells and sections or through federation leaders. However, as the Twenty-third Congress drew close the leadership of the Party could be seen to adopt a softer approach towards the "deviationist" sections of the PCF. Once more this softer approach can be seen to have resulted from a secret and intricate power game within the Communist leadership from which Marchais had emerged stronger. Leroy was to be ousted from his key position within the secretariat of the Central Committee at the Congress itself. Part of the softer approach was that prior to the Congress, L'Humanité and France Nouvelle had opened up tribunes de discussion and had allowed the inclusion of letters
from noted "dissidents", thus giving the impression that freedom of expression was alive and well in the Party. However such letters were a drop in the ocean of supporting letters and thus failed to make a great deal of impact. The tactic of including, now and then, the "token" letter of dissent in tribunes de discussion was not new in L'Humanité in any case.

The Twenty-third Congress marked a critical point in the Party's recent history for it took place immediately after the PCF had experienced one of its gravest crises. It ought to have provided the Party with the opportunity to confront its past, analyse its failure at the legislative elections of 1978 and consequently break out of the situation of impasse in which it found itself. However, the Congress did not provide a clear answer to the question which had dogged Communists since the defeat of the Left: "where was the PCF going?"

The Twenty-third Congress was presented as "un congrès de pragmatisme" and examination of the text of the Resolution would appear to suggest this despite the fact that the PS remained the target of ritual denunciations and that a certain shift had occurred in the Party's attitude towards the Eastern bloc of nations suggesting a return to pre-1976 pro-Soviet positions.

However the Congress document also expressed the Party's desire to pursue alliances with all but the monopolies and particularly with intellectual workers. Again, amongst the latter, the PCF's preferred allies were the ITC. This was made clear by the fact that, in his opening speech to the Congress, Marchais went further than ever before to state that not only were certain categories of technicians an integral part of the
working class but so also were certain categories of engineers and cadres and that because of the increasingly closer objective association between ITC and the working class, workplace cells were to be given absolute priority as the terrain for alliance building and recruiting of new members amongst ITC strata. To demonstrate the Party’s commitment, at the highest level, René le Guen (UGICT leader) was elected to the Politbureau while the Central Committee was expanded to include 20 (out of 38) new members exercising occupations falling within intellectual worker categories.

The re-emphasis on the importance of cross-class alliances with intellectual workers brought back, as was the intention of the Party leadership, echoes of the Twenty-second Congress. Furthermore such alliances were proposed within the framework of the strategy union à la base which was to be created through a series of crisis-induced "step-by-step" struggles in a perspective autogestionnaire which would eventually lead to socialism. Again the Party’s adoption of autogestion appeared as a consolidation of the line of the Twenty-second Congress. However the autogestion perspective had been poorly developed and a general confusion had reigned in the Party as to what were appropriate step-by-step struggles in which to engage and how the process of such struggles waged within an autogestion perspective worked in reality. At the Congress itself no answers were provided. In fact the hasty promotion of autogestion by the PCF leadership, without adequate reflection upon its theoretical content and its day-to-day practice, can be seen to amount to no more than a tactic aimed at stemming further manifestations of
discontent within the Eurocommunist camp and at breaking down the Party's *ouvriériste* image. In reality there was no reason to suppose that the basis for the proposed alliances was anything but *ouvriériste* as PCF practice, in the period leading up to the Twenty-third Congress, had suggested that the most important crisis-induced struggles were to be waged within the declining traditional industrial sector - shipbuilding, iron and steel - where large numbers of intellectual workers were not situated.

However, the Congress's adoption of *auto-gestion* and promises of change in the area of the PCF's relations with intellectual workers went some way, as the leadership had hoped, to placate Eurocommunists at least for a short time while the sectarianists of the Party had been satisfied with the Congress line on Left unity (Left unity was not possible without an equalising of the balance of forces in the PCF's favour) and on the Socialist bloc of countries. The only group which had not in some way been satisfied was the Althusserian group. As this group was relatively unimportant both within the Party hierarchy and within the Communist rank and file organisation, the leadership could afford to ignore it completely. In any case, for the leadership, the important thing was that a certain image of unity had been achieved and that the Party appeared, once more, to have a strategy for the advancement of socialism in France.

The European elections of June 1979 provided the Party with the first opportunity, since the Left's defeat in March 1978, to test the effectiveness of the strategy *union à la base*. During the electoral campaign, the Union "led by the working class and its party" was presented as a true reflection of the French
nation. In voting for the PCF and the Union the electorate would be voting for France; thus the slogan votons pour la France was repeatedly enunciated. In the interests of pure electoralism, the PCF had sought a nationalist perspective so that the class basis and contradictions of the "new" Union as in the case of union du peuple de France were once more overlooked. This oversight was convenient in view of the fact that the Party had still not come up with an analysis, based in class theory, of the situation and evolution of French society within which alliances could be articulated. The nationalism of the PCF's campaign, however, only managed to convince the electorate of the South's wine-growing areas (the Hérault, Lot, Aveyron, Tarn and Lozère), to vote Communist. In fact, the Party's extraordinary performance in this region helped to maintain its overall national score at 20.6 per cent.

Elsewhere the PCF's results were unpromising. A reading of the results confirms that electoral trends set by the Legislatives of March 1978 were being reinforced unambiguously. That is, the Communist vote had only held out or increased in areas with a sociologically immobile electorate where old nationalist and republican sentiments predominated. In areas with a sociologically dynamic electorate the Communist vote had continued to shrink. This trend, as in March 1978, was reflected most consistently in the PCF's traditional "working class" bastions in and around Paris where the introduction of new technologies had favoured the rise of new intermediary strata. For example, in a ten-year period ending in 1979, 10,000
traditional manual industrial occupations had been lost in Ivry while another 15,000 had been lost in Montreuil. Such occupations had been replaced by those falling either into routine white-collar or intellectual worker categories. In all compared with March 1978 results the PCF sustained losses in 70 out of its 86 constituencies situated in some of the most urbanised départements of France (Isère, Bouches du Rhône, Loire, Moselle, Seine, Nord and Pas de Calais) where electoral populations were sociologically mobile. In addition to this the parallel trend favouring the PS's implantation amongst the fast changing electoral populations of these very areas was confirmed by the fact that in 36 of the PCF's 70 vote-losing constituencies the Socialist score had increased compared with March 1978.

The PCF's repetition of the poor 1978 score at the European elections especially amongst new intermediary strata brought home the fact that much ground had to be covered before the important electoral test of the 1981 presidential elections (it was most unlikely that a joint Left candidate would be presented). It was decided that the first Central Committee meeting following the European elections would be devoted to the question of the Party's activity amongst intellectual workers.

This prompt action contrasts with the leadership's attitude following the March 1978 elections. Although the European election results had provoked the usual outcry against the media's savaging of the PCF's image, this time the leadership found it more difficult to deflect blame for the Party's losses away from itself and thus was forced to acknowledge the urgency
of the problem it faced in the arena of electoral politics. The meeting decided on the following initiatives: to call a session of the Party's new organism, the Conseil National in order to discuss the question of the Party's relations with intellectual workers, to combine the Institut Maurice Thorez (IMT) and the CERM into one body (the Institut de Recherches Marxistes - IRM) and to replace the weekly France Nouvelle and monthly Nouvelle Critique with a new publication entitled Révolution. These initiatives were ostensibly taken with a view to establishing permanent dialogue between the Party and intellectual workers (both Communist and non-communist) and increasing theoretical research. They were thus presented by the leadership as a reflection of its desire to fulfil the promises made at Vitry in December 1978. However, several journalists at France Nouvelle and Nouvelle Critique regarded the closing down of their publications as a leadership ploy to gag "dissident" voices once and for all. This view was corroborated by François Hincker, one of the original sub-editors of the new journal Révolution. He stated:

"J'ai ... vu, avant même que le journal ne vive, Révolution passer d'un projet de grand hebdomadaire autonome, par rapport au Comité Central ("un espace de liberté", disait Guy Hermier lors de la conférence de presse annonçant sa création!) à un journal à destination intérieure, dont la direction et la rédaction en chef faisaient explicitement devant les animateurs fédéraux de sa diffusion l'antithèse de la Nouvelle Critique et du courrier des lecteurs de France Nouvelle."114

The combining of the two research institutes to form the IRM was also seen as a measure taken, by the leadership, to gain better control and influence over research undertaken by Communist
intellectuals. Consequently Francette Lazard, elected to the Politbureau at the Twenty-third Congress, was put in overall control of the IRM. Prior to the meeting of the Conseil National which was to take place in February 1980, the PCF held a series of important meetings (attended by Communist and non-Communists from a varied background of intellectual disciplines) meant to set the tone of its approach in redefining its policy towards intellectual workers. The Party stated that the redefinition of policy would be aided by the results of research carried out in six main areas: social classes and movements in France; the historical movement of socio-economic, political and cultural formations; the effects of science and technology on society; international life; the crises of human relations and modes of living; marxism and philosophy. The Party would take into account all research, set in a Marxist perspective, whether it was carried out by Communist or non-Communist researchers, academics, teachers, ITC or militants in the working class movement:

"Le parti communiste entend . . . oeuvrer à l'essor du marxisme . . . Tous ceux qui entendent aborder en marxistes les grandes questions de notre temps peuvent compter sur notre appui, dans leur combat pour leur reconnaissance, pour l'accès aux divers moyens de recherche et de publications, quel que soit le lieu où ils développent leurs activités et attestent de la valeur scientifique de leurs travaux, quelles que soient les différences de point de vue qui peuvent nous opposer . . .

Nous n'entendons ni déduire à priori notre politique d'une théorie officielle et figée, ni demander à la théorie de cautionner ou de justifier à posteriori notre politique."115

Such expressions of intent, heard frequently in the past also, at times of ouverture, were carried over to the Conseil National of
Bobigny held in early February 1980.

An examination of the Resolution of the Conseil National and of the discussion between participants reveals that nothing of an original or innovative nature emerged. Much of the content of the Bobigny meeting centred around the Party's favourite themes and did not extend beyond the boundaries of pure "description". Hence the PCF characterised very well the "contradictory" situation of intellectual workers in capitalism, that is: a situation which required intellectual workers to stimulate and cultivate vast stores of specialised knowledge in order to do anything other than carry out their professional tasks unquestioningly; a situation whose contradictions could only be overcome through socialist change. Although the PCF made the usual concessions to the fundamental role of intellectual workers in the progress of science and technology or of culture in general, it hastened to affirm, as it had always done, that the working class remained the major force for change in society:

"N'en déplaise à ceux qui prédisaient son déclin inéductable, la classe ouvrière est plus que jamais au coeur des luttes pour les changements démocratiques et le socialisme . . . Affirmer le rôle historique dirigeant de la classe ouvrière, ce n'est pas réciter un dogme. Ce rôle résulte de sa situation objective dans le processus de production . . ." 117

At Bobigny the PCF's song had not changed. It was still attempting to reconcile two seemingly contradictory elements: the recognition of the importance, quantitatively and qualitatively, of intellectual workers in capitalist society; the affirmation of the vanguard role of the traditional industrial working class.

For a large number of Communist and non-Communist intellectuals and rank and file militants (both manual and
intellectual workers) the affirmations of the Conseil National rang more hollow than those of the Twenty-third Congress. Not for the first time had the PCF chosen its interlocutors. Those Communist intellectuals who had expressed the will to contribute towards a new theorisation of the question of the position and the role of intellectual workers, and hence towards a changed conceptualisation of the alliance between the latter and the working class, were notably absent at Bobigny. Yvonne Quilès, for example, who had sent in a discussion paper on the Resolution of the Conseil National was refused her contribution - "j'étais quelqu'un qui sentais le soufre." Even François Hincker, who had not been part of the group of "intellectuels contestataires", was not amongst participants of the discussion at Bobigny. He had made some criticism of the Party's approach to the question of social alliances in a tribune de discussion in L'Humanité.

The overwhelming majority of participants at Bobigny were Communists whose opinions converged narrowly with those of the leadership. One exception was Jean-Pierre Marchand (who was also secretary of the CGT section artistes) whose contribution to the discussion criticised, in what he called "termes très très modérés", a number of aspects of the PCF's approach to intellectual workers and their alliance with the working class. In his critique Marchand had reproached the leadership for not taking a firmer stand against a particular ouvriériste thinking in the Party, which on the one hand tended to consider dangerous and isolate intellectuels contestataires (who for the most part were "producers of ideas") from the mass of
intellectual workers, especially those who intervened in the production process. On the other hand, this same ouvriériste thinking refused to admit that it was not only intellectual workers but also the working class which required to be convinced of the relevance of socialism and of the need to build an alliance against the monopolies. Marchand (perhaps rather naively), was both astonished and disappointed at the hostility with which the gathered faithful at Bobigny greeted his intervention. Yet to allow a certain amount of criticism to surface at large meetings of this type, in order to give a democratic outlook to the proceedings, and then to bear down with either hostility or ridicule upon those who voiced such criticism had always constituted a classic PCF ploy.

In terms of PCF practice, one unambiguous signal to emerge from the Conseil National was that the Party's major priority in the future would be to win over intellectual workers to an alliance with the working class through the waging of an "ideological war" (this idea had already been expressed at the Twenty-third Congress). The "ideological war" would be waged in a number of ways. These were outlined by Guy Hermier (in charge of the Politbureau's "intellectuals" section) at the Conseil National. The Party intended firstly to engage in a major campaign of réunion-débats which, it was hoped, would bring tens of thousands of intellectual workers face to face with Communist leaders. In this respect it would conduct a "category by category" approach whereby a certain meeting would address only certain categories of intellectual workers. More specifically, in his report to the Conseil National, Hermier also announced the
gathering of some 2000 ITC in March at Nanterre and of teachers in May when the Party would take the opportunity to "préciser leur place dans la lutte pour un nouveau type de développement de la société." Secondly, Communists and in particular Communist intellectuals were urged to promote the new journal *Révolution* - "un élément de première importance dans la bataille idéologique" at their places of work and in other intellectual milieux. Thirdly, the IRM would be in the forefront of providing the PCF's ideology with a sound theoretical basis. Finally, alongside these initiatives, the PCF decided to launch a wide recruitment drive of intellectual workers in workshops, laboratories, offices, universities and schools. By March the Party claimed to have recruited 25,000 new members in 1980, of which a relatively high proportion were intellectual workers. However, this figure may be called into question as the experience of Communist militants showed that it was becoming increasingly difficult, when canvassing in local neighbourhoods, to persuade intellectual workers to discuss issues with them or to participate in local Communist organised activities let alone join the Party. There is no reason to suppose that Communist militants in work places achieved greater success as generally work place cells tended to have more economistic perspectives and were thus less likely than local neighbourhood cells to see the need for cross-class alliances. This impression of the situation based upon the experience of Communist militants is confirmed by the results of studies of the sociological profile of PCF members. The results demonstrated that in 1978 and 1979 only six
per cent of the PCF's new members were recruited from new intermediary strata or intellectual worker milieux. This figure contrasts sharply with that of 14.4 per cent between 1975 and 1977 and with that of 23.9 per cent between 1968 and 1971.

In the months following the Conseil National of Bobigny it became clear that as in previous years the prime target of the Party's propaganda were the categories ITC (these were followed in order of importance by teachers, researchers and academics). After the Nanterre meeting of ITC in March, the Politbureau's ITC section launched a campaign Science, technologie, société (coupled with the theme "travailler autrement") which was to intensify from October 1980 in the run-up to the presidential elections of 1981 when large meetings were scheduled each month in major cities in France. However, the increase in the PCF's activity (organisation of meetings, exhibitions) amongst certain privileged intellectual strata only served to contrast sharply with disagreements and tensions occurring within the Party as to how the question of intellectual workers and cultural creation should be approached. These tensions and disagreements once more arose mainly between the leadership and Communist intellectuals and were most aptly illustrated by the Révolution "affair" involving principally the personalities of François Hincker (one of the journal's editors) and Lucien Marest (a collaborator on the Central Committee). In an article which appeared in the 9 May issue of Révolution, Marest criticised certain "intellectual creators" who seemed to express scepticism in the viability of a socialist future and argued that they ought instead to "participer aux luttes, aux espoirs, aux rêves des travailleurs."
"creators" of culture a more judicious choice be made of artists and entertainers engaged to perform at Party events such as the fête de l'Humanité. Marest’s remarks were considered as intolerable by Hincker in whose opinion they represented a retrograde reflection vis-a-vis positions adopted, by the Party, in the past and particularly at the Argenteuil meeting in 1966.

In response to Marest, Hincker suggested that cultural or intellectual creation bore a specificity of its own as did political action. Hincker's reply was refused publication and he resigned. The circumstances of this affair revealed the extent to which PCF leaders imposed their own line thus negating decisions and policies made "collectively" at meetings such as those of Bobigny and that there existed within certain sections of the leadership, at this time, a veritable distaste for all things intellectual. Hincker's departure was followed by a spate of resignations by journalists at Révolution and L'Humanité whose main complaint was that the two organs were regarded increasingly as internal bulletins through which individual PCF leaders or the leadership as a whole could address messages or impose decisions upon PCF militants. Among the more important resignations were those of Jean-Pierre Gaudard (in charge of L'Humanité's economic section since 1947), Serge Goffard (at Révolution) and Michel Cardoze (deputy editor at Révolution).

The divergence between the leadership and a large number of Communist intellectuals (mainly Eurocommunists) and trade-unionists over the approach to cross-class alliances was also publicised, in July, in a petition favouring union dans les
luttés. The petition launched by a hundred, mainly Communist militants, was signed by almost a hundred thousand Communists and Socialists. It called for the setting up of comités d'union à la base in several localities and workplaces, after recognising that the PCF's Twenty-third Congress had failed to initiate the movement of union à la base due to the fact that the conditions set out for its realisation were strict adherence to the Party's positions and the willingness to vote for Georges Marchais in the Presidential elections. The latter condition had emerged at the Party's June Central Committee meeting where it was affirmed:

"Toutes nos taches vont s'inscrire désormais dans la bataille des présidentielles." 131

The aim of the call for union dans les luttes was, above all, to force a debate upon the state of the democratic forces and anti-capitalist struggles in French society which is why, according to the initiators of this union, its content had been left undefined. It was this loophole that the PCF leadership pounced upon most often in its criticism of union dans les luttes. However, in general, Party leaders thought it wiser to intervene as little as possible in the debates surrounding this union for fear of damaging Georges Marchais' already slim victory chances in the Presidential elections.

As the campaign for the Presidential elections began to be intensified towards the end of 1980, the Party's conduct became more of a puzzle to Communist militants and electors alike. The leadership continued to echo its hollow call for union à la base and increased its participation at public meetings addressed to ITC and teachers. In December the Party launched an "appel
national d'intellectuels". The aim of this appeal was to draw the 4.5 million intellectual workers in France into a vast debate over the implications for them of Georges Marchais' candidature. A large number of Communist intellectuals, however, refused to sign the appeal and of these several considered that the logic of their refusal forced them to leave the Party. The leadership's reaction to the refusal of the latter to sign the appeal and to leave the Party was heavy-handed. It refused to discuss, with those concerned, their reasons for contesting Party positions; instead, these Communist intellectuals were accused of succumbing to the ideological propaganda of the adversary and of undermining the revolutionary nature of the PCF.

While the Party was seen to be making overtures to intellectual workers it was, at the same time, initiating "popular involvement" campaigns which took it away from the arena of intellectual workers and in which the needs of the "poor" were constantly re-emphasised. These "popular involvement" campaigns designed to appeal to the poorest sections of the working class enmeshed the PCF in a series of heated controversies concerning immigrants and drugs. This sort of exaggerated ouvrierisme reached a peak in December 1980 when immigrant workers were aggressively ejected from a hostel in Vitry by local Communist municipal officials who wished to be seen by "the poor" to be taking action on issues which concerned them in their day-to-day lives. Also, in November 1980, the publication of the PCF's 131 propositions for change, encompassed
in a plan de luttes, drew charges of ouvrierisme, from Communist intellectuals as well as from intellectual workers attending election meetings, for the propositions centred mainly on working class demands. The Party's emphasis upon the plight of the low-paid, upon the idea that no real change was possible for working people without an improvement in the living and working conditions of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers (OS) and upon means of crushing wage hierarchies caused particular concern among ITC who were at the same time being promised a glorious future in science and technology. Refuting charges of ouvrierisme in the Party's approach to intellectual workers, Revolution ran a number of features on the social and economic situation of ITC and teachers and the importance of their role in the struggle for socialism. The features, published just prior to the presidential elections, were obviously aimed at appeasing these strata in a bid to win votes. However, the fact that the PCF's "meandering and chaotic" line was making little impression on voters was borne out by the results of a series of by-elections (municipal, cantonal and legislative) in the months preceding the presidential elections. In July 1980 the PCF lost ground, in the first round of the municipal by-elections in Precy-sur-Oise, to the Socialists, scoring 25.23 per cent to the PS's 32.28 per cent. In the cantonal by-elections held during the same period, in Haute Savoie, the PCF trailed approximately three points behind the Socialists after having lost more than two points off its 1979 score. However the greatest cause for concern came from the results of seven by-elections (in Dordogne, Ardeche, Cantal, Ain, Aveyron, Gironde and Doubs) in which the
PCF only managed to improve significantly on its 1978 score in one constituency - Gironde. In Aveyron, one of the few areas where the PCF had done well in the 1979 European elections, voters decided to vote overwhelmingly for the better-placed Socialist candidate. The results of these elections signalled that Communist electors preferred to follow a Left unity line and voted for better placed Socialist candidates. The proceedings of these elections were a cause for alarm within the central leadership as they exposed the extent of the divergences reigning within local Communist federations on the question of social and political alliances. Hence while some federations waged ouvrieriste and anti-unity campaigns, others stressed the importance of alliances. They also manifested, on the part of tens of thousands of Communist militants and electors, a refusal to follow blindly a discipline imposed from above:

"Considérant que leur parti n'est ni une armée ni une Eglise, de nombreux adhérents et électeurs communistes ne veulent plus faire de la discipline une première vertu ni de la foi une règle absolue. Ils pensent, se sentent responsables et agissent en leur âme et conscience."139

The PCF's poor showing in these by-elections set the scene for the Presidential elections of April-May 1981. Georges Marchais was voted out of the running at the first round having mustered a score of 15.34 per cent last equalled in 1936 when the Party's fortunes were nonetheless on an upward turn. Although poor election results had, in the past, called into question the general conduct of the PCF, never before had they so clearly identified the General-Secretaryship with the question of the Party's survival as a credible political force for the future.
In the Paris region, where the population was fast losing its proletarian constituents, the PCF's losses (in relation to its 1978 scores) were most heavily felt. In Paris itself the PCF's score of 9.18 per cent signified a drop in its vote, of March 1978, by 6.43 per cent (see figures below). Similarly in Parisian suburbs the extreme disaffection of voters for the PCF's candidate and election campaign was apparent as was the further upturn in the PS's fortunes. The figures below represent the percentage scores of the PCF and PS in April 1981 with gains or losses, in relation to March 1978, indicated in brackets.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>PS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% vote</td>
<td>% vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>24.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-6.43)</td>
<td>(+7.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seine-St-Denis</td>
<td>27.29</td>
<td>24.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-10.69)</td>
<td>(+5.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Val-de-Marne</td>
<td>21.38</td>
<td>24.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-8.10)</td>
<td>(+4.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seine et Marne</td>
<td>15.36</td>
<td>25.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-5.54)</td>
<td>(+4.25)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Essone</td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>26.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-9.87)</td>
<td>(+5.15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yvelines</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>24.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-5.16)</td>
<td>(+6.62)</td>
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The evolution of the PCF vote in Paris and its regions was a reflection (albeit in very marked terms) of the Party's rapidly decreasing influence in other areas of France where deprolletarianisation of the population was taking place (for example in Isère where the Party sustained a loss of 6.97 per cent in relation to its March 1978 vote and in Bouches-du-Rhône where its vote fell by 6.56 per cent). However, in general,
in 1981, the PCF sustained vote losses in all regions including the rural South-West where it had made gains in the European elections.

Communist militants were shaken deeply. The PCF leadership was, however, as unwilling as ever before to concede that any fault lay at its own door. The General-Secretary held up, as the major cause for his resounding defeat, "les efforts conjugués de la droite et du parti socialiste" to poach upon Communist votes. In the Legislative elections which followed in June, the Party only marginally improved its standing to obtain 16.17 percent of the vote at the first round. At the end of the second round 44 Communist deputies out of the 86 elected in 1978 were returned to the Assemblée Nationale. In Paris the PCF was eliminated as a parliamentary force as it failed to retain its three seats from 1978.

Contrary to what one might have expected, the defeat of the PCF in the Presidential and Legislative elections did not spark off an immediate and dramatic contestation of Party strategy as had been the case in 1978. Most of the leadership's fiercest intellectual critics of both Eurocommunist and Althusserian currents (Spire and Balibar respectively, for example) had left the Party. Moreover a large proportion of Communist militants and rank and file members had become dejected in the face of their powerlessness to influence the Party's strategy. Also the PCF had, over the months, lost the support of entire sections of intellectual workers, for example, that of teachers in secondary education belonging to the trade union SNES ( Syndicat National des Enseignants du Secondaire), who had found themselves unable
to support Marchais’ presidential candidature. The PCF had also lost large numbers of workplace cells whose animators were mainly ITIC as well as local cells where, according to one estimate, the activity of militants had decreased by 40 per cent since 1978.

However, a group of Communists, for the most part intellectuals and numbering 29 in all, decided to stay within the Party and work for a "democratic renewal" of all aspects of PCF life before the Twenty-Fourth Congress which many had already dubbed "Congrès de la dernière chance". In the Party leadership’s eyes, these Communists had, through their "fractional" activities, "placed themselves outside the Party". However, as specific names had not been singled out the "dissidents" maintained that correct procedures for expulsion had not been followed and that they had every right to remain in the Party. This group led by Henri Fiszbin, Louis Régulier and François Hincker, amongst others, launched a weekly "oppositionist" (Eurocommunist) publication Rencontres Communistes Hebdo of which the principal objective was to create a new forum for reflection, discussion and research apart from mainstream Party publications. The "dissidents"' main call to the leadership, in common with that of "dissidents" in 1978, was to:

"Tirer au grandjour les leçons de l'échec subi par le parti communiste et analyser les raisons de la crise qui l'affecte." 151

This, they affirmed, had to be done by facing up to questions relating to the nature of changes which had taken place in French
society. The role of Rencontres Communistes Hebdo as a focus for opposition to the PCF's policies became apparent after October 1981 during the preparatory debates of the Twenty-fourth Congress. In the meantime the Party leadership, busy participating in the newly formed Socialist government, declined to officially furnish an immediate and detailed account of the reasons for defeat until October when the draft resolution of the Twenty-fourth Congress was published.

IV. The Twenty-fourth Congress

The draft Resolution, the essential content of which was retained and adopted at the Twenty-fourth Congress in February 1982, revealed that the PCF leadership refused to assume responsibility for the Party's double historic defeat of May-June 1981. This time the responsibility was placed upon the shoulders of ex-leaders Thorez and Waldeck Rochet although the names of the latter were left unmentioned. In an analysis of the reasons governing the decline of the Party's influence, the Resolution stressed the importance of acknowledging that a strategic "retard sur l'histoire" had taken place after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 when, faced with a break from Stalinism and the Soviet socialist model on the one hand and a changing French society on the other hand, PCF leaders had not known how to react correctly:

"Il reste qu'au moment où des forces nouvelles commençaient à s'orienter confusion vers un autre choix de société, nous n'avons pas su dire assez tôt et assez claire: c'est le socialisme qu'il faut à la France, et voilà quel socialisme original nous proposons. Tel est le fond du retard stratégique que nous avons pris sur l'histoire."
Furthermore the manner in which this "retard stratégique" contributed to the electoral defeats of 1981 and thus, by implication, let the present leadership "off the hook", was clarified by Guy Hermier in his report on the Resolution:

"... ce n'est pas ce retard en lui-même qui explique de façon directe notre mauvais résultat électoral de l'an dernier. Mais c'est l'ensemble des effets qu'il a exercés sur notre stratégie et notre pratique politique. C'est que nous n'avons pas fait en temps voulu... la conception du socialisme à la française... Et c'est que nous avons fait à la place, la forme d'union inadaptée dans laquelle nous avons enfermé notre politique propre, avec toutes les conséquences négatives qu'indique le projet de résolution."155 (his italics)

The leadership's analysis had already brought forth a barrage of criticism from Communists writing in tribunes de discussion in Rencontres Communistes Hebdo and L'Humanité. The immense interest created by the tribunes de discussion in Rencontres Communistes Hebdo, which claimed to have the support of thousands of Communists (municipal councillors, intellectual and manual workers in the rank and file organisations of the Party, journalists in Party organs and so on), forced L'Humanité to accept letters from critics in the hope of deflecting attention away from the "dissident" organ Rencontres Communistes Hebdo. The main criticism centred upon the notion of "retard stratégique" which, it was claimed, masked the need for an understanding of the Party's more recent errors or which served to:

"noyer les quatre dernières années dans l'océan de vingt-cinq ans d'histoire, de diluer les réalités et les responsabilités, alors qu'il faudrait procéder à une prise en compte courageuse de cet échec plus politique qu'électoral, même si cela met en cause la direction du parti."156
The Party's errors, most commonly evoked in tribunes de discussion, concerned its approaches to the question of political and social alliances, and were: its systematic and incoherent denunciation of the Socialists which had prevented the formulation, on a general level, of an "analyse de fond portant sur le parti socialiste" and, on a specific level, of the question as to why new intermediary strata, in particular ITC were more attracted to the PS than to the PCF; its interpretation of union à la base as a union of only those who aligned themselves with the Party's positions; its retrograde stance on cross-class alliances which did not take into account that technological mutations had produced changes in the core composition of the traditional social classes including the working class. These criticisms were not new and had been heard by Party leaders time and time again in the past. Thus it was unlikely that they would rouse little more than indifference from the leadership who was more concerned with extending the Party's influence through its participation in the operation of government policies. However criticisms were not left uncontested and as had generally been the case in the past, in response to every critical letter, L'Humanité usually printed many more supporting the Party line.

While the PCF's past strategy of political and social alliances had provoked intense internal debate, relatively little attention was addressed to the question of how the Party should proceed in the immediate future. The Resolution affirmed that the Party's commitment to socialisme démocratique et
autogestionnaire, as the model for socialism in France, had remained firm since the Twenty-third congress. It put forward the view that the achievement of a political alliance with the PS and the participation of the PCF in government had increased the possibility of advancing to a socialist future. Nevertheless, as the poor electoral results of 1981 had reduced its scope to act in favour of change, the Resolution indicated that it was all the more necessary for the Party to engage the working class together with the vast majority of intellectual workers in the struggle for socialism, to "faire progresser les réalités et les consciences". But how was this to be achieved? An ambiguity had appeared over the question of whether the strategy geared towards the construction of cross-class alliances was the best means to bring about a common action for change.

On examination of the text of the Resolution, one discovers that the term "alliance" had altogether disappeared from the vocabulary of the text. Instead, developing certain ideas already expressed at the Twenty-second and Twenty-third Congresses, the Resolution stated that in practice the engagement of the working class and intellectual workers in the advancement of socialisme autogestionnaire would principally be achieved within the workplace setting and more importantly within the industrial enterprise because:

C'est là que se manifestent le plus vivement les grandes mutations technologiques et sociales qui marquent notre époque, que s'exprime le plus durement, dans ses effets comme dans ses causes, la profondeur de la crise. C'est là que se rassemblent la classe ouvrière - des OS aux techniciens - les employés, les ingénieurs et les cadres . . ."157

Furthermore, within the enterprise setting itself, relations
between the working class and intellectual workers would be developed within the framework of the collectif de travailleurs.

This was not the first time that the usage of this notion had occurred in the Party's discourse. Georges Marchais had, in a speech delivered to ITC (at the Laboratoire d'électronique et de technologie, de l'informatique, Grenoble) in February 1981, made reference to it although on that occasion he had employed the term travailleur collectif to mean the same thing:

"Il nous faut faire avancer concrètement la conception nouvelle d'ensembles de travailleurs organisés, de travailleurs collectifs ..."158

But neither Marchais nor the text of the Congress Resolution went any further in enlarging upon the notion collectif de travailleurs other than stating that it was founded upon "une coopération libre et responsable entre compétences diverses s'exerçant dans des fonctions complémentaires". Certainly little thought had been given to the notion prior to the Congress. It had been put forward hastily in order to give the impression that the Party was not without a strategy given that a question mark hung over the strategy of alliances. The ambiguity of the PCF's position on alliances, as reflected by the Resolution, revealed the existence of a great deal of confusion not only amongst the rank and file but also amongst those responsible for the formulation of theory and practice within the Party. Was the concept and strategy of alliance abandoned by the PCF or not? At Grenoble, in February 1981, Georges Marchais had suggested "il faut aller au-delà de la simple alliance entre catégories différentes de qualifications et de positions
hierarchiques" while Guy Hermier explaining the lack of reference to the term "alliance" in the Resolution stated:

"la notion d'alliance paraît à certains égards retarder sur les mutation sociales de la dernière période, qui font par exemple que le plus grand nombre des techniciens et un certain nombre d'ingénieurs sont désormais partie intégrante de la classe ouvrière du point de vue économique."161

In view of this and the fact that the Party was already engaged in theoretical reflection on the question it was, he said, unwise to determine whether the strategy of alliances remained appropriate or otherwise:

"Il s'agit donc là d'un vaste problème ouvert, sur lequel nous considérons que la résolution doit se garder de figer les réflexions en cours."162

In agreement with Hermier was Lucien Sève whose view of the situation was as follows:

"... si une partie des intellectuels font partie de la classe ouvrière, est-ce que le mot 'alliance' ne retarderait pas sur la réalité ... parler d'alliance, c'est presque présupposer qu'il y ait non seulement extériorité de classe mais divergences de certains intérêts secondaires ..."163

However, as Sève went on to point out that there were others in the Party who did not share this perspective and in whose view the PCF was in danger of moving too quickly towards "une vision fusionnée" of certain categories of intellectual workers and the working class. Thus he concluded:

"... d'ici le prochain congrès nous sommes officiellement en état d'interrogation sur la notion d'alliance ... Elle n'est pas retirée mais elle n'est pas reconduite ..."164

Among those who at the time believed that the concept of alliance was still a valid one were Danièle Tartakowsky and Roger Martelli. They maintained that only the forms of posing the
question of the intellectual worker-working class alliance in practical terms remained variable and that it was in this sense that the notion of collectif de travailleurs was operable. Roger Martelli outlined his view of the link between the notions of alliance and collectif de travailleurs. Firstly, the notion collectif de travailleurs was clearly not to be equated with the concept of travailleur collectif (see Chapter V of this thesis) which was a theoretical concept based upon class relations and the use of which had varied since Marx's time, thus:

"... plus que travailleur collectif on dit collectif de travailleurs parce que la notion de collectif de travailleurs n'est pas un concept scientifique ... elle désigne une réalité empiriquement observable, c'est-à-dire les relations qui s'établissent entre diverses catégories de travailleurs, non pas en général, mais à l'intérieur d'une entreprise."

Secondly, the diverse categories of intellectual and manual workers within the collectif de travailleurs faced, because of their similar objective situation, a "communauté de problèmes" definable at a national level and including, for example, problems related to the content and quality of work activities, the elevation of qualifications primarily of the working class, the development of national production. For the collectif de travailleurs to respond to these problems effectively and thus promote change two principles had to be recognised: that there existed contradictions not only between categories of intellectual workers and the working class but also within the working class itself; that it was necessary to break down old authority relations and establish new equal ones between all categories. Finally, the solution to the "communauté de problèmes" would be sought at local levels in differing
situations:

"la démarche consiste à partir de là à essayer, autour de ce que sont des grands problèmes sociaux, de situer, étape par étape, endroit par endroit, entreprise par entreprise, niveau par niveau, l'organisation de la vie sociale, la contribution des uns et des autres à la solution de ces grands problèmes."167

The operation of the notion of collectif de travailleurs thus contrasted, according to Martelli, with the pre-conceived and set schema of the intellectual worker-working class alliance which the Party had seen as having universal applications. Martelli concluded:

"... on garde l'idée de la construction d'une alliance qui se forge dans la solution apportée aux différents niveaux de l'organisation sociale, aux problèmes opposés par la crise. C'est donc la conception d'une alliance moins schématique mais plus mobile plus vivante, plus enracinée dans les problèmes concrets de la vie sociale."168

The PCF's role in all of this was (through its three key Central Committee sections - économie, science et technologie and ITC) to define the "communauté de problèmes" and to then intensify its ideological propaganda (la guerre idéologique) within workplaces and collectifs de travailleurs with a view to increasing workers' (intellectual and manual) awareness of their own interests and problems. Martelli's interpretation of the operation of the notion collectif de travailleurs as a practical form of posing the question of alliances was clearly far from original and appeared to fit into the autogestion perspective that the PS and others had peddled since 1968 and that the PCF had officially taken up since 1979.

However whether the notion collectif de travailleurs was a
practical means of posing the question of alliance or whether it should have replaced the concept and strategy of alliance altogether - for this was the point being debated within the PCF - the basic ideological question of the class nature of working-class - intellectual worker relations still remained unsolved. If the notion of collectif de travailleurs was introduced by the PCF it was done because it enabled the Party to remain within its basic theoretical conception of French society as composed of two basic opposing classes with a welter of social strata in between, with which it could do what it pleased depending upon the political conjuncture. Class relations within the collectif de travailleurs were still conceived in the same way as before so that the denial of class membership (either of the working class or any other class) to intellectual workers reduced the latter to a weak social force divided along lines of occupational category and which, following this line of logic, could not possibly play a leading role in the struggle for change. The working class, on the other hand, regarded as free of internal divisions and contradictions, continued to constitute the vanguard force for change, around which unity with other social strata could be built. The communauté de problèmes then would reflect mainly the problems and interests of the working class. In practice this was manifested, for example, in the campaign calling for an elevation of the qualifications of the working class. It was argued that an elevation in the qualifications of the working class would lead to a general raising in qualifications of the salaried workforce. Even if this were to be true it was not easily swallowed by intellectual workers who felt that they were
not fighting for their own interests but for those of the working class. However, the fact that intellectual workers did not respond to such campaigns was generally put down to the fact that Communist militants were not making enough effort in initiating the "ideological war" in workplaces.

Thus following the Twenty-fourth Congress, while Party theoreticians were debating the nature of the concept of alliance and its validity as a strategy, the PCF's propaganda initiatives directed at intellectual workers in industrial workplaces was making little impact. For example, April 1982 saw the launch of a new monthly newspaper, Avancées, addressed to ITC. The organ, conceived as a major weapon in the guerre idéologique, called upon ITC to support a host of government policies related to nationalisations of industry, banking reforms and so on. Most of the articles were descriptive in nature and lacked analyses grounded in theory which might indicate to ITC the reasons why it was in their interests to support, at a national level, government policies or, at the workplace level, the policies of the PCF. Consequently Avancées had, and continues to have, a negligible impact despite vigorous promotion campaigns. In any case, in the eyes of a great number of intellectual workers, the Party's general approach (in which it continued to stress the needs of "les pauvres" for instance) still smacked of ouvrierisme. By the end of 1982, the Party had made no headway regarding a solution to the ideological question of the alliance between the working class and intellectual workers. Certainly for the leadership, if not for certain theoreticians within the
IRM, "alliance" had become "un concept désuet".

The period under study here (1973-1982) has shown that the PCF's approach towards intellectual workers, expressed in the strategy of cross-class alliances, has been wholly consistent only in its inconsistency. This inconsistency has been tempered by considerations of a political nature. The principal political consideration for the PCF, in determining the course of its alliance strategy during this period, has had to do with its own position, as opposed to that of the PS, in the contest for greater electoral power and the leadership of the Left. Thus it is that as the PS continued to gain the upper hand in the contest, gaining greater influence than the PCF amongst intellectual workers or "new intermediary strata", so the latter chopped and changed its alliance strategy, in order to reverse the winning order in its favour. Clearly this zig-zag approach did not just fail to stem the fortunes of the PS, it also exacerbated the situation of the PCF so that by 1982 it had been reduced, in electoral terms, to fourth party of France having lost not only the support of intellectual workers but also a sizeable proportion of its working class constituency. The PCF had, by 1982, also suffered the loss of large numbers of its members (in particular intellectual workers and routine white-collar employees). The fact that the PCF has, since 1979, stopped publishing membership figures or details regarding the sociological profile of its members indicates that the Party is not in good shape.

Since 1982, the PCF has gone from crisis to crisis as far as its electoral standing is concerned. As far as formulations for
a strategy designed to win influence amongst strata of intellectual workers is concerned, the Party has come up with nothing precise. The Twenty-fifth Congress's call for a nouveau rassemblement populaire majoritaire was vague. However, the Congress Resolution admitted that the composition and certain characteristics of the working class were being modified but that its existence and vanguard role could not be called into question:

"Bien au contraire, elle s'accroît en nombre en intégrant dans le "travailleur collectif" dont parlait déjà Marx tous les travailleurs affectés aux fonctions productives nouvelles. Les ouvriers, les techniciens, les employés en grand nombre, des ingénieurs et des cadres en sont partie intégrante. Ils ont les uns et les autres - quant au fond - le même rapport d'exploité à exploiteur avec ceux qui tirent profit de la richesse qu'ils créent. La place et le rôle de la classe ouvrière dans la société se renforce."169 (my italics)

The PCF appeared to be saying what Serge Mallet and theorists of the "new working class" had said for many years (see chapter five of this thesis). Was this a precursory signal of an ideological shift within the PCF to respond to a criticism which was beginning to be very strongly echoed in the Party at all levels:

"Si nous continuons à parler pour l'ouvrier modèle 1917, rectifié 1936, nous ne parlerons bientôt plus à personne."170

If it was just such a signal the PCF still had much lost ground to make up.
CONCLUSION
Sixty-six years after its formation the PCF struggles to survive as a viable political force in French society. The level of influence which is maintained by the Party today, measurable by the results of the legislative elections of March 1986, is comparable to that reached in the early days of its existence. In 1924, the PCF faced its first legislative election challenge and obtained 9.5 per cent of the vote; in March 1986 it achieved not much more with 9.78 per cent. Yet the real difference between the two figures lies in the fact that in 1924 the PCF was a young party whose fortunes were following an upward trend (for example, by 1936 it was to increase its share of the vote by almost six per cent) while the 1986 results represented a rejection of the Party by almost 20 per cent of the electorate since the immediate post-war period (November 1946, to be precise). In addition to this, although the PCF constitutes a far stronger organisational force today than it did at the time of its formation, its membership, as in the case of its share of the vote, has followed an overall pattern of decline since the immediate post-war days.

This study has suggested as well as attempted to demonstrate that one of the major reasons for the PCF's decline can be found in the Party's lack of success to work out a sound political response to changes taking place on the sociological map of France; in other words, because of the Party's lack of success in finding an audience amongst the expanding new intermediary strata of intellectual workers. Let us, at this concluding stage, remind ourselves of the reasons for which the PCF has not been able to build support amongst intellectual workers.
As the 'fifties drew to a close the major parties of the Left, the PCF and the SFIO, had already begun to realise the importance of building support amongst intellectual workers or new intermediary strata. In view of the fact that both parties had the same strategic objectives it was clear that one would eventually gain to the detriment of the other. It could be said that the Socialists had certain advantages over the PCF in that they constituted more "naturally" a party of "middle" or "intermediary" classes or strata not only in terms of their social-democratic ideology which generally mirrored that of intellectual workers, but also in terms of their perceptions of modes of living and cultural references and preferences. The PCF, on the other hand, was more obviously a working class party whose strident "revolutionary" ideology appealed less or even appeared as a threat to a large section of intellectual workers. Thus, the fact that the PCF was entering into a competition which was, from the start, weighted in favour of the Socialists, may be taken as an initial factor contributing to its eventual failure to attract intellectual workers. Nevertheless, it is true to say that the advantages enjoyed by the Socialists were, to some extent, counterbalanced by the situation of internal conflict which had enveloped the SFIO during the 'fifties and 'sixties. The latter had begun to project the image of an undemocratic party whose socialist principles had been swept aside as it compromised with forces of the Right and Centre to impose harsh policies upon workers both at home and abroad in France's crumbling colonial empire. In theory the PCF ought to have taken
the opportunity afforded to it, by this situation, to accumulate long-lasting support amongst intellectual workers, but it was unable to do so.

As we have seen in preceding chapters, any positive approaches made by the PCF (or on its behalf by individuals such as Garaudy or Barjonet) in the direction of intellectual workers were in the long term to be undermined by the Party’s ingrained ouvriériste responses which prevented it, firstly, from according to intellectual workers anything but a secondary or supporting role to that of the working class in the struggle for change, and secondly, from taking on board issues close to the hearts of intellectual workers. Such ouvriériste responses were cumulatively articulated by the PCF during and immediately following the events of May 1968 in which intellectual workers played an important part. In marked contrast to the PCF, the Socialists had emerged from a mire of internal conflict at the end of the 'sixties to form a new look PS which was to make good and rapid use of the slogans and "new" issues (relating to autogestion, the rights of minorities and of women, ecology) which had been at the heart of the May 1968 events. Moreover, of the two strategies union du peuple de France and front de classe which were developed by the PCF and PS respectively, it was front de classe which appeared to be more the product of a fine awareness of the realities of French society.

By the mid-'seventies the PS had advanced further down the road to winning over new strata of intellectual workers than the PCF. What is more, although the PCF had started, by the mid-'seventies to view with greater concern its lack of progress
amongst intellectual workers and therefore to throw considerable weight behind "new" issues, its actions were perceived, by many of the latter, as no more than a product of electoral manoeuvring which would enable the Party to appear as a plausible alternative to the Socialists. It would appear that the processes of de-Stalinisation and Eurocommunisation which had some effect in counteracting ouvrierisme had come much too late for the Party to pose any real threat to the influence built up by the PS within new intermediary strata. It can, in fact, be argued that the PCF's late decision to integrate auto-gestion and other new perspectives into its vision for socialist change only made matters worse in that all decisions regarding changes came from the Party leadership without prior consultation of rank and file members and hence showed up even more acutely the disparity between what the Party said about socialisme democratique and its own undemocratic practices. In any case, by the end of the 'seventies, the processes of Eurocommunisation and de-Stalinisation, which had represented a certain liberalisation of the PCF's ideology and practice, were abruptly brought to a halt with the Party retreating to an extreme sectarian and ouvrieriste stance as the balance of forces within the Left increasingly favoured the Socialists and reduced the PCF to the position of a potential force d'appoint. In the 'eighties the PCF continued along the path of ouvrierisme, its strategy of cross-class alliances dead and buried while a credible analysis of the class nature of present day French society and in particular of the precise class relationship of intellectual workers to the working
class in the struggle for socialism remains unposed.

Why has the PCF been unable or unwilling to provide a credible analysis? It can be said that if the Party were to do so it would be undermining one of the basic tenets of its ideology according to which the working class remains the major force for change in France and upon which rests the PCF's own distinctive identity as party of the (traditional) working class. Hence, if the PCF was to concede to the view that the working class was numerically a diminishing force and that the latter's role as revolutionary vanguard had to be reconsidered then it would actually be calling into question its own raison d'etre. If the struggle for a socialist transformation of French society was to be waged primarily by the rapidly expanding strata of intellectual workers then what purpose could the PCF possibly serve which was not already served by the PS, more readily styled and perceived as a party of "middle" or "intermediary" strata or classes? The PCF has pushed itself into an ideological corner as it continues to feel the need to reaffirm the vanguard role of its traditional constituency, the manual industrial working class, while at the same time it cannot help but recognise the importance of the growing numbers of intellectual workers in society whose intervention, direct or indirect, in the production process is furthered every day. As long as the Party tries to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory "lines" its crisis of ideology will continue to deepen.

Finally, one may ask how the PCF will progress in time to come. For the moment the Party seems set on the course of decline. A halt to this decline depends (apart from upon the
vicissitudes of the political conjuncture) upon how the PCF sees its own future role. If the Party is to be serious in its attempts to act as a political force for social change which represents the interests and aspirations of all those who would profit from such a change, then it must present a credible ideological line on the question of the class situation and role of intellectual workers. Since its Twenty-fifth Congress in 1985 the call for such a line on intellectual workers has been echoed with greater intensity as a new movement of contestataires grouped around key Party figures, such as Pierre Juquin, has gained momentum. The Twenty-fifth Congress Resolution had already provided indications that the Party was moving towards a "new working class" perspective. Since then, the PCF's move in this direction has been confirmed by the publication of Jean 3 Lojkine's work La classe ouvrière en mutation, which steps away from the classical Party view whereby the working class is defined purely and simply in terms of productive manual industrial labour. However, whether or not the PCF's move towards the "new working class" perspective (which it has opposed for many years) is taken seriously by intellectual workers remains to be seen. It may be that this move has come about much too late and that the PCF had, in fact, missed its chance a long time ago.
Introduction

1. Where the values and interests, whether socio-economic or political, of "proletarians" or the working class are considered of paramount importance over and above those of other classes and strata of which some could be considered allies of the working class.


Chapter I


21. These agents could either perform work of which the content is predominantly manual or intellectual. In both Britain and in France, white collar workers in the lower echelons of a firm's hierarchy are referred to as employees or employés for example. Also in both these countries some workers whose work is mainly of a manual kind (for example hospital porters and auxiliary staff) are referred to as employees or employés. This is particularly so in the case of public service workers.

22. Cited by Roussot, p. 16.


24. Gramsci was opposed to the Bolshevisation of the European communist parties and warned against problems inherent in the direct application of Leninist strategy in the West. He was also against the Comintern's united front policies of the early 'twenties and the "class against class" tactics later on. In addition to his opposition on matters of practice, on the theoretical level, his analysis of fascism coincided with that of Trotsky. This attitude contrasted sharply with that of other Communist cadres.


27. Evidence of this is obtained from a study of PCF texts from 1920 to 1982 and has been substantiated by interviews, carried out in Paris in March and April 1983, of several former and current Party members.


30. Celebrated physician who had participated actively in the defence of Dreyfus.

31. Writer and member of the Académie Française.


34. Lucien Marest (PCF cadre and collaborator on Central Committee), interviewed April 1983.
35. If the term "travailleur intellectuel" was used during the PCF's early years, this was done for a specific purpose: that of flattering intellectuals and of demonstrating to them that the Party was according as much attention to their plight as to that of the working class. Also many intellectuals within and close to the Party called themselves "travailleurs intellectuels" as a means of bringing themselves closer to the working class. This opinion was offered by Phillippe Robrieux, historian and former Communist student leader, interviewed in April 1983.

36. Roger Martelli, elected to the Central Committee in 1982 and historian based at the Institut de Recherches Marxistes, interviewed in April 1983.

37. At the Conseil National de Bobigny, in February 1980, the general theme of discussion was "les intellectuels, la culture et la révolution" whereas in fact actual and specific discussions related to the notion of "intellectual worker" and to problems concerning diverse categories of intellectual workers.

38. References to "intellectual workers" do not relate to the liberal professions, teachers in private education, the clergy, creative writers, thinkers and artists who are self-employed. These are often referred to as "independent intellectuals" ("intellectuels indépendants") or just "intellectuals". Roger Martelli, interviewed April 1983.

39. Salaried artists, creative writers and so on may be considered as intellectual workers but their numbers are relatively insignificant. These categories do not therefore merit separate attention.
Chapter II

1. That portion of capital which does not undergo any quantitative alteration of value in the production process (plant, equipment, raw materials).


3. For example, the Société des Gens de Lettres, the Société des Ingénieurs Civils, the Association des Inventeurs were all set up between 1838 and 1848. See Victor Roussot (1934), p. 17.

4. For example, in the sphere of textile production, a vegetable dye may have become scarce due to the increased production of cloth; in this case the demand for an artificial substitute could only be fulfilled by science.


7. Nuclear power plants, oil refineries, petrochemical plants.


12. In France, large enterprises (combined or part of monopolies) only represented 3.4% of the total of 1.7 million declared businesses in 1980. However, they made 81.6% of the total investment which took place in French industry in the same year. See Bellon et Chevalier, pp. 32-33.

14. For example the following associations were affiliated to the CGT: the Syndicat des Chimistes du Ministère des Finances, the Syndicat National des Professeurs de Collège, certain sections of Artistes de la Fédération du Spectacle. See Rousset, p. 284.


16. A typical enterprise of this era would have been a textile and weaving workshop where the division of labour was beginning to play an increasing part in work organisation.

17. The appearance of stage two does not preclude the existence of small industrial units. These still existed but were no longer the principal units of industrial production.

18. In 1881 (a date taken as the beginning of mass industrialisation) there were 4,444,000 persons employed in the secondary sector. By 1906 this figure had risen to 6,338,000. See D. Howard and D. Savage, Essays on the New Working Class. Telos Press, 1975, p. 30.


24. Generally it is the department dealing with planning and methods which indicates the types of machines and processes to be used for production, and also sets out the rhythm of work, so that forecasts for production are accurately met. See J. Chevalier, Organisation. Tome II, Paris: Dunod, 1948, pp. 81-89.
25. For example, transfer mechanisation type of automation or continuous-flow type of automation.


Chapter III


3. The Party was accused by the ECCI of failing to address a number of vital issues. See Jane Degas, The Communist International. 1919-1943. (volume I), London: F. Cass, 1971, p. 304.

4. For example, Romain Rolland, Anatole France, Henri Barbusse and others.


10. The United Front theses called into question the very existence of the PCF which had only left the SFIO six months prior to this time. Centrists (led by Frossard) opposed United Front while the Left within the Party (led by Boris Souvarine) supported it.

11. BC, 5 mai, p. 2.


15. L'Humanité, 7 février 1923.


17. For example Daniel Renoult, a journalist, and Antoine Ker, international secretary of the PCF.

18. Eighty-six in all including Pioch and Méric. See L'Humanité, 18 janvier 1923.


21. A vast literature is available on the course of the Russian revolution during the 'twenties which also refers to the internal oppositions and debates within the CPSU. See E. H. Carr, *The Russian Revolution from Lenin to Stalin, 1917-29.* London: Macmillan, 1977


23. For example these intellectuals included Boris Souvarine (editor of the Bulletin Communiste) Victor Serge (a key figure in the Clarté group). They were supported by others such as Monatte, Rosmer and a host of "surrealist" writers and artists (led by Jean Bernier and Marcel FOURRIER) who were later to form the focus of French Trotskyism.


25. Ibidem, p. 155. This reminder was followed by the ECCI with the expulsion of Souvarine from its midst. Note that the Trotskyist opposition was accused of displaying "right-wing" tendencies because Rosmer, with approval of Souvarine, Monatte, and other Trotskyists, had sent a letter of congratulations (with reservations included) to the British Labour Party upon the accession of Ramsay MacDonald to premiership.


27. A number of intellectuals including Monatte and Rosmer were expelled at a special Party Conference in December 1924 while others (for example Chambeland, a close associate of Monatte and Rosmer) left.


29. L'Humanité, 3 janvier 1926. *La révolution prolétarienne* was revived by Monatte and Rosmer.


31. D. Tartakowsky, "Les intellectuels et le PCF. 1920-1940." *Cahiers d'Histoire de l'Institut Maurice Thorez* (henceforth
32. L'Humanité, 17 décembre 1924.


34. In a gesture of appeasement towards the PCF leadership, the Surrealists later changed the title La Révolution Surréaliste to Le Surréalisme au Service de la Révolution.

35. For example Aragon's poem "Front rouge".


38. See Le parti communiste et la question littéraire. . . pp. 44-46.


41. Apart from the Surrealist group there also existed the group Philosophies which came closest to adhering to Soviet orthodoxy in its attempt to define relations between intellectuals and proletarian culture.

42. See L'Humanité, 28 octobre, 3 novembre 1931 for relevant extracts of the Kharkov resolution.

43. That part of the Kharkov resolution denouncing Barbusse was never printed by the PCF.

44. An association for revolutionary writers and artists (Association des Ecrivains et Artistes Révolutionnaires - AEAR) was formed in December 1932 but did not in any way constitute an experimental forum for the development of proletarian culture. On the contrary, the association was to gradually welcome, within its ranks, large numbers of intellectuals without solid revolutionary credentials.

45. In 1933 the PCF's membership total had dropped to under 28,000 from 109,000 in 1921. See Annie Kriigel, The French Communists. Chicago: University Press, 1972, p. 32.

46. In the 1924 legislative elections the PCF had secured 27 parliamentary seats. In 1928 it returned 14 deputies while in 1932 it returned just three (Doriot, Clammanus and Renaud) all of whom were against "class against class" tactics.
47. Thorez had acceded to the position of Party leader by 1932 after out-maneuvering the Barbé-Célor faction.

48. CHIMT, no. 15, 1976, p. 56.


50. Lenin's arguments on the need for the working class and its party to forge alliances with other classes, disadvantaged by capitalism, can be found in What is to be Done? in Collected Works. (volume 5), pp. 349-529.

51. The working class can only gain "trade-union consciousness" from the sphere of economic relations.


53. This idea of linkage between the working class and middle classes through culture (therefore through intellectuals) was discussed in a personal interview conducted with Danielle Tartakowsky in April 1983.


55. See L'Humanité, 1 janvier 1936.


57. CHIMT, no 15, p. 61.

58. This information was offered by Danielle Tartakowsky in a personal interview.

59. The PCF's enhanced position in France's national life was reflected by the legislative election results of 1936 when it captured 15.3 per cent of the vote as opposed to 8.4 per cent in 1932. Its membership also rose from 30,000 in 1932 to 300,000 at the end of 1936. See J. R. Frears, Political Parties and Elections in the Fifth Republic. London: Hurst, 1977, p. 136.

60. The CI was dissolved in 1943. Thus, to an extent, its sections were experiencing independence by virtue of not having to refer to a regulating body.


63. See Political Parties and Elections in the Fifth Republic.


68. Ibidem, p. 4-5.

69. Unsuccessful because, by and large, intellectuals did find it easier to sell L'Humanité on street corners or attend demonstrations rather than change their modes of thought and working methods inculcated since the early days of their education.


77. Advisor to Stalin on Soviet cultural policy, he promoted the doctrine of socialist realism.

78. This doctrine, first formulated in 1934 was defined then as "the basic method of Soviet belles-lettres and literary criticism" which demanded a "truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development". (Cited by H. Savage, *Political Control of Literature in the USSR. 1946-1959*. Harvard: University Press, 1962, p. 113). In the Cold War period it became an ideological weapon for the defence of Soviet policies.


86. *Le parti communiste, les intellectuels et la nation*, p. 77.


88. Ibidem, pp. 75-76.

89. See *L'Humanité*, 22 novembre 1956.


91. See *LNC*, mars 1951, pp. 76-77.


Chapter IV

1. It is argued that ownership of or access to certain goods or services (depending upon income, education or geographic location), categorises an individual according to only one or two dimensions of their existence. Occupation, however, gives a good indication of an individual's income, conditions of work, education, social origin, age and sex and consequently of his or her social position. Hence persons with the same occupations can be presumed to have similar practices and beliefs. See INSEE, "Activités professionnelles et groupes sociaux". Données Sociales, 1978, pp. 69-79.


3. The working population includes:

   - those in employment
   - the unemployed available for work
   - apprentices under contract
   - those temporarily unable to exercise an occupation through illness

The non-working population includes:

   - students aged seventeen and over
   - contingents (conscripts to National Service)
   - all retired persons
   - other non-working persons including children

Note that on a collective level non-working persons are categorised according to the occupation of the head of the household to which they belong.

4. In 1945, the first official government classifications of the salaried working population (cadres, employés, ouvriers) were elaborated by ministerial orders which became known as the Arrêtés Parodi. By 1950 these classifications applied to all branches of industry and commerce and formed the basis of the majority of collective agreements (conventions collectives) on wages, pensions and other conditions of work. Classifications into occupational categories were based mainly upon professional qualifications as proven by the attainment of a higher academic qualification in the case of non-manual workers and the level of skills as proven by the completion of an apprenticeship in the case of manual workers.

5. The national collective agreements, on conditions of retirement (Convention National de Retraite), of March 1947 adopted the definition of cadres as set out by the Arrêtés Parodi of 1945 as:
"agents possédant une formation technique, administrative, juridique, commerciale ou financière et exerçant par délégation de l'employeur un commandement sur les collaborateurs de toute nature: ouvriers, employés, techniciens, agents de maîtrise, ingénieurs, collaborateurs administratifs ou commerciaux."

The terms of these agreements were also extended to certain technicians, supervisory staff (agents de maîtrise) and employee categories, called assimilés cadres, as long as one of these conditions was met: they possessed a level of education equivalent to that of cadres, they exercised functions calling into use initiative and responsibility; they were delegated by an employer to enforce decisions and orders: their net income reached a specified point on the salaries' index scale. The last condition was removed in 1960.


6. Other definitions have been established by professional organisations of cadres, for example the CGC and the CGT affiliated *Union Générale d'Ingénieurs, Cadres et Techniciens - UGICT*. The former defines cadres in the following manner:

"Le lien qui nous réunit tous, c'est que par nos fonctions - et c'est là ce que nous différencie d'une manière fonctionnelle des ouvriers et des employés - nous avons tous à exercer dans le cadre de nos attributions des responsabilités de direction. Un cadre est toujours amené à un moment de son activité professionnelle à être, d'une façon ou d'une autre, le représentant de son employeur, que celui-ci soit public ou privé."

(A. Malterre (Chairman of the CGC) in 1966 quoted in *Combat*, 30 June 1966)

This definition incorporates into the category of cadres salaried professionals in the higher echelons of private and public sector enterprises. In addition to this article 3 of the CGC's statutes specifies that organisations or unions affiliated to the CGC must accept only: "les titulaires salariés ou retraités de fonctions comportant commandement responsabilité ou initiative". See J-P. Bachy *Les cadres en France*. Paris: Armand Colin, 1971, p. 16.

On the other hand the UGICT’s definition of the category of cadres coincides more with that of the INSEE:
"Cette définition [that elaborated in the Arrêtés Parodi] à caractère administratif, qui, il y a près de vingt ans, délimitait essentiellement les cadres supérieurs d'une entreprise ou d'une administration, s'étend aujourd'hui, du fait de la parcellisation du travail due à l'évolution des techniques et à la concentration, à l'ensemble des travailleurs qui de par leurs connaissances techniques, administratives, juridiques, commerciales ou comptables assument une quelconque responsabilité de commandement... Elle doit s'étendre également à tous ceux qui sans commandement et en fonction de leurs connaissances, assument une responsabilité de même nature dans les secteurs de création, de recherche ou d'étude, qu'il s'agisse de disciplines techniques, administratives, juridiques, commerciales ou comptables." (their italics)

UGICT, from Introduction to Congress of May 1965 cited by J-P. Bachy, p. 16.


8. OS - unskilled manual worker
    OQ - skilled manual worker


10. In 1975, 17,000 responses from individuals' census declarations were compared with responses, from the same persons, in an employment survey (enquête emploi) carried out during the same period, ensuring, at the same time, that the 17,000 persons had not changed occupations between the two surveys.

    It was found that 39 per cent of individuals classed according to census declarations under occupational title 78.09 (ingénieur et cadre technique supérieur, spécialiste de l'infomatique) and 31 per cent of those under 78.10 (ingénieur et cadre supérieur, spécialiste de l'organisation et de gestion) were reclassified after their declarations of the employment survey. See ES, avril 1979, p. 53.

11. In the case of a manual worker, whose response to the question "what is your current occupation" was "spot-welder" (soudeur par points), the INSEE classifier would choose a corresponding occupational title from the Code des Métiers, in this case ouvriers de la soudure (welding workers). If the worker was self-employed he or she would be affected to the category of independent craftsmen. If not a further criterion, that of professional qualification linked with
that of hierarchical position would be applied and the worker would accordingly be classified as an OS, OQ or contremaitre. In the case of a non-manual worker, whose response was "secretary" (secrétaire), the occupational title Secrétaire, dactylo, sténodactylo et assimilés would be chosen from the Code des Métiers whereas if the response was "accountant" (comptable), the occupational title comptable, chef comptable would be chosen. The persons concerned would then be directly classified under employés de bureau (office employees) and cadres administratifs moyens (middle administrative, supervisory and managerial personnel) respectively.

12. For example, FQP (Formation - Qualification Professionnelle) surveys, also carried out by INSEE and reports published by employers, such as the DAS (Déclarations Annuelles de Salaire).

13. This nomenclature lists 489 occupational titles which are grouped under 31 occupational categories or PCS.

14. The non-working population has been categorised into five PCS, retired farmers (anciens agriculteurs exploitants), retired craftsmen, businessmen and company bosses (Anciens artisans, commerçants, chefs d'entreprise), retired cadres and intermediary professions (Anciens cadres et professions intermédiaires), retired employees and manual workers (Anciens employés et ouvriers), others (students, conscripts to national service, those under sixty, those of sixty and over). Of these PCS the first four form the aggregate group Retraités whereas the latter forms the group Autres personnes sans activité professionnelle.

15. Groups 7 and 8, of the old system, no longer exist in the new classifications: the six categories making up the two groups have been integrated into the following groups of the new nomenclature: employés, professions intermédiaires and artisans, commerçants, chefs d'entreprise.

16. This opposition is not a simple one between public and private sectors of the economy. Fonction Publique refers only to occupations exercised in central and local government and excludes those exercised in the Sécurité Sociale, the French railways (SNCF), the national electricity network (EDF) and other nationalised industries. See A. Desrosières, A. Goy and L. Thévenot "L'identité sociale dans le travail statistique", ES, février 1983, p. 69.

17. The distinction between industrial type of activity and artisanal type of activity is made in the cases of OS and OQ. Occupations based on artisanal type of activity are distinguished mainly by the type of personalised apprenticeship training received by manual workers as opposed to the general technical type of training received by manual workers whose work is based on industrial type of activity.
18. With the exception of top salaried company directors and chairmen who are now classed in group two of the new nomenclature: Artisans, commerçants, chefs d'entreprise because their economic position (in terms of income and power wielded) resembles that of non-salaried company bosses rather than that of other salaried cadres.

19. Classifications of jobs by an employer should correspond to those set out in collective agreements, indicated by the divisions between the different collèges: ouvrier, employé, technicien, dessinateur et agent de maîtrise, ingénieur or cadre.

20. The grades classifying occupations within the sector fonction publique are A, B, C and D. Grade A would correspond to the category cadres de la fonction publique, B to professions intermédiaires administratives de la fonction publique, C and D to employés civils et agents de service de la fonction publique. In the old system A would have corresponded to cadres administratifs supérieurs, B to cadres administratifs moyens, C and D to employés de bureau.

21. Only 28 per cent of intellectual workers classified in the old CSP cadres administratifs moyens would remain in the new group professions intermédiaires. Sixteen per cent would move up to the group cadres whereas 55 per cent would move down to the group employés. See ES, novembre-décembre 1984, p. 165.

22. The criterion of function enables horizontal distinctions to be made, for example that between company chairmen and top bosses who would be classified in group 2 (artisans, commerçants, chefs d'entreprise) and their assistant directors who would be classified amongst cadres in group 3. It also enables vertical distinctions to be made between specific functions, for example between those of a commercial nature and those of a technical nature, or between those relating to production management and those relating to production planning and design. This criterion is used mainly in making finer distinctions within the categories of ITC.

23. A question on monthly salary earned was included in the employment survey of 1982. Five per cent of respondents refused to answer the question. Of those who answered, some did not give precise figures but stated that their salaries were situated between two given figures. In such cases the half-way mark between the two figures was taken as representative of salary. Of those who gave precise figures, some deliberately indicated figures which were too high for the occupation exercised whereas others gave figures which were too low. Although respondents were asked to include extras (such as bonuses) many did not do so. Consequently
when information on salaries was compared with that derived from the salary departments of companies and other employer organisations discrepancies were much in evidence.


25. Not all cadres, as defined by collective agreements are located in group 3 of the PCS nomenclature; see reference note 18.

27. Ibidem, p. 94.
31. Cadres techniques or company technical managers have been added to the category ingénieurs because of the advanced technical nature of their work which has much in common with that of ingénieurs.

32. Those ingénieurs working in central and local government are categorised in the PCS cadres de la fonction publique whereas those who are self employed are classed in PCS professions libérales.

33. The remaining 40 per cent of ingénieurs and cadres techniques exercise functions relating to maintenance and planning, computing, commercial problems. See ES, novembre- décembre 1984, p. 93.


36. Extract from definition of cadres administratifs et techniciens established by a national collective agreement within the metal industries. Cited in ES, ibidem pp. 99-100.


38. From definition of agents de maîtrise in a national collective agreement in the wholesale trade, cited in ES, ibidem.

39. A distinction is not made between those who work in the section fonction publique and those who work in the enterprise sector in the case of techniciens and contremaîtres, agents de maîtrise. The majority of those
with similar functions who work in central and local government are categorised in professions intermédiaires administratives de la fonction publique as they have an administrative grade.


43. Ibidem, p. 104. This category also groups together a negligible number of free-lance technicians.


48. For example the divisions between manual and non-manual workers as represented by the separation between aggregate groups ouvriers and employés.

49. ES, novembre-décembre 1984, p. 120.


51. This figure is arrived at by adding together the totals corresponding to the strata of intellectual workers discussed in this chapter pp. 155-164. Thus:

- cadres administratifs et commerciaux d'entreprise 549,000
- cadres de la fonction publique 244,000
- ingénieurs et cadres techniques 372,000
- professeurs, professions scientifiques 349,000
- instituteurs et assimilés 759,000
- professions intermédiaires de la fonction publique 277,000
- professions intermédiaires administratives et commerciales des entreprises 932,000
- techniciens 656,000
- contremaîtres et agents de maîtrise 550,000

   Total 4,688,000

52. The growth rates of all the intellectual worker categories were greater than those of categories in the group ouvriers. For example, that of ingénieurs stood at 4.4 per cent in 1982. See ES, novembre-décembre 1984, pp. 156-157.
Chapter V

1. Serge Mallet, now deceased, left the PCF in 1958 to join the Parti Socialiste Unifié. It was after his departure from the PCF that he began to seriously consider the implications of the emergence of intellectual workers for theoretical Marxism and the parties of the Left. His most influential work on this subject is La nouvelle classe ouvrière. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969.

2. Unlike Mallet, Touraine had never subscribed to orthodox Marxism; consequently his views are further from classical Marxist theory than those of Mallet. His theories of modern society have also been described as "technocratic" or "post-industrial" theories. Touraine's views on intellectual workers and "neo-capitalist" society are presented in the following works: La société post-industrielle. Paris: Denoël, 1969; Pour la sociologie. Paris: Seuil, 1974. For an account of the development of class consciousness see La conscience ouvrière. Paris: Seuil, 1966. This list is by no means exhaustive.

3. Theorist of the Greek Communist Party (Interior) and lecturer in Sociology at the University of Paris (Vincennes). Now deceased.


5. One must not assume, however, that the Left gained power in 1981 because appropriate consideration was given to the question of intellectual workers. Other factors at play in 1981 led to Left-wing victory at the polls.


8. In Marxist theory a mode of production is an entire process where individuals come together and use the means of production to produce material goods required by society.

9. Prior to his writing Capital Marx had written about the "alienation" of labour, whereby the propertyless, deprived
of control over the products of their labour, become alienated from the labour process.


16. Capital. (III), p. 383. The term "productive" is perhaps confusing here. Supervisory or managerial functions are not in themselves inherently capitalist in nature and therefore, viewed as an integral part of the production process they are productive. This idea may be linked with that of the "productive collective worker":

"A single man cannot operate upon nature without calling his own muscles into play under the control of his brain. As in the natural body head and hand wait upon each other, so the labour-process unites the labour of the hand with that of the head. Later on they part company and even become deadly foes. The product ceases to be the direct product of the individual, and becomes a social product, produced in common by a collective labourer, i.e., by a combination of workmen, each of whom takes only a part, greater or less, in the manipulation of the subject of their labour. As the co-operative character of the labour process becomes more and more marked, so, as a necessary consequence, does our notion of productive labour, and of its agent the productive labourer, become extended."


18. A great many of the managers in Marx's time were former owners of factories who, through bankruptcy, had lost their factories to creditors. These were often employed by creditors as managers, of their former factories. In such cases not only were managers representing capital but were ex-capitalists themselves. As an exception to managers representing capital, Marx cites the case of managers and supervisory staff in cooperative enterprises where the latter are employed by workers. As they represent the workers the antagonistic nature of supervision disappears.


23. Manifesto. p. 43.


25. This idea is also expressed in "The Poverty of Philosophy" (Marx and Engels, Collected Works., Volume 6, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975, p. 177.) where Marx makes a distinction between a "class in itself" (i.e. without a political character) and a "class for itself" (with a fully developed political character). The notions of "class in itself" and "class for itself" in relation to the proletariat correspond with Lenin's distinction between "trade union consciousness" and "revolutionary consciousness" respectively.


28. Thus Marx recognised the fact that although England was far more industrially advanced than France, the latter country was in many respects more advanced politically. Hence the correlation between the economic and political spheres may often be rather loose. See D. McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx. New York: Harper and Row, 1974, p. 182.


30. Manifesto. p. 44.

31. Eighteenth Brumaire.

32. Mallet uses the three-stage model of capitalist development originally put forward by Touraine.


34. Mallet recognises the existence of a petty-bourgeoisie
small shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, independent artisans etc.) "réactionnaire et anachronique". He does not however recognize the notion of "classe moyenne" in terms of Marxist orthodoxy. Mallet describes the latter notion as "foncièrement antiscientifique" but does not explain why.


37. Mallet argues that surplus products are actually produced by machines and not by workers whose role is confined to the pre and post production spheres; thus as machines become producers then so the proportion of "constant capital" (machines, buildings, land) becomes greater to that of "variable capital" (salaries of workforce) to the extent that the latter is eventually integrated into the former thus negating the relation between an individual's salary and his or her labouring capacity. See Arguments. pp. 253-254 and La nouvelle classe ouvrière. pp. 80-82.

38. La Nouvelle Classe Ouvrière. p. 74.


40. Arguments. p. 255.

41. Mallet specifies that "revolutionary", here, does not translate into the will to capture political power by any possible means. It does, however, imply the fundamental alteration of existing social relations in the era of neocapitalism. See La nouvelle classe ouvrière. pp. 40-41.


43. For Mallet's discussion of the differences and similarities between the modern and archaic forms of anarcho-syndicalism see La nouvelle classe ouvrière. pp. 92-94.


45. Certain sociologists reject the view that the radical demands of intellectual workers in May 1968, reflected a revolutionary or anti-capitalist stance. The militancy of the "new working class" vanguard in France is regarded more as a reaction to the specific rigidity of the French management structure rather than an outcome of objective class membership. See M. Mann, Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class. London: MacMillan, 1973, p. 67.
46. Mallet's methodology (that of carrying out case studies of certain factories in technologically advanced as well as traditional sectors of industry is described as obscure. His case studies of different factories of the Compagnie de Machines Bull consist of facts which could have been obtained from readily accessible sources (such as newspapers, company reports to shareholders, trade-union reports) and a selection of opinions from CFDT militants, without details of how information was gathered or validated. See D. Gallie, *In Search of the New Working Class*. Cambridge: C.U.P., 1978, p. 27.


48. The fact that intellectual workers are paid high salaries in comparison with those paid to traditional industrial workers, is not a reflection of the automated firm's capacity to pay high wages. Wage differentials are maintained within the working class to create a wage hierarchy which in turn contains political and ideological components; the spread of wage categories is used to accentuate the social division of labour and to facilitate tasks of direction and control of the labour process. Wage demands will therefore continue to constitute an important element of all workers' grievances, despite the fact that wage levels may already be high in a particular factory, industry or country.

49. Of the other six strikes, three may be construed as anti-capitalist in nature (two against the granting of "special powers" to the government and one for protection of union rights). See *In Search of the New Working Class*. p. 60.


51. See A. Touraine, *Pour la sociologie*. pp. 94-98.

52. A term borrowed by Touraine from Daniel Bell whose writings on "post-industrial" society and new classes can be found under the following titles:

Unlike Touraine, Bell believes that "post-industrial" society will herald an end to class ideologies and conflicts as a result of the gradual disappearance of manual workers and the progressive integration of the growing numbers of intellectual workers into a ubiquitous technocracy.

53. According to Touraine, persons are "alienated" when they are forced, by the ruling class, to accept a "dependent participation" ("participation dépendante") in matters (social, political, economic etc.) which affect their lives in such a way that the dominance of the ruling class is enhanced. Therefore, in "post-industrial" society, alienation exists not because it reduces people to misery or subjects them to surveillance but because it enforces conformity.

54. Touraine's line of reasoning to some extent parallels that of Ralf Dahrendorf who considers that classes should be defined in terms of authority relationships. (See R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.) Touraine, however insists upon the dissimilarity between his model of class and that of Dahrendorf, pointing to the fact that his ruling class is made up of those who participate in power through decision-making rather than those who just wield authority. This line of reasoning is specious; in reality it is very difficult to separate those with authority from those holding power (ultimate or devolved). It is only in the case of low level managers and supervisors that this separation can perhaps be made.

55. Louis Althusser was a major Marxist philosopher and member of the PCF who began to elaborate his ideas on a "structuralist" interpretation of Marx's thought in the early 'sixties. His Marxism is opposed to the "humanist" Marxism, of Gramsci and of Lukac's early writings, which emphasises human beings as active subjects of history. It is equally opposed to traditional dialectical materialist approaches in which, Althusser considers "economism" or "reductionism" to be inherent.


56. Structuralist Marxists use the term "social formation" to designate, on the one hand, types of societies (feudalist, capitalist etc.) and on the other hand particular social structures at a given historical moment (Britain, France, U.S.A. etc.). Marx rarely used the term "social formation" in preference to "society".


60. *Les classes sociales*. p. 245.


64. For critiques of Poulantzas's analysis of class see T. Johnson, "What is to be known? The structural Determination of social Class". *Economy and Society*, Volume 6, no. 1, 1977, pp. 194-233. E. O. Wright, "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies". *New Left Review*, no. 98, pp. 3-41.


66. According to calculations made by E. O. Wright, by applying Poulantzas's definition to the social structure of the USA, the working class there would only constitute approximately fifteen per cent of the population. Cited by Alan Hunt in *Class and Class Structure*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977, p. 108.


Chapter VI


3. C. Wright Mills was, until the time of his death in 1962, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University. Mills was explicitly Weberian in his emphasis on the occupational order as the basis of class. See C. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.


5. Selections in Translation. p. 44.

6. Ibidem, p. 44.

7. Also referred to as "income" class or "commercial" class.


12. In his use of the term "party" Weber did not only include modern political parties as we know them but any organisation striving "to influence the existing polity" within or without its state's boundary. thus Calvinists constituted a party during the time of religious struggles in Fourteenth century Europe, just as pressure groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament would constitute a party today.


16. For example, David Lockwood argues that "'class' like any other sociological concept is a device by which social facts are to be understood, and in the last analysis, the definition of class that is adopted can be justified only by its usefulness in the explanation of particular concrete events." See D. Lockwood, The Blackcoated Worker, London: Allen and Unwin, 1958, p. 231.

17. Selections in Translation, p. 58.


20. Although Mills's general assumptions are based upon his study of American society, they are widely considered (in Weberian circles) as applicable to other Western capitalist societies for whom the USA provides a model of economic development.

21. C. W. Mills, White Collar: the American Middle Classes., p. XV.


26. See H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man., London: Abacus, 1972. Marcuse argues that advanced technology coupled with consumer capitalism gives rise to large bureaucratic institutions whose role it is to repress individuality, disguise exploitation and limit freedom. This new totalitarianism also institutionalises class conflict through the manipulation of workers' organisations so that in the final count only "those who are outside the productive process" (alienated ethnic minorities, the long-term unemployed and students) continue to display revolutionary potential.

27. A. Giddens, CSAS. pp. 298-299. In stressing the centrality of the labour contract, Giddens claims to be echoing Marx. However the question of whether or not his interpretation of Marx is correct has become the subject of debate among certain contemporary Marxists. For example see E. O. Wright, "Giddens's Critique of Marxism". New Left Review, March-April 1983, pp. 11-35. and A. Callinicos, "Anthony Giddens: A Contemporary Critique." Theory and Society, March 1985, pp. 133-166.

28. CSAS, p. 131.
29. The term "mediate" refers to:

"the factors which intervene between the existence of certain given market capacities and the formation of classes as identifiable social groupings, that is to say which operate as 'overall' connecting links between the market on the one hand and structured systems of class relationships on the other."

See CSAS, p. 107.

30. Proximate structuring refers to "localised factors which condition or shape class formation." Ibidem, p. 107.

31. This class grouping does not include the "old middle class" or "petty bourgeoisie" which lies adjacent to the middle class and which Giddens regards as a dying class.

32. For example, the ownership of property gives one fundamental capacities of authority which may be increased depending upon the importance and value of property owned.

33. Giddens suggests that those distributive groupings which are conscious of their "honour" or "prestige" in relation to others, may be likened to Weberian "status groups".

34. CSAS, p. 110.


36. Touraine, La conscience ouvrière, p. 17.

37. CSAS, p. 116.

38. This process forces workers tied to the land to move to industrial production, presenting them with the very first opportunity to form legitimate workers' organisations. Because this organisation (of workers) takes place during a period of intense socio-economic (hence also political) change threatening their very existence, workers develop a revolutionary consciousness. In France, this consciousness was articulated through the ideologies of anarcho-syndicalism and revolutionary socialism.


40. For example those of A. Willener, Images de la société et classes sociales. Berne: 1957 and J. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure. Cambridge: 1969. For the full list of studies see CSAS, p. 334. (footnote 17)

It is interesting to note that in France white-collar unions participated in the general strikes of 1919 and 1936 and more recently in the events of May 1968. Following the logic of Giddens's argument one would conclude from this that white-collar unions are well integrated with the French labour movement and that they reveal as much potential for revolutionary consciousness as do manual workers during periods of intense class struggle. Such a conclusion is certainly drawn by Michel Crozier: "It is from this period (1919-1920) that we can date the deep allegiance of the French white-collar world to the workers' cause...this unity would remain extremely vague and would accommodate itself to much opposition. Officially, however, it could never again be brought into question. The Catholic unions, which until then remained dubious, had at last shown that at the decisive moment they took sides with the strikers. Even the white-collar employees in banks, those last bastions of bourgeois respectability, had followed..." M Crozier, *The World of the Office Worker* Chicago: 1971, p. 4.
Chapter VII

1. The Italian Communists had already, during Stalin's lifetime, favoured the parliamentary road to socialism. Thorez had, in an interview with The Times, 17 November 1946, hinted at the possibility of following an alternative road to socialism to that chosen by the CPSU. That possibility was rejected as the Cold War closed in.


8. Ibidem, p. 44.


15. Interview with Phillipe Robieux, ex-Communist student leader, now researches at the CNRS (Centre National des Recherches Sociales), 13 April 1983.

16. Interview with Jean Rony, university teacher and ex-journalist at France Nouvelle, interviewed 18 April 1983.


19. First within the cultural section of the Party linked with the CGT and later as an executive committee member of the International Federation of Youth.


33. Barjonet's pragmatic approach towards "new class" theories were made evident by the tone of his contribution to a meeting held at Dijon University in February 1960 on the relations between parties and trade-unions. The proceedings
of the meeting, attended by Touraine, Mallet, Pierre Naville and representatives of the CFDT (Barjonet was representing the CGT), are published as *Les nouveaux comportements politiques de la classe ouvrière*. (Edited by Léo Hamon), Paris: P.U.F., 1962.

34. See *L'Humanité*, 15 octobre 1960.


39. See for example articles in *FN*, no. 915, 1963, pp. 19-20; *FN*, no. 1036, 1965, p. 7; *EP*, janvier 1965, pp. 90-110. The last article in *Economie et Politique* by Mury is more nuanced than the first two which contain a propagandistic thrust.

40. The six main topics of debate were "notion de classe et rôle historique de la classe ouvrière", "la lutte des classes est-elle dépassée", "personnalisation et lutte des classes", "bourgeoisie et classe ouvrière devant Hitler", "morale de classe, morale universelle" and "qu'est ce qu'un révolutionnaire en 1963?". See *L'Humanité*, 13-21 mars 1963.

41. Politbureau member.

42. Editor of *Economie et Politique* (since Prontneau's fall from grace).

43. Professor at Collège de France.


46. See students views expressed in *Que Faire?*, no. 6, pp. 28-29.

47. See *Le Monde*, 13 mars 1963, p. 5.


49. The conferences were held in May 1963 and June 1965; the first was organised by the UGIC(T) with PCF support while the second was organised by the PCF. For reports on conference proceedings see *L'Humanité*, 11-13 mai 1963, and


51. See L'Humanité, 16 et 17 mai 1965 (for reports on congress).

52. See Le Monde, 19 octobre 1965.


60. According to Antoine Spire (ex-PCF member, ex-co-director of Les Editions Sociales) interviewed 14 April 1983.


64. Ibidem, p. 279.


68. Histoire intérieure ... (Volume II), pp. 637-638.


71. Jean Rony interviewed in April 1983.

73. CC, mai-juin 1966, p. 280.

74. Frears, Political Parties and Elections ... p. 136.

75. That is 18 out of 507 delegates (x 100 to obtain a percentage figure). For sociology of delegates to Fifteenth Congress see CC, juillet-aout 1959, pp. 551-555.

76. That is 57 out of 788 delegates (x 100). See CC, février-mars 1967, pp. 529-533 for sociology of delegates.

77. For results of this survey see Georges Marchais' report to the Eighteenth Congress in CC, février-mars 1967, pp. 263-282.


81. Robrié, Histoire intérieure ... (Volume II), p. 641. See also p. 642.
Chapter VIII

1. Details of the May 1968 events are not discussed in this chapter as several authors have devoted entire works to their description and analysis. See for example:


5. See May issues of the *Marseillaise.*

6. This opinion was expressed by both Jean Rony and Maurice Goldring (ex-Communist intellectual and member of *France Nouvelle*'s editorial committee until the review's closure in 1979) interviewed in Paris 18 April and 28 March 1968 respectively.

7. See *LNC,* juin 1968.


15. Jean Rony had remarked "... on ne peut faire rentrer Gramsci dans le parti français qu'en contrabande". See *Trente ans de parti*, p. 83.


24. Federal sections which had not set up commissions or which had manifested a lack of interest in the PCF's proposals were rebuked by Leroy.


28. See *FN*, no. 1199, 1968, pp. 4-5.


31. Interviewed 14 April, 28 March, 12 April and 18 April 1983 respectively.

32. Jean Tornikian interviewed 11 April 1983.


36. See *tribune de discussion* in *L'Humanité* and *France Nouvelle* issues of January 1970.


39. Clearly Garaudy had borrowed elements of theory from Gramsci. For the latter, the term "historical bloc" signified the combination of all the economic, social and ideological forces opposed to capitalism, on a temporary basis and for the purposes of changing society under the hegemony of the working class. See A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks.* (Edited by Hoare and Nowell-Smith), p. 168.


41. Garaudy was expelled following a Central Committee meeting decision of 21 March 1970.

42. See *Que Faire,* op. cit. pp. 50-88.

43. See *L'Humanité,* 24 mars 1970, p. 6 for Marchais' report on results.

44. By 22 December 1970 Communists and Socialists had drawn up a document (*premier bilan*) which considered the terms under which the PCF and PS could promote the French road to socialism.


47. For details of *assemblées-débats* see *L'Humanité* 23, 24 octobre 1970 and thereafter Tuesday issues.

49. For these and other results see L'Humanité, 26 octobre 1970, p. 6.

50. Members of the economic section of the Central Committee.

51. The authors devote just over two pages to the historical role of the working class and restrict themselves to drawing justifications for their argument from Marx and Engels, thus preserving their work from Stalinist overtones. This must be compared with Mury and Bouvier-Ajam's Les classes sociales en France where Thorez's speech on "notion de classe et rôle historique de la classe ouvrière" was cited in its entirety.

52. The foremost of these critics were Poulantzas and Touraine.


Chapter IX


4. See LNC, juin-juillet 1973, pp. 6-19 for Roland Leroy's warnings against the "class collaborationist" tendencies of the PS.

5. The Party hesitated in supporting students protesting against the loi Debré and the structure of the university premier cycle. The PCF leadership's stance on this student protest resembled that taken in May 1968. See Jean Rony, Trente ans de parti. pp. 167-168.


9. For results of by-elections see Le Monde, 1 et 8 octobre 1974.


16. According to Quin's arithmetic, the working class, composed of 10 million members, represented 44.5 per cent of the working population and was still expanding due to the steady increase in the number of OS and techniciens de fabrication. See Classes sociales et union du peuple de France, pp. 33-35. Compare these figures with those of the INSEE according to which industrial workers, numbering some 7.8 millions in
1974, represented 36.9 per cent of the working population. See *Le Monde*, 9-10 mai 1976, p. 6.


18. This view of the Politbureau split was offered by Antoine Spire, Jean Rony and Phillippe Robrieux, all interviewed in Paris in April 1983.


22. This was the testimony of several of my interviewees, Antoine Spire, Jean Tornikian, Jean Rony, Yvonne Quilès. It should be noted that they had all participated in cell and section meetings in the area covered by the PCF's Paris federation and they all belonged to cells which tended towards a "Eurocommunist" thinking. To obtain a picture of the nature of discussion and debate within the tribunes de discussion see *L'Humanité* and *France Nouvelle* from 17 September to 22 October 1974.

23. For critical commentaries of the Twenty-first Congress Resolution by Althusserian Communists see, for example, Louis Althusser's contribution to the tribune de discussion in *L'Humanité*, 12 octobre 1974, p. 3 and Etienne Balibar, "Union du peuple et luttes de classes". *FN* (tribune de discussion), 1 octobre 1974, pp. 11-13.


30. For details of internal classifications of principal constituent groups of front de classe see the Bulletin de l'ISER (Institut Socialiste d'Études et de Recherches), no. 1. 1977, pp. 10-16.

31. For example, "les exploitants" of which, the PS maintained, there were more than a handful of millionaire monopolists and:

"tous ceux qui, en dépit de leur situation sociale et de leur position économique d'exploité, continueront, culturellement, sentimentalement ou traditionnellement, de préserver et de maintenir les structures de domination capitaliste."


33. These facts emerged in interviews with the following persons in March and April 1983: Jean-Pierre Marchand, Jacques Frémonier, Jean Rony, Antoine Spire, Jean Tornikian.

34. See CC, décembre 1975, p. 22.


38. See Jean-Paul Molinari, "Contribution à la sociologie du PCF." CC, janvier 1976, pp. 38-49.


42. See F. Platone and F. Subileau, "Les militants communistes à Paris." RFSP, octobre 1975, p. 843. The breakdown of intellectual workers categories in the above study are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{cadres supérieurs} & \quad \text{ingénieurs} \\
\text{cadres administratifs supérieurs} & \quad \text{professeurs}
\end{align*}
\]
cadres moyens
instituteurs
services médicaux et sociaux
techniciens
cadres administratifs moyens

43. See CC (Twenty-second Congress issue), février-mars 1976, p. 228.

44. Ibidem, p. 44.


46. Ibidem, p. 36.

47. The names of those dissatisfied with the PCF's sudden imposition of a new line were cited by Yvonne Quilès in an interview given on 12 April 1983.


49. Yvonne Quilès in interview given 12 April 1983.

50. See FN, 28 juin 1976, p. 15.


54. The negative effects of the PCF's stand on wage hierarchies upon intellectual workers both inside and outside the Party were discussed in interviews with Antoine Spire and Jean Tornikian, April 1983.


59. This was well demonstrated in the case of places like Courneuve, Drancy and Romainville where the PCF made gains of 10, six, and 13 per cent respectively. See FN, no. 1637, 1977, pp. 4-6.


69. The Majority lost 14 per cent of the vote, compared with its 1973 results, amongst cadres supérieurs and other intellectual professions and 13 per cent amongst cadres moyens and employés. Ibidem, p. 79.


74. For example, Eurocommunists themselves identified two major currents within their ranks: one labelled *eurocommunisme libéral* et *social-démocrate* followed by Communists such as Elleinstein; the other labelled *eurocommunisme démocrate* et
révolutionnaire was espoused by Communists such as Christine Buci-Glücksmann and Yves Roucaute. See O. Duhamel et H. Weber, Changer le PC? Paris: P.U.F., 1979, p. 126.

The Althusserians can be seen as divided into three currents: one composed of Althusser and his direct "disciples", Balibar, Labica, Moissonier, Bois; the second composed of individuals who do not consider themselves as Althusserians but whose theoretical standpoint broadly converges with that of Althusser et al; the third, a Parisian current espousing a certain Trotskyist tradition but which echoes Althusserian themes. See Jean Badouin "Les phénomènes de contestation au sein du parti communiste français." RFSP, février 1980, p. 92.

75. Jean Tornikian in personal interview, April 1983.
77. For example, the sociological composition of active cell members in a typical local Parisian cell in 1978 is described by George Ross and Jane Jenson in The View from Inside. London: University of California Press, 1984, p. 27. According to Jenson and Ross, of 25 active cell members only one was a manual industrial worker. The rest were either intellectual workers or routine white collar workers.
78. L'Humanité, 6 avril 1978, p. 4.
82. L'Humanité, 18 avril 1978, p. 4.
83. Les bouches s'ouvrent, p. 48.
86. Interview given to Socialist weekly L'Unité, 13 octobre 1978, p. 12.
87. Antoine Spire in personal interview given in April 1983.
88. Les bouches s'ouvrent. p. 72.
l'Institut Maurice Thorez, no. 25-26, 1978.


95. In a personal interview, Yvonne Quilès remarked of Communist intellectuals at that time:

"Ils ont une grande capacité de naïveté ... à l'égard du parti communiste français ... il y en avait même ceux qui étaient furieux de ne pas être invités."

96. This was certainly a speculation made by many leading Communists at the time and was discussed in personal interviews given by Spire, Rony, Goldring, Hincker in March and April 1983.


98. This December Central Committee meeting ignited the first sparks of the "Tiszbiin affair" which was to unfold fully in October 1979. The "affair" forms the subject of Les bouches s'ouvrent.

99. This information emerged in the course of personal interviews with Jean Rony and Antoine Spire. Rony and Spire's testimony is supported by Jenson and Ross in their account of the preparations, within the Paris federation, for the Twenty-third Congress. See The View from Inside.

100. See, for example, L'Humanité, 9 mars 1979, for letters from Jean Rony and Antoine Spire.


102. In the Congress document it was pointed out that while Stalinism was to be condemned, socialism was alive and well in Eastern Europe: "le bilan des pays socialistes est globalement positif". See CC, ibidem, pp. 372-374.


104. Ibidem, pp. 56-59 and pp. 369-370. The PCF had renounced the concept of démocratie avancée (advanced democracy) as a necessary and fixed stage on the road to socialism.

106. According to Antoine Spire this confusion had been expressed widely in cell and section meetings prior to the Congress. Personal interview April 1983.

107. For a generally positive interpretation of the Twenty-third Congress line by Eurocommunists, see article "Discutons" by Serge Lewisch and Yves Roucaute in Le Matin, 2 juin 1979, p. 13.


113. This view emerged in personal interviews with France Nouvelle collaborators Yvonne Quilès, Jean Tornikian, Jean Rony and Maurice Goldring.


116. Culture was defined as:

"Le mouvement des sciences comme celui des arts, l'avancée des connaissances, des techniques, des langages en même temps que des représentations, l'enrichissement des sensibilités et de l'épanouissement physique des individus, le progrès des idées, des mentalités, des comportements, des valeurs morales."


118. Quilès in personal interview, April 1983.

120. For the text of Marchand's intervention see *Les intellectuels, la culture et la révolution*, pp. 121-125.

121. Marchand's sentiment expressed in personal interview, April 1983.


125. This was certainly the experience of Communist militants in Paris according to Jean Rony, Antoine Spire and Jean Tornikian. Personal interviews, April 1983.


127. For texts of Marchais' speeches at nine of the most important of these meetings see *Science, technologie et société*. PCF brochure, 1981.


133. For a list of those who refused to sign see *Le Monde*, 10 décembre 1980.

134. Among those who decided to leave were Antoine Spire, Hélène Parmelin and Robert Merle (both novelists) and Edouard Pignon. For statement of 32 intellectuals who left the Party see *Le Monde*, 20 janvier 1981.


139. Yvonne Quilès, ibidem.


142. In April 1981 the PCF made slight gains in only two areas: Haute Corse and Lozère.


147. This information emerged in an interview with François Hincker in March 1983. The Resolution of the Twenty-fourth Congress was later to admit the loss of several hundreds of workplace cells. See *CC*, février-mars 1982, p. 384.

148. See Jenson and Ross, *The View from inside*, p. 320.


152. See *L'Humanité*, 13 octobre 1981.

153. For text of final Resolution see *CC*, février-mars 1982, pp. 343-393.


156. See *L'Humanité*, 12 and 17 novembre 1982 for letters containing hard-hitting criticisms.


158. Marchais cited in PCF brochure *Sciences, production,*


163. Lucien Sève in personal interview given in April 1983.


165. Danielle Tartakowsky and Roger Martelli interviewed in April 1983.

166. Martelli, personal interview, April 1983.


Conclusion


3. J. Lojkine, La classe ouvrière en mutation. Paris: Editions Sociales/Messidor, 1986. (Jean Lojkine is a member of the IRM's Société Française section). I have been unable to comment further on this work as, at the time of writing the conclusion of this thesis, it had not yet been received.
Appendix 1

Presentation of occupational titles according to CSP.

44. Cadres administratifs moyens

Cette catégorie comprend des salariés faisant un travail administratif ou de bureau sans technicité marquée, mais dans des conditions qui impliquent certaines responsabilités. Les fonctionnaires qui y sont classés appartiennent au "cadre B".

Cas typiques:

Secrétaire comptable (sal¹);
Secrétaire de direction;
Secrétaire d'administration;
Rédacteur (s.a.i.² - administration).

Y sont classés également:

Secrétaire commercial
Comptable (sal ou s.n.p.³)
Caissier comptable (sal);
Chef comptable (sal);
Chef de comptabilité (sal);

Greffier (sal);

Expert (automobiles, assurances) (sal);
Cadre (administratif, financier, commercial);
Clerc de notaire;
Clerc d'avoué;
Clerc d'huissier;
Clerc (s.a.i.);

Agent syndical;
Secrétaire de syndicat (permanent);
Permanent de parti politique;
Chef de bureau (banque);
Chef de section (banque);
Chef de service (banque);
Commis d'agent de change;
Agent d'assurances (sal);
Inspecteur d'assurances (sal);

Agent général (sal ou s.n.p.);
Représentant de commerce (sal ou s.n.p.);
Acheteur;
Chef de rayon;
Chef de ventes;
Agent commercial (sal ou s.n.p.);
Délégué commercial (sal ou s.n.p.);
Promoteur des ventes (sal ou s.n.p.);
Gérant d'immeubles (sal);
Syndic d'immeubles (sal);

Cadre de l'hôtellerie;
Chef réceptionnaire (hôtel);
Concierge d'hôtel;
Gérant (sal) (d'hôtel, de cantine, de restaurant, de café);
Agent administratif;
Receveur des P.T.T. (en dessous de "hors classe");
Receveur percepteur;
Inspecteur du trésor;
Percepteur;

Secrétaire interprète (Ambassade);
Secrétaire de mairie;
Rédacteur (services publics, sauf S.N.C.F.);
Chef de section (Sécurité sociale);
Chef de gare 2e et 3e classe (S.N.C.F.);
Chef agent mouvement (S.N.C.F.);
Agent mouvement principal (S.N.C.F.);
Chef de service mouvement (S.N.C.F.);
Sous-chef de bureau (S.N.C.F.);
Chef de gare routière;

Économe intendant (secteur privé);
Régisseur (théâtre, cinéma, télévision).

En sont exclus:

Secrétaire (s.a.i.), classé en "51. Employés de bureau";
Secrétaire de mairie-instituteur, classé en
"41. Instituteurs; professions intellectuelles diverses"
Contrôleur des trains (S.N.C.F.), classé en "51. Employés de
bureau"
Rédacteur (S.N.C.F.), classé en "51. Employés de bureau";
Inspecteur de police, classé en "82. Armée et police".

Comparer aux catégories: 34, 41, 43, 51

1. "salarié." Persons exercising this occupation are salaried
2. "sans autre indication." The declarations of persons
   exercising this occupation are unprecise.
3. "situation non précisée." It is unknown whether these
   persons are salaried or self-employed.
## The distribution of CSP and PCS according to aggregate occupational groups
(Source: *Économie et Statistique*, novembre-décembre 1984, p 160)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSP</th>
<th>PCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. AGRICULTEURS EXPLOITANTS</td>
<td>1. AGRICULTEURS EXPLOITANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 Agriculteurs exploitants</td>
<td>11 Agriculteurs sur petite exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. SALARIES AGRICOLES</td>
<td>12 Agriculteurs sur moyenne exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Salariés agricoles</td>
<td>13 Agriculteurs sur grande exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. PATRONS DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DU COMMERCE</td>
<td>2. ARTISANS, COMMERCANTS ET CHEFS D'ENTREPRISE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Industriels</td>
<td>21 Artisans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Artisans</td>
<td>22 Commerçants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 patrons pêcheurs</td>
<td>23 Chefs d'entreprise de 10 salariés ou plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Gros commerçants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Petits commerçants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PROFESSIONS LIBERALES ET CADRES SUPERIEURS</td>
<td>3. CADRES ET PROFESSIONS INTELLECTUELLES SUPERIEURS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Professions libérales</td>
<td>31 Professions libérales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Professeurs, professions littéraires et scientifiques</td>
<td>33 Cadres de la fonction publique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Ingénieurs</td>
<td>34 Professeurs, professions scientifiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Cadres administratifs supérieurs</td>
<td>35 Professions de l'information, des arts et des spectacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CADRES MOYENS</td>
<td>37 Cadres administratifs et commerciaux d'entreprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Instituteurs, professions intellectuelles diverses</td>
<td>38 Ingénieurs et cadres techniques d'entreprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Services médicaux et sociaux</td>
<td>4. PROFESSIONS INTERMEDIAIRES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Techniciens</td>
<td>42 Instituteurs et assimilés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 Cadres administratifs moyens</td>
<td>43 Professions intermédiaires de la santé et du travail social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. EMPLOYES</td>
<td>44 Clergé, religieux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 Employés de bureau</td>
<td>45 Professions intermédiaires administratives de la fonction publique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 Employés de commerce</td>
<td>46 Professions intermédiaires administratives et commerciales des entreprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. OUVRITERS</td>
<td>47 Techniciens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Contributeurs</td>
<td>48 Contremaîtres, agents de maîtrise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 Ouvriers qualifiés</td>
<td>5. EMPLOYES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62 Ouvriers qualifiés de type industriel</td>
<td>52 Employés civils et agents de service de la fonction publique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 Ouvriers spécialisés</td>
<td>53 Policier et militaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 Mineurs</td>
<td>54 Employés administratifs d'entreprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 Marin et pêcheurs</td>
<td>55 Employés de commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 Apprentis ouvriers</td>
<td>56 Personnel des services directs aux particuliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 Manœuvres</td>
<td>6. OUVRITERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PERSONNELLES DE SERVICE</td>
<td>62 Ouvriers qualifiés de type industriel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 Gens de maison</td>
<td>63 Ouvriers qualifiés de type artisanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 Femmes de ménage</td>
<td>64 Chauffeurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 Autres personnels de service</td>
<td>65 Ouvriers qualifiés de la manutention, du magasinage et du transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. AUTRES CATEGORIES</td>
<td>67 Ouvriers non qualifiés de type industriel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 Artistes</td>
<td>68 Ouvriers non qualifiés de type artisanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 Clérégé</td>
<td>69 Ouvriers agricoles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 Armée et police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3

Presentation of occupational titles according to PCS
(Source: Nomenclature des professions et catégories
socioprofessionnelles. (index analytique), Paris: INSEE, 1983)

3828 INGENIEURS ET CADRES SPECIALISTES DE L'INFORMATIQUE
(SAUF TECHNICO-COMMERCIAUX)

Ingénieurs et cadres chargés de concevoir, négocier, définir, 
analyser les projets informatiques. Ils sont parfois chargés de 
prévoir et de planifier les ressources techniques d'exploitation.

NOYAU
Analyseur en informatique (SAUF ETAT, COLL LOC) (CADRE, QND)  
Chef de service informatique (CADRE, QND)
Ingénieur en informatique (CADRE, QND)

ASSIMILES
Analyseur fonctionnel (SAUF ETAT, COLL LOC) (CADRE, QND)
Analyseur organique (SAUF ETAT, COLL LOC) (CADRE, QND)
Chef de projet informatique (CADRE, QND)
Informaticien (SAUF ETAT, COLL LOC) (CADRE)
Ingénieur en hardware (CADRE, QND)
Ingénieur en logiciel (CADRE, QND)
Ingénieur en software (CADRE, QND)
Ingénieur IBM, CII (SAUF COMMERCIAL) (CADRE, QND)
Ingénieur système (CADRE, QND)

CAS LIMITES EXCLUS
Ingénieur (RECHERCHE PUBLIQUE) 3421 (CADRE, QND)
Ingénieur commercial en informatique (CADRE, QND)
Ingénieur technico-commercial en informatique 3855 s1 (CADRE, QND)

1 "Qualification non déclarée". The declarations of persons 
exercising this occupation are unprecise.

2 The occupational titles listed under each PCS (in this case, 
number 3828) are specified by the information contained in the 
brackets ( ).
Appendix 4

Evolution of social structure in France (1954 to 1968) according to the PCF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of working population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried intermediary strata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent middle strata (including peasantry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Bosses&quot; of capitalist enterprises and &quot;auxiliaries of the bourgeoisie&quot;¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The authors stress that the figures assembled in this table are not based upon the occupational categories (CSP) of the INSEE but upon the nomenclature of individual activities.

¹ Certain salaried persons belong to the bourgeoisie or are "auxiliaries" of this class in view of their functions and high remuneration.
### Appendix 5

**Social composition of delegates to the PCF's Twenty-first and Twenty-second Congresses**

(Source: *Cahiers du Communisme*, no. 11, novembre 1974, p. 130; no. 2-3, février-mars 1975, p. 230.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL COMPOSITION</th>
<th>CONGRESSES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Twenty-first</td>
<td>Twenty-second</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouvriers professionnels</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouvriers spécialisés</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manoeuvres</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouvriers agricoles</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniciens de fabrication</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employés</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniciens d'études</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingénieurs</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres moyens</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres supérieurs</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enseignants:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primaire</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondaire</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>supérieur</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technique</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etudiants, lycéens</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fermiers - Métayers</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitants agricoles, propriétaires</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerçants, artisans</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ménagères</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
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